# **ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

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# August 2005

# Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 10 August 2005

# **ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

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# Preface

This manual establishes the Army's doctrine for the conduct of Personnel Recovery (PR) operations. It is the foundation for the Army PR program and is consistent with federal, statute, DOD, and Army policy. It targets commanders and staffs at primarily the Brigade through Corps levels and provides them with a single reference that articulates the Army philosophy and policy towards PR. The cornerstone of that philosophy is leadership and personnel accountability and the core beliefs that demand we expend every possible effort to recover and return all US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment.

The manual focuses on task organization, command relationships, planning considerations and execution tasks for Army PR operations, as well as how the Army PR system fits into the Joint PR system in order to support Combatant Commander PR requirements. It presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience and demonstrates the integration of PR into existing command and control systems across the three principal echelons of command.

The manual is composed of six chapters that include an introductory chapter that provides a broad overview of PR and five chapters that detail PR operations including Command and Control, Planning, Preparation, Execution and Assessment. The remainder of the manual includes an additional six appendixes (Civil SAR, Service capabilities, Checklists, PR Equipment, PR in MDMP matrix, Reports and Formats) that provide consolidated PR focused information, checklists, and matrices in one location.

The key theme in this manual is to understand that PR is no longer solely relegated to air, dedicated force, or SOF centric operation. Every soldier and every sensor on the battlefield is woven into a seamless system as a part of our everyday operations that enables the immediate recovery of any IMDC person. The four PR methods (immediate, deliberate, and external support required (ESR), and unassisted) and the five PR execution tasks (report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate) are detailed throughout the manual and highlight their commonality to all Army operations.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to: Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FM 3-50.1), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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## Chapter 1

## Overview

"We need to focus on Soldiers being able to take care of themselves, then able to take care of their buddies, then able to take care of their larger team...It's all part of the Warrior Ethos: Place the mission first, never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade."

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

## DEFINITIONS

1-1. Before we can address Personnel Recovery (PR) at large we must understand the answers to two important questions; "What is PR?" and "Who are Isolated Personnel?"

1-2. Personnel Recovery is defined differently in several documents. The most current definition is contained in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3270.01A, which defines Personnel Recovery as "The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of US Military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated or missing while participating in a US government-sanctioned military activity or missions in an uncertain or hostile environment, or as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Also called PR."

1-3. CJCSI 3270.01A further defines Isolated Personnel as "US military, DOD civilians, or DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel designated by the President or Secretary of Defense, who have become separated from their unit or organization in an uncertain or hostile environment or denied area, requiring them to survive, evade, or escape."

1-4. The Army defines Personnel Recovery as "The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment. Also called PR."

1-5. The expanse of this definition cues us to consider a variety of possibilities available to recover isolated personnel by referring to military, civil, and diplomatic options for recovery. It also broadens our historical view of personnel who may become isolated, missing, detained, or captured on the battlefield. Individuals not specifically addressed within this definition may be included in our PR responsibilities at the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This expands Army PR responsibilities considerably as multinational partners, American civilians, and citizens from other nations in our operational areas now become potential recovery obligations for the Army. As an example, In November 2001 Army forces

conducted the recovery of religious missionaries Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry, who had been imprisoned by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

1-6. IMDC Personnel are defined as "US military, DOD civilians, or DOD contractor personnel, or other personnel as designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense, who are beyond the positive or procedural control of their unit, in an operational environment requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or escape (SERE)." Personnel who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) will be collectively referred to as "IMDC personnel."

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1-7. Readily evident from this definition is the fact that we are not just concerned with the recovery of Soldiers. It is every unit's task to have procedures in place to be ready to recover our own personnel, whether soldier, civilian or contractor. Examples of IMDC personnel include:

- Individuals who are unaccounted for as a result of a break in contact (e.g. while on patrol or during a convoy operation) or during a routine 100% personnel and accountability check.
- Hostages.
- Prisoners of War (POW).
- Individuals illegally detained by foreign governments.
- Crew of an aircraft experiencing a mishap or shoot down.

## **ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY PHILOSOPHY**

1-8. The Army's PR philosophy is one of leadership and accountability. It comprises primarily the Soldier's Creed, directed responsibilities, and practical considerations.

1-9. The Soldier's Creed is a major portion of our PR philosophy. By never accepting defeat, never quitting, and never leaving a fallen comrade behind we ensure that IMDC personnel benefit from core beliefs that demand we expend every possible effort to recover them should they become IMDC on the battlefield.

1-10. The Army's directed PR responsibilities stem from Title X, United States Code (USC), directives and instructions issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), policy issued by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and Joint PR doctrine.

1-11. By creating a robust, well-trained, and properly equipped force capable of conducting PR we ensure that our adversaries are denied the ability to exploit IMDC personnel for purposes detrimental to the United States Government or US military forces. An effective PR capability also increases force morale by demonstrating that we will employ every effort possible to recover our IMDC personnel.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1-12. The key to effective PR is synchronized command and control (C2). Pre-established and well rehearsed C2 procedures are essential to the recovery of IMDC personnel. The integration of Personnel Recovery into established C2 systems is discussed in Chapter 2.

## THE ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY SYSTEM

1-13. The PR system is a collection of architecture and activities designed to effect recovery of IMDC personnel and allow PR to adapt to future changes on the battlefield. The Army PR system dovetails with the Army Operations Process. Although presented in the sequential order of Planning, Preparation, Execution, and Assessment it is important to understand that these activities can occur simultaneously or in any sequence. The Army PR system, like the Army Operations Process, is iterative and the individual activities are interdependent; a change occurring in one portion can affect what is happening in the other three.

## PLANNING

1-14. PR planning includes the collective efforts of commanders and staffs, forces, and individuals to integrate and employ Army PR capabilities for maximum effectiveness during operations. The integration of PR into established planning processes is discussed in Chapter 3.

### PREPARATION

1-15. PR preparation encompasses the activities of developing guidance for, providing appropriate equipment to, and the education and training of commanders, staffs, forces, and potential IMDC personnel.

PR preparation occurs throughout the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities of operations (see FM 3-0). The integration of PR into established preparation activities is discussed in Chapter 4.

### EXECUTION

1-16. The execution portion of the PR system is comprised of the five PR execution tasks; Report, Locate, Support, Recover, and Reintegrate. These tasks are central to any PR mission and must be accomplished. The integration of PR execution tasks into ongoing operations is illustrated in figure 1-1 and discussed further in Chapter 5.




Figure 1-1. PR Integration into the operations process

1-17. The report task includes the recognition, proper notification, and validation that personnel have or may have become IMDC. Reports can be generated by an accountability mechanism, visual sightings, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, or communications with an IMDC person reporting the event.

1-18. The locate task includes actions taken to precisely find IMDC personnel. Location efforts, using all necessary means, begin with the initial report and continue until recovery of the IMDC person.

1-19. The support task includes actions taken to mentally, physically, and emotionally sustain IMDC personnel, and their families, throughout the five tasks. Support to IMDC personnel includes establishing communications, conducting resupply, maintaining their morale, and protecting them. Support to families

includes preparing them for potential media interaction and providing other support to reduce their anxiety and possible frustration during recovery activities.

1-20. The recover task includes the employment of forces to regain positive and procedural control of IMDC personnel and does not end until the IMDC personnel are handed over by the recovery element to medical personnel for reintegration.

1-21. The reintegrate task includes immediate medical assessment and appropriate debriefings before returning recovered personnel back to duty and their family. The task ends when the individual is returned to duty and requires no further care relating to the IMDC event.

### ASSESSMENT

1-22. Assessment of actions taken during the planning, preparation, and execution of PR missions is vital if we are to successfully adapt to changes. While presented as the last major portion of the PR system, assessment is a continuous process and occurs throughout the system. PR assessment is discussed in Chapter 6.

## PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPTIONS

1-23. PR options are not intended to provide a prescriptive set of rules for conducting PR missions. Rather, they provide a context from which to plan, prepare, execute, and assess Army PR by providing a description of the various ways a PR mission can be executed. These options are introduced here and discussed in more detail throughout the FM.

1-24. The United States Government (USG) has three options available for recovery of IMDC personnel: military, diplomatic, and civil. Although discussed separately for illustrative purposes, it is important to know that these options are often combined during a single recovery mission.

### MILITARY

1-25. The Army uses four principal methods when planning and executing military recoveries; Immediate, Deliberate, External Supported, and Unassisted.

1-26. Immediate recovery is the sum of actions conducted to locate and recover IMDC personnel by forces directly observing the isolating event or, through the reporting process, determining that IMDC personnel are close enough for them to conduct a rapid recovery. Immediate recovery assumes that the tactical situation permits a recovery with the forces at hand without detailed planning or coordination.

1-27. Deliberate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by Army forces when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. Weather, enemy actions, IMDC personnel location, and recovery force capabilities are examples of factors that may require the detailed planning and coordination of a deliberate recovery.

1-28. External Supported Recovery (ESR) is the sum of actions conducted when immediate or deliberate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. ESR is either the support provided by the Army to other Joint Task Force (JTF) components, interagency organizations, or multinational forces or the support provided by these entities to the Army. Close Air Support (CAS), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and airborne command and control are examples of capabilities that may be required from different components to execute an ESR.

1-29. Unassisted recovery comprises actions taken by IMDC personnel to achieve their own recovery without outside assistance. An unassisted recovery typically involves an evasion effort by IMDC personnel in order to get back to friendly forces, or to a point where they can be recovered via another method. While the Code of Conduct requires IMDC personnel to make every effort to evade or escape, commanders must strive to recover these personnel via one or a combination of the other methods.

#### DIPLOMATIC

1-30. This option may involve direct negotiations between the USG and other governments that have detained US personnel. Examples of employing the diplomatic PR option are the recoveries of Francis Gary Powers from the Soviet Union in 1962 and of the EP-3 crew from Hainan Island in 2001. As we were not in a state of declared hostilities with either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China at the time of these incidents, employing military recoveries could have been construed as a hostile act and further exacerbated already tense and public situations.

1-31. Diplomatic recoveries can also occur as a result of armistice or treaty agreements. Over 4000 POWs were returned after the Korean War Armistice brought the warring parties to a cease-fire.

#### CIVIL

1-32. In situations where diplomatic or military recovery options may not be feasible or acceptable by themselves, a civil recovery option may prove useful. International or non-governmental (NGO) may be able to assist in the recovery of IMDC personnel in these situations. Careful consideration must be given to this option as many of these organizations are limited by their charters and/or international law as to the type of assistance they may provide or actions they may perform.

1-33. In areas of the world where a humanitarian crisis has preceded the need for US military intervention, international and non-governmental organizations may have an established presence. Because of the nature of services these organizations provide, they typically establish relationships with the local populations and have considerable influence in the international community.

1-34. In the event personnel become IMDC where international organizations and NGO are established, these organizations may be in a unique position to provide critical information regarding an isolating event. The organization may even find itself in possession of a formerly IMDC person. Military commanders must consider the presence of these organizations in military operational areas when planning and executing operations. Examples of such organizations are the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the American Red Cross, and Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF – also known as Doctors Without Borders).

#### INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE CITIZENS

1-35. In certain circumstances, an influential private citizen may be able to recover IMDC personnel in certain situations. Recoveries of this nature occurred from Syria in 1984 and during the Vietnam War.

## CONCLUSION

1-36. The ability of the Army to meet its PR responsibilities hinges on leaders at every level preparing for the recovery of IMDC personnel. As surely as we feel the moral obligation to make every effort to prevent an isolating event and ultimately recover 100% of our personnel, PR responsibilities are also based on public law, DOD directives and instructions, and US Army policy. PR must be integrated into ongoing planning, preparation, and execution activities and commanders must consider a broad range of possible options for successful execution.

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# Chapter 2 PR Command and Control

The key to effective PR is synchronized command and control (C2). Pre-established and well-rehearsed C2 procedures are essential to the recovery of IMDC personnel. Commanders and staffs should not create a separate C2 system for PR missions. Instead, commanders and staffs must integrate PR planning, preparation, execution, and assessment into the existing command and control system at all echelons from the joint force commander to the individual company commander on the battlefield. We will use the term "joint" to include interagency and multinational forces as well. While this is an Army manual, joint PR concepts are included to facilitate understanding until Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 is published.

PR missions require the collection, processing, storing, displaying, and dissemination of relevant information (RI) to develop situational understanding. The collaborative efforts of individual staff members provide PR relevant information to assist the commander in gaining situational understanding. Situational understanding enables a commander to make effective and timely decisions and transmit them through his or her C2 system to direct rapid and effective recovery missions. The composition and disposition of enemy forces, weather conditions, capabilities of recovery forces, and the medical condition of IMDC personnel are examples of PR relevant information required to gain situational understanding for PR missions.

This chapter discusses the integration of PR into existing command and control systems, beginning with a commander's PR responsibilities at different echelons of command. Concepts of C2, commander and staff responsibilities, and concepts of monitoring and control of PR missions are also included.

## **ECHELONS OF COMMAND**

2-1. We will consider three principal echelons of command. Army commanders may be charged with: command of a joint force component, command of a subordinate joint task force (JTF), and command of a JTF major subordinate command (MSC).

### COMMAND OF A JOINT FORCE COMPONENT.

2-2. Army component commanders are responsible for PR within their area of operations unless directed otherwise by the joint force commander (JFC). They may task organize their forces as necessary for PR mission accomplishment. Army component commanders are also responsible for providing PR capability to other components of the joint force when directed by the JFC. Army component commanders establish a Personnel

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Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) to coordinate PR missions within their AOs and with other components.

2-3. Joint force commanders may task organize the elements of the joint force by service or functional capability for operations. They may elect to retain PR command and control authority at their level or task a subordinate component commander to coordinate PR for the joint force. If JFCs retain PR coordinating functions at their level, they establishe a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in the operations section of their staff. The JPRC coordinates PR for the commander across the entire joint operations area (JOA) (figure 2-1). If the JFC tasks a subordinate component to coordinate PR in the JOA for him, this component then becomes the supported commander for PR and its PRCC also performs the functions of the JPRC (figure 2-2). If a JFC tasks a subordinate component that possesses the most robust capability to provide effective coordination of joint PR missions and/or mission support capability.




Figure 2-1. Personnel Recovery C2 – JPRC at JFC level

2-4. When the JFC task organizes by functional capability, he combines land forces from different services, such as the Marine Corps and multinational land forces, into a single component. The land component headquarters is then built around an existing Army or Marine headquarters staff. If Army forces constitute the bulk of the land component, the JFC typically designates an Army commander as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). In this situation, the commander and staff must integrate not only the PR capabilities of attached and assigned Army forces; they must also integrate the PR capabilities that must be integrated (see Appendix B). Host nation or multinational forces may also be placed under the JFLCC and must be integrated into the PR plan and C2 system as well.




Figure 2-2. Personnel Recovery C2 – JPRC at component level




Figure 2-3. Personnel Recovery C2 – JTF

### COMMAND OF A JOINT TASK FORCE

2-5. Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders have overall responsibility and authority for PR within their joint operations areas (JOAs). The JTF commander determines the PR command relationships among the JTF components and establishes a JPRC to coordinate PR throughout the JTF JOA (figure 2-3, page 2-3).

## PR C2 AT MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND (MSC) AND BELOW

2-6. JTF MSCs establish PRCCs to coordinate PR within their AOs and with other MSCs. MSC subordinate units coordinate PR through their respective Personnel Recovery Officers (PROs). As PR missions are executed during operations, the current operations section (or its equivalent) is the optimal location for PROs at echelons below the MSC (figure 2-4).




Figure 2-4. Personnel Recovery C2 – MSC and below

## **TYPICAL COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITIES**

2-7. Table 2-1 depicts the typical coordination responsibilities of the JPRCs, PRCCs, and subordinate echelon operations sections. As an example, a JTF coordinates PR through its JPRC. The JPRC typically coordinates any PR missions utilizing an External Supported Recovery (ESR) method. It coordinates PR execution anywhere in the JTF JOA. At brigade and below, the PROs and operations sections coordinate immediate recoveries within the unit AO.

## THE COMMANDER'S ROLE IN PERSONNEL RECOVERY C2

2-8. Conducting PR missions requires a blending of command concepts. Commanders can elect to employ a decentralized execution approach or retain strict control of a PR mission at higher levels. Given the possible range of PR missions, commanders must remain flexible, applying a combination of these command approaches as the individual PR mission dictates. Successful personnel recovery operations often depend on timely decisions and execution. The time available to conduct a recovery may be short and the

tactical situation may change rapidly. Delegating PR decision-making authority to subordinate commanders to facilitate decentralized execution maximizes available time for planning and executing PR missions. Subordinate commanders often have the best situational understanding of their battlefield and the capability of their units to conduct a PR mission in that battlefield. Decentralizing PR decision-making and execution should be matched with allocation of the appropriate resources for that subordinate commander to execute PR missions effectively.

Command Level	Coordinating Element	Recovery Method	Typical Area
Combatant Command Joint Force	JPRC	External Supported	Anywhere in the JOA / AOR
Joint Task Force	JPRC	External Supported	Anywhere in the JTF JOA
Component	PRCC	Deliberate	Anywhere in the component's AO
Major Subordinate Command	PRCC	Deliberate	Anywhere in the MSC's AO
Tactical units	PRO	Immediate	Within immediate footprint
IMDC personnel	Individual responsibility	Unassisted	Wherever they are

 Table 2-1. Army PR coordinating matrix

2-9. While decentralized execution is applicable to many PR missions, there are situations where a centralized command approach may be appropriate. As an example, this approach may be appropriate when IMDC personnel are in a country that is neutral to an ongoing conflict. Subordinate commanders may not have sufficient information to evaluate the impact of conducting a recovery on the operation at large when facing these conditions. Other examples include:

- Missions requiring the assets of several components (ESR missions).
- Missions requiring interagency support.
- Missions taking place in the areas between non-contiguous AOs.

#### **ESTABLISH COMMAND/SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

2-10. Commanders establish command and support relationships to form structure and fix authority and responsibility during operations. Clearly defined command and support relationships reduce confusion, identify decision makers, and facilitate unity of command when conducting PR operations. They also describe the boundaries within which subordinate commanders may exercise disciplined initiative when unanticipated opportunities to achieve the commander's PR intent present themselves.

2-11. When interagency and multinational forces are involved in operations, direct command relationships between Army commanders and these forces may not be possible. Military command relationships such as operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and the various support relationships are often interpreted differently by interagency and multinational partners. In these situations, commanders and staffs establish cooperative relationships through coordination with these organizations in order to achieve unity of effort when conducting PR missions.

2-12. Remember that IMDC personnel can be contractors or DA civilians. Army commanders are responsible for integrating, supporting, and protecting these personnel as well. Army commanders exercise control over contract employees in accordance with the terms stated in the contract itself. Examples of contract requirements that reduce requirements for recovery operations or enable recovery operations include fitness standards, PR specific pre-mobilization individual training, and requirements to comply with PR reporting and accountability procedures and directives established by the command.

### **DELEGATE AUTHORITY**

2-13. Commanders delegate the authority to make PR execution decisions to the lowest possible echelon. Subordinate commanders with the capability to gain and maintain situational understanding about a PR mission within their AO should have the authority to execute that mission if they have forces capable of conducting the recovery. Factors to consider when delegating PR authority include the subordinate commander's PR capable forces and their ability to coordinate and conduct recovery missions within their AO without adversely affecting the overall commander's intent and concept of operations. Figure 2-6 depicts delegation of PR authority from JTF to brigade level.

### **ALLOCATE RESOURCES**

2-14. When commanders delegate PR authority to subordinates they must also allocate sufficient resources to facilitate the subordinate commander's effective accomplishment of PR missions. By allocating battlefield operating system (BOS) resources to subordinates, commanders weight PR resources to subordinate commanders commensurate with the authority delegated to them. BOS resources that facilitate a subordinate commander's ability to conduct PR missions include:

### Intelligence

2-15. Intelligence capabilities focused on gathering information to assist commanders, staffs, units, and potential IMDC personnel in gaining and maintaining situational understanding include:

- PR-focused intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Cross-queue intelligence disciplines to support PR planning, preparation, and execution.
- Evaluate likely areas for recovery and evasion.

### Maneuver

2-16. Maneuver forces provide the physical capability to conduct and/or support a recovery. Infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, and maritime forces provide the following capabilities to enable PR missions:

- Combat power to execute PR missions throughout the full spectrum of operations.
- Lethal and non-lethal fires supporting recovery missions.
- Rotary wing assets to support recovery missions.
- Coordinate offensive operations to locate/recover IMDC personnel.
- Coordinate pickup zone and landing zone operations to recover IMDC personnel.

### **Fire Support**

2-17. PR missions often require the ability to detect and locate surface targets and the capability to destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy surface targets enroute to and near IMDC personnel. As in any operation, effective fire support must be tied to forces having the ability to observe the target area. Fire support capabilities that enable PR missions include:

- Lethal and non-lethal surface-to-surface and air-to-surface fires that support PR execution.
- Deception operations to influence enemy decision makers during PR missions.
- Electronic attack to disrupt enemy communications capability during PR missions.
- Psychological operations to shape the PR battlefield.

### Air Defense

2-18. Air defense capabilities protect PR units and IMDC personnel from missile attack, aerial attack, and aerial surveillance. If extensive air defense capabilities are required during the conduct of a PR mission, commanders must ensure they are available from other components of a joint force. Air defense capabilities that enable PR missions include:

- Search for, detect, locate, and characterize enemy aerial platforms during PR missions.
- Engage and destroy enemy aerial platforms to protect recovery assets/IMDC personnel.

• Employ combined arms / joint assets for air defense during PR missions

### Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

2-19. Preserving freedom of maneuver for PR units, denying mobility to enemy forces during PR missions, and protecting commanders and staffs, PR units, and IMDC personnel from enemy weapons effects are vital during PR missions. Capabilities enabling PR missions include:

- Report barriers/obstacles/mines to support PR planning/execution.
- Conduct breaching operations to recover IMDC personnel.
- Establish forward airfields and landing zones to support PR missions.
- Provide positive identification of friendly forces during PR missions.
- Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) to protect recovery assets.

#### **Combat Service Support**

2-20. Combat service support will always be an important part of PR operations and planning. Understanding requirements for resupply, refueling, and rearming, to name a few aspects, plays a role in the success of recovery operations. Logistics and support capabilities enabling PR missions include:

- Provide personnel accountability for casualty reporting.
- Conduct Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) activities.
- Provide combat casualty care to IMDC personnel during and after recovery.
- Provide medical evacuation for IMDC personnel.
- Provide religious care and counseling during reintegration.
- Provide legal assistance during reintegration.
- Provide transportation means for PR forces (ingress/egress).
- Interface / liaison between US military forces and local authorities / non-governmental .organizations (NGO) to coordinate PR capabilities and execution.

#### **Command and Control**

2-21. While establishing PR C2 within existing command and control system, commanders allocate C2 resources specifically for planning, preparing, and executing PR missions to cover the communications spectrum across the joint, interagency, and multinational forces. C2 resources critical to PR missions include:

- Facilities for JPRC / PRCC.
- Information Systems (INFOSYS) equipment to manage PR relevant information.
- Personnel to staff the JPRC / PRCC.
- PR liaisons from subordinate units.
- Allocate C2 platforms during PR mission execution.

## THE STAFF'S ROLE IN PERSONNEL RECOVERY C2

2-22. While commanders have the authority and responsibility for PR, they cannot fulfill this responsibility alone. Commanders exercise control of military operations through a C2 system that integrates personnel, information management, procedures, equipment, and facilities. The staff members perform a pivotal function in the C2 system providing relevant information to the commander. The commander uses relevant information to achieve situational understanding and make effective PR decisions. The staff then transmits those decisions to subordinate forces in the form of plans, orders, and procedures.

## **JPRC/PRCC/PRO** RESPONSIBILITIES

2-23. While the staff members collect PR related information in their specialty areas, a central point for gathering the information from all the staff members is required to establish a usable operational picture. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) at the joint level and the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) at the component level are the fusion points for the staff's collaborative efforts to gather PR related information. Personnel Recovery Officers at Brigade and below are the fusion points for their respective units. JPRC/PRCC/PRO personnel coordinate with the individual staff members to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate this information. JPRCs, PRCCs, and PROs are collectively referred to as PR cells throughout this manual.

## JPRC responsibilities

2-24. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) is responsible for coordinating all PR related matters for the JFC, including PR missions employing joint, interagency, or multinational forces and capabilities. JPRC responsibilities include:

- Recommending recovery courses of action to decision makers.
- Developing PR SOPs for the joint force.
- Coordinating External Supported Recoveries with interagency and multinational organizations (including host nation capabilities).
- Assisting PRCCs in fulfilling their requirements.
- Coordinating for theater and national intelligence support to PR.

2-25. The JPRC is manned by PR trained and knowledgeable personnel representing each component of the joint force. These personnel provide PR expertise specific to their respective commands. The number of personnel assigned to the JPRC varies based on the size of the operation. Large joint forces require significant capability in the JPRC. At one point during Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were over 50 personnel assigned to the JPRC. For further information on staffing and training requirements for a JPRC, see JP 3-50.

### **PRCC** responsibilities

2-26. The PRCC is responsible for coordinating all PR related matters for the component or MSC commander. The PRCC also coordinates PR planning, preparation, and execution vertically with the JPRC and horizontally with other PRCCs. PRCC responsibilities include:

- Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate unit PROs, other PRCCs and JPRC.
- Coordinating deliberate recoveries for the component.
- Reviewing accountability and movement reporting procedures of subordinate units.
- Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) deconfliction during PR missions.
- Assisting in immediate recoveries when requested by subordinate units.
- Coordinating for component fire support to the operation.
- Ensuring subordinate units have access to SOPs developed by the JPRC.
- Ensuring subordinate units have sufficient evasion aids.

2-27. Commanders must staff PRCCs with appropriate representation from subordinate commands. Personnel representing air, land, maritime, intelligence, and combat service support forces provide a robust capability for the PRCC to coordinate missions with subordinate commands. At one point during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the land component PRCC was staffed with over 30 personnel.

2-28. Minimum staffing for the PRCC is seven personnel – a director, deputy director, four mission coordinators, and one SERE coordinator. This provides limited-duration, 24-hour PR coordination coverage for PR missions. Recommended requirements for the PRCC individual positions are shown in Table 2-2. PR certification levels are determined by the training completed by individuals prior to performing PRCC duties. A Top Secret security clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information access (TS/SCI) is required for all positions.

Position	Grade	MOS	PR certification level
Director	O-5	Combat Arms	Advanced
Deputy Director	CW3 and above	Aviation	Advanced
Mission coordinators (2)	E-7 and above	Combat Arms	Intermediate
Mission coordinators (2)	E-7 and above	Intelligence	Intermediate
SERE coordinator	E-6 and above	Combat Arms	Specialized

### Table 2-2. PRCC position requirements

## PRO responsibilities

2-29. PROs perform PRCC-like functions at brigade and below. Recommended grades for PROs are combat arms E-7s and above with TS/SCI access and intermediate PR skills training. Their responsibilities include:

- Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate units.
- Coordinating immediate recoveries for their units.
- Gathering PR-specific information developed by JPRC/PRCCs and disseminate to subordinate units.
- Coordinating for unit fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) and control measures.
- Ensuring subordinate units have access to SOPs developed by the JPRC/PRCC.
- Identifying subordinate unit PR equipment shortfalls to the PRCC.
- Ensure sufficient evasion aids are available within subordinate units.

### **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

2-30. During execution, PR cells must be able to process large quantities of information. Information from ISR systems, on-scene observations, and radio communications may be reported at close intervals and via different methods. PR cells filter and sort this information to identify and validate PR relevant information. PR cells fuse the RI into an operating picture focused on a specific recovery mission and disseminate this picture to all concerned individuals. Examples of PR relevant information PR cells would focus on to enable the commander to achieve situation understanding include:

- Location, intentions, medical condition, and identity of IMDC personnel.
- PR training level of IMDC personnel.
- Tactical situation around IMDC personnel.
- Communications capabilities of IMDC personnel.
- Location and capabilities of enemy forces in proximity to IMDC personnel.
- Location, status, and capabilities of Army forces.
- Location, status, and capabilities of other component forces.
- Terrain and weather enroute to and near IMDC personnel.
- Assets available to execute PR missions.

## STAFF AND PERSONNEL RECOVERY INTEGRATION

2-31. The collaborative efforts of the entire staff facilitate the collection of relevant PR information so commanders can make effective decisions. Staff members have specific responsibilities that assist the commander in conducting operations in general; many have direct and indirect relationships to PR. Specific staff duties for PR operations are discussed in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment chapters. Some are listed in tables 2-3 through 2-15 to illustrate how PR is integrated throughout individual staff functions.

G/S-1 (Personnel)		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Maintain accountability of all forces (military, DA civilians, and DA contractors) and information.	Provide accountability information to PR cells and other staff agencies to ensure 100 percent force accountability is maintained.	
Maintain a personnel information database.	PR cell requires information on IMDC personnel. This is especially important if the Individuals in question did not complete DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) or civilian equivalent form.	
Casualty reporting.	PR cell must be informed of Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN) incidents and casualty reports. Additionally, ongoing IMDC events require support to the family.	
Analyze personnel strength data to determine current capabilities and project future requirements. Track the status and location of recovered personnel until they complete the reintegration process.	PR cell might require additional staffing to fulfill assigned responsibilities. Additional maneuver forces may also be required for PR missions (see Resource Allocation discussion).	

## Table 2-3. G/S-1 PR integration

G/S-2 (Intelligence)		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Manage intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and integrate IPB efforts with other staff members and echelons.	Support PR planning and execution with PR specific intelligence planning. Counter-PR capabilities, potential adversary courses of action with respect to IMDC personnel, etc (see Chapter 3).	
Establish and maintain relationships and procedures with other intelligence staffs, units, and organizations.	Provide conduit to other intelligence agencies, including theater and national level, for collection of PR specific intelligence.	
Disseminate intelligence.	Ensure PR cell is informed of PR-specific intelligence.	
Store sensitive materials.	Maintain isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPS) and evasion plans of action (EPAs) completed by potential IMDC personnel (see Chapter 3).	
Debrief recovered personnel to collect intelligence.	Inform PR cell of collected intelligence.	

## Table 2-4. G/S-2 PR integration

## Table 2-5. G/S-3 PR integration

G/S-3 (Operations)		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Establish operations center.	Establish PR cell – functions as the PR focal point for the commander and staff.	
Prepare, coordinate, and distribute standing operating procedures (SOPs), plans and orders	Establish IMDC reporting requirements, PR information management, etc.	
Recommend task organization of and mission assignment to subordinate elements.	Assist commander in identifying and organizing subordinate units that are PR mission capable. Synchronize all required assets for PR missions.	
Plan, coordinate, and supervise training, exercises, and rehearsals.	Includes PR training for commanders and staff, recovery units, and individuals.	

G/S-4 (Logistics)		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Coordinate with G/S-5 for host nation support.	Provides conduit for PR cells to coordinate HN support of PR missions.	
Develop the logistic plan to support operations (with the G/S-3).	FARP locations, class III/V availability, and equipment procurement specific to PR.	
Identify requirements that can be met through contracting.	Access to contractor information will be required during an IMDC event.	
Coordinate or provide mortuary affairs.	Ensure information on recovered remains is shared with PR cells – they might be tracking an IMDC individual when that individual is in the mortuary.	

## Table 2-6. G/S-4 PR integration

## Table 2-7. G/S-5 PR integration

G/S-5 (Civil-Military Operations – this will be the Plans section in the future)		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Establish and operate the civil-military operations center (CMOC) to maintain liaison with other US governmental agencies (OGA), host-nation civil and military authorities, and nongovernmental and international organizations in the area of operations.	Conduit for PR cells to coordinate support with these agencies.	
Provide G/S-2 with information gained from civilians in the AO and assist the G/S-2 with the analysis of the civil dimension.	NGOs or local civilians may have information related to an IMDC event. This must be shared with the G/S-2 staff and PR cells. Identify (before an IMDC event occurs) medical facilities and other key structures where IMDC personnel might be taken to and held by hostile forces.	
Coordinate with the PAO and PSYOP officer to ensure that disseminated information is not contradictory.	Ensure PR information in the civil affairs plan does not contradict public affairs, PSYOP, and deception plans.	
Exercise supervision over attached civil affairs units.	Conduit for PR cells to gather information on possible IMDC events.	

## Table 2-8. G/S-6 PR integration

G/S-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations[C4OPS])		
Typical staff member duties	PR integration	
Provide the architecture necessary to collect, process, display, store, and disseminate relevant information to support C2 functions.	Dedicated systems for PR cell. Computers, communications, software, etc.	
Coordinate, plan, and direct all C4OPS support interfaces with joint and multinational forces, to include host-nation support.	Interoperability of these systems is critical, across the entire joint force, during PR missions.	
Ensure that redundant communications means are planned and available to pass time-sensitive information.	PR cell must have alternate systems for collection and dissemination of PR relevant information.	
Manage radio frequency allocations and assignments and provide spectrum management.	Dedicated PR communication nets, frequencies for survival radios, frequency deconfliction between PR nets and other operations nets.	

G/S-7 (Information Operations[IO])					
Typical staff member duties	PR integration				
Recommend IO effects to influence adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions.	Integrate PR considerations into PSYOP, deception, and Public Affairs plans.				
Synchronize and coordinate offensive and defensive IO with the overall operation.	Mislead the enemy about the purpose of recovery operations or mask the capabilities and TTP of recovery units.				
Coordinate preparation of the IO portions of plans and orders	Include PR IO actions in the plan or order.				
Coordinate IO with other agencies (such as US Information Agency, US Agency for International Development, and US Ambassador).	Conduit for PR cells to gather information from these agencies.				

## Table 2-9. G/S-7 PR integration

## Table 2-10. G/S-8 PR integration

G/S-8 (Resource Management)					
Typical staff member duties	PR integration				
Monitor resource utilization	Program funding for reintegration activities, PR equipment acquisition, and PR education and training initiatives				
Articulate and justify funding requirements	Articulate justification for PR funding requirements				
Prioritize requirements	Prioritize PR funding requirements with other command requirements				
Develop future budgets	Include PR in future budget formulation				

## Table 2-11. Surgeon PR integration

Surgeon					
Typical staff member duties	PR integration				
Medical evacuation, including Army dedicated medical evacuation platforms (air and ground).	Recovered personnel may require MEDEVAC from the recovery vehicle to a location where definitive medical care is available.				
Coordinate for aeromedical evacuation aircraft.	Recovered personnel may require intertheater MEDEVAC.				
Provide health care and support for the force.	Coordinate medical (including psychological) personnel to assist during reintegration of isolated personnel.				
Hospitalization support of sick, wounded, or injured personnel.	PR cell must know location of available hospital facilities in the event recovered personnel are injured or wounded.				

## Table 2-12. Command Sergeant Major PR integration

Command Sergeant Major				
Typical staff member duties	PR integration			
Monitor unit and enlisted Soldier training (including sergeant's time training), making corrections as necessary.	Ensure PR training is included into unit enlisted training programs.			
Attend/coordinate rehearsals.	Ensure IMDC events are evaluated during unit rehearsals.			

Chaplain					
Typical staff member duties PR integration					
Advise the commander and staff of the impact of the faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the AO.	Indigenous population reactions to IMDC personn can be affected by religious/cultural beliefs of the population. Assess feasibility of utilizing local religious elements to facilitate prevention of IMDC events.				
Provide religious support to hospitalized personnel.	Provide religious support to IMDC during reintegration operations.				

## Table 2-13. Chaplain PR integration

## Table 2-14. Public Affairs Officer PR integration

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)					
Typical staff member duties	PR integration				
Advise the commander of the public affairs impact of planned or current operations.	Determine public affairs impact of successful and unsuccessful PR missions on the operation at large.				
Expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information to the media.	Prevent inadvertent release of IMDC personal information throughout a PR mission.				
Coordinate with the PSYOP officer and G/S-5 to ensure disseminated information is not contradictory.	Ensure PR information in the public affairs plan does not contradict civil affairs, PSYOP, and deception plans.				
Inform Soldiers, family members, and DOD civilians of their rights under the Privacy Act, OPSEC responsibilities, and roles as implied command representatives when interacting with the media.	The media will want to see these individuals. They need to be prepared for the experience.				

## Table 2-15. Staff Judge Advocate PR integration

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)				
Typical staff member duties	PR integration			
Provide international and operational law assistance, including advice and assistance on implementing the DOD law of war program.	Advise commander on ROE impact to PR missions. Asses feasibility of and advise commander on legal use of funds to effect recoveries.			
Coordinate with Department of State to determine legal status of captured friendly personnel. Status must be determined and communicated to the force prior to the commencement of operations.	Prior to operations commencing, determine what the legal status of captured personnel will be. There are differences between POW, UN Expert on Mission, illegal detainee, etc. Potential IMDC personnel must understand what their status is <i>prior</i> to captivity in order to properly apply the Code of Conduct.			

## **CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS**

2-32. The staff assists the commander in the exercise of control over PR operations. Like the collection and fusing of PR information, the JPRC and PRCC are the central staff elements for developing procedures to control PR operations.

### **BOUNDARIES**

2-33. Boundaries define the AOs for commanders, providing an area within which the commander is responsible for and has full freedom to conduct operations (unless otherwise constrained). JPRCs/PRCCs also use boundaries to identify coordination requirements between adjacent forces and determine which forces are in the best position to execute a PR mission. Additional control measures that have direct impact on PR operations are:

- Fire support coordination line (FSCL).
- No fire areas (NFAs).
- Restrictive Fire Line (RFL).
- Restrictive fire areas (RFAs).
- Restricted operations areas (ROAs).
- Intelligence handover line (IHL).

## **STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES**

2-34. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) are a method for commanders and staffs to exercise control. They provide a common reference for performing actions, particularly in time constrained situations. PR cells develop PR SOPs in conjunction with other staff members. These procedures then serve to automate and standardize routine actions required for effective PR missions. PR SOPs work well to standardize procedures but are only effective when rehearsed and understood by all. Examples of procedures for PR include:

- PR incident reporting procedures
- PR forces status reporting
- IMDC personnel actions
- Recovery force actions
- Required information and format for decision briefings
- Reintegration procedures
- PR rehearsals
- Battle rhythm integration

### PR incident reporting procedures

2-35. Report format, transmission channels and methods, required information, transmission time standards, and addressees must be established prior to operations. This facilitates a common understanding of procedures between higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders and staffs.

2-36. PR forces status reporting. JPRCs/PRCCs are required to monitor the status of PR capable forces for the commander. Standardizing the information required, times and channels of delivery, and information format throughout the force enables status information to be integrated into the Common Operational Picture (COP) and shared throughout the command.

## **IMDC** personnel actions

2-37. JPRCs establish procedures for personnel to use should they become isolated. These procedures ensure that Individuals and Army forces conducting immediate, deliberate, or external supported recoveries are using procedures common to all component recovery forces. Communication methods and times, location reporting, authentication, and actions when under duress are examples of Individuals actions that can be standardized via approved procedures.

### **Recovery force actions**

2-38. C2 within a recovery force, roles and responsibilities specific to ongoing operations, coordination with higher headquarters during mission execution, and communication procedures are examples of recovery force actions that can be established via SOPs.

#### Required information and format for decision briefings

2-39. JPRCs/PRCCs must determine the minimum information commanders require to make execution decisions and the format for that information. This standardizes briefing procedures when time is critical and prevents overloading the commander with information that does not contribute to an effective decision for PR mission execution. Unknown information can be addressed and resources focused to obtain a clearer picture for decision makers. It also ensures that all RI the commander requires is included in the decision brief.

#### **Reintegration procedures**

2-40. Reintegration procedures establish the process for debriefing recovered personnel, coordinating family member support, locations for medical evaluations, and support requirements from outside agencies/commands. Reintegration procedures also establish the decision making process for duty determination of recovered personnel. Clearly understood reintegration procedures reduce the burden on the command from outside observers by delineating responsibilities during the conduct of reintegration operations.

#### **Personnel Recovery rehearsals**

2-41. Procedures for PR rehearsals prescribe who must attend, evaluation of specific staff responsibilities and actions, and locations/times of the rehearsals. Chapter 4 discusses PR rehearsals.

#### **Battle rhythm integration**

2-42. The PR cell director or deputy director must attend key meetings to incorporate PR into the staff battle rhythm. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss PR battle rhythm integration.

#### **Monitor progress**

2-43. Regardless of the authority delegated to subordinate units to conduct PR missions, commanders and staffs must monitor the progress of those missions and be prepared to support subordinate commanders' requests for assistance. This also allows higher echelons to determine if strict control or more support is required or if a different course of action would be more effective. Unforeseen situations may develop during a PR mission, requiring the involvement of higher headquarters for resolution. PRCCs and JPRCs perform the monitoring function for their respective commanders.

### Overcontrol

2-44. Given the current attention IMDC personnel garner on the world stage, it is tempting for commanders to exert excessive control over the execution of PR missions. The time it takes for a subordinate unit to contact higher headquarters for an execution decision may be longer than the window of opportunity for conducting that mission. Commanders must ensure they exercise only that level of control necessary to synchronize forces and actions for mission accomplishment.

## THE ARMY PR SYSTEM IN ACTION

2-45. Figure 2-5 (page 2-17) shows the Army PR system in action. Coordination between the different PR cells, utilizing different recovery methods, shows possible PR missions being conducted simultaneously across the battlefield.

2-46. Within the theater, several IMDC events have occurred. The four PR methods (unassisted, immediate, deliberate, externally supported recovery (ESR) and five PR execution tasks (report, locate, support, recover, reintegrate) are utilized simultaneously throughout the battlespace to effect the recovery of IMDC personnel.

## VICINITY (A)

2-47. In the NE corner, P2 control was lost with a LRS team. The PRCC utilizes the deliberate method to direct an Army aviation element (A1) as it recovers the LRS team while an aviation attack element (A2) blocks an enemy mechanized QRF. The PRCC monitors the progress of the recovery operation via a UAV (A3) with a signal re-trans capability.

## VICINITY **(B)**

2-48. BDE PRO synchronizes the immediate recovery of an IMDC USAF pilot near a town utilizing Army infantry or armor forces conducting operations in the area.

## VICINITY (C)

2-49. JPRC coordinates USAF resupply bundle drop to support IMDC vicinity the Ground to Air Signal (GTAS) in the far east.

## VICINITY (D)

2-50. JPRC coordinates the ESR recovery of a downed USMC aircraft crew member in the river utilizing Army divers.

## VICINITY (E)

2-51. National intelligence (E1) reports acquisition of a signal affiliated with a survival radio (E2) in the SE portion of the AO to the JPRC/PRCC. An Army MI element (E3) immediately monitors the associated frequency and establishes voice communications with the IMDC person as he conducts unassisted evasion towards the west. JSTARS (E4) and the MI element maintain voice communications to provide situational understanding and locate the IMDC person. The JPRC begins coordinating for an ESR recovery.

## VICINITY (F)

2-52. JPRC coordinates the ESR recovery by a Navy aviation element, of an Army boatswain washed overboard from an LCM.

## VICINITY (G)

2-53. PRCC synchronizes the deliberate recovery of an IMDC person along a convoy route utilizing MP's manning the convoy route checkpoints.

## VICINITY (H)

2-54. The local media broadcasts an interview with a local citizen who helped an Army soldier evade the enemy and was rewarded with a monetary amount after having turned in the soldier's blood chit.

## VICINITY (I)

2-55. Personnel from the JTF Full Accounting (JTF-FA) recover a missing Army aviator from prior hostilities and prepare the remains for return.

## VICINITY (J)

2-56. The Rear Detachment (J1) prepares the family of an IMDC person for the reintegration of their loved one as he leaves the care facility (J2) within theater.




Figure 2.5. The Army PR system in action

## CONCLUSION

2-57. PR C2 is most effective when synchronized with existing C2 in a fashion supporting effective information management and timely decisions. By delegating PR execution authority to subordinates as appropriate, commanders foster an atmosphere of initiative, allowing subordinate units to respond effectively to missions that can occur suddenly and change rapidly during execution. Finally, through judicious application of control via well-rehearsed procedures and continuous monitoring and assessment, commanders and their staffs can streamline the collection, processing, and dissemination of PR relevant information. This allows commanders, recovery units and forces, and IMDC personnel to focus on the tasks at hand – gaining and maintaining situational understanding and executing the recovery.

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## Chapter 3

# Planning

PR planning includes the collective efforts of commanders and staffs, units, and individuals to integrate and employ Army PR capabilities for maximum effectiveness during operations. Planning for personnel recovery operations employs the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) that is found in FM 5-0. Just as commanders and staffs should not create a separate C2 system for PR missions, they should not create a separate planning process either.

Using common processes that are understood throughout the Army helps commanders and staffs standardize procedures. Standard processes facilitate effective planning between echelons and with adjacent units.

This chapter discusses the integration of PR-specific factors into the MDMP. PR planning is conducted by all staff elements, under the supervision of the chief of staff (CofS), and coordinated by the G/S-3. Primary PR planners must be identified before planning begins. Additionally, personnel who will be manning the PR cells must be selected and receive additional PR-specific training. These are the individuals responsible for coordinating PR operations for the command.

## **STAFF INTERACTION**

3-1. The designated staff planners and the PR cell personnel work closely together throughout MDMP to develop a sound PR plan that supports the overall operation from start to finish. The commander and CofS/executive officer (XO) should ensure that the PR cells are represented at all planning meetings and PR planning considerations are addressed by all staff members.

3-2. After action reviews (AARs) of our most recent combat operations have all pointed to planning as a critical element in successful PR on the battlefield. The importance of understanding what the mission of Personnel Recovery is and how the Army organizes the battlefield and staff for recovery operations is mandatory for effective planning.

3-3. Personnel Recovery planning is conducted in six phases. The six phases are: Pre-mobilization; Mobilization; Deployment; Employment, Sustainment and Redeployment. Pre-mobilization encompasses

all activities conducted prior to Mobilization. The remaining five phases parallel the five phases of Force Projection (FM 3-0). During Premobilization, the commanders and staffs visualize the requirements, conduct in-depth planning and focused training, and integrate rehearsals of PR for all phases. By visualizing the PR requirements and conducting deliberate planning for every phase when more time is available, the unit establishes a baseline to effect time-constrained planning during operations.

Contents
Staff Interaction
Fundamentals of Personnel
Recovery planning
Planning Considerations for PR
The Military Decision Making
Process (MDMP)3-10
Conclusion

3-4. This chapter will highlight the PR planning considerations. The information will apply to the staff PR planners and the PR cell personnel as they integrate Personnel Recovery into the overall plan and as they prepare the PR attachment to the base plan/order.

## FUNDAMENTALS OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY PLANNING

3-5. With the Army operating around the world, consideration must be given to PR planning throughout full-spectrum operations. PR is conducted on linear and non-linear battlefields with contiguous or non-contiguous AOs. PR cell personnel must be creative and proactive in their approach to providing PR capabilities to the ground forces, considering the following fundamentals:

- The primary mission continues parallel to the recovery effort
- The goal is recovery of the IMDC person
  - Plan a system that enforces timely reporting; accurate report validation and location determination; and rapid dissemination of the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
  - Ensure that the system provides for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.

## Lessons Learned

The lack of accurate personnel accountability was a critical factor during OIF/OEF. Units reported some Soldiers missing, who were actually out of theater or in the Replacement Station, initiating needless PR missions. Even worse, some absent Soldiers turned up at other locations without ever being reported as missing.

- Prevent the IMDC event
  - Enforce strict accountability of all Soldiers, contractors, DA civilians (DAC), and other assigned civilians.
  - Constant training of core warrior skills.
  - Continuously gather information on the nature and level of the threat.
  - Integrate PR into education and training.
  - Reinforce the use of troop leading procedures (TLP) throughout the force.
  - Anticipate potential IMDC events and develop countermeasures.
  - Emplace positive and procedural (P2) controls.
  - Establish a system of reporting channels that cross-queue and interrogate each other.
- Prepare for an IMDC event
  - Identify and train the PR cell personnel.
  - PR cell personnel educate and train commanders, leaders, and fellow staff members in PR system.
  - Plan for all PR tasks from commander and staff; units; and individual perspectives.
  - Integrate the full range of staff directorate capabilities, supporting PR through all six phases.
  - Integrate theater entry requirements for PR into the OPORD.
  - Integrate the rear detachment into the PR family support plan.
  - Design the capability to locate IMDC personnel using all BOS.
- Design the PR architecture within the C2 system
  - Design the PR organization.
    - Establish the PR cell.
    - Ensure primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency PR reporting means (software, hardware, formats, dedicated information pipeline, etc.).

- Integrate PR vertically and horizontally.
- Ensure the PR system is adaptive in order to flex with operational requirements based on continual AARs, integrating lessons learned into new products, processes, and procedures.
- Organize, train, and equip for PR
  - Organize, train, and equip the PR cell appropriate for the unit's echelon.
  - Enforce and integrate individual SERE requirements into all training and exercises (Ex. Evasion and survival exercises with Individuals).
  - Integrate PR events into all collective training (CPXs, MRXs and FTXs) to refine staff operations and identify gaps and shortfalls in the organization's capabilities (ex. a patrol member missing from a combat patrol; a convoy overdue and out of contact or several vehicles missing; or someone taken hostage in the AO).
- Integrate contractor and DA civilians (DAC) into OPLAN/OPORD
  - Design system to account for Contractors and DAC on the battlefield.
  - Establish interface with Contractor and DAC representatives.
  - Establish procedures for sharing the COP/situational understanding.
  - Establish procedures to ensure Contractors and DAC meet theater entry requirements and maintain proficiency.
- Transition the PR capability
  - Plan for early deployment of the PR capability in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
  - Develop procedures for relief in place of the PR capability.
  - Ensure PR capabilities are available until all forces, including Contractors and DAC, have redeployed.
- Plan for integrated rehearsals
  - Throughout all six phases of PR planning.
  - Incorporate the five PR tasks.
- Employ the recovery force based on METT-TC
  - Develop and maintain the situational understanding to select the most appropriate unit/force for recovery operation.
  - Ensure PR cell capability to monitor PR asset status.

## PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-6. Commanders and staffs plan for PR tasks by analyzing the organization, training, and equipment required through the three focal lenses; commander and staff, units, and individuals. This helps to determine the activities to be incorporated into plans, orders, and SOPs. Optimally, the plan will identify all the activities that take place during each phase. The figures 3-1 through 3-6 provide commanders and staffs, units and individuals with starting points to identify the tasks required.

Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance
Commander	•Reviews policy, doctrine, regulations and OPLANs to develop guidance and intent for training		Integrate PR in the Family Support Plan •Coordinate PAO intent	<ul> <li>Identify the CCIR</li> <li>Commander location during recovery missions</li> </ul>	•Provide guidance and intent	•Provides Guidance and intent
Staff	•Develop Processes and Procedures	•Coordinate BOS ability to locate •Identify staff PR reps •Identify shortfalls and procure resources •Schedule training;	•Develop the IMDC family support plan; •Identify procedures for support products (EVCs, IPGs, blood chits, etc.) •Update IPB	•Create the tools to monitor the CCIR and associated indicators	•Develop the Reintegration plan and incorporate the Rear Det	•Unit Training Plan •PR SOPs •Budget •Plans / processes/ products/ and procedures/ orders •PR Products
Coordination	Receive PR-specific training to include training for specialized duty positions (RWS operator; Terrain Det; etc.)     Integrate PR into the SOPs; CSM assesses all activities to integrate experience, lessons learned and the NCO support channel; Plan for the integration of DAC and contractors into the PR system					Updated SOPs and Lessons Learned
Units	•Ensure interoperability of equipment equipment equipm					•PR SOPs •ISOPREP/EP guidance
Individuals	<ul> <li>Receive PR-specific training</li> <li>Procedures for reporting location to PR architecture</li> </ul>	•Schedule training on equipment and procedures used for determining location	•Schedule training: call for fire/CAS; •EVCs, blood chits, pointee talkees; etc.; •survival equipment	•Learn IMDC procedures during recovery	•Be prepared for debrief and medical support	•ISOPREP •Prepare EPA
Coordinating Instructions	Incorporate PR specific     Complete ISOPREP dat		1	1	1	

Figure 3-1. Pre-mobilization planning considerations

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Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance	
Commander	•Synchronize guidance and intent with the theater plan			•Assess the MRX	•Assess the Reintegration portion of the MRX		
Staff	•Integrate the processes, plans and procedures into the theater plan	•Standardize maps and charts •Ensure interoperability of location methods •Synchronize location techniques/system	Integrate special/ personal staff into Family Support Plan Integrate PR into PSYOP Prep of battlefield	•Synchronize the MRX •Integrate the results of commander's assessment	•Synchronize the Reintegration program from AO to home station •Integrate lessons learned into SOPs/plans/ processes/ products/ procedures and orders	Schedule training     Refine SOPs/ plans/processes/ products/ procedures and orders     Disseminate IPG	
Coordination	Integrate and train the augmentees to the staff in PR; Update running estimates; Synchronize national, theater, JTF, component support; Schedule AAR for MRX; Identify refresher requirements for advanced SERE trained personnel;     Review TPFDD for early movement of PR units; Provide guidance to PR forces to hand carry personal and recovery mission essential equipment; Review IPG						
Units	•Review operation specific C2 procedures	•Schedule training and rehearsals against identified shortfalls in organization, equipment and procedures		•Schedule integrated rehearsals for PR •(eg. National/ joint/ combined arms/ BOS, etc.)	•Assess the reconstitution effort from MRX		
Individuals				Integrate IMDC     event into MRX			
Coordinating Instructions	<ul> <li>Inventory equipment for reporting; locating; supporting; recovering and repatriating IMDC.</li> <li>Schedule training for recently assigned and non-unit personnel (include DACs and contractors)</li> <li>Schedule operation specific briefing and training</li> <li>Schedule training/rehearsals to synchronize the BOS to integrate the staff, supporting assets and recovery forces</li> <li>Update ISOPREP and EPA</li> </ul>						

Figure 3-2. Mobilization planning considerations

ſ	Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance
	Commander					•Plan for initiating Reintegration plan if IMDC events occurs	•Provide guidance re Positive and Procedural controls
	Staff	•Implement accountability procedures to identify actual IMDC events and preclude false reports	•Plan to identify person and equipment to maintain accountability and communications with movement serials	<ul> <li>Identify IMDC support capabilities if event happens during this phase</li> </ul>	•Implement requirements to supported command if recovery support is required •Plan to support authentication during movement	•Plan for Rear Detachment to support Reintegration efforts	<ul> <li>Integrate strict accountability processes and procedures in SOPs/ plans/ and orders</li> </ul>
	Coordination	<ul> <li>Identify capabilities and (RSOI), to supported con</li> <li>Plan build up of combat</li> <li>Maintain accountability of Implement deployment re</li> </ul>	•Updated SOPs Lessons Learned				
	Units	•Enforce accountability procedures •Exercise reporting procedures within theater communications architecture					
	Individuals						
	Coordinating Instructions	•Attend operation specific PR briefings and training •Plan for ISOPREP and EPA completion •Plan for PR rehearsals					

Chapter 3

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Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance
Commander	•Consider including IMDC events as CCIR	<ul> <li>Provides oversight and monitors process</li> <li>Approve rehearsal</li> </ul>	•Directs support to IMDC	<ul> <li>Identify key command locations, P2 throughout operation</li> </ul>	•Provides oversight and monitors process	•Command Message for Recovery / Reintegration •CCIR
Staff	Coordinate the PR architecture to support CCIR Cross talk/walk of information among staff sections Cross-queue INFOSYS •Plan to record Search and Rescue Numerical Encryption Grid (SARNEG) into file	•Synchronize ISR •Develop validation process •Verification with all PR C2 nodes •Integrate all source capabilities	Synchronize effects     to protect IMDC     Develops plan to     provide SU to IMDC     Rear Det begins     support to family	<ul> <li>Integrate ISOPREP dissemination into PR architecture.</li> <li>Develops plan to monitor and support recovery</li> <li>Plan</li> </ul>	Plan immediate medical support, tactical debrief, transload, PAO and Reintegration Plan for transition of P2/C2 Integrate LL into SOPs	•Extract SARNEG and Search and Rescue dot (SARDOT) from SPINs
Coordination	<ul> <li>Plan for integrating ISOPREP/EPA information; Plan for authenticating IMDC</li> <li>Ensure operations are synchronized with SPINs/ATOs;</li> <li>Plans for alert, WARNO/OPORD and dissemination to units and Reintegration system</li> <li>Plan for transition of C2 and authority as recovery commences; Plan for/recon alternate sites; Plan for AAR</li> </ul>				•Updated SOP and Lessons Learned	
Units	Integrate CCIR     Plan for training/     rehearsals/ranges     Plan for alert     procedures	•Integrate ISR	•Plan for recon of alternate sites for providing effects/C2	<ul> <li>Plan to contact/ authenticate/ recover</li> <li>Plan for accountability of recovery force at the departure from objective</li> <li>Plan for emergency property destruction</li> </ul>	•Plan to reconstitute the force •Plan to redevelop the training plan	•Updated SOP •SARNEG and SARDOT disseminated daily (like challenge/ password)
Individuals	Alert PR architecture	•Provide location to PR architecture		•Plan to support/ submit to recovery effort	•Synchronize Reintegration with individual actions	
Coordinating Instructions	Plan response to information collected at recovery area; Include contingency plan to recover other personnel co-located at recovery area     Plan for EPW during recovery     Plan for AAR					

Figure 3-4. Employment planning considerations

Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance
Commander						Maintain appropriate PR capability throughout; •Reinforce fundamentals of IMDC prevention during Re- Deployment
Staff		Plan for battle handoff of IMDC location/recovery responsibilities to national assets	•Plan for support of IMDCs not recovered until battle handoff		•Confirm and update status of Reintegration of IMDCs and of Reintegration support architecture •Plan for battle handoff /records transfer of IMDC	
Coordination	incoming forces or HN; records to JPRA/ HQD/	L ut duration of operation incl Plan battle handoff of recor A C2 through the Re-Deployn	ds any IMDC personnel no	t recovered; Plan for pack	aging/ transferring IMDC	•Updated SOP an Lessons Learned
Units	•Enforce accountability procedures					
Individuals						
Coordinating Instructions	Update and maintain I	L Rs, briefings and training SOPREP and EPA s throughout redeployment,	incorporating LL	1	1	•Updated SOP an Lessons Learned

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Focal Lens	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegration	Guidance
Commander						Maintain appropriate PR capability throughout; •Reinforce fundamentals of IMDC prevention during Re- Deployment
Staff		Plan for battle handoff of IMDC location/recovery responsibilities to national assets	•Plan for support of IMDCs not recovered until battle handoff		•Confirm and update status of Reintegration of IMDCs and of Reintegration support architecture •Plan for battle handoff /records transfer of IMDC	
Coordination	incoming forces or HN; records to JPRA/ HQDA	I ut duration of operation incl Plan battle handoff of recor C2 through the Re-Deploym	ds any IMDC personnel no	t recovered; Plan for pack	aging/ transferring IMDC	•Updated SOP ar Lessons Learned
Units	•Enforce accountability procedures					
Individuals						
Coordinating Instructions	Update and maintain Is	Rs, briefings and training SOPREP and EPA throughout redeployment,	incorporating LL			•Updated SOP an Lessons Learned

# THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

3-7. The military decision making process is a seven step process that has as its goal the production of a plan or an order. Although there are only seven steps, there are numerous tasks within those steps that may be performed simultaneously, as opposed to sequentially.

3-8. When a unit is not constrained by time, every step in the planning process should be given full consideration and planned in detail. During time-constrained planning, these steps may be abbreviated to provide subordinate units as much time as possible to prepare for the mission.

3-9. In table 3-1 and in Appendix E, the PR activities of the MDMP are highlighted in the right column. The MDMP steps, along with some planning tips, are listed in the left column. For purposes of understanding this matrix, the steps identified in the right column are directed toward producing the PR attachment (Annex or Appendix) to an OPLAN/OPORD.

Note: The activities listed in the matrix are starting points for planning and not considered allinclusive. Only the "Alert the Staff" portion of the matrix is provided within this chapter because of the volume of information that is contained in Appendix E. Please refer to the appendix for remainder of the Military Decision Making Process matrix.

	Receipt of mission
Responsible	PR activities
	Alert the Staff
Battle Captain	CCIR update to CDR
CofS	Directs the staff to conduct parallel/collaborative planning
	<ul> <li>Direct staff to begin taking notes for the AAR now (all staff sections/units/ and leaders). Schedule a formal AAR/lessons learned session after each phase and mission. Incorporate the AAR/PR LL into the RSOP/TACSOP and disseminate the information to all subordinate forces and follow on echelon forces</li> </ul>
	(The mission may be tasked by higher, identified through message traffic, or received from an IMDC event or person. Key formats that may be received include: OPLAN, OPORD, Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR); SAR Situation Report (SARSIT), a Ground to Air Signal (GTAS); or derived from other staff communications (Spot Report [SPOTREP]), etc.)
G3	Alerts the designated staff reps for PR planning
Battle Captain	
G3	Identifies location/attendees (to include LNOs) for planning
Staff	Staff begins parallel/ collaborative planning
PR cell	Alerts units/forces in vicinity of IMDC
PR cell	• Specific report that identified the IMDC event (Convoy overdue, PERSTAT, SITREP,
Staff	contact by IMDC)
CDR	Emphasizes IMDC's time on the run (isolation/captivity)

#### Table 3-1. Receipt of Mission

# CONCLUSION

3-10. The integration of the entire staff is crucial to developing sound PR plans during MDMP. Commanders ensure that PR is included in the MDMP and in the eventual plan or order that results. PR planners coordinate their actions with all functional staff elements, leveraging the expertise of staff members in their individual areas to develop PR COAs and plans that enable PR coverage across the AO. By focusing planning on the five PR execution tasks and the abilities of commanders and staffs, units, and

potential IMDC personnel to perform together to execute those tasks during a PR mission, PR planners develop robust PR plans that support the overall mission.

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### Chapter 4

# Preparation

"In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military."

General Douglas MacArthur

PR mission success depends as much on preparation as it does on planning. The objective of preparation by commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and individuals is to enable them to function as a cohesive PR team. This chapter discusses PR preparation from pre-mobilization preparation through the stages of force projection operations.

## **PRE-MOBILIZATION PR PREPARATION**

4-1. Pre-mobilization preparation includes all efforts during peacetime to organize, train, and equip to accomplish PR missions. Pre-mobilization preparation actions are necessary for commanders and their staffs, units, and individuals and consist of reviewing and developing PR guidance, acquiring PR equipment, and conducting PR focused education and training.

#### GUIDANCE

4-2. DODD 2310.2, CJCSI 3270.01A, and Joint PR doctrine are issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (DODD) and the Joint Staff (CJCSI and Joint Doctrine) to establish policy and responsibilities for PR. The Military Services, Combatant Commanders, and their respective subordinate commands adhere to this guidance when preparing for PR. Service PR policy and doctrine. HQDA Letter 525-03-1, Personnel Recovery, is the Army policy that establishes goals, responsibilities, and the baseline for establishing a coordinated PR program. This FM establishes Army PR doctrine. Subordinate commands and units integrate PR into internal SOPs for standardization. Care must be taken so these SOPs do not contradict PR guidance provided by higher levels of command.

#### EQUIPMENT

4-3. It is particularly important to identify PR equipment requirements specified by the combatant command that will be supported during operations. These requirements must be communicated through official Army channels to ensure this equipment is available when operations commence. Commanders and staffs should not assume this equipment will be waiting for them when they arrive in theater.

4-4. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals all have PR equipment requirements. Commanders and staffs require secure information systems (INFOSYS), computer hardware equipment, and planning collaborative software tools in order to plan, command, and control PR operations. Commanders are also responsible for identifying and requesting equipment required by units and individuals. See Appendix D for information on PRspecific and PR-related equipment.

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#### **C2** Infrastructure

4-5. Lessons learned have shown that adequate and sufficient communications equipment must be available for the planning of, preparing for, executing, and assessing PR operations. Much of the guidance issued for PR is stored on and distributed via secure computer networks, so this equipment must be available for commanders and staffs as well as recovery forces and isolated personnel. Procurement of INFOSYS (to include computer systems) well in advance will preclude denial of access to PR information.

4-6. Recovery forces require secure, reliable communications capability. SATCOM, HAVE QUICK, and secure VHF radios are examples of communications equipment currently in use for PR today. PR units should be equipped with both terrestrial and satellite-based communications to enable communications with higher headquarters, other component or joint assets, and IMDC personnel.

4-7. IMDC personnel require survival, communications, and evasion equipment to report their situations, survive the event, and evade enemy forces until they are recovered.

#### **Planning/collaborative tools**

4-8. Many planning and collaborative software tools are currently in use for military operations in general. Obtaining these tools prior to operations allows proper integration and training on their use. Recovery units must have access to the same planning and collaborative tools that the command and staff elements use to plan and disseminate information. Integrated Work Space (IWS), Portable Flight Planning System (PFPS), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS), etc. are advanced planning tools but recovery forces may not be able to use the data generated by these tools if they do not have access to the same systems. Table 4-1 lists examples of equipment used to plan, prepare, execute, and assess recovery operations.

Commander and staff	Units	Individuals
Information Systems (INFOSYS)	Secure communications radios	Communications capability
Computer hardware	Have Quick	<ul> <li>Signaling devices</li> </ul>
Planning/collaborative software	• VHF-FM	Signal strobe
Tactical Airspace Integration	• VHF-AM	Flares
System (TAIS)	SATCOM	Firefly
<ul> <li>Portable Flight Planning System (PFPS)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Precision navigation equipment</li> </ul>	Chemlights
Command and Control	<ul> <li>Computer hardware</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Navigation equipment</li> </ul>
Personnel Computer (C2PC)	<ul> <li>Planning/collaborative software</li> </ul>	• GPS
Automated Deep Operations	<ul> <li>Portable Flight Planning System (PFPS)</li> </ul>	Compass
Coordination System (ADOCS)	Computer (C2PC)	<ul> <li>Location equipment</li> </ul>
mIRC chat (secure internet relay		<ul> <li>Evasion charts (EVCs)</li> </ul>
chat)	<ul> <li>Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS)</li> </ul>	Blood chits
<ul> <li>Software for generating and disseminating PR guidance</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>mIRC chat (secure internet relay chat)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Survival equipment</li> </ul>
documents	<ul> <li>Specialized recovery equipment as</li> </ul>	Access to computer
Theater Battle Management	necessary/if available	equipment or printed PR quidance
Core System (TBMCS)	Rescue hoists	guidanoo
	Litters	
	Extraction tools	
	<ul> <li>Direction finding equipment for locating survival radios (PLS, Quickdraw, etc)</li> </ul>	

Table 4-1. PR equipment requirements

#### **EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

4-9. Commanders and staffs require training on the proper use of planning and collaborative tools. TBMCS, C2PC, mIRC chat, and ADOCS are very capable tools but they require training and familiarity

for their proper use. When developing training guidance for subordinate units, commanders and staffs must not forget to provide training opportunities for themselves as well.

4-10. A thorough understanding of the individual Service PR capabilities and limitations enables commanders and staffs to integrate different capabilities in the manner that best assures PR mission success. It also allows rapid course of action adjustments during missions when the circumstances of the mission change prior to and during execution. Service recovery capabilities and methods are listed in Appendix B.

4-11. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) offers an extensive list of education and training courses tailored to specific audiences. Courses are offered in-residence at the PR Education and Training Center and via mobile training teams. The JPRA website (www.jpra.jfcom.mil or www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil) lists all available courses and procedures for attending in-residence training or requesting MTT support at unit location.

4-12. PR missions can be complicated, often involving many different assets over relatively long periods of time. C2 procedures, mission planning, communications must be coordinated and effectively executed during recovery missions. Achieving this level of execution capability requires prior training in recovery procedures. Employing forces untrained in recovery procedures, particularly as part of a large recovery force, can complicate the execution of the mission and increase risk.

#### Individual and collective PR training

4-13. Once individual training is complete, collective training commences. Collective PR training events reinforce individual skills and evaluate the abilities of commanders, staffs, units, and individuals to perform critical tasks as a team. Collective training after action reviews also identify individual and collective PR tasks that require further emphasis and practice.

	Commander and staff	Units	Individuals
Guidance	Policy/doctrine	Doctrine, ARs, TMs, etc.	Doctrine
	<ul> <li>Review existing PR SOPs</li> </ul>	PR SOPs	PR SOPs
	Review subordinate unit/force	<ul> <li>Develop unit/force recovery SOPs</li> </ul>	Prepare ISOPREP
	recovery SOPs	ISOPREP/EPA guidance	Prepare EPA
Equipment	C2 INFOSYS	C2 INFOSYS	<ul> <li>Survival radios</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Planning/collaborative tools</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Planning/collaborative tools</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Survival equipment</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Procure PR-specific equipment for units and individuals</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Precision navigation / IMDC personnel locating equipment</li> </ul>	Evasion aids
		<ul> <li>Interoperable, secure communications</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>PR-specific equipment</li> </ul>	
Education / Training	<ul> <li>PR planning / execution procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Recovery tactics, techniques, and procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape</li> </ul>
U	<ul> <li>PR C2 considerations</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>IMDC authentication procedures</li> </ul>	training
	<ul> <li>INFOSYS equipment training</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>PR equipment training</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Radio, survival equipment, and evasion</li> </ul>
	Planning / collaborative tools	Planning/collaborative tools	aid training
	training <ul> <li>Other Service capabilities</li> </ul>	<ul><li>training</li><li>Interoperability training</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Recovery procedures training</li> </ul>

 Table 4-2. Pre-mobilization PR preparation activities

4-14. Collective PR training must integrate all battlefield operating system capabilities and personnel. Training with a combined arms approach enhances interoperability during operations. Army forces should also conduct collective training with other services. The individual Services have different terminology and TTP – collective, inter-service training familiarizes all participants with each other's procedures and capabilities. Table 4-2 summarizes pre-mobilization preparation activities.

# MOBILIZATION

### GUIDANCE

4-15. During mobilization activities, commanders and staffs obtain specific PR guidance from the supported combatant command. This allows the commander to focus previous training and tailor existing guidance to the specific requirements of the supported combatant command. Examples of combatant command guidance include theater PR regulations, Appendix 5 to Annex C of OPLANS and OPORDS, Theater PR SOPs, PR Special Instructions, and Isolated Personnel Guidance (IPG).

#### Theater PR regulation

4-16. Also referred to as a Theater PR Directive or Instruction, this document is developed by the Combatant Command staff and prescribes PR guidance from the Combatant Commander for the entire theater. The individual theater PR regulations expand on the concepts contained in joint and Service doctrine by providing information on how recovery forces are to be employed in an entire theater. By nature a macro-level document, a theater PR regulation does not list specific details for every possible PR mission that may be conducted by forces in that theater, rather it contains general guidance to be used in the event a specific operation is to be planned and conducted. Subordinate commands use this document as a guide when developing supporting PR plans. Examples of guidance in a theater PR regulation are:

- Planning responsibilities for peacetime and contingency operations.
- Supported and supporting commanders for PR planning and operations.
- Theater PR training policy.
- Combatant command staff directorate PR responsibilities.
- Supported and supporting command PR responsibilities.

#### **Appendix 5 to Annex C**

4-17. Developed by the Combatant Command or Joint Task Force staff, this appendix of joint operations plans or OPORDs details PR responsibilities and procedures for a specific operation.

#### **PR Standing Operating Procedures**

4-18. Developed by the Combatant Command staff or JTF staff in conjunction with the JPRC, the PR SOP also contains PR information specific to an individual operation, describing in detail how commanders and staffs, recovery forces, and isolated personnel must interact to conduct successful PR missions. Since the geographic area for each operation may be different, there may be several PR SOPs in existence in an AOR where simultaneous operations are conducted in different JOAs.

4-19. Much of the information in the PR SOP is directed at commanders, staffs, and recovery forces. However, familiarity with PR SOP will provide potential IMDC personnel information on how C2 and recovery forces are going to conduct operations, enabling IMDC personnel to become an active part of their own recovery. It is the PR cell's responsibility to extract information from these documents and disseminate it to their commands in classified and unclassified formats.

4-20. The PR SOP is authoritative guidance for planning and executing PR operations. Examples of information contained in a PR SOP are:

- Recovery force roles and responsibilities.
- C2 within a recovery force.
- Responsibilities and duties of each element of a recovery force.
- Procedures for planning, execution, and requesting support for a recovery force.

#### **PR Special Instructions**

4-21. The PR Special Instructions (SPINs) are developed by the JPRC (in conjunction with the staff and other components) and details perishable or changing PR information specifically for use by recovery forces and IMDC personnel. The PR SPINs are typically disseminated electronically on SIPRNET and published on a quarterly schedule, with weekly and daily updates as required. Staff member (particularly PR cell personnel), unit, and individual familiarity with this information are essential for successful recoveries. Examples of information found in the PR SPINs include:

- SARDOT locations and reporting procedures.
- SARNEG procedures.
- Hand held GPS configuration instructions.
- IMDC personnel contact and communication procedures.
- C2 responsibilities within a recovery force.
- PR mission code words.
- Communication/navigation radio configurations.
- PR-specific communications frequencies.
- ISOPREP/EPA guidance (completion, storage, and use).
- Evasion guidance.
- Authentication data and procedures for use.
- Signaling procedures.

#### **Isolated Personnel Guidance**

4-22. The Isolated Personnel Guidance (IPG) is a standalone document containing information and guidance for individuals to assist in their successful survival of a captivity situation. Existing IPGs for specific countries and operations can be found on the SIPRNET at www.jpra.jfcom.smil.mil.

#### **Specific ISOPREP / EPA guidance**

4-23. The Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) is the most important source of authentication data in use by US and some multinational forces. It is the primary tool used by recovery forces to positively authenticate an isolated person. If not completed during pre-mobilization activities, this form must be completed during the mobilization phase and maintained IAW guidance contained in the PR SOP.

4-24. All individuals operating in or over hostile or uncertain territory should also develop an evasion plan of action (EPA) and review it prior to each mission. The EPA is the means by which potential IMDC personnel relay their evasion actions.

4-25. When these two documents are completed by potential IMDC personnel, they become "guidance" to recovery forces and commanders and staffs, detailing personal information for authentication and planning information the IP intends to follow if evading. This information enables commanders, staffs, and units to execute the most effective recovery COA.

#### Family support plans and activities

4-26. Unit family support plans are finalized during pre-mobilization activities and should include procedures for supporting the family members of IMDC personnel during and after an IMDC event. Casualty assistance, religious support, public affairs guidance, and channels of communication should all be addressed.

#### EQUIPMENT

4-27. PR equipment not on hand that is required by the supported command must be acquired during deployment activities. Examples include unique signaling/location devices, survival radios, blood chits, and evasion charts.

#### **EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

4-28. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals complete PR training required by the supported command that was not completed during pre-mobilization preparation. The most advantageous sites to conduct PR education and training required by the theater prior to arrival are at home station or the mobilization site. An example of training of this type is the theater IMDC brief (also referred to as the theater high-risk-of-capture [HRC] brief). Theater guidance will detail required PR training for incoming forces.

4-29. PR training must also be included in exercises. Mission rehearsal exercises, command post exercises, command post exercises, and combat training center exercises are ideal venues to train for PR.

#### Rehearsals

4-30. PR rehearsals are the most important preparation activities. Practicing PR actions prior to an actual IMDC event is critical to successful PR operations. PR rehearsals optimally include all participants in a PR mission; commanders and their staffs, units expected to perform PR operations, and potential IMDC personnel. While these elements can certainly rehearse individual and collective actions independent from each other, a rehearsal with all participants exercises the entire PR plan, from the initial report through reintegration, and evaluates the ability of all participants to complete critical actions to resolve an IMDC event.

4-31. Even if time does not permit a full rehearsal with all participants, some form of rehearsal must take place with all key leaders. FM 6-0, Appendix F, contains detailed information on conducting rehearsals. The purpose of a PR rehearsal is to:

- Reinforce training.
- Increase proficiency in key PR tasks.
- Identify decision points.
- Synchronize actions of command and staff, units, and individuals.
- Synchronize battlefield operating systems during execution.
- Confirm internal and external coordination requirements.
- Increase leader understanding of PR concept of operations.
- Allow participants to become familiar with the operation and visualize the plan.
- Orient participants to a specific PR plan.
- Identify shortfalls for resolution (manpower, training, and equipment).
- Identify possible actions and reactions required during PR operations.
- Provide a forum for subordinates and supporting leaders and units to coordinate.
- Provide familiarity with intra-service equipment and procedures.
- Foster confidence in the ability to execute PR operations.
- 4-32. The extent of PR rehearsals depends on time and resources available. PR rehearsals should:
  - Include all key command and staff elements, rehearsing their actual roles and responsibilities for PR during the rehearsal.
  - Approximate actual conditions in theater.
  - Evaluate communications capability.
  - Evaluate application of the rules of engagement during PR missions.
  - Are realistic and involve chance, contingencies, and a ruthless, thinking enemy using most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs.
  - Allow initiative and improvisation.
  - Include actions on the PR objective, maneuver and fires, critical actions, actions on contact, passage of lines, and contingencies.
  - Use the same information systems (INFOSYS) and equipment expected to be used in actual operations.

• Be documented, with results distributed to all participants.

4-33. Table 4-3 lists the PR execution tasks and key supporting tasks for PR rehearsals. Table 4-4 (page 4-8) summarizes mobilization PR preparation activities.

Task	Commander and Staff	Units	Individuals
Report	<ul> <li>Receive IMDC report</li> <li>Validate report</li> <li>Determine unit/ID of IMDC</li> <li>Determine location of IMDC event</li> <li>Determine medical condition of IMDC</li> <li>Transmit report horizontally and vertically</li> <li>Alert potential recovery forces</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Receive report</li> <li>Confirm higher HQ and PR cell have report</li> <li>Begin initial recovery planning</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Report situation IAW established procedures</li> <li>Use survival/evasion techniques</li> <li>Use survival equipment</li> <li>Use established authentication procedures</li> </ul>
Locate	<ul> <li>Pinpoint IMDC personnel location</li> <li>Identify threats to recovery units</li> <li>Identify threats to IMDC personnel</li> <li>Determine necessary forces for mission</li> <li>Select recovery method appropriate to situation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Confirm IMDC location with PRCC</li> <li>Identify threats to units</li> <li>Identify threats to IMDC</li> <li>Determine necessary forces for mission</li> <li>Verify all forces have current IMDC location</li> <li>Begin detailed planning</li> </ul>	Provide location IAW established procedures
Support	<ul> <li>Communicate with IMDC personnel</li> <li>Provide fire support to IMDC personnel</li> <li>Implement family support plan</li> <li>Confirm recovery method and forces</li> <li>Obtain execute decision</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Determine support required for recovery units and IMDC personnel</li> <li>Finalize recovery planning</li> <li>Receive execution decision</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Relay support requirements</li><li>Prepare for recovery</li></ul>
Recover	<ul> <li>Transmit execute order</li> <li>Monitor mission progress</li> <li>Allocate additional recovery and supporting forces as needed</li> <li>Alert reintegration channels and resources of imminent IMDC recovery</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Locate IMDC personnel</li> <li>Transmit progress reports</li> <li>Protect IMDC</li> <li>Authenticate IMDC</li> <li>Gain custody of IMDC</li> <li>Transport individuals as directed by higher</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Perform IMDC actions to facilitate recovery</li> <li>Provide situation update to recovery forces</li> <li>Comply with recovery force directions</li> </ul>
Reintegrate	<ul> <li>Coordinate transportation of individuals from recovery forces to medical facility</li> <li>Assess IMDC medical condition</li> <li>Conduct SERE / intelligence debriefs</li> <li>Monitor reintegration activities</li> <li>Gather lessons learned</li> <li>Assess event / adjust as necessary</li> <li>Identify basic necessities required by recovered personnel</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Assess event and adjust as necessary</li> <li>Reconstitute for next IMDC event</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Participate in SERE and intelligence debriefs</li> <li>Complete medical evaluation</li> </ul>

Table 4-3. PR execution task rehearsal matrix

	Commanders/staffs	Units	Individuals
Guidance	Review theater PR regulation	Review theater PR	Review operation-specific
	Review App 5 to Annex C of	regulation	IMDC guidance
	theater OPLAN	<ul> <li>Review operation specific recovery procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Refine ISOPREP/EPA if necessary</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Review operation-specific C2 procedures</li> </ul>	Refine unit PR SOPs	Review Isolated Personnel
	•		Guidance (IPG)
	Develop PR plan	<ul> <li>Isolated Personnel Guidance (IPG)</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Develop family and religious support plan</li> </ul>		
	Rear-echelon PR PA guidance		
Equipment	Identify facilities for PR cell	Review equipment	Ensure familiarity with
	<ul> <li>Review operation specific equipment requirements</li> <li>Fill equipment shortfalls for units and individuals</li> </ul>	requirements	equipment
		<ul> <li>Request equipment to fill shortfalls</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Test and train on new equipment</li> </ul>	
Education /	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training</li> </ul>
Training	<b>v v</b>		Complete ISOPREP/EPA
	<ul> <li>Rehearse PR plan and procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Rehearse PR plan and procedures</li> </ul>	
	procedures	p. 000 unoo	Rehearse ISOPREP/EPA and recovery procedures

# DEPLOYMENT

4-34. An advanced echelon (ADVON) typically deploys ahead of the main body of forces. The PR cell director or deputy director accompanies the advance party. PR responsibilities of the ADVON include:

- Identify C2 facilities/equipment already in place.
- Verify sufficient facility space for PR cell.
- Confirm PR planning guidance provided by JFC.
- Establish connectivity with the PR architecture for the supported commander.
- Identify ports of debarkation locations (PR equipment and personnel accountability).
- Identify/confirm reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) sites and procedures (personnel accountability and PR training location considerations).
- Identify PR training requirements not noted during pre-mobilization and confirm training site locations.
- Confirm PR equipment requirements for arriving forces.

4-35. During deployment, commanders must determine who will be providing PR coverage for their arriving forces. Until commanders can build sufficient combat power to provide PR for their forces, other forces in theater must provide PR support. Early and continuous connectivity with the theater PR architecture enables commanders to report IMDC incidents during deployment. This also allows commanders to report unit status when ready to assume responsibility for assigned PR missions.

4-36. Accountability of equipment and personnel can be challenging during deployment. Personnel and equipment arrive at the port of debarkation (POD) and begin RSOI at different times. Personnel and equipment may even arrive at different PODs. This requires that forces link up with equipment and supplies, sometimes at an intermediate location prior to movement to the staging location. Strict accountability during this phase prevents triggering erroneous IMDC events and ensures that actual events are quickly reported to the theater PR architecture.

#### GUIDANCE

4-37. Commanders, staffs, and units ensure they have the current PR guidance for the operation and review internal guidance/SOPs for compliance and adequacy.

#### EQUIPMENT

4-38. Commanders and staffs, units/ and individuals check equipment to ensure it survived the deployment process and is still operable. Any non-operable equipment must be identified and replacement equipment requested.

#### **EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

4-39. During the deployment stage, personnel attend any PR training required by the supported command that was not completed during pre-mobilization or mobilization activities. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals from different Services must also have the opportunity to train and rehearse together prior to employment as a joint force.

4-40. This also applies to multinational recovery missions. Recovery forces from different nations participating as a multinational force must train together to identify capabilities and limitations, differing operating procedures, and possible language barriers. Rehearsals with other nations participating in the operation allow the development of effective tactics, techniques, and procedures and facilitate interoperability during multinational PR operations.

4-41. By the end of the deployment process, commanders and staffs, units, and individuals have reviewed and developed PR guidance, acquired and operationally tested their equipment, conducted extensive rehearsals, and completed any education and training required prior to employment. Table 4-5 summarizes deployment PR preparation activities.

	Commanders/staffs	Units	Individuals
Guidance	<ul> <li>Implement deployment accountability plans</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Review theater PR regulation</li> </ul>	Review operation-specific     IMDC guidance
	<ul> <li>Develop family and religious support plan</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Review operation specific recovery procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Refine ISOPREP/EPA if necessary</li> </ul>
	Rear-echelon PR PA guidance	Refine unit PR SOPs	Review Isolated Personnel
		<ul> <li>Isolated Personnel Guidance (IPG)</li> </ul>	Guidance (IPG)
Equipment	<ul> <li>Confirm facilities for PR cells</li> <li>Fill equipment shortfalls for units and individuals</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Verify equipment operability after deployment to theater</li> </ul>	Ensure familiarity with     equipment
		<ul> <li>Request equipment to replace inoperable equipment</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Test and train on new equipment</li> </ul>	
Education / Training	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training not previously completed</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training not previously completed</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Attend operation-specific PR briefings and training not previously completed</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Rehearse PR plan and procedures</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Rehearse PR plan and procedures</li> </ul>	Rehearse ISOPREP/EPA     and recovery procedures

#### Table 4-5. Deployment PR preparation activities

### **EMPLOYMENT**

4-42. Preparation does not stop when employment begins. Rehearsals and battle drills continue and should become more demanding as skills increase. Procedures are refined as after action reviews from PR operations identify changes required in task organization, command relationships, and recovery TTP. New and replacement personnel will require training and equipment. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals continue to refine their skills throughout the employment phase of operations.

# REDEPLOYMENT

4-43. As units redeploy, either back to CONUS or to another AO, actions accomplished for PR are similar to those undertaken during deployment. An important task is the transfer of PR responsibility, including the key task of transferring lessons learned gathered during AARs. If units are redeploying to CONUS, PR responsibility for the AO is transferred to incoming forces. If redeploying to another AO, units must integrate into that AO's established PR architecture or build one if it does not exist.

4-44. Accountability is another concern during redeployment. As units begin movement, commanders must maintain accountability of personnel that are often at different locations during the redeployment process.

# CONCLUSION

4-45. Thorough PR preparation by commanders and staffs, units, and individuals (including supporting DA civilians and DA contractors) results in a trained and integrated team appropriately equipped to conduct PR operations within their assigned AO and in support of the joint force. Realistic, demanding rehearsals orient the team to the battlefield situation and continuously hone PR skills.

# Chapter 5 PR Execution

# GENERAL PR EXECUTION PRINCIPLES

5-1. During execution there is one overriding goal – to employ sufficient combat power to return IMDC personnel to safety. All the elements of the PR architecture must work together to that end; commanders, staffs, units, and IMDC personnel function as a team during PR execution. General execution principles include:

- Identifying the nature of the IMDC event and designing a workable solution.
- Monitoring the COP and recognizing significant elements of an IMDC event.
- Using established and rehearsed processes and procedures.
- Using all available resources to collect and disseminate IMDC event information.
- Effective coordination throughout the PR architecture.
- Employing the recovery method and units appropriate to the event.

### REPORT

5-2. Timely delivery of IMDC reports to the PR cell is crucial for successful recoveries. Reports from the initial person or agency that becomes aware of an IMDC event must be passed to the PR cell directly and quickly. It is all too easy for an IMDC report to flow into a parallel staff or subordinate unit channel and never get passed to the operations channel. A potential method for preventing this from happening is including IMDC events in the CCIR.

5-3. Reports with missing data, incorrect call signs, inaccurate positions, or incorrect IMDC identities all seriously hamper recovery efforts. Report data must be consistent, complete, accurate, and delivered shortly after initial awareness of an IMDC event by any party. Commanders, staff members, units, and individuals must all have the means to transmit and receive PR reports. During the report phase of PR execution, the following actions occur:

- Transmit the report of an IMDC event.
- Receive the report.
- Validate the report by cross-queuing multiple sources.
- Record IMDC event information.
- Disseminate event information to all concerned.
- Establish communications with IMDC personnel if possible.
- Request support as required.
- Start the PR incident folder.
- Alert units.

#### TRANSMIT THE REPORT

5-4. Commanders, staffs, PR cells, recovery forces, and units in the field cannot react to an IMDC event if they are unaware one has occurred. IMDC events are reported through operations, intelligence, and personnel channels to ensure situational awareness. Rapid reporting of an IMDC

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event, particularly to PR cells, is critical for initiating a timely recovery mission.

5-5. Initial communications of actual, suspected, or potential IMDC events are often transmitted on the frequency being used to control the ongoing operation, versus a dedicated PR frequency. PR cells should have the capability to monitor the primary operations frequency for indications of IMDC events. Gathering the information directly from the initiating source saves time and reduces confusion by skipping the normal intermediate reporting stations and going directly to the PR cell.

5-6. Precious planning, preparation, and execution time is lost when an incident goes unreported or when the initial report is stuck in non-operations channels. The difficulty lies in surmounting the sometimes many communication obstacles between IMDC personnel, units observing an IMDC event and the PR cell. Information about an IMDC event must be transmitted, via the most direct means, to the PR cell so they can begin coordinating a response.

5-7. Even if an immediate recovery mission is mounted by forces in the area, the report must still be passed to the PR cell so they can monitor the progress of the immediate recovery attempt and begin coordinating support. Also, the PR cell can begin coordinating a deliberate/external supported effort in the event immediate recovery is not possible.

5-8. Reports can come via a variety of methods. On scene observations, lost unit accountability, beacon transmissions (on frequencies 243.0 and 406 MHz), or radio transmissions from IMDC personnel are all methods of transmitting reports of IMDC events. PR cells must be prepared to receive IMDC reports via any of these methods.

5-9. Reports of an IMDC event have priority over routine communications. Anyone receiving information about an IMDC event must immediately cease routine transmissions which may interfere with the report and monitor the communications channel being used for the call.

5-10. The ability of a PR cell to respond to an IMDC event depends largely on the information it receives in the initial report. Since the initial report may not come to the PR cell directly from the IMDC person, the intermediate reporting entity (on-scene observer, aircraft that heard it, unit with lost accountability) performs a pivotal role in the PR reporting process. PR cells depend on these reporting "middlemen" to provide accurate, timely information about the event. If the PR cell does not receive the initial report, it must be retransmitted immediately to them. The initial report cannot stay in personnel reporting, intelligence, or subordinate unit channels - it must get to the PR cell. Conversely, if the report goes directly to the PR cell, it must be retransmitted throughout the PR architecture once validated.

#### **RECEIVE THE REPORT**

5-11. Reports may come from many sources. Figure 5-1 depicts possible sources of reporting information about a single IMDC event. The critical skill of the PR cell is identifying that these separate reports may all apply to a single incident.

5-12. IMDC reports have precedence over routine communication traffic on operations nets. As soon as possible, all communications concerning a particular IMDC event must be moved to a dedicated PR communication channel(s). This prevents interference with time-sensitive PR communications by routine or other operations communications messages.

#### **RECORD IMDC EVENT INFORMATION**

5-13. The PR cell must maintain accurate records of all information it receives – intermediate reporting elements and units preparing for a recovery mission are expected to do the same. As events unfold during an IMDC event, they should be recorded in a log which will become a part of the permanent event folder. The entries in the log will be the primary record of the chronology of the case. This is particularly important if the IMDC is not recovered during the course of operations. After combat operations, unrecovered IMDCs are still looked for. The agencies conducting these operations require accurate records of the event in order to organize their operations. These operations sometimes take place years after combat operations have ceased, so gathering this information at the time of the event is required.

5-14. The initial notification of an incident should be entered on a standardized form. Use of a standardized form will assist with gathering important event details from the reporting source. This is particularly important if the reporting source is not experienced in PR or does not understand precisely what information they should be providing. The person making the initial report may be excited or under stress. A standard form that is readily available ensures that all available information on important event details is obtained during the initial report.




Figure 5-1. Hypothetical IMDC reporting channels

5-15. Using equipment with recording and playback capability can lead to identification of information missed in the initial report. In some cases it can be an authentication method if the IMDC personnel reported their situation. Unit personnel may be able to identify the voice of an IMDC person in the absence of other authentication information or capability.

5-16. Get as much of the following information as possible during the initial report. A few extra minutes spent obtaining additional information can save time during the locate, support, and recovery phases of PR execution. Information not obtained initially must be obtained throughout the coordination process. However, don't let the process of recording information impede the overall recovery effort. Remember that

the principal goal of PR execution is the recovery of the IMDC personnel, not meticulous record keeping. As much of the following information as possible should be gathered when receiving the initial report:

#### **Reporting source/date-time group**

5-17. Include reporting source and date-time group (DTG) on all information received. This allows the information to be chronologically organized in the event of a protracted recovery effort (maybe over days or weeks) and provides a sequential timeline of events for gathering lessons learned. This is also important when determining what information was available at key decision points during an IMDC event.

#### **Event time and location**

5-18. Ideally, the initial report arrives with location information. Often, however, only partial information is available from which to estimate the time and location of the IMDC event. Every effort must be made to obtain additional information which, when analyzed, will reduce the size of the area most likely to contain IMDC personnel. Additional information may include communications from the IMDC prior to the event or observations by other persons which might be related to the event or the conditions that led to it. The effort to obtain more information should continue until all IMDC personnel have been located and continue to be refined until they are recovered or otherwise accounted for.

#### Cause

5-19. The cause of the event often has a direct impact on which method of recovery is used and what type of assets will be employed. If an aircraft was shot down by high volumes of small arms fire, it may not be advisable to send more aircraft into the area to conduct an immediate recovery attempt until the level of threat can be verified and appropriate countermeasures taken. Conversely, if the event was caused by a navigation error or equipment malfunction in friendly areas, the range of recovery methods and units capable of conducting a recovery may be much wider.

#### **IMDC** location

5-20. Accurate IMDC locations are critical to PR missions. If the wrong area is searched there is no hope that recovery units will find the IMDCs, regardless of the quality of their tactics or the amount of their effort.

5-21. Initial reports often contain inaccurate or missing IMDC location information. IMDC locations contained in the initial report must be confirmed via another location method if possible. Don't confuse the event location with IMDC location – IMDC location is often different from the point at which the event occurred. Pilots evade from crash sites, personnel may be captured immediately after the event occurred, or IMDC personnel may have traveled a significant distance from their last known point before their current location is determined.

5-22. Date/time last seen or accounted for may be the only location information initially available. Other information of use when precise location cannot be determined and there is no contact with IMDC is:

- Date/time at point of departure.
- Planned route of travel.
- Speed.
- Possible route deviations.
- Estimated time of arrival (ETA) at destination.
- Current situation vicinity IMDC.

5-23. If an IMDC location is stated in the initial report, an initial analysis of friendly and enemy situations near the IMDC is conducted. If friendly forces are nearby, an immediate recovery may be possible. If the IMDC is in an area of significant enemy forces, providing immediate support to the IMDC may be necessary.

#### **IMDC** identities

5-24. Determining the identities of IMDC personnel serves several purposes. Their unit can be contacted (if it was not the reporting source), ISOPREP/EPA information can be obtained, or their location can be estimated if it is not already known or contained in the initial report. IMDC identification also facilitates initial family support activities at home station during the event.

#### IMDC numbers

5-25. Identifying the numbers of IMDC personnel associated with a particular incident has a direct impact on which recovery resources will be used. If there are 12 IMDC located together and it is determined that the suitable recovery vehicle is an armored asset, sufficient vehicles need to be sent to the location to recover all IMDCs as quickly as possible.

#### **IMDC** medical condition

5-26. The medical condition of the IMDC personnel has a direct impact on assets used for recovery and time available to conduct that recovery. A seriously injured IMDC, even in uncontested environments, may not have much time and requires definitive medical care immediately. An uninjured IMDC does not impose time restrictions, from a medical perspective.

#### **Recovery actions currently underway**

5-27. If an immediate recovery attempt is in progress, the details need to be communicated to the PR cell. This allows the PR cell to determine what support is required, if any, by the units conducting the immediate recovery. It also permits notification of the other staff and support elements to begin a coordinated effort to support the reintegration of IMDC after a successful recovery.

5-28. If the immediate recovery is unsuccessful and the PR cell is aware of what actions were not successful, it can avoid including those actions when coordinating a deliberate or external supported recovery.

#### Other IMDC info to gather

5-29. The following information should also be gathered :

- IMDC unit(s).
- Copy of the ISOPREP (if completed).
- Copy of the EPA (if completed).
- IMDC equipment.
- Communications.
- Survival.
- Evasion aids.
- Navigation equipment, EVC, blood chit.
- Clothing/footwear.
- IMDC SERE training level.

5-30. SERE training levels of IMDC personnel are indications of their preparedness to survive initial isolation, and possibly captivity, until a recovery effort can be conducted. It also provides an indication, in conjunction with the EPA, of what the IMDC's intentions are after isolation. This information can be used to narrow the size of the area containing the probable IMDC location, allowing the PR cell to focus location efforts of supporting organizations.

#### VALIDATE REPORT

5-31. After receiving the initial report and recording the information, the PR cell validates the report. The primary purpose for validation is to determine if the report is an actual IMDC event, a false alert, or a

deception effort by the enemy. The principal methods of determining report validity are determining source validity; checking information with operational documents; checking information with unit operations.

5-32. Determine source validity. The source of the initial (and subsequent) reports provides an indication about the validity of the report. A report coming to the PR cell (or to an intermediate reporting element) from an AWACS aircraft via secure channels can be considered more reliable than a voice transmission monitored on an unsecured emergency frequency, such as 243.0 MHz, from an unidentified source. This is not to say that the latter is automatically considered suspect, but it requires additional scrutiny to determine the identity of the person making the emergency transmission.

5-33. Check report information with operational documents. Checking the information contained in the initial report with current operational documents furthers the process of determining report validity. If a call sign of the IMDC person(s) is contained in the report, the call sign should be verified by cross-checking ground, air, and maritime OPORDs and FRAGOs, and communications plans.

5-34. Check report information with unit operations. If the call sign is not contained in an operational document, or no call sign was used, the report information must be checked with tactical units to determine if they are using that particular call sign or if they have personnel who are unaccounted for. Additionally, other staff sections should be queued for any knowledge of the call sign or accountability problems.

5-35. If the information in the initial report cannot be validated by any of these methods, the event may be a deception effort by the enemy. If this is suspected, this information is disseminated throughout the PR architecture for further analysis and any necessary adjustments (OPSEC review, frequency changes, codeword changes, etc). Although deception efforts can cause wasted effort, personnel should treat any alert of an IMDC event as genuine until they know differently.

#### **False alerts**

5-36. If the initial report is not considered to be a deception effort and the IMDC personnel listed in the report are accounted for and were not beyond P2 at any time, this is considered a false alert. Causes of false alerts include equipment malfunctions, interference, testing, and inadvertent human error. Although false alerts can cause wasted effort, personnel should treat any alert of an IMDC event as genuine until they know differently.

5-37. Records must be kept of all false alerts and their causes. If an alert is determined to be false, PRCC should transmit that fact to all personnel in the reporting chain.

#### Preventing false alerts

5-38. Ensure individuals know how to operate their PR communications equipment, the importance of avoiding false alerts and steps to be taken to prevent transmitting false alerts. Individuals must not transmit on dedicated PR frequencies to "see if they work." These frequencies are monitored for any indication of an IMDC event, often by several different organizations.

5-39. If a specific model of emergency communications equipment repeatedly transmits unintended alerts, investigate the cause and inform appropriate organizations.

5-40. Give instruction to the units during battle drills on how emergency equipment should be used for emergency functions. Ensure battle drills are never allowed to cause false alerts.

5-41. Ensure equipment testing personnel are properly trained and have the appropriate testing equipment.

5-42. Use caution when working around emergency locating transmitters (ELTs) installed in aircraft, including ejection seats, to prevent inadvertent activation. Even though these devices transmit only beacon signals, monitoring systems and agencies will detect the beacon and must respond to the transmission as an actual IMDC event.

5-43. If equipment is to be tested using exercise frequencies, this must be coordinated by the JPRC to ensure that the PR architecture is informed of the test or exercise and does not respond as if it were an actual event. Equipment testing of this nature must be conducted very carefully and with appropriate coordination.




Figure 5-2. SARIR distribution chart

#### **ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH IMDC**

5-44. If possible, initiate a communications search and a radio listening watch if IMDC contact is not immediately established. The IMDC may be able to provide additional information not contained in the initial report. Establishing communications also informs the IMDC that others are aware of their situation and are developing recovery plans.

#### **DISSEMINATE INCIDENT INFORMATION TO PR ARCHITECTURE**

5-45. After evaluating all information received in the initial report, and taking into account the degree of urgency, the PR cell should immediately disseminate the information to all key PR architecture nodes capable of providing assistance to the recovery effort. This report is transmitted in the Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR) format and should not be delayed unnecessarily for confirmation of all details. The initial SARIR should be transmitted as soon as details of a reported IMDC event are validated and become clear enough to indicate a PR response will be required. Examples of message formats are included

in Appendix F. Figure 5-2 (page 5-7) depicts typical dissemination paths for the SARIR and follow-on information as it is collected.

#### **START THE INCIDENT FOLDER**

5-46. All information pertaining to a specific PR incident should be placed in an easily identified and labeled file folder for use during the event. This serves as a consolidated storage file for all event information in case the recovery becomes protracted and event information needs to be re-examined for different courses of action. A central folder for event information also allows a PR cell director to provide information required by the C2 architecture to support decision making.

### LOCATE

5-47. If the IMDC location is unknown at the time of the initial report, every effort must be made to determine the location and status of the IMDC. Without knowing where the IMDC is, recovery efforts cannot commence.

5-48. Confirm IMDC location accuracy. Physical searches of large areas are normally not practical. Therefore, the next step is to develop sets of known facts and carefully considered assumptions describing what may have happened to the IMDC since they were last known to be within positive or procedural control. This assists the PR cell with establishing a corresponding geographic reference for the IMDC's most probable location. Knowing the possible IMDC locations, based on information gathered to this point, allows the PR cell to determine where to focus further information gathering activities related to the event and whether an incoming report might apply to the event.


5-49. Once determined (or estimated), the IMDC location should be plotted on a map or displayed as an overlay on the COP containing operational data for the force at large. This assists in initially identifying potential recovery forces and proximity to enemy forces for more detailed planning efforts. Units in the immediate vicinity should be alerted to the incident as soon as possible. This makes them aware of an IMDC in their AO, facilitates an initial threat assessment, and allows nearby units to determine their capabilities to execute an immediate recovery. These units can also provide information about the event that may not have been available in the initial report.

5-50. Locations have various degrees of accuracy. An airborne asset with a location derived from direction finding a radio transmission from 30,000' may have sizeable error. This may be close enough to further narrow the scope of the location effort but may not be accurate enough for ground troops to locate the IMDC, particularly in enemy held areas. Pinpoint position accuracy is a continuous effort until the IMDC personnel are back in friendly areas. Figure 5-3 illustrates a method of confirming or determining an IMDC location if is not received in the initial report.

5-51. Methods of determining the accuracy of an IMDC location include the source of location information, method of determining location, and cross-queuing intelligence assets to confirm the location.

#### SOURCE OF LOCATION INFORMATION

5-52. The source of location information is an important factor in assessing the reliability and accuracy of the location. Examples of different sources of location information include those provided by personnel or assets that observed the incident (via any means), location information provided by intelligence assets, and location information provided by the IMDC person.



5-53. Location information provided by local observation is often an estimate based on the location of the reporting source. The accuracy depends on the ability of the reporting source to accurately determine their location and the method used to estimate the location of the IMDC event. Possible sources of this type of location information are air, ground, or maritime resources that are on-scene or close by.

5-54. Location information provided by intelligence collection varies with the intelligence method used to determine that location. These locations typically include an estimated position error. Estimated position error information should accompany the location coordinates of the collection. PR cell personnel should not assume that a grid coordinate provided by intelligence collection is absolute. If the estimated position error does not accompany the location, PR cell personnel must ask for the information from the reporting source.

5-55. Location information provided by IMDC personnel, provided they do not indicate they are under duress, should have a high priority. Many times this location is the most accurate if several different locations are provided by different reporting sources.

#### METHOD OF DETERMINING LOCATION

5-56. Coupling the method of determining a location with the reporting source further enhances confidence in the accuracy of the location. Examples of methods of determining an IMDC location are;

- Extrapolation of IMDC travel from a last known point.
- IMDC uses a GPS to determine their location.
- IMDC estimates their location by comparing their local surroundings with a map.
- IMDC determines bearing and distance to the SARDOT.
- Forces observing the event use distance and bearing relative to their position to estimate the IMDC location.

5-57. A SARDOT is a geographic location known only to friendly forces, which allows an IMDC to pass his or her location over an unsecured radio net without compromising their location. The PR SPINs lists SARDOT locations, coordinate format, map datum, and GPS programming procedures, including bearing and distance formats.

5-58. The SARNEG is a 10-letter code word, with no repeating letters, that corresponds to the numbers 0 through 9. It allows an individual to pass his or her encrypted location over an unsecured radio net without compromising their position. Normal procedures are to pass latitude and longitude without regard for the directional indicators. The PR SPINs or SOP will normally direct coordinate format and SARNEG reporting procedures. An example of a SARNEG is code is shown below.

	Table	5-1.	SAR	NEG	enco	oding	j exa	mple			
Ē		С	0	м	в	Δ	Т	н	F	I	

	SARNEG		C	0	M	В	A		Η	E	L	Р	
	To encode u	ise	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
ina	the evenue	in t	ahla	5 1	26201	N 01	125E				aada	1	the

5-59. Using the example in table 5-1, 2630N 01125E would be encoded via the SARNEG "COMBATHELP" and passed as "MHBCCOOMT". The SARNEG can also be used to pass locations in military grid reference system format.

5-60. Of these examples, an IMDC-provided location using a properly programmed and initialized GPS device is often the most accurate.

#### **CROSS-QUEUE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND ALL DISCIPLINES**

5-61. Relying on a single intelligence discipline, capability, or agency to provide an accurate location may not provide the fidelity required. If the IMDC location is not known or is considered to be suspect, crossqueuing all intelligence disciplines can result in locations from different sources that can corroborate each other. If several different locations, from different collection capabilities, all plot closely together on a map, the confidence that the IMDC is actually at or very near one of those locations is much higher than, for example, a single SIGINT detection of a radio transmission.

5-62. Assets from several different agencies must also be coordinated to verify the accuracy and validity of a location. Capabilities from subordinate components can be combined with theater and national intelligence agencies to confirm the IMDC location. Typically, the JPRC requests the use of national and theater assets, while the PRCCs coordinate for the use of component intelligence assets.

#### PASS LOCATION TO PR ARCHITECTURE

5-63. Once the location is determined with reasonable accuracy it is disseminated throughout the PR architecture so they can begin refining plans for recovery. As further location updates arrive they must be vetted and disseminated in the most expeditious manner. The goal is for everyone working the event to have the latest, most reliable location information. If there are conflicting locations coming in from several sources, a decision must be made as to which location is most probable and should receive the most effort and attention. The PR cell makes this decision for deliberate and external supported recoveries.

#### **UPDATE LOCATION CONTINUOUSLY**

5-64. Even if the IMDC location is determined to be accurate and reliable, it should be continuously updated until recovery forces take custody of the IMDC. Survivors in maritime environments are subject to currents, on land they may move to a more suitable location or begin evading enemy forces.

#### **BEGIN MDMP**

5-65. As planning for the recovery begins, it is important to evaluate all information and assumptions regularly and as new information becomes available. Re-evaluating assumptions is especially critical. If assumptions are not regularly re-evaluated, an otherwise sound recovery COA may not succeed because the planners' judgment was clouded by a false assumption being interpreted as fact.

5-66. As more information is collected and assumptions about the event are transformed into fact, courses of action for recovery can be more accurately developed. PR cells, units, and supporting organizations continue to refine their plans for recovery. Information concerning the event is continuously updated until IMDC personnel are successfully recovered. This is particularly important for events of long duration.

5-67. One of the main factors for a recovery mission is the threat. While threats to the IMDC are identified and considered, the primary threat that must be determined is that which affects the recovery unit's/force's ability to successfully conduct a mission.

5-68. Enemy composition and disposition are primary factors when considering which method of recovery is most feasible. Enemy capabilities that prevent an immediate recovery might very well be manageable for a deliberate recovery combining the capabilities of several major subordinate commands. Likewise, enemy capabilities that prevent a deliberate recovery might be manageable for an external supported recovery utilizing the combined capabilities of several components to perform the mission.

5-69. Threat levels should not be considered static when planning recoveries. While the enemy situation is continually analyzed by the G/S-2, the PR cell considers all units available in order to successfully conduct recovery operations based on the intelligence analysis. An IMDC event may even require that the threat be substantially degraded before any recovery is attempted. For example, IMDC personnel in enemy territory that is heavily concentrated with enemy ground forces and protected with a robust enemy integrated air defense system (IADS) may have to evade or remain concealed until those enemy forces can be attacked and degraded by friendly forces to a point where a recovery attempt is possible.

5-70. Enemy capabilities to counter a recovery attempt may even be so robust that the only available method initially is to have the IMDC evade to a location where the threat is less severe. This was the case when multiple forces attempted to recover Lt Col Iceal Hambleton from North Vietnam in April, 1972. After multiple attempts to recover him in the middle of a North Vietnamese invasion operation across the established demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, the only viable option that remained (after over two weeks of effort and several lost recovery assets and personnel) was to have him evade to a point where friendly ground forces could recover him and return him to a point south of the concentration of enemy forces.

Mission	Immediate recovery	Deliberate recovery	ESR	Unassisted recovery
Enemy	<ul> <li>Enemy not present</li> <li>Enemy present but not in sufficient numbers or capability to prevent immediate recovery</li> <li>Uncoordinated or ineffective response to recent, similar events</li> <li>Not able to reinforce beyond capabilities of available forces</li> <li>Will likely attempt an uncoordinated response or interference attempt</li> <li>Threat non-existent or manageable by friendly forces in immediate area</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Enemy present in numbers and capability requiring combined-arms response</li> <li>Enemy altering tactics based on recent recoveries</li> <li>Ability to reinforce but not immediately</li> <li>Will attempt to counter recovery attempt with coordinated response</li> <li>Will capture IMDC if they can locate him</li> <li>Threat level robust enough to require coordinated response from 2 or more MSCs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Large numbers of enemy with robust air ground, and/or maritime capabilities</li> <li>Enemy has effectively interfered with recent immediate or deliberate recoveries</li> <li>Capable of rapid reinforcement to counter recovery</li> <li>Enemy conducts elaborate, coordinated PR ambushes</li> <li>IMDC movement will result in capture</li> <li>Threat level robust enough to require involvement of several components</li> <li>Robust captivity environment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Large numbers of enemy with robust air (or anti-air), ground, and/or maritime capabilities</li> <li>Actively and effectively engage responding forces</li> <li>Rapid reinforcement capability</li> <li>Enemy will immediately move captured personnel to hidden location</li> <li>Enemy will kill, rather than capture, IMDC personnel</li> <li>Threat level prohibits any external response from ground, air, or maritime assets</li> <li>Captivity environment</li> </ul>
Terrain and weather	<ul> <li>Terrain within capabilities of available forces</li> <li>Time not constrained by severe weather</li> </ul>	Requires capabilities of 2 or more MSCs	Beyond capabilities of component assets (high-angle, contested urban, high-altitude, severe weather, etc.)	<ul> <li>Weather or terrain prohibit location or communications</li> <li>Weather beyond capability of any available assets</li> </ul>
Troops / support available	Sufficient and available for immediate recovery	<ul> <li>Troops for immediate recovery not available</li> <li>No friendly troops in proximity</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Component does not possess capability to execute alone</li> <li>Component does not possess sufficient support assets or support not available</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Ongoing operations prohibit diversion of available recovery assets.</li> </ul>
Time available	<ul> <li>IMDC close enough that time is not a factor</li> <li>IMDC injuries not severe or within capabilities of immediate forces</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Immediate response required but troops in area do not have rapid response capability</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Enemy in proximity and can locate IMDC rapidly</li> <li>IMDC severely injured and must be treated at location (beyond component capabilities)</li> </ul>	Situation requires immediate evasion
Civilian factors	<ul> <li>Local populace not belligerent</li> <li>Recovery does not require precision or coordinated fires</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Local populace belligerent but not aware of IMDC in area</li> <li>Precision, coordinated fires required</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Local populace belligerent and aware of IMDC in area</li> <li>Precision, coordinated fires required</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Local populace non- belligerent</li> <li>Local populace will likely assist IMDC without alerting enemy forces</li> <li>IMDC presence mus be concealed</li> </ul>

#### Table 5-2. PR METT-TC factors

# **DEVELOP COA/RECOVERY METHOD**

5-71. Table 5-2 lists METT-TC factors that typically affect which recovery method is used.

#### **UNIT SELECTION**

5-72. Using all information gathered to this point and applying the known and assumed METT-TC factors, commanders and staffs identify units that are most capable of conducting a recovery under the current event conditions. Commanders and staffs consider all available units forces and choose the initial task organization that best fits the PR scenario that is presenting itself. Based on knowledge of the developing situation a commander may elect to begin movement of units toward the IMDC to gather more information about the situation and position friendly forces closer to the IMDC for a rapid response.

5-73. Once potential unit/force recovery task organization is identified, the commander passes a warning order to those units selected for the recovery, providing all information that the staff and PR cell has received thus far. This permits subordinate units to begin detailed tactical planning for the recovery.

### SUPPORT

5-74. While planning continues, IMDC personnel require support until units can conduct a recovery. IMDC personnel are authenticated to confirm their identities, family support is initiated with the rear detachment, and planning for the recovery is finalized and briefed to decision makers.

#### **ESTABLISH CONTROL MEASURES**

5-75. The staff, in conjunction with the PR cell, identifies any protection measures immediately required by the IMDC. Air, ground, and fire support control measures may need to be established to protect the IMDC personnel until they can be recovered. Airspace control measures restrict access into the airspace over the IMDC to only those assets that are supporting or executing the recovery. Fire support control measures protect the IMDC from friendly fires. As an example, if an IMDC is located in the vicinity of a pre-planned fires target, those fires may need to be delayed or otherwise adjusted to prevent fratricide, involving both the IMDC and responding units. Coordination of control measures is particularly important for events of long duration in enemy held areas.

#### CONTROL IMDC PERIMETER IF POSSIBLE

5-76. Setting a perimeter around an IMDC controls movement into and out of the area around the IMDC. For example, if the IMDC is located on contested urban terrain and the exact location has not yet been determined but a general location is known, it may be possible for responding military forces to control a perimeter around the suspected location. This enables further information gathering and may prevent enemy forces from transporting the IMDC out of the immediate area. In this example, even if recovery units cannot immediately respond they may be given the mission to block or contain the IMDC and enemy forces until a recovery can be executed.

#### DISSEMINATE IMDC AUTHENTICATION DATA

5-77. Recovery forces require IMDC authentication data for use during the terminal phase of recovery missions. Several types of authentication are available to the force that does not apply to a specific person. Operational PR authentication information such as the letter, word, and number of the day are typically used to authenticate IMDC personnel during the report and location phases. These authenticators should be used before other information.

#### PR word/letter/number of the day.

5-78. The PR word of the day (WOD), letter of the day (LOD), and number of the day (NOD) are means of authentication published in the special instruction. These authentication items should be used first when authenticating IMDC personnel. They are changed on a regular schedule and published with the regular SPINs updates.

5-79. This information is to be used when on-scene forces observe an IMDC event and attempt to establish communication with IMDC personnel. Use of this information should be reported to the PR cell as soon as

practicable, ideally with the initial report. Reporting the use of these authenticators establishes initial authentication of IMDC personnel, which can support validity of the initial report.

#### **Isolated Personnel Report information**

5-80. Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) data is typically reserved for use by recovery forces to conduct a final authentication just prior to recovery. However, the entire ISOPREP card should not be given to a recovery force. ISOPREPs are designed to be used multiple times during a recovery using only portions of the information on the ISOPREP. As an example, one of the four statements on an ISOPREP is typically reserved for use by an on-scene commander making initial communications contact with IMDC personnel, while a different statement is reserved for use by personnel who will be making the initial physical contact with IMDC personnel.

#### Challenge/password

5-81. There may be instances when an IMDC may not have knowledge of authentication information in the SPINs. In these instances, the challenge/password combination being used at the time of the event can be used to authenticate the IMDC.

5-82. Personal information provided by unit. In cases where other forms of authentication cannot be used, personal information about the IMDC can be obtained from their units. While other forms should be used first, this may be the only method recovery units have authenticating IMDC during the recovery.

#### AUTHENTICATE IMDC

5-83. IMDC authentication procedures ensure PR units are not responding to a deception or ambush effort by the enemy and that the IMDC being recovered is the one that units are looking for. There have been recovery efforts in past conflicts when recovery forces thought they were responding to an actual friendly IMDC when in fact they were greeted by a concentrated ambush effort when they arrived in the area. Authentication between recovery forces and IMDC personnel is designed to confirm that the event is not deception.

5-84. If the authentication already accomplished during efforts to this point do not result in a comfortable assurance that the identity of the IMDC has been verified and that he or she is not currently under duress, recovery forces have new, unused authentication information to use on initial contact – the information from the IMDC ISOPREP.

5-85. Conversely, IMDC personnel may use authentication information to verify the identity of personnel communicating with them. Recovery forces must be prepared to identify themselves with mutually understood authentication information should an IMDC person decide to use it to verify their identities.

5-86. PR cells continuously track authentication information that is used during recovery attempts and disseminate that information to the entire PR architecture. If a single piece of authentication information is used repeatedly on unsecured communication networks its security degrades. This is particularly true in environments where adversaries have the capability to monitor unsecured friendly communications. If a piece of authentication information is used to the point where its security becomes doubtful, that should be communicated throughout the force and that information should no longer be used. This is often a subjective decision by PR cells and recovery units participating in a mission.

#### CONFIRM MEDICAL CONDITION OF IMDC

5-87. Confirm the physical condition of the IMDC if it was not in the initial report. Reconfirm IMDC medical condition when first contact voice or data contact is made with the IMDC. If the medical condition has changed, this information is disseminated to the PR architecture. Ensure that any changes can be addressed by the responding recovery units.

#### MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH IMDC

5-88. Once communication is established with the IMDC, maintain communication. IMDC personnel are typically placed on a communications schedule to conserve battery life of radios and minimize the chances of enemy monitoring of communications.

#### UPDATE MDMP

5-89. During the planning process, METT-TC considerations are continually assessed in relation to new information received by the staff and PR cell. Commanders, staffs, units, and IMDC personnel continually assess the situation and adapt as new information comes to light.

#### SUPPORT IMDC FAMILY

5-90. As more information is gathered about the event, coordination with rear detachment personnel to ensure the family is adequately supported should be confirmed. For immediate recoveries the first indication that the family receives that their loved one was IMDC may be news of the recovery. For long duration events, such as known captivity, support to the family by casualty affairs officers, public affairs, chaplains, etc. becomes more important and can play a pivotal role in the successful recovery of IMDC personnel. Maintaining communications with IMDC Service representatives and with home station/unit representatives facilitates family support by these individuals during the event. For contract personnel, coordinate these actions through the contractor's company. The reintegration checklist in Appendix C lists family support considerations, as does the Department of the Army Reintegration OPLAN.

#### **CONFIRM RECOVERY METHOD AND UNITS REQUIRED**

5-91. After establishing that all information received about the event is accurate, confirm that the recovery method and forces/units selected to perform the recovery are adequate for the situation. Also confirm that forces selected for the mission and any support requested is available for execution once the mission has been briefed to decision makers and approved.

#### FINALIZE COA

5-92. The commander and staff, in conjunction with the PR cell (or units preparing for an immediate recovery) wargame and finalize all courses of action developed to this point and assemble the information for briefing the decision maker.

#### **BRIEF COA TO DECISION MAKER**

5-93. The PR cell briefs the appropriate decision maker on the COA recommended for the recovery. Often there is more than one feasible COA for a given recovery – in this instance all COAs are briefed and the PR cell recommends one for implementation. The decision maker may accept the recommended COA, blend portions of all briefed COAs into a new one, or reject all briefed COAs and direct that planning continue. If all COAs are rejected, the PR cell coordinates with other staff elements and recovery forces/units to develop new COAs. This continues until an acceptable COA is developed and selected for execution by the decision maker.

### RECOVER

5-94. Once a course of action has been approved by the appropriate decision maker, the order for mission execution is issued to the units that will be conducting the recovery. Each PR mission is carried out under the direction and supervision of a commander. This function exists only for the duration of a specific PR mission and normally is performed by the commander of units conducting the recovery. Ideally, this commander will be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the PR process. At a minimum, he will be thoroughly familiar with the recovery plan. The commander must be able to competently gather information during the recovery mission, keep higher commanders and staffs informed of mission progress,

and effectively coordinate the actions of the units performing and providing support to the recovery mission.

#### **PASS ORDER TO RECOVERY FORCES**

5-95. Once the order to conduct the recovery is obtained from the decision maker, the staff/PR cell transmits that order to recovery units, including any changes that affect their final planning. Support requirements for the mission are confirmed and units finalize tactical mission planning.

#### EXECUTE MISSION TO REGAIN POSITIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONTROL OF IMDC PERSONNEL

5-96. Recovery units should be provided with equipment to establish communications with IMDC personnel during the mission and confirm their location. If the IMDC person has a modern survival radio, equipment that can determine the precise location of that radio should be employed by units when possible. The location provided in the report gets the recovery units close to the IMDC. Communications and precise locating equipment refines that location when recovery units arrive in the objective area and minimizes the time spent searching for the survivor.

5-97. Communications during the recovery are crucial for mission success. Minimum communications to be established during a recovery are:

- Dedicated PR channel between aircraft, and between aircraft and ground forces, and between aircraft and C2 facilities involved in the recovery.
- Air-to-ground communications between aircraft and IMDC personnel. If the IMDC has a survival radio, this communication will take place on one of the dedicated frequencies programmed into that radio.
- Ground-to-ground communications between recovery units/forces and IMDC personnel.

#### PROVIDE SITUATION REPORTS (SITREPS) AS NEEDED OR MANDATED BY HIGHER ORDERS

5-98. During mission execution, recovery units provide SITREPs to the PR cell as new information becomes available or as mandated by local SOP. Examples of information that must be passed immediately to the PR cell are changes in enemy forces that require significant alteration of the approved COA, IMDC location reached and IMDC not there, weather significantly different from briefed, or IMDC personnel indicate that the enemy situation in their immediate vicinity has changed.

#### **MONITOR MISSION PROGRESS**

5-99. During the recovery, the PR cell continuously monitors the progress of the mission and keeps the commander and other staff elements informed. This is particularly important if the mission does not progress as initially envisioned and additional support is required to ensure success.

#### **ALERT MEDICAL/REINTEGRATION CHANNELS**

5-100. The PR cell alerts medical and reintegration channels when recovery is imminent to ensure that they are aware that recovered IMDC personnel will be arriving for treatment and that all medical and reintegration support requirements are met and ready for reception of the recovered personnel. The commander also alerts the rear detachment that the reintegration effort is beginning.

#### COORDINATE TRANSPORTATION FROM RECOVERY FORCES TO MEDICAL FACILITY

5-101. Recovery units may not be able to transport recovered personnel to initial medical/reintegration facilities for a variety of reasons. If this is the case, the PR cell, in coordination with the G/S-4, coordinates for transportation assets to meet recovery forces/units, gain custody of recovered personnel, and transport those personnel to the initial medical/reintegration site.

FM 3-50.1

#### CAPTURE EVENT INFORMATION FOR IMMEDIATE DISSEMINATION

5-102. PR cell personnel must capture any information gathered during the recovery that has an immediate impact on operations in general and PR operations that may be conducted in the future. Examples include recovery forces encountering significant enemy presence where it was not expected, enemy TTP exhibited during the recovery that indicates a required change during future recovery operations, or compromise of procedures used to conduct recovery operations. This information, gathered during tactical debriefs by the G/S-2, must be immediately incorporated into existing documents for PR such as the special instructions or standing operating procedures used by recovery forces.

5-103. If information is discovered that affects the operation at large, PR cell personnel must ensure that that information gets to the appropriate staff element so adjustments can be made in existing and future plans.

### REINTEGRATE

5-104. PR execution does not stop with the successful recovery of IMDC personnel – it continues through the reintegration process. The goal of reintegration is two-fold: attend to the medical needs of the recovered personnel and gather information about the event that has immediate impact on current and future operations. The overriding concern during reintegration is the health and welfare of the recovered personnel. These factors take precedence over all others during the reintegration process. Reintegration from the recovered personnel must often balance these factors with the need to gather pertinent information from the recovered personnel. The phases of reintegration and the activities that typically occur during each phase are detailed in Appendix C.

#### TRANSPORT SURVIVOR TO SECURE LOCATION

5-105. Once recovered, individuals must be transported to a secure location as quickly as possible. The preferred location for the initial assessment and debriefing is a level III medical facility, but this may have to occur at a forward location initially. Once the recovered personnel are transported to this facility, reintegration can begin.

#### IMPLEMENT REINTEGRATION PLAN

5-106. Reintegration of recovered personnel is not optional. It is similar to a mission debrief for any other completed mission. The length of time and extent of reintegration activities depend on each individual IMDC. Personnel who were isolated from their units for a very short time and were not captured may not require an in depth reintegration effort. Conversely, personnel who spent a considerable time in captivity or evading the enemy may require an extensive reintegration effort in order successfully return them to duty and their families, mentally and physically fit.

5-107. A reintegration team, formed by and under the authority of the JFC, conducts the reintegration of recovered personnel. Ideally, the full reintegration team will be present at the location when the recovered personnel arrive. Typical reintegration team members include:

- DOD certified SERE psychologist.
- Medical personnel.
- Unit command representative.
- Key unit personnel (someone the recovered personnel know and trust).
- Intelligence debriefers.
- SERE debriefers.
- Security personnel.
- Legal representatives.
- Chaplain.

- Service/unit casualty affairs officer.
- Public affairs officer.
- JPRA representatives (if available and coordinated).

5-108. The reintegration team functions under the guidance of the team leader (often the SERE psychologist) and conducts the reintegration in close coordination with supported and service command authorities. The main activities accomplished during reintegration are:

#### ASSESS MEDICAL CONDITION

5-109. Immediate medical needs are attended to prior to any other reintegration activities. Before any other reintegration activities can take place, the recovered person's injuries must be treated.

#### ASSESS PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION

5-110. A DOD certified SERE psychologist makes an initial determination of the recovered person's mental state to determine if the IMDC event has adversely affected them and if immediate treatment is necessary. In conjunction with medical personnel and unit command authorities, the SERE psychologist makes a recommendation on continuing the reintegration process.

#### CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE AND SERE DEBRIEFS

5-111. The SERE and intelligence debriefs are conducted to identify information with immediate impact on operations and long term applicability to organization, training, and equipping the force at large.

5-112. Intelligence debriefers are gathering information on enemy activities that indicate a required change in current procedures. Intelligence debriefers are also attempting to identify any information not previously known and validate or discredit any intelligence assumptions made. Additional information of particular importance when debriefing personnel who were captured is any information they have about other IMDC personnel.

5-113. SERE debriefers are gathering information on the evasion or captivity environments encountered by the recovered personnel. How the recovered personnel used their individual equipment, evasion aids, and how previous SERE training benefited them during their experience are important areas of information.

#### DISSEMINATE INFORMATION FROM INTELLIGENCE AND SERE DEBRIEFS

5-114. Information gathered during the intelligence and SERE debriefs that has immediate importance to ongoing operations is immediately disseminated to the PR cell and applicable staff elements for inclusion in existing PR guidance and adaptation of ongoing operations/plans.

#### CONTINUE TREATMENT OF MEDICAL / PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AS NECESSARY

5-115. After the initial debriefings, the SERE psychologist and medical personnel continue to assess the recovered personnel's' condition. If it is determined that they require further medical treatment and/or psychological assessment, recovered personnel may continue to intermediate location for continued treatment. If the recovered personnel's medical or psychological condition is severe, they may be transported back to the United States for in-depth care until their condition can be appropriately treated.

#### **COMPLETE REINTEGRATION PROCESS**

5-116. When debriefings, medical and psychological care are complete, the SERE psychologist and medical personnel make a recommendation to service representatives on duty status for the recovered personnel. The recommendation may be for a return to duty or discharge from the military for long-term care. This decision is made on a by-individual basis and takes the results of the entire reintegration process into consideration.

#### **RETURN IMDC TO SERVICE/FAMILY**

5-117. Once the recovered personnel are returned to their service or family, the PR cell closes the event file. Although long-term care may continue for recovered personnel, the initial IMDC event is considered closed.

#### FOLLOW-UP AS NECESSARY

5-118. Recovered personnel may be contacted periodically after the final duty status determination is made. The purpose of the follow-up is to ensure that recovered personnel are not suffering from any latent medical or psychological problems related to their IMDC experience.

#### FILE INCIDENT INFORMATION

5-119. Recovery missions are not complete until all information is gathered and analyzed for potential lessons learned. Keeping accurate records throughout the PR execution process facilitates this process.

5-120. IMDC event files are distributed according to policies and procedures established by the supported command for the operation (or exercise). At a minimum, the IMDC's service office of primary responsibility, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and the supported combatant command get copies of all files associated with each IMDC event. Each of these agencies is required to gather lessons learned and distribute them for incorporation into future operations and exercises.

#### **COMPILE RECORDS**

5-121. All notes, forms, chat logs, message traffic, etc. associated with the IMDC event and recovery mission are collected and compiled into a single folder. This includes all recordings, digital files, and paperwork gathered or completed during the event. Having all associated information in a single location enables rapid retrieval for developing lessons learned.

#### GATHER LESSONS LEARNED FROM EVENT

5-122. Commanders and staffs analyze information from each IMDC event to determine if there is anything that needs to be immediately distributed to the force for the current operation. Actions of the PR cell, commanders and staffs, recovery units and forces, and IMDC personnel during the event are all scrutinized to identify best practices that need to be repeated and for actions on that need to be modified to ensure future success. All actions are analyzed with their effect on the conduct of the five PR execution tasks.

#### ASSESS AND ADAPT AS NECESSARY

5-123. If information is identified that needs to be distributed to the force for immediate inclusion into existing plans and procedures, the PR cell disseminates that information as soon as possible. This should not be delayed because of administrative issues – this is information that has immediate impact on current and future operations. Examples of information of this type are:

- Enemy TTP that were unknown before the operation and were exhibited during a recovery, with a negative effect on the recovery or evasion efforts of IMDC personnel.
- Information that was compromised during the event and needs to be changed. This could include authentication information, communications frequencies, code words, etc.
- Procedures that were ineffective or overly cumbersome and must be modified.
- Equipment that was ineffective and must be replaced.
- Information that may affect current evasion or captivity guidance.

5-124. Friendly force actions that were particularly effective and merit emulation during future PR missions. While the tendency is to focus on what went wrong, it is just as important to identify what went right.

5-125. Information that has long-term effects on organizing, training, and equipping the future force must be identified and forwarded to Department of the Army for inclusion in future service-level plans and budgets.

#### **CLOSE MISSION FOLDER**

5-126. When recovered IMDC personnel are returned to control of their service/component, the PR cell closes and files the mission folder containing the information pertinent to that event. Copies of this folder are typically forwarded through the chain of command to the IMDC's service office of primary responsibility, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and the supported combatant command for historical storage and further analysis.

## **CONCLUSION**

5-127. Successful PR mission execution requires effective management of information from a variety of sources, communicating that information to those who are in a position to act on it, identifying accurate locations of IMDC events and personnel, supporting IMDC personnel and their families, well planned recovery missions and expeditious reintegration of recovered personnel. Commanders and staffs, units, and IMDC personnel must all be active participants during execution and information affecting current and future operations must be identified and distributed as lessons learned to enable future success.

### Chapter 6

# Assessment

Assessment is the continuous monitoring-throughout planning, preparation, and execution-of the current situation and progress of an operation and the evaluation of it against the criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments (FM 3-0). Like planning, assessments are conducted using one of two methods-deliberate and time constrained.

Assessment precedes and guides every activity within the PR operations process and concludes each PR operation/mission or phase of an operation. Assessment begins immediately and includes three distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations, evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness, and recording and disseminating the lessons learned. Together, the three tasks compare reality to expectations and provide for adapting to the lessons learned.

### Assess and Adapt.

The American way of war has historically included rapid adaptation to unexpected challenges and situations. In Barbara W. Tuchman's history of GEN Joseph W. Stilwell's operations in the China-Burma-India theater in WWII, <u>Stillwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45</u>, GEN (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell identified the need for a post-operational assessment with these words, "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back in and retake it." If ever there was a mandate to assess and adapt, GEN Stilwell pronounced it with those words.

### PLANNING

6-1. During PR planning, the commander and staff make assumptions about the nature of the situation at the projected time of execution. As information becomes available, plans are adjusted to reflect the new reality. Tradition has it that Napoleon used a corporal to review his campaign plans to assess simplicity and comprehension by those who would be tasked to execute it.

6-2. In <u>The Iraq War</u>; <u>Strategy</u>, <u>Tactics</u>, <u>and Military Lessons</u>, author Anthony H. Cordesman reported that GEN Franks established an assessment program early in the planning process. "One of most

interesting aspects of the campaign was the fact that the "lessons learned" process began even before the war began. GEN Franks installed a "lessons learned" team from Joint Forces Command with his command from the start. They did more than take notes to improve our performance for the next warthey provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM leadership to apply "lessons learned" in real time and improve coalition performance in this war."

### PREPARATION

6-3. While assessing preparation, information from unit brief backs and rehearsals may also initiate changes to the plan. This helps the staff refine the plan. The commander and staff monitor the progress of readiness to execute the operation.

6-4. In preparation for Operation Just Cause, a small team had concluded a day of rehearsals for their mission. The senior NCO organized an assessment of the plan, in light of all the rehearsals they had completed. The brainstorming session consisted of four basic questions:

- "What could go wrong with this plan/operation? What else? What else? What else?" (The unit exhausted every scenario they could imagine that "Murphy" could inflict.)
- "How will we respond?" (The question was asked of every potential problem they had identified. Then the unit formulated an alternate plan in response to each scenario.)
- "What code word can we use on the radio to notify the unit that we have adjusted to one of the alternate plans?"
- "How will we notify the unit if we can't use the radio?"

6-5. Although it was a very simple assessment technique, it was highly effective and provided the unit with a creative examination of the plan. It helped them identify the potential problem areas, develop solutions to those possibilities, and prepare two ways to notify the organization that a change to the basic plan was in effect. This assessment, coupled with the alternate plans that were developed, generated additional rehearsal requirements that proved critical to the success of their mission. PR cells should ask similar questions during planning and preparation in every phase and of every operation.

### EXECUTION

6-6. During execution, plans and activities are revised based on the assessed progress of the operation and new information. Assessments during execution may often be time constrained and require immediate changes to the plan. Under optimum conditions, the event that triggers the assessment and change was identified as a potential event during the planning and preparation phases.

6-7. During Operation Ivory Coast, the raid at the Son Tay POW camp in North Viet Nam, the helicopter carrying part of the ground forces, including the Task Force Commander, COL Arthur (Bull) Simons, landed at the wrong complex. The Ground Force Commander, LTC Elliot P. Sydnor, was informed, assessed the information, and immediately notified the ground forces at the POW camp that Alternate Plan Green was in effect. The ground forces adapted to the change. When the helicopter carrying the "Green" forces and COL Simons landed at the POW camp, the ground force personnel adjusted again to incorporate the "Green" forces into their original positions. This well-rehearsed force adapted to both changes and the mission continued without skipping a beat.

### **PR ASSESSMENT**

6-8. In order to adapt our forces and method of operations, PR planners must be diligent in assessing planning, preparation and performance in every task against the standard. It is critical that planners assess the operations that have not succeeded to expectations. It is equally important to assess the operations that have gone well, or are going well, to identify the practices that signal success. Additionally, PR planners must be vigilant against establishing a routine that the enemy can exploit. The goal of PR assessment is to:

- Validate the way we conduct PR operations.
- Improve the methods and results. (includes changing policies, directives, RSOPs/TACSOPs/PR SOP/Appendix 5 to Annex C, etc.).
- Identify emergent requirements to higher HQ (MACOM, ASCC, HQDA, and JFC).

6-9. PR planners must keep in mind that the enemy is always watching. Just as we assess and adapt to the battlefield environment, our adversaries are also changing their methods of operations to take advantage of perceived vulnerabilities and static, repetitive actions that Army forces exhibit through routine operations.

6-10. When the British were occupying Boston at the beginning of the American colonists' struggle for independence, they formed a routine of marching out of Boston against the fledgling militia forces. General Gage, of the British forces, felt it was important for physical conditioning and to provide the show of force against the rebellious citizens. The Minute Men adopted a routine of assembling to respond to the threat. During the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Minute Men exploited the British routine and used the "lessons learned" to assemble and employ the Minute Men quickly and engage the British along their route back to Boston.

6-11. An assessment of that engagement by GEN Galvin, in the book The Minute Men, suggests that the British had, in effect, provided the Minutemen with emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) rehearsals several times in the months preceding the engagement that would ultimately become known as "The Shot Heard 'Round the World".

### ASSESSING PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-12. Assessing PR begins with Step 1 of the military decision making process, Receipt of Mission. The commander and staff, units and individuals should review their current situations and assess their level of preparation for personnel recovery operations. Commanders should encourage the staff and subordinate unit members to begin gathering data for the lessons learned, immediately. Command emphasis is very important for the success of the assessment process. The process includes:

- Review the task/process/mission evaluating it from the focal points of command and staff, units and individual and the aspects of organization, guidance, equipment, and education/training.
- Identify the need for change and record the data. Initiate required changes immediately at all levels.
- Conduct formal AARs on a routine basis to identify shortfalls/needs and make recommendations.
- Evaluate the recommendations.
- Adopt the changes.
- Disseminate the information and adapt.
- Rehearse and assess the change for effectiveness.

6-13. Anytime during the operations process, unanticipated threats or opportunities may significantly change the situation, requiring the planning process to restart and a new plan to be developed. Continuous assessment, including the identification of branches and sequels, reflected in staff running estimates, is key to ensuring plans are revised and remain relevant to the situation.

6-14. Commanders and staffs must bear in mind that the after action review (AAR) is not only for the benefit of upgrading the performance of the current staff. It is also for each staff member's successor, so that the learning curve to becoming an effective PR cell member is shortened. Mistakes in the critical aspects of the job could lead to deadly results. The unit can't allow its effectiveness to dip due to the learning curve of the replacements.

6-15. Gather the information. As already stated, note taking for the assessment should begin immediately, but critical information that requires an immediate change to operational procedures or to the current plan should not be held back until a formal AAR. Adaptation begins immediately. As an example, receipt of intelligence or information that may affect individuals or the recovery forces may require an immediate change in actions with one or both in any part of planning or execution.

### CAPTURING THE DATA

6-16. Routinely, during the conduct of the operation, every leader should "step back" and assess the sum of all parts of the operation and gain insight into developing a better way to conduct PR operations and to identify stumbling blocks to excellence. All information that can be used to create a more effective unit is recorded but the data collection effort is not restricted to identifying poor performances. Leaders should look for best practices also. And remember, "A short pencil is better than a long memory." Don't trust your memory. Write it down.

6-17. A good technique to use for recording the vital information regarding PR operations, and to keep it in context, is to employ the STAR report:

- Situation to include date-time group (DTG).
- Task.
- Action.
- Results.

6-18. To assist key personnel in collecting the information, a matrix with a list of topics to assess during the AARs is included in Appendix C, PR Checklists. The commander and staff should evaluate each topic to determine its impact on personnel recovery and generate recommendations to improve PR operations.

#### **ORGANIZE THE ASSESSMENT/AAR**

6-19. An important aspect of a recovery AAR is to ensure that key leaders and a representative cross section of the organization attend. The commander or CofS/G-3 should identify and notify attendees to the AAR. Attendees should include the commanders, CofS, principal staff officers and other key staff members, LNOs, key senior NCOs, recovery unit leaders, IMDC parent company leaders, IMDCs (if possible) and supporting unit leaders.

6-20. The commander and staff treat the personnel recovery assessment/AAR with the same level of importance as the planning, preparation and execution phases of PR operations. Personnel recovery AARs should be conducted at the end of each phase/operation/mission/ task. If possible, conduct the AAR for each phase before you become too involved in the next phase to give the PR assessment the requisite attention. A timely assessment will provide a more effective AAR. The execution phase and PR mission assessments should be conducted before you return to home station, while the staff is still together. Quite often, redeployments initiate personnel rotations, especially the reassignment of key leaders to professional military education courses and other assignments.

6-21. AARs are an effective technique to use in a combat environment, especially for the units employed in the recovery missions. Effective AARs takes little time, and leaders can conduct them almost anywhere consistent with unit security requirements. Immediately following a rehearsal, leaders should conduct an AAR at the rehearsal site. Conducting AARs help overcome the steep learning curve that exists in a unit exposed to combat. AARs also help the unit sustain strengths and avoid repeat mistakes. By integrating PR training into combat operations and using tools such as AARs, leaders can dramatically increase their unit's chances for success on the battlefield.

6-22. During the formal AAR, the G-3 tasks several junior leaders for duty as recorders. This duty will help train them in conducting assessments that will prove helpful during their careers and also infuse them with the institutional memory regarding why changes to the SOPs were implemented. After an AAR, the G-3 prepares the report and records all the recommendations. If the unit is redeploying and expecting the reassignment of key leaders and staff members, task one senior staff member in the G-3, who is not slated for reassignment, to prepare the AAR. As part of the AAR process, create an operational time line for implementation that identifies who is responsible for implementing all changes and the date to have all the changes made to the SOP and all the emergent requirements submitted to the higher HQ. Don't let the "lessons learned" become simply "lessons observed" because they are never implemented.

6-23. By establishing formal structure for the published AAR results/format, the information is systematically captured, recorded, stored, and implemented. Some units employ the five paragraph OPORD format for their SOPs and AAR products. The AAR review format (five-paragraph OPORD) is included in Appendix C, PR Checklists.

6-24. By using the five paragraph OPORD format, the unit ensures that each element in the organization is addressed to include key personnel, the BOS and recovery units, and individuals. It also provides a familiar retrieval system by placing the information in the same paragraph or in the same attachment as would be found in the base document.

6-25. The matrixes included in this chapter and in Appendix C will help the PR staff ensure that all aspects of the operational process and phases of force projection are assessed. Including the "why we do it this

way" in the AAR report and, ultimately in the SOPs, helps a unit maintain the institutional memory. The AAR report should summarize the event/problem that initiated the AAR recommendation and the SOP input. Considerations for the planning of, preparation for, and execution of the AAR include:

- Plan the assessment/AAR
  - CofS/G-3: Schedule the routine, formal AAR for the PR tasks. AARs should be conducted during or immediately after each event.
  - CofS/G-3: Determine how the PR AAR will be conducted.
  - CofS/G-3: Determine the PR phase; operation; mission; SOP; etc. that will be the focus of this PR AAR.
  - CDR/CofS/G-3: Identify the attendees ensuring that all key personnel (to include the senior NCO leaders plus a sampling of junior officers/NCOs) are included.
  - G-3: Task several junior leaders to serve as recorders.
  - G-3: Design the AAR to link performance to subsequent preparation, training, and rehearsal to improve future operations.
- Prepare for the assessment/AAR
  - G-3: Notify key personnel of the PR AAR schedule; focus; and requirements.
  - G-3: Direct that attendees review the PR tasks for the phase/operation/mission that is the focus of this PR AAR and to organize their thoughts/notes (STAR reports).
  - G-3: Direct the attendees to schedule an AAR with their section, at least 24 hours prior, to elicit suggestions from the field.
  - PRCC: Prepare graphic aids to "jog" the memory of the attendees. (map sheets, Datum, overlays, orders, operational time line, etc.)
  - PRCC: Reconstruct the operational time line integrating the mIRC chat and other significant activity log reports to use as a guide to the AAR.
- Execute the assessment/AAR.
  - Commander: Set the tone for an open, frank discussion among professionals about the unit's performance of PR. Place yourself in a position that allows for frank discussion to obtain critical comments.
  - CofS/G-3: Guide the discussion encouraging frank and open comments to make the unit better in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing recovery operations. When guiding the questions, go through each step/task and elicit information. In assessing the planning: How can we improve the coordination? How can we improve the execution? How can we improve our method or results when developing the milestones/operational time line? In assigning responsibilities? Tracking and enforcing the time line tasks? Etc. Can the operational time line/milestones be used as a reverse planning document? Do reverse planning times need to be adjusted? Also ensure that the basic assessment questions are asked: "What can go wrong? How will we respond? How will we notify the organization?
  - CofS/G-3: Identify the PR phase/operation/mission on which the AAR is focused.
  - PRCC: Post the operational time line.
  - G-3: Using the operational time line, discuss each task, in order, using the STAR Report. How was the task accomplished? Was it effective? Was it addressed in the SOP? Was the task executed IAW the SOP? How could we improve upon the execution? How can we improve the SOP/OPLAN/OPORD?

• CofS/G-3: What are the recommendations to change the SOP/OPLAN/OPORD (organization, training, equipment)? Why would that improve the performance?

6-26. The assessment/AAR meeting begins with a brainstorming session among professionals where every idea/comment/suggestion is collected for evaluation and possible adaptation. AAR attendees should be encouraged to look at the task from several different perspectives. How did each facet (organization, guidance, equipment, education/training) affect each focal point (command and staff, units, individual)? Table 6-1 provides a general outline of the PR assessment matrix. Tables 6-2 (page 6-7) and 6-3 (page 6-8) provide the outline for PR mission assessment.

Pre-mobilization – developing the PR plan				
	Organization	Guidance	Equipment	Education/Training
Command and Staff				
This HQ				
Higher HQ				
Adjacent Units				
Subordinate Units				
Component forces				
Units				
Recovery Force				
Supporting Units		V $'$		
IMDC Parent Unit	C			
Individual				
Service Member				
DAC				
Contractor				

6-27. The personnel recovery AAR helps the organization merge the perspectives of the various views within the command regarding the operation. After gathering the information in the brainstorming session, the AAR progresses to the next step in which the issues are evaluated.

#### **ANALYZE INFORMATION**

6-28. After identifying the issues, the AAR attendees evaluate each one for substance and validity. Afteraction reviews may reveal areas within the unit SOPs/OPLAN/OPORD that require changing or clarification. AARs may reveal that the SOP/OPLAN/OPORD is valid but the staff, units, and/or individuals require additional education and training.

#### **DEVELOP LESSONS LEARNED**

6-29. From this analysis, the commander and staff will develop the lessons learned. A lesson learned may take the form of a change to the SOP/OPLAN/OPORD; elimination of a needless step in a process; addition to the training program; changes to the organization or equipment; etc.

6-30. The nature of staff assignments, personnel rotations, promotions, etc., demands that units capture the lessons learned, adapt their methods of operation and SOPs, and prepare duty position SOPs to maintain the effectiveness of the unit. A grim reality of Army service is that changes in staff personnel can come as a result of combat actions. Each staff member should ask, "What can I prepare to help my successor become immediately effective in this staff position? How can I leave the unit better prepared for personnel

recovery?" The long term success of PR planning and staff performance is not personality driven. It is system driven. Strive to develop a system that overcomes the potential problems in planning and conducting combat operations.

	PR mission e	execution assessment	
Mission #			
Name of IMDC			
Recovery Unit			
Situation			
Task			
Action			
Result		$\sim$	
Time line			
	Plan	Prenare Execute*	Assess
Command and Staff		* PR execution	
This HQ		task assessmen is shown in table	
Higher HQ	5	6-3.	
Adjacent Units	J		
Subordinate Units			
Component forces			
Units			
Recovery Force			
Supporting Units			
IMDC Parent Unit			
Individual			
Service Member			
DAC			
Contractor			

### SYNCHRONIZE THE LESSONS LEARNED INTO OPERATIONS

6-31. After developing the lessons learned, it is vital to disseminate the information immediately to the field and to the follow-on echelon. The lessons learned should influence officer and NCO development programs. Commanders and staffs and units should teach the lessons learned and changes to the PRCC SOP and the PR section of the TACSOP. Units should include the lessons learned into their TACSOPs. Commanders and staffs and units synchronize the lessons learned in all battlefield operating systems to ensure the lessons learned are fully integrated and then validated for effectiveness.

6-32. Bear in mind that Soldiers, to include commanders and staffs and units, usually remember what they did last but not always what was discussed last. After the procedures are changed, and the organization is trained, schedule a training event to exercise, assess, and validate the new procedures.

#### IDENTIFY NEW REQUIREMENTS/RESEARCH AND DEVELOP NEW PR CAPABILITIES

6-33. Assessments may reveal shortcomings in organization, guidance, equipment, education/training. Formal, post operational assessments become the basis for changes to PR. If resources are identified that the unit does not possess, determine if the resources are available through the procurement system or available off the shelf. If a change to organization, guidance, equipment, and education/training is the solution and it is beyond the authority of the unit, again, submit the validated requirement to higher HQ (MACOM, ASCC, HQDA, and JFC).

PR mission execution assessment					
	Report	Locate	Support	Recover	Reintegrate
	Timely Accurate Format	On ground On map On tech equip	Tactical Environmental Mental/ Emotional		
	PR channel		Emotional		
Command and Staff					
This HQ					
Higher HQ					
Adjacent Units					
Subordinate Units			0 1		
Component forces		N			
Units					
Recovery Force		<u> </u>			
Supporting Units		2			
IMDC Parent Unit					
Individual					
Service Member					
DAC					
Contractor					

#### Table 6-3. Execution task assessment

### CONCLUSION

6-34. The ultimate results from assessments are to capture the lessons learned and adapt the unit processes, procedures, training, and operations to improve the organization. One vital step toward that end is to fix responsibility for the recommendation and its implementation. Assessments are designed to fix the problems, not the blame.

6-35. The CofS must be diligent in monitoring the implementation process to ensure that identified lessons learned are incorporated into training exercises, SOPs, existing procedures, equipment acquisition plans, etc.

6-36. Assessments are crucial to improving the performance of the PR cell, units and individuals in all operations. If the assessments do not generate changes in guidance, policies, and operations the lessons will "walk out the door" of the organization with every reassignment and retirement. If the resource requirements aren't elevated to the higher HQs for action and a system established for following up on each requirement, support will probably not be forthcoming. Without a process to ensure the PR assessments translate into adaptations, the unit will go to war with the same faulty procedures and inadequate resources that were identified during previous operations.

# Appendix A Civil Search and Rescue

Civil SAR is regulated by various US and international documents and agreements. One of the principal documents guiding international execution of civil SAR operations is the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) manual. The United States defines its contributions to and responsibilities for civil SAR via the National SAR Plan and the National SAR supplement to the IAMSAR manual. DODD 2310.2 (Personnel Recovery), the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) provide direction for DOD support to civil SAR (see AUTL tasks 6.14.6.7 and 8.4.3.4).

### TERMS

A-1. The following terms for civil SAR are defined by the National SAR Plan, the IAMSAR manual, and the National SAR supplement to the IAMSAR manual. Understanding civil SAR terms and concepts is required for two principal reasons. First, when military units are providing support to civil SAR efforts (or requesting national or international civil SAR support) they must understand the terminology being used. Second, there are parallels between terms and concepts in the civil SAR community and those used in the PR community. Many of the concepts of civil SAR have been adapted for use by the US military for PR. Table A-1 summarizes civil SAR terms and their comparable DOD PR terms.

Civil SAR term	PR term
Search and Rescue Coordinator	Supported commander for PR
Search and Rescue Region	Military area of operations
Rescue Coordination Center	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
Rescue Sub-center	Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell
Joint Rescue Coordination Center	No equivalent PR term/capability
SAR Mission Coordinator	PR cell coordinator/controller
On-scene Coordinator	On-scene Commander (joint term)
Aircraft Coordinator	Airborne Mission Commander
Search and Rescue Unit	Dedicated CSAR unit
Search and Rescue Facility	Recovery vehicle or support assets

Table A-1. Civil SAR terms and PR equivalents

#### SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATOR (SAR COORDINATOR)

A-2. A federal person or agency with overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a search and rescue region(s) for which the US has primary responsibility. A SAR coordinator is analogous to a military commander with PR responsibilities in an operational environment.

#### SEARCH AND RESCUE REGION (SRR)

A-3. An area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center (RCC) within which SAR services are provided. An SRR is analogous to a military area of operations. An example of SRR arrangements in the Mediterranean Sea can be found at http://www.shipping.gov.cy/search\_and\_rescue/.

### **RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (RCC)**

A-4. A unit, recognized by ICAO, IMO, or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of civil SAR services and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operation within an SRR. The military equivalent to a civil SAR RCC is the JPRC. It should be noted that civil SAR RCCs are internationally recognized coordination centers for civil SAR, established by agreement between international civil SAR participants. Their locations, respective SRRs are published in the IAMSAR manual. United States Coast Guard (USCG) RCC contact information can be obtained at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g%2Do/g%2Dopr/rcc's.htm

### **RESCUE SUB-CENTER (RSC)**

A-5. A unit subordinate to an RCC established to complement the latter according to particular provisions of responsible authorities. The military equivalent is the PRCC.

### JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (JRCC)

A-6. An RCC responsible for more than one primary type of SAR services, e.g., both aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents. The term JRCC, unlike the military term JPRC, is not used solely on the basis that an RCC is staffed by personnel from more than one organization. There is no military equivalent PR coordination entity based on this usage.

### SAR MISSION COORDINATOR (SMC)

A-7. The official temporarily assigned to coordinate response to an actual or apparent distress situation.

#### **ON-SCENE COORDINATOR (OSC)**

A-8. A person designated to coordinate search and rescue operations within a specified search area. The on-scene coordinator does not have to be in an aircraft – he may be ground or vessel based. The term is analogous to the joint term on-scene commander.

#### AIRCRAFT COORDINATOR (ACO)

A-9. The term is analogous to airborne mission commander (AMC).

#### SEARCH AND RESCUE UNIT (SRU)

A-10. A unit composed of trained personnel and provided with equipment suitable for the expeditious conduct of SAR operations. This term is comparable to Air Force and Navy usage of the term "dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) units." Dedicated CSAR units are those that are organized, trained, equipped, and funded to conduct CSAR as a primary mission.

### SAR FACILITY

A-11. The term SAR facility, while not specifically defined in the National SAR Supplement, refers to an aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter), vessel, boat, or vehicle used to support or conduct a civil SAR mission. The term does not refer to fixed installations, such as an RCC. The term is analogous to military recovery forces or assets.

### DOD CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A-12. As a participant in the National SAR plan, the Department of Defense agrees to provide military support to Civil SAR, CONUS, and OCONUS. DOD provides this support only when it does not interfere

with ongoing military operations. The National SAR plan, International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, various international agreements, and DOD policy all provide the authoritative basis for military participation in civil SAR efforts. Military commanders, regardless of service, may be requested to support civil SAR operations when they have the capability to do so.

A-13. An example of military support to civil SAR is the rescue of a civilian off the coast of Florida requiring urgent medical attention in December, 2002. The individual was on a fishing vessel beyond the range of US Coast Guard assets. US Air Force rescue helicopters, with refuel support from an airborne tanker, flew to the vessel with Pararescuemen. After deploying the Pararescuemen and recovering the civilian, they flew him to a hospital on shore for treatment.

### **CIVIL SAR COORDINATION**

A-14. International coordination for civil SAR follows a construct similar to that of planning, preparation, and execution of personnel recovery. A SAR coordinator is identified and given responsibility for an SRR. To fulfill that responsibility, the SAR coordinator establishes an RCC, delegating authority necessary for that RCC to coordinate civil SAR within the SRR and with adjacent RCCs. The RCCs are staffed with personnel trained to internationally accepted standards and equipped with the necessary communications infrastructure to receive distress alerts, process the information, notify SAR facilities and SRUs, and coordinate the efforts for a given civil SAR effort. The RCC will identify an SMC to be responsible for a given mission from start to finish (if practicable). The RCC may identify an OSC and an ACO to coordinate the efforts on scene and communicate mission progress information back to the RCC and other assisting assets. When the distressed personnel are recovered they are evaluated for medical problems and, if from a foreign country, repatriated to that country.

A-15. SAR coordinators have the overall responsibility for establishing RCCs as necessary and for providing/coordinating SAR services within US SRRs. The recognized US SAR coordinators are:

- The US Coast Guard for the internationally recognized U.S. aeronautical and maritime SRRs which coincide with the ocean environments, including Hawaii. The Coast Guard utilizes several RCCs in the continental United States and one in Alaska to coordinate maritime civil SAR. The Coast Guard is also designated as the lead agency for coordinating national participation in the SAR and safety related initiatives of the International Maritime Organization.
- USPACOM for the recognized aeronautical SRR corresponding to Alaska. The RCC for coordination within this SRR is staffed by the Air Force and located at Ft. Richardson, Alaska.
- U.S. Air Force for the recognized aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental US other than Alaska. The Air Force RCC (AFRCC) at Langley, Virginia coordinates military support to civil SAR in the continental United States.

### **OCONUS CIVIL SAR**

A-16. Outside the continental United States civil SAR is coordinated by various RCCs established to coordinate civil SAR within international SRRs. The locations of these RCCs and the dimensions of their associated SRRs are listed in the IAMSAR manual.

A-17. In accordance with international law, SAR facilities (recovery forces) may enter into territorial waters to rescue persons in distress. DOD refers to this as the "right of assistance entry" (RAE). International law refers to it as "assistance entry."

A-18. In times of conflict SAR services will continue to be provided in accordance with the Geneva conventions. While RAE still exists, its application requires prudence. Military commanders must exercise extreme caution when using the right of assistance entry to recover personnel in distress. RAE covers rescue only, not entering territorial areas to search for persons in distress. In addition, using military vessels is often more acceptable to sovereign states than using military aircraft. International maritime law covers vessel entry into territorial waters in much more detail than aircraft entry into these areas. Additionally, entry of military vessels or aircraft into territorial maritime environments to assist persons in

distress is generally more acceptable than military aircraft entering areas over the land mass of sovereign nations.

# LOCATION CAPABILITIES

A-19. The international civil SAR community uses the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system as its primary method of locating persons in distress (http://www.cospas-sarsat.com/MainPages/indexEnglish.htm). The system can geolocate emergency beacons transmitting on 406 and 121.5 MHz (121.5 monitoring will terminate in 2009). Some military survival radios utilize beacons that transmit on these frequencies. The system can locate 406 beacons within 5 kilometers (100 meters if there is a GPS encoded position in the beacon transmission). This information is then relayed to the RCC responsible for the SRR around the beacon location or the closest RCC when the beacon location is outside established SRRs.

A-20. Civil SAR forces also conduct physical searches for personnel in distress when an exact location cannot be provided by COSPAS-SARSAT. There are various air and maritime assets, including international shipping capabilities, which conduct these searches.

### **COMMON CONCEPTS**

A-21. Operating concepts accepted by the international civil SAR community are applicable to military PR as well. These concepts include:

- Consider all available assets as potential recovery forces.
- Coordination and establishment of common procedures, terminology, and decision templates streamlines execution.
- Identify coordination centers/cells with clearly defined responsibilities for a given dimension of geography (AO).
- Execution decisions are made based on the best course of action to successfully recover distressed persons (IMDC personnel), not on the identity of the persons nor their country of origin.

### **CONCLUSION**

A-22. The international civil SAR community is well-established and capable of providing assistance to persons in distress over a wide area. International cooperation between sovereign nations is common and governed by agreements accepted by the participating countries. DOD provides military support to civil SAR, both within the United States and in areas overseas, and IMDC personnel in permissive environments may be recovered by international civil SAR assets. The environment of cooperation, coordination, and use of common procedures by the international community is worthy of emulation by the PR community.

# Appendix B Service PR Capabilities

The individual services and USSOCOM all have PR capabilities. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force maintain personnel and aircraft dedicated to certain methods of PR as a primary mission. The other services fulfill their respective PR capabilities by employing aircraft, vessels, vehicles, and personnel trained and equipped to perform other missions but capable of performing PR missions. When considering other service capabilities, remember to think beyond that service's aircraft fleet; ground and naval assets are also capable of conducting and supporting PR missions.

Each service is listed with a brief description of their individual PR capabilities. Principal documents containing applicable service doctrine are listed, along with aircraft, vessels, vehicles, and personnel (as appropriate) that typically conduct or support PR operations for that service. Where specific capabilities and/or TTP manuals are available, they are listed next to the appropriate asset.

When conducting joint operations, there are subject matter experts on each of these systems available to planners and tactical forces via liaison individuals/teams, operational planning teams, or in joint staff directorates. For the most current information on a given aircraft, vessel, vehicle, or personnel PR capabilities, direct contact with these experts can significantly shorten planning time and increase understanding about a given asset.

### U.S. NAVY

B-1. The Navy organizes, trains, and equips dedicated forces to conduct Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations. The HH-60H helicopter is the current, dedicated CSAR aircraft for the Navy. Navy procedures require specific CSAR training for crews of these aircraft conducting CSAR missions.

B-2. Naval vessels also have a long history of conducting both civil SAR and PR missions in maritime environments. These vessels carry varying complements of aircraft and personnel which can all be employed for a maritime recovery mission within the capabilities of the vessel. Submarines have also been used to conduct recoveries during previous conflicts.

### DOCTRINE

B-3. The principal Navy doctrine document for CSAR is NTTP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare, Chapter 5. The document is currently classified SECRET//NOFORN and is available on the SIPRNET.

U.S. Navy Assets		
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info
Aircraft carrier	Forward presence, conventional deterrence, power projection	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/ships/ship-cv.html
Cruiser	Air, surface, and undersea warfare	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/ships/ship-cru.html

#### Table B-1. U.S. Navy assets

U.S. Navy Assets			
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info	
Frigate	Protection of shipping, anti-submarine warfare	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/	
		factfile/ships/ship-ffg.html	
Destroyer	Anti-air, -surface, and undersea warfare	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/	
		factfile/ships/ship-dd.html	
Attack submarine	Anti-submarine warfare, carrier strike	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/	
	group escort	factfile/ships/ship-ssn.html	
Missile submarine	Strategic deterrence	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/	
		factfile/ships/ship-ssbn.html	
E-2C Hawkeye	Airborne early warning, C2	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-E2C (U)	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.5-E2C (U)	
F/A-18 Hornet	Fighter/attack aircraft	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-FA18AD (U)	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.5-FA18AD (U)	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-FA18EF (U)	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.5-FA18EF (U)	
F-14 Tomcat	Strike fighter	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-F14ABD (U)	
EA-6B Prowler	Electronic warfare aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-EA6B (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.13 (U)	
S-3 Viking	Air-to-air refueling, surveillance, search and rescue	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-S3B	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.5-S3B (U)	
P-3C Orion	Anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-P3C (U)	
EP-3 Aries II	Signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance aircraft	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-EP3 (U)	
HH-60	Naval Special Warfare, Combat Search and Rescue	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-HH60 (U)	
SH-60	Anti-submarine warfare, search and	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-SH60B (U)	
	rescue	(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-SH60F (U)	
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC)	Ship-to-shore and across the beach transport	(U) MCRP 3-31B	
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)	Embark, transport, and land elements of a Marine landing force	(U) MCRP 3-31B	
LHD/LHA	Amphibious warfare, Marine Expeditionary Brigade transport	(U) MCRP 3-31B	
Dock Landing Ship (LSD)	Amphibious operations support	(U) MCRP 3-31B	
Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) / Landing Craft Utility (LCU)	Ship-to-shore transport	(U) MCRP 3-31B	

# **U.S. AIR FORCE**

B-4. The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips dedicated forces to conduct Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations. With the CSAR-dedicated aircraft and personnel under Air Force Special Operations Command, combined with support aircraft and personnel in the conventional forces, the Air Force maintains a robust ability to conduct CSAR operations with a wide variety of aircraft and personnel.

### DOCTRINE

B-5. The principle doctrine for Air Force CSAR is AFDD 2-1.6, with additional planning guidelines in AFTTP 3-1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations. The AFTTP manual is currently classified SECRET//NOFORN and is available on the SIPRNET, as are the TTP manuals listed in the table below.

U.S. Air Force Assets			
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info	
E-3A AWACS	Airborne Early Warning, C2	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.15 (U)	
KC-10	Air-to-air refueling	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.22 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.22A (U)	
KC-135	Air-to-air refueling	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.22 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.22B (U)	
JSTARS		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.30 (U)	
RC-135 Rivet Joint	SIGINT aircraft	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.21 (U)	
F-15E	Fighter/precision strike aircraft	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.17 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.17 (U)	
F-15C	Air superiority fighter	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.4 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.4 (U)	
F-16	Fighter/attack aircraft	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.5 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.5 (U)	
F-16CJ	SEAD	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.5 (U)	
A-10 / OA-10	Close air support, CSAR, armed reconnaissance, air interdiction, joint air attack team	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.13 (U)	
EA-6B Prowler	Electronic warfare aircraft, SEAD	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.13 (U)	
		(S/NF) NTTP 3-22.1-EA6B (U)	
EC-130 Compass Call	Electronic warfare aircraft	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.16 (U)	
Global Hawk	ISR	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.9 (U)	
RQ/MQ-1 Predator	Air interdiction, armed reconnaissance, limited FAC(A), ISR, CSAR support	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.29 (U)	

Table B-2. U.S. Air Force assets

### **U.S. MARINE CORPS**

B-6. The Marine Corps fulfills its PR responsibilities via Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) missions. These missions are performed by assigned and briefed aircrews and/or ground forces for the specific purpose of recovering personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft. The composition of a TRAP mission may vary from a single aircraft to an assault support mission package, consisting of multiple fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft with on-board security, ground search, and medical capabilities.

B-7. TRAP missions are implied tasks in all Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. TRAP missions are executed when the tactical situation prevents traditional search and rescue techniques and only when survivors and their locations are confirmed.

#### DOCTRINE

B-8. There is no single doctrinal reference for TRAP operations. The Marine Corps considers TRAP missions specialized raids. As TRAP is considered an implied task in all MAGTF operations, it is referenced throughout Marine Corps doctrinal publications, such as:

• MCWP 3-34.1, Raid Operations.

- MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations.
- MCWP 3-11.4, Helicopterborne Operations.
- MCWP 3-2, Aviation Operations.
- MCWP 3-24, Assault Support.
- MCWP 5-11.1, MAGTF Aviation Planning.

#### Table B-3. U.S. Marine Corps assets

U.S. Marine Corps Assets			
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info	
CH-53E Super Stallion	Combat assault heavy transport, airborne C2, aeromedical evacuation, TRAP	MCWP 5-11.1	
CH-46	Combat assault troop transport, airborne C2, aeromedical evacuation, TRAP	MCWP 5-11.1	
UH-1N	Airborne C2, armed escort, combat assault, TRAP	MCWP 5-11.1	
AH-1 Cobra	Armed escort, point target destruction, helicopter escort	MCWP 5-11.1	
AV-8 Harrier	Attack aircraft, helicopter escort	MCWP 5-11.1	
F/A-18 Hornet	Fighter/attack aircraft	MCWP 5-11.1	
EA-6B Prowler	Electronic warfare aircraft, SEAD	MCWP 5-11.1	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.13 (U)	
KC-130J	Air-to-air refueling, C2	MCWP 5-11.1	
Amphibious Assault	Armored amphibious assault, troop	MCRP 3-11.1A	
Vehicle (AAV)	transport	MCRP 4-11.3F	
		MCRP 4-11C	
		MCRP 5-12D	
		MCWP 3-35	
		MCWP 3-15.5	
		MCWP 3-35.3	
Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)	Armed reconnaissance, C2, light anti-tank, transport	MCWP 3-14.1	
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC)	Insertion/extraction, reconnaissance	Various Marine and Navy publications	

### **U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM)**

B-9. USSOCOM comprises components from the Army (U.S. Army Special Operations Command [USASOC]), Navy (Naval Special Warfare Command [NSW]), and the Air Force (Air Force Special Operations Command [AFSOC]). Each component has PR capabilities.

### U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USASOC)

B-10. USASOC consists of Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Ranger, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. Special Forces, Aviation, and Ranger units are often task organized to provide CSAR capability to support special operations missions and recoveries for the joint force as well. Civil affairs and PSYOPS units are also valuable force multipliers during PR operations.

B-11. The use of USASOC assets for PR missions is often desired because of their unique capabilities to penetrate and operate within hostile areas. Special Forces units also provide unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) in areas where conventional recovery is not feasible, not acceptable, or not available.

#### Doctrine

B-12. FM 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery, describes UAR and other PR missions as performed by Special Forces units. The documents listed in the table below describe the capabilities of other USASOC units and assets.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Assets			
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info	
Special Forces Teams	Unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, combating terrorism (other missions listed in reference)	FM 3-05.20 (restricted)	
Ranger units	Raids, interdiction, recovery, airborne assault, air assault	FM 7-85	
MH-60L/K	Infiltration/exfiltration, resupply, C2, CSAR, MEDEVAC. Armed escort, fire support (MH-60L Defensive Armed Penetrator)	FM 3-05.60 (restricted)	
MH-47D/E	Infiltration/exfiltration, air assault, resupply, external slingload, mass casualty, CSAR	FM 3-05.60 (restricted)	
AH-6	Target destruction / neutralization, close air support	FM 3-05.60 (restricted)	
MH-6	Infiltration/exfiltration, combat assault	FM 3-05.60 (restricted)	
Psychological Operations	Influence foreign target audiences	FM 3-05.301 (restricted)	
Civil Affairs	Engage the civil component of a military operational area	FM 3-05.401	

#### Table B-4. USASOC assets

### AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AFSOC)

B-13. AFSOC is the USSOCOM proponent for special operations CSAR. AFSOC provides unique air and ground special operations capabilities for CSAR supporting global USSOCOM missions.

#### Doctrine

B-14. AFSOC Instruction 10-3001, Personnel Recovery, prescribes policies and procedures, assets, their capabilities and responsibilities within AFSOC, and the unique contribution AFSOC offers to the PR mission area. AFDD 2-1.6 and AFTTP 3-1.1 also apply.

Air Force Special Operations Command Assets				
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info		
MC-130P Combat Shadow	Special Operations air-to-air refueling	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.33 (U)		
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.33 (U)		
MC-130E/H Combat Talon	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces, Special Operations air-to-air refuel (E model, some H models)	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.33 (U)		
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.33 (U)		
HC-130P	Air-to-air refuel, insertion of recovery personnel	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.33 (U)		
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.33 (U)		
AC-130 H/U Specter/Spooky	Aerial attack	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.31 (U)		
EC-130 Commando Solo	PSYOP/Civil affairs broadcasts	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.32 (U)		
MH-53J/M Pavelow	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.34 (U)		
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.34 (U)		

Table B-5. Air Force Special Operations Command assets
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Air Force Special Operations Command Assets			
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info	
HH-60G Pavehawk	Dedicated CSAR aircraft	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.24 (U)	
		(S/NF) AFTTP 3-3.24 (U)	
Pararescuemen	Dedicated CSAR personnel	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.8 (U)	
		AFPD 16-12	
Combat Rescue Officer	Dedicated CSAR personnel	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.33 (U)	
		AFPD 16-12	
Special Tactics forces	Establish and control the air-to-ground interface at an objective area	(S/NF) AFTTP 3-1.33 (U)	

### NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE (NSW)

B-15. NSW PR capabilities are provided by Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams and Special Boat Teams (SBT). SEAL teams conduct special operations missions, primarily in the maritime and riverine environments. SEAL teams also conduct UAR operations. SBTs operate the various special operations watercraft employed during NSW missions.

### Doctrine

B-16. There is no single doctrine document for NSW PR operations. The general capabilities of the various NSW assets are available online at the listed web addresses.

Naval Special Warfare Command Assets				
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info		
SEAL teams	Unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, combating terrorism	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/personnel/seals.html		
Mark V Special Operations Craft (SOC)	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/ships/boat-mkv.html		
11-meter rigid inflatable boat (RIB)	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ factfile/ships/ship-rib.html		
SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV)	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces	http://ncsc.navy.mil/Our_Mission/ Major_Projects/Swimmer_Delivery_ Vehicle_Focus_Sheet.htm		
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)	Insertion/extraction of Special Operations forces	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ cno/n87/usw/issue_14/asds.html http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ cno/n87/usw/future/seal.html		
Dry Deck Shelter (DDS)	Launch/recover SDVs and ASDS	http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ cno/n87/issue_7/losangelesclass.ht m		

#### Table B-6. NSW assets

### U.S. COAST GUARD

B-17. Coast Guard contributions to PR are an extension of their civil SAR capabilities. Ideally suited to recoveries in permissive maritime environments, Coast Guard assets are valuable force multipliers when operating in the vicinity of military operations. All assets are multi-mission resources and potential recovery platforms.

### DOCTRINE

B-18. The Coast Guard follows concepts established in the National Search and Rescue Plan, COMDINST M16130.2D, and the IAMSAR manual.

U.S. Coast Guard Assets				
Asset	Mission	Capabilities / TTP info		
378' Heavy Endurance Cutter (WHEC)	Maritime law enforcement, national defense, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
282', 270', 230', 213', 210' Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC)	Maritime law enforcement, national defense, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
123', 110' Patrol Boats (WPB)	Maritime law enforcement, national defense, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
52', 47', 44' Motor Lifeboats (MLB)	Maritime law enforcement, national defense, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
HH-65	Search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
HH-60J	Search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
MH-68	Maritime law enforcement, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
HC-130	Maritime law enforcement, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		
HU-25 Falcon	Maritime law enforcement, search and rescue	www.uscg.mil/datasheet/dataindx.htm		

#### Table B-7. U.S. Coast Guard assets

### CONCLUSION

B-19. Each service has PR capability. Many assets that can conduct or support PR operations provide this capability in addition to their primary missions. By incorporating the capabilities of all services during planning and executing joint operations, PR missions can be conducted in virtually all environments.

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# Appendix C

# **PR Checklists**

## PRCC SETUP CHECKLIST (\* INDICATES PRO CHECKLIST ITEMS)

- 1. Admin setup
  - a. Task organize
    - (1) Director\*
    - (2) Deputy director
    - (3) Controllers
    - (4) Support personnel from other staff directorates\*
  - b. Develop a work schedule\*
  - c. Obtain reference documents
    - (1) Theater PR Regulation\*
    - (2) PR SOP for the operation\*
    - (3) PR attachments to component and subordinate plans\*
    - (4) PR Special Instructions (PR SPINs)\*
    - (5) Operation phone book/reintegration phone list/e-mail contact list \*
    - (6) Communications plan/master frequency list\*
    - (7) Ground control orders (OPORD or FRAGO)\*
    - (8) Maritime control orders (OPORD or FRAGO)\*
    - (9) Air Tasking Order (ATO)\*
    - (10) Airspace Control Order (ACO)\*
  - d. Check radio/communications equipment
    - (1) Conduct familiarization training for PRCC/support personnel\*
    - (2) Set up secondary/mobility radios as required\*
    - (3) Develop and review frequency list\*
    - (4) Coordinate communication procedures with recovery assets\*
  - e. Check computer equipment and software (software may change these are current examples)
    - (1) Desktops / laptops\*
    - (2) Printers\*
    - (3) COP/NIPR/SIPR/JWICS\*
    - (4) Integrated Workspace (IWS)\*
    - (5) ADOCS
    - (6) TAIS\*

- (7) WIN-T\*
- (8) AMPS\*
- (9) PFPS/Falcon View\*
- (10)mIRC chat\*
- (11) Word processing/spreadsheet/e-mail/etc.\*
- f. Develop and display two wall charts
  - (1) In-progress IMDC events and recovery missions\*
  - (2) Available PR assets\*
- g. Identify PR incident/mission number conventions for the operation\*
- h. Set up information folders and worksheets
  - (1) PR incidents\*
  - (2) PR missions\*
  - (3) Event logs\*
  - (4) Incoming messages / communications\*
  - (5) Outgoing messages / communications\*
  - (6) Historical files
- i. As needed, review:\*
  - (1) Grid coordinate plotting skills\*
    - (a) UTM / MGRS\*
    - (b) Latitude / longitude\*
  - (2) Identify current map datum (should be WGS 84)\*
  - (3) SARDOT plotting procedures\*
  - (4) SARNEG encryption/decryption procedures (in SPINs)\*
  - (5) Unit-level authentication procedures\*
- j. Identify location and procedures for using message center\*
- k. Obtain message templates\*
  - (1) PRCC activation message
  - (2) SARIR\*
  - (3) SARSIT\*
  - (4) PR mission planning order\*
  - (5) PR execution order\*
  - (6) OPORD/FRAGO formats\*
- 1. Brief supporting personnel on their duties during an IMDC event\*

- 2. Connectivity check / initial coordination
  - a. Identify primary/secondary POCs for all areas listed. Identify phone numbers, e-mails, chat IDs, radio call signs, radio frequencies as applicable.\*
  - b. G/S1
    - (1) Casualty affairs
    - (2) Accountability\*
    - (3) PERSTAT or similar reports (including civilian accountability databases)
  - c. G/S2
    - (1) Components\*
    - (2) JTF
    - (3) Theater (JPRC will generally coordinate for theater-level Intelligence support)
    - (4) National (JPRC will generally coordinate with the National Intelligence Community)
      - (a) National Security Agency
      - (b) National Reconnaissance Office
      - (c) Central Intelligence Agency
      - (d) Defense Intelligence Agency/POW-MIA cell
      - (e) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
      - (f) Other (Federal agency intelligence sections as they apply)
  - d. G/S3
    - (1) Own command coordination procedures\*
    - (2) AO boundaries\*
    - (3) Cross AO procedures\*
    - (4) PRCC/PRO authorities and responsibilities\*
    - (5) Required info for execution\*
    - (6) Who has execute authority?\*
    - (7) Who has termination authority?\*
    - (8) Who makes reintegration decisions?\*
    - (9) Identify and locate subordinate Personnel Recovery Officers (PROs)\*
    - (10) Liaison elements/officers\*
    - (11) Fires/effects support\*
    - (12) A2C2/ATO distribution\*
  - e. G/S4
    - (1) Mortuary affairs
    - (2) PR equipment acquisition procedures\*
    - (3) PR logistics support\*
    - (4) Contractor issues/requirements\*

- f. G/S5
  - (1) Deliberate or future plans if not integrated into the G/S3\*
  - (2) Civil/Military Operations Center (CMOC)
  - (3) Obtain information on NGOs operating in the area\*
  - (4) Establish procedures for relaying PR information to/from Civil Affairs units
- g. G/S6
  - (1) Communications equipment support\*
  - (2) Computer infrastructure support\*
  - (3) Access to COP\*
  - (4) Access to cryptographic information\*
  - (5) Dedicated PR frequencies\*
- h. G/S7(if functions not absorbed into another staff section)
  - (1) PSYOP support (if no JPOTF established)
  - (2) Deception support
  - (3) Offensive/defensive IO support
  - (4) Electronic warfare support
- i. G/S8
  - (1) Ensure adequate funding for reintegration efforts and TDY associated with PR events.
- j. Other Government Agencies working with the component (State, Justice, etc.)
- k. Surgeon
  - (1) Medical plan\*
  - (2) Reintegration plan\*
- l. Chaplain
  - (1) Availability of religious support for returned IMDC personnel\*Availability of religious support for IMDC family\*
- m. PAO
  - (1) Command message for PR missions/reintegration activities\*
- n. Provost Marshall (security for reintegration locations/events)\*
- o. Host nation
  - (1) Host nation coordination procedures\*
  - (2) Identify employment restrictions
  - (3) Determine decision-making authorities (might be different from those authorized to make decisions using US forces)
- p. Multinational partners
  - (1) Multinational coordination procedures\*
  - (2) Identify employment restrictions

- (3) Determine decision-making authorities (might be different from those authorized to make decisions using US forces)
- q. JPRC and other PRCCs/PROs
  - (1) Locations, requirements, and responsibilities\*
  - (2) Develop quick reference list of key personnel and key leaders and phone numbers/e-mail/chat IDs/etc\*
  - (3) Establish procedures for after duty hours notification of key PRCC personnel\*
- r. Subordinate unit ops
  - (1) Identify primary/secondary PROs/POCs and key leaders\*
  - (2) Establish procedures for obtaining current availability of recovery assets\*
  - (3) Where are ISOPREP/EPA maintained?\*
  - (4) Establish transmission methods for ISOPREP/EPA from unit to PRCC\*
  - (5) Communication/evasion/survival equipment available to forces?\*
  - (6) Communication/evasion/survival equipment needed by forces?\*
- s. Develop standing distribution list for IMDC event notification\*
- 3. Recovery information to have readily available
  - a. Communications information
    - (1) PR phone list\*
    - (2) Call signs\*
      - (a) C2 nodes\*
      - (b) Decision makers\*
      - (c) ISR assets\*
  - b. PR dedicated frequencies\*
    - (a) SAR A (survival radio UHF)\*
    - (b) SAR B (survival radio UHF)\*
    - (c) Personnel Locating System (PLS) code (survival radio) / Quickdraw (recovery force) info \*(if using compatible equipment)
    - (d) Combat Survivor/Evader Locator (CSEL) frequencies\*
    - (e) Other radios used for PR\*
    - (f) PR Task Force (PRTF) internals\*
      - 1) VHF-FM\*
      - 2) VHF-AM\*
      - 3) SATCOM\*
      - 4) UHF\*
      - 5) HF\*
      - 6) Other frequencies\*

- c. PR SPINs information
  - (1) Search and Rescue Dot (SARDOT)\*
    - (a) Name\*
    - (b) Location\*
    - (c) Reporting procedures\*
  - (2) Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG)\*
    - (a) Name\*
    - (b) Decryption / encryption procedures\*
  - (3) GPS configuration instructions\*
  - (4) IMDC authentication procedures\*
  - (5) Duress word\*
  - (6) Communications procedures\*
  - (7) Signaling procedures\*
    - (a) Day\*
    - (b) Night\*
  - (8) PR Word/Letter/Number of the day (WOD/LOD/NOD) \*
  - (9) Unit-level authentication/location encryption procedures (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency procedures)\*
- d. Identify critical locations
  - (1) Friendly forces\*
  - (2) Enemy forces\*
  - (3) FARPs\*
  - (4) Refuel tracks (airborne)
  - (5) Intelligence asset tracks (airborne)
  - (6) C2 platform tracks (airborne)
  - (7) IMDC transload locations\*
  - (8) Hospitals/Level III medical care sites\*
  - (9) Reintegration facilities (coordinate with JPRC)
    - (a) In-theater\*
    - (b) Intermediate location
    - (c) CONUS
  - (10) Reintegration team (coordinate with JPRC)
  - (11) In-theater
    - (a) Intermediate location
    - (b) CONUS

- e. Establish common PR information displays
  - (1) Establish the PRCC map/COP and post with:\*
    - (a) Friendly forces\*
      - 1) General force locations\*
      - 2) Recovery asset locations\*
      - 3) AO boundaries\*
    - (b) Enemy forces\*
    - (c) FARPs\*
    - (d) Air refueling locations
    - (e) Intelligence collection platform locations (air/ground/maritime)
    - (f) C2 platform locations (air/ground/maritime)
    - (g) IMDC transload locations\*
    - (h) Hospitals/Level III medical care sites\*
    - (i) In-theater reintegration facilities\*
    - (j) Helicopter flight route waypoints\*
      - 1) Standard Army Aviation Flight Routes (SAAFRs)
      - 2) Minimum Risk Routes (MRRs)
      - Established routes for recovery helicopters (commonly referred to as "spider routes" by the Air Force)\*
    - (k) SARDOT\*
    - (l) FLOT (if established)\*
    - (m) FEBA (if established)\*
    - (n) Fire control measures (if established)\*
      - 1) FSCL\*
      - 2) ROZ\*
      - 3) RFA\*
      - 4) NFA\*
      - 5) Others as necessary\*
    - (o) Established evasion/recovery areas\*
    - (p) "current as of:" DTG\*
  - (2) Establish an incident tracking display\*
  - (3) Establish a PR asset tracking display\*
  - (4) Post daily IMDC authentication information\*
  - (5) Post static call signs\*
    - (a) Airborne\*
    - (b) Ground\*
    - (c) Maritime\*

- (d) JPRC, other PRCCs, PROs\*
- (6) Post important phone numbers\*
- 4. Transmit activation message (PROs need a copy of this message when transmitted)\*
  - a. PRCC location
  - b. PRCC contact information
    - (1) Phone/fax
    - (2) E-mail
    - (3) Radio
    - (4) Chat ID
  - c. Authorities delegated to PRCC
  - d. Coordinating procedures between subordinate units and PRCC
  - e. Request all verify primary and secondary POC
  - f. Request all to provide complete contact info
    - (1) Phone
    - (2) Fax
    - (3) E-mail
    - (4) Radio
    - (5) Chat ID
- 5. End of checklist

### JPRC SETUP CHECKLIST

- 1. Admin setup
  - a. Task organize
    - (1) Director
    - (2) Deputy director
    - (3) Controllers
    - (4) Support personnel from other staff directorates
  - b. Develop a work schedule
  - c. Obtain reference documents
    - (1) Theater PR Regulation
    - (2) PR SOP for the operation (if developed if not, one must be developed and distributed)
    - (3) PR Special Instructions (PR SPINs)
    - (4) Operation phone book/reintegration phone list/e-mail contact list
    - (5) Communications plan/master frequency list
    - (6) Ground control orders (OPORD or FRAGO)
    - (7) Maritime control orders (OPORD or FRAGO)
    - (8) Air Tasking Order (ATO)
    - (9) Airspace Control Order (ACO)
  - d. Check radio/communications equipment
    - (1) Conduct familiarization training for PR cell personnel
    - (2) Set up secondary/mobility radios as required
    - (3) Develop and review frequency list / and sweep
    - (4) Coordinate communication procedures with recovery assets
  - e. Check computer equipment and software (software may change these are current examples)
    - (1) Desktops / laptops
    - (2) Printers
    - (3) NIPR/SIPR/JWICS
    - (4) Integrated Workspace (IWS)
    - (5) ADOCS
    - (6) WIN-T
    - (7) AMPS
    - (8) PFPS/Falcon View
    - (9) mIRC chat
    - (10) Word processing/spreadsheet/e-mail/etc.
  - f. Develop and display two wall charts
    - (1) In-progress IMDC events and recovery missions

- (2) Available PR assets
- g. Identify PR incident/mission number conventions for the operation
- h. Set up information folders and worksheets
  - (1) PR incidents
  - (2) PR missions
  - (3) Event logs
  - (4) Incoming messages / communications
  - (5) Outgoing messages / communications
  - (6) Historical files
- i. As needed, review:
  - (1) Grid coordinate plotting skills
    - (a) UTM / MGRS
    - (b) Latitude / Longitude
  - (2) Identify current map datum (should be WGS 84)
  - (3) SARDOT plotting procedures (in SPINs)
  - (4) SARNEG encryption/decryption procedures (in SPINs)
- j. Identify location and procedures for using message center
- k. Obtain message templates
  - (1) PR cell activation messages
  - (2) SARIR
  - (3) SARSIT
  - (4) PR mission planning order
  - (5) PR execution order
  - (6) OPORD/FRAGO formats
- 1. Brief supporting personnel on their duties during an IMDC event
- 2. Connectivity check / initial coordination
  - a. Identify primary/secondary POCs for all areas listed. Identify phone numbers, e-mails, chat IDs, radio call signs, and radio frequencies as applicable.
  - b. J/G1
    - (1) Casualty affairs
    - (2) Accountability
    - (3) PERSTAT or similar reports (including civilian accountability databases)
  - c. J/G2
    - (1) Component
    - (2) JTF
    - (3) Theater
    - (4) National

- (5) National Security Agency
- (6) National Reconnaissance Office
- (7) Central Intelligence Agency
- (8) Defense Intelligence Agency/POW-MIA cell
- (9) National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
- (10) National Military Joint Intelligence Center
- (11) Other (Federal agency intelligence sections as they apply)
- d. J/G3
  - (1) Own command coordination procedures
  - (2) AO boundaries
  - (3) Cross AO procedures
  - (4) JPRC authorities and responsibilities
  - (5) Required info for execution
  - (6) Who has execute authority?
  - (7) Who has termination authority?
  - (8) Who makes reintegration decisions?
  - (9) Liaison elements/officers
  - (10) Fires/effects support
  - (11) A2C2/ATO distribution
- e. J/G4
  - (1) Mortuary affairs
  - (2) PR equipment acquisition procedures
  - (3) PR logistics support
  - (4) Contractor issues/requirements
- f. J/G5
  - (1) Deliberate/future plans if not integrated into J/G3
  - (2) Civil/Military Operations Center (CMOC)
  - (3) Obtain information on NGO/PVO operating in the area
  - (4) Establish procedures for relaying PR information to/from Civil Affairs units
  - (5) Politico/Military section (POLMIL)
- g. J/G6
  - (1) Communications equipment support
  - (2) Computer infrastructure support
  - (3) Access to COP
  - (4) Access to cryptographic information
  - (5) PR network integration and dedicated PR frequencies

- h. J/G7
  - (1) PSYOP support (if no JPOTF established)
  - (2) Deception support
  - (3) Offensive/defensive IO support
  - (4) Electronic warfare support
- i. J/G8
  - (1) Ensure adequate funding for reintegration efforts and TDY associated with PR events.
- j. Other Government Agencies working with the joint force (State, Justice, etc.)
- k. Surgeon
  - (1) Medical plan
  - (2) Reintegration plan
- l. Chaplain
  - (1) Availability of religious support for returned IMDC personnel
  - (2) Availability of religious support for IMDC family during/after recovery
- m. PAO
  - (1) Command message for PR missions/reintegration activities
- n. Provost Marshall (security for reintegration locations/events)
- o. Host nation
  - (1) Host nation coordination procedures
  - (2) Identify employment restrictions
  - (3) Determine decision-making authorities (might be different from those authorized to make decisions using US forces)
- p. Multinational partners
  - (1) Multinational coordination procedures
  - (2) Identify employment restrictions
  - (3) Determine decision-making authorities (might be different from those authorized to make decisions using US forces)
- q. PRCCs/PROs
  - (1) Locations, requirements, responsibilities
  - (2) Develop quick reference list of key personnel and phone numbers/e-mail/chat IDs/etc
  - (3) Establish procedures for notification of key PRCC personnel and key leaders in their chain command after duty hours.
- r. Subordinate unit ops
  - (1) Identify primary/secondary PROs and/or POCs
  - (2) Establish procedures for obtaining planned and current availability of recovery assets
  - (3) Where are ISOPREP/EPA maintained?
  - (4) Establish transmission methods for ISOPREP/EPA from unit/PRCC to JPRC

- (5) Communication/evasion/survival equipment available to forces?
- (6) Communication/evasion/survival equipment needed by forces?
- s. Develop standing distribution list for IMDC event notification
- 3. Recovery information to have readily available
  - a. Communications information
    - (1) PR phone list
    - (2) Call signs
      - (a) C2 nodes
      - (b) Decision makers
      - (c) ISR assets
    - (3) PR dedicated frequencies
      - (a) SAR A (survival radio UHF)
      - (b) SAR B (survival radio UHF)
      - (c) Personnel Locating System (PLS) code (survival radio) / Quickdraw (recovery force) info
      - (d) Combat Survivor/Evader Locator (CSEL) frequencies
      - (e) Other radios used for PR
    - (4) PR Task Force (PRTF) internals
      - (a) VHF-FM
      - (b) VHF-AM
      - (c) SATCOM
      - (d) UHF
      - (e) HF
      - (f) Other frequencies
  - b. PR SPINs information
    - (1) Search and Rescue Dot (SARDOT)
      - (a) Name
      - (b) Location
      - (c) Reporting procedures
    - (2) Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid (SARNEG)
      - (a) Name
      - (b) Decryption / encryption procedures
    - (3) GPS configuration instructions
    - (4) IMDC authentication procedures
    - (5) Duress word
    - (6) Communications procedures

- (7) Signaling procedures
  - (a) Day
  - (b) Night
- (8) PR Word/Letter/Number of the day (WOD/LOD/NOD)
- (9) Unit-level authentication/location encryption procedures (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency procedures)
- c. Identify critical locations
  - (1) Friendly forces
  - (2) Enemy forces
  - (3) IMDC transload locations
  - (4) Reintegration facilities
    - (a) In-theater
    - (b) Intermediate location
    - (c) CONUS
  - (5) Reintegration team
    - (a) In-theater
    - (b) Intermediate location
    - (c) CONUS
- d. Establish common PR information displays
  - (1) Establish the JPRC map/COP and post with:
    - (a) Friendly forces
      - 1) General force locations
      - 2) Recovery asset locations
      - 3) AO boundaries
    - (b) Enemy forces
    - (c) FARPs
    - (d) Airborne refueling locations
    - (e) Intelligence collection platform locations (ground/air/maritime)
    - (f) C2 platform locations (ground/air/maritime)
    - (g) IMDC transload locations
    - (h) Hospitals/Level III medical care sites
    - (i) In-theater reintegration facilities
    - (j) Helicopter flight route waypoints
      - 1) Standard Army Aviation Flight Routes (SAAFRs)
      - 2) Minimum Risk Routes (MRRs)
      - 3) Established routes for recovery helicopters (commonly referred to as "spider routes" by the Air Force)

- (k) SARDOT
- (l) FLOT (if established)
- (m) FEBA (if established)
- (n) Fire control measures (if established)
  - 1) FSCL
  - 2) ROZ
  - 3) RFA
  - 4) NFA
  - 5) Others as necessary
- (o) Established evasion/recovery areas
- (p) "current as of:" DTG
- (2) Establish an incident tracking display
- (3) Establish a PR asset tracking display
- (4) Post daily IMDC authentication information
- (5) Post static call signs
  - (a) Airborne
  - (b) Ground
  - (c) Maritime
  - (d) PRCCs/PROs
- (6) Post important phone numbers
- 4. Transmit activation message
  - a. JPRC location
  - b. JPRC contact information
    - (1) Phone/fax
    - (2) E-mail
    - (3) Radio
    - (4) Chat ID
  - c. Authorities delegated to JPRC
  - d. Coordinating procedures between JPRC, PRCCs, and PROs
  - e. Request all verify primary and secondary POC
  - f. Request all to provide complete contact info
    - (1) Phone / fax
    - (2) E-mail
    - (3) Radio
    - (4) Chat ID
- 5. End of checklist

## **PR EXECUTION CHECKLIST**

- 1. Report
  - a. Transmit report to PR cells (IMDC personnel, unit, observer)
  - b. Receive report at PR cell
  - c. Obtain and record event info
    - (1) Reporting source/date-time group
    - (2) Event time and location
    - (3) Cause
    - (4) IMDC location (if available)
    - (5) IMDC identities
    - (6) IMDC numbers
    - (7) IMDC medical condition
    - (8) Recovery actions currently underway (if any)
    - (9) Other info
      - (a) IMDC unit(s)
      - (b) ISOPREP
      - (c) EPA
      - (d) IMDC equipment
        - 1) Communications
        - 2) Survival
        - 3) Evasion aids (navigation equipment, EVC, blood chit)
        - 4) Clothing/footwear
      - (e) IMDC SERE training level
  - d. Validate report
    - (1) Determine source validity
    - (2) Check information with operational documents
      - (a) OPORDs/FRAGOs (ground, air, and maritime)
      - (b) Communications plan
      - (c) SOI
    - (3) Check information with unit operations (through component RCC)
  - e. Establish communications with IMDC if possible
  - f. Disseminate incident info to PR architecture
    - (1) PR cells/subordinate unit operations section
    - (2) All intelligence representatives/agencies/organizations
    - (3) Alert recovery forces
    - (4) C2 assets for radio monitoring

- (5) Airspace management for restricted operating zone (ROZ) establishment
- (6) Fires/effects cell for fire control measures
- (7) Medical/reintegration channels
- g. Request support as required
- h. Start incident folder
- 2. Locate
  - a. Confirm IMDC location accuracy
    - (1) Source of location information
      - (a) Provided by local observation
      - (b) Provided by intelligence collection
      - (c) Provided by IMDC personnel
    - (2) Method of determining location
      - (a) Last known point
      - (b) GPS
      - (c) Map estimation
      - (d) SARDOT
      - (e) Distance/bearing from on-scene forces
    - (3) Forces on-scene?
    - (4) Forces close by?
      - (a) Air
      - (b) Ground
      - (c) Maritime
    - (5) Cross-queue intelligence capabilities and ALL disciplines
      - (a) Coordinate use of national assets
      - (b) Coordinate use of theater/joint force assets
      - (c) Coordinate use of component assets
  - b. Pass location to PR architecture
  - c. Update location continuously
  - d. Begin recovery planning (MDMP)
  - e. Select appropriate recovery method (immediate, deliberate, ESR, unassisted)
  - f. Select initial units for recovery
- 3. Support
  - a. Establish control measures
    - (1) Air
    - (2) Ground
    - (3) Fires

- b. Control IMDC perimeter if possible
- c. Disseminate IMDC authentication data
- d. Authenticate IMDC
  - (1) Track/manage use of authentication info
    - (a) PR WOD/LOD/NOD
    - (b) ISOPREP information
    - (c) Challenge/password
    - (d) Personal information provided by unit
- e. Inform PR nodes and C2 assets of authentication that has been used
- f. Confirm medical condition of IMDC
- g. Maintain communications with IMDC
- h. Continue MDMP
- i. Prepare for recovery
- j. Support IMDC family
  - (1) Maintain communications with IMDC Service representative
  - (2) Maintain communications with home station and unit representatives
- k. Confirm recovery method
- l. Confirm units required
- m. Finalize recovery COAs
- n. Brief recovery COAs to decision maker
- o. Get execute order from decision maker
- 4. Recover
  - a. Pass recovery order to units (through PRCC to PRO/unit operations section)
  - b. Rehearse approved COA
  - c. Units finalize mission planning
  - d. Execute mission to gain custody of IMDC personnel
  - e. Obtain/provide SITREPs as required
  - f. Monitor mission progress
  - g. Confirm medical channel notification/availability
  - h. Confirm reintegration channel notification/availability
  - i. Coordinate transportation from recovery forces to medical / reintegration facility
  - j. Capture event information for immediate dissemination
- 5. Reintegrate (see reintegration checklist for details)
  - a. Move survivor to secure location
  - b. Implement reintegration plan
    - (1) Assess/treat medical condition

- (2) Assess/treat psychological condition
- (3) Conduct SERE debrief
- (4) Conduct Intel debrief
- (5) Disseminate information from SERE and Intel debriefs to PR cells for inclusion in and adaptation of ongoing operations/plans
- (6) Continue treatment of medical / psychological problems as necessary
- (7) Complete reintegration process
- c. Return IMDC to service/family
- d. Follow-up as necessary
- 6. File incident info
  - a. Compile records of all notes, forms, chat logs, message traffic, etc associated with each individual mission
  - b. Gather lessons learned from event
    - (1) PR cell conduct of 5 tasks
    - (2) Commander and staff lessons learned
    - (3) Units lessons learned
    - (4) IMDC lessons learned
  - c. Assess and adapt as necessary
  - d. Close mission folder when IMDC personnel returned to control of service/component. For ongoing missions, handover complete mission folder with all information to relief PR cell personnel.
  - e. Maintain all records of each IMDC event and PR mission
  - f. Forward copy of each completed or closed event to JPRC, JPRA, and HQDA PR office
- 7. End of checklist

## **REINTEGRATION CHECKLIST**

- 1. General considerations/preparation
  - a. General logistics considerations
    - (1) Transportation (ground and airlift)
      - (a) To Phase I location
      - (b) To Phase II location
      - (c) To Phase III location
      - (d) For returned personnel
      - (e) For reintegration team
      - (f) For family members and casualty affairs representative
    - (2) Medical
    - (3) Clothing
    - (4) Meals
    - (5) Security
      - (a) Physical
      - (b) OPSEC
      - (c) Secure storage for debriefing materials (at the S/NF level)
    - (6) Communications channels
    - (7) Debriefing
      - (a) Audio/visual supplies and equipment
    - (8) Financial
    - (9) Public affairs
    - (10) Visitors
    - (11)Housing
    - (12) Forms
      - (a) Obtain DD 2810 (Promise of Confidentiality)
      - (b) Nondisclosure agreements for returnees and reintegration team members
      - (c) Debriefing statement
  - b. IMDC support
    - (1) Medical
      - (a) Physical
      - (b) Psychological (SERE psychologist)
      - (c) Dental
    - (2) Religious
      - (a) Determine returnee's religious faith
      - (b) Chaplain available

- (c) Any specific religious implications
- (3) Legal
- (4) Billeting
- (5) Meals
- (6) Clothing
- (7) Personal hygiene supplies
- c. Identify family issues
  - (1) Travel from/to CONUS (if required)
  - (2) Civil law enforcement coordination for home security
  - (3) Casualty assistance
  - (4) Billeting (military installation recommended)
  - (5) Meals
  - (6) SERE psychologist support
  - (7) Chaplain availability and support
  - (8) PAO rep/training
  - (9) Past military experience of family members
  - (10) Attitude toward military
  - (11) Hidden issues with returnee
  - (12) Hidden issues between visiting family members
- 2. Gather initial returnee information
  - a. Name
  - b. Rank (if military)
  - c. SSN
  - d. Physical condition
    - (1) Not injured
    - (2) Ambulatory
    - (3) Non-ambulatory
    - (4) Critical injuries
    - (5) Deceased
  - e. Unit
  - f. Recovery details
    - (1) Date
    - (2) Location
    - (3) Method
    - (4) Recovery unit
    - (5) OPSEC issues

- (6) Captive?
- 3. Confirm Reintegration locations
  - a. Phase I
  - b. Phase II
  - c. Phase III
- 4. Verify locations and availability of reintegration team members
  - a. Unit command representative
  - b. Key unit personnel
  - c. Service/unit SERE psychologist
  - d. Local medical authorities
  - e. Intelligence debriefers
  - f. SERE debriefers
  - g. Security personnel
  - h. US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) personnel
  - i. Legal personnel
  - j. Chaplain representative
  - k. Service/unit casualty affairs representative
  - 1. Contractor company representative
  - m. Public affairs
  - n. Marriage/dependent counselors (if required)
  - o. JPRA representatives (if available)
- 5. Implement media / communication procedures
  - a. Control media access to recovered personnel
  - b. Control media access to family members
  - c. Information to project
  - d. Information to protect
- 6. Coordinate IMDC transport to safe/secure area for initial screening/debrief
  - a. Keep recovered personnel together if they were IMDC together
  - b. Ambulatory
  - c. Non-ambulatory
- 7. Phase I (closest or predetermined safe/secure area for initial medical care and debriefing)
  - a. Keep recovered personnel together if they were IMDC together
  - b. Non-essential access to recovered personnel prohibited or strictly controlled
    - (1) Media
    - (2) Well-wishers
    - (3) VIPs

- (4) Family contact
- c. Inform family of returnee status (casualty affairs)
- d. Provide immediate medical treatment
- e. Initial psychological assessment (SERE psychologist)
- f. Conduct initial intelligence and SERE debriefs for information of immediate importance to the operation
  - (1) Intel debrief
    - (a) Determine location
    - (b) Identify debrief personnel
  - (2) SERE debrief
    - (a) Determine location
    - (b) Identify debrief personnel
- g. Have key unit member available
  - (1) Company representative (contractor)
  - (2) National representative (recovered foreign national)
- h. Inform returnee of upcoming reintegration activities
- i. Prepare returnees to handle media, family, non-isolated unit members, well-wishers, VIP visits, etc.
- j. Back to duty or continue to Phase II
- 8. Phase II (intermediate location)
  - a. Keep recovered personnel together if they were IMDC together
  - b. Develop returnee schedules/timelines (4 hour maximum debrief time per day)
  - c. Continued medical treatment
    - (1) Physical
    - (2) Psychological
  - d. Decompression and reorientation (minimum 3-day time period after arrival)
  - e. Phone contact with family members/significant other (with prior preparation by SERE psychologist for recovered person and family members)
  - f. Back to duty or continue to Phase III
    - (1) Phase III planning
- 9. Phase III (CONUS)
  - a. Keep recovered personnel together if they were IMDC together
  - b. PAO assistance
  - c. Reunite with family
  - d. In-depth intelligence, SERE, and SERE psychology debriefs (as required)
  - e. CID debriefs as required
  - f. Compartmented recovery debriefs as required
  - g. Security review of debrief results

- h. Consult with other government agencies (if required)
- i. Post debrief report from unit command to returnee
- j. Final duty status determination
- 10. End of checklist

# ASSESSMENT MATRIX

	Pre- mobilization	Mobilization	Deploy	Employ	Sustain	Redeploy
Command & Staff						
This HQ						
PR C2 cell						
Augmentees						
Higher HQ						
DA and DOD support						
OGA						
Interoperability						
Units						
IMDC unit						
Recovery unit				$\phi >$		
Supporting unit				X		
Individuals		•	l Mr			
Service member		C \				
DAC		5				
Contractors						
Organization						
Guidance						
Education Training						
Equipment						
Classes of Supply						
I Subsistence						
II Expendable (Were consumption rates roughly equal to projected rates?)						
III Petroleum						
IV Construction						
V Ammunition						
VI Personal Demand Items						
VII Major End						

#### Table C-1. PR Assessment Matrix

	Pre- mobilization	Mobilization	Deploy	Employ	Sustain	Redeploy
Items						
VIII Medical						
IX Repair Parts						
X Non-military						
Top 10 DX items						
Top 10 Maintenance Issues						
Comms/ C4OPS						
Computers						
Software						
Weapons						
Ammo						
Navigation			<			
Signal locating			11	K		
Transporting		1				
Soldier as a System		S	$\mathbf{h}$			
Consume						
Wear						
Carry						
Systems/Pro- cesses						
Planning						
Deliberate						
Time- constrained						
Accountability						
Personnel						
Sensitive Items						
Battlefield Operating Systems						
ISR						
Maneuver						
Fire Support						
Air Defense						
Mobility Countermobility Survivability						

	Pre- mobilization	Mobilization	Deploy	Employ	Sustain	Redeploy
Combat Service Support						
Command and Control						
Non-DA units to Address						
USJFCOM JPRA						
USN				_		
USMC						
USAF						
USCG						
IPB						
Intelligence Disciplines			W.			
All-Source						
HUMINT		S				
IMINT		J				
SIGINT						
COMINT						
ELINT						
FISINT						
MASINT						
TECHINT						
OSINT						
CI						
Special Areas of Interest						
Fratricide						
Air to Air						
Air to Surface						
Surface to Surface						
Prevention of IMDC						
Ideas to increase our capability						
Locating and tracking IMDC location						

	Pre- mobilization	Mobilization	Deploy	Employ	Sustain	Redeploy
Items to speed/ increase effectiveness in planning/ supporting/ responding						
Decision Matrices						
Support Matrices						
Reports						
Message Formats						
Response						
Tracking incidents						
Battle Handover from previous unit					K	
Battle Handover to replacing unit			N	<b>8</b>		
Core Soldier Skills training			V 14.			
Facilities		ن ح				
Training Areas		)				
Operational time line converts to D-Day milestone chart for future operations						
Special Staff and Personal Staff						
CSM						
Chaplain						
SJA						
PAO						
Surgeon						
Special PR Equip/ Resources						
Medical Package						
Emergency resupply						
Others						

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	Pre- mobilization	Mobilization	Deploy	Employ	Sustain	Redeploy
Officer/NCO Professional Development Opportunities						
Accuracy of Fires						
Did subordinate units know how to:			•	E		
Shoot						
Move			$\mathbf{O}$	•		
Communicate						
Unassisted Recoveries						
Evasion						
SERE						
JPRSP						
SAFEs						
DARs						
Integration of the PR staff						
Soldier Accountability						

### **AFTER-ACTION REVIEW REPORT FORMAT**

[Classification]

Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number

AAR of OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code] References Time Zone Used Throughout the AAR: Task Organization

- 1. SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Forces.

b. Friendly Forces. (Include this heaquarters, PR C2 cell, higher HQs, adjacent and subordinate units, Component forces, OGAs, etc.)

c. Attachments and detachments.

- d. Assumptions.
- 2. MISSION.
- 3. EXECUTION ASSESSMENT.
  - a. Assessment of operations.
    - (1) Maneuver. (include units conducting recovery)
    - (2) Fires.
    - (3) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
    - (4) Intelligence.
    - (5) Engineer.
    - (6) Air and Missile Defense.
    - (7) Information Operations.
  - b. Assessment of Tasks to maneuver units.
  - c. Assessment of Tasks to other combat and combat support units.
  - d. Coordinating instructions. (to include impact on PR operations)

e. Time line of incorporating accepted recommendations from the AAR (changes to the RSOP/TACSOP/PRCC SOP, etc. and submitting requirements to higher HQs)

- f. CCIR (PIR, FFIR) EEFI assessment.
- g. Risk reduction control measures assessment.
- h. Rules of engagement assessment.
- i. Environmental considerations assessment.
- j. Force protection assessment.
- k. Commander's assessment.
- 1. CofS assessment.
- m. CSM assessment.
- n. G1 assessment.
- o. G2 assessment.
- p. G3 assessment.
- q. G4 assessment.
- r. G5 assessment.
- s. G6 assessment.
- t. G7 assessment.
- u. G8 assessment.
- v. SJA assessment.

- w. PAO assessment.
- x. Surgeon assessment.
- y. Chaplain assessment.
- z. Recommendations for changes in Guidance, Organization, Training and Equipment
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT.
  - a. Support assessment.
  - b. Material and services.
  - c. Health service support.
  - d. Personnel.
  - e. Civil military.
  - f. As required.
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL ASSESSMENT
  - a. Command.
  - b. Signal.
  - c. Recommendations to change RSOP/TACSOP/PR SOP/PRCC SOP/OPLAN/ OPORD.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

[Commander's last name] [Commander's rank]

OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's Position]

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

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# Appendix D PR Equipment

PR-specific equipment is available for potential IMDC personnel and units. For potential IMDC personnel, evasion aids, signaling devices, survival radios, and survival equipment can aid in evasion and survival. Additionally, this equipment can enable IMDC personnel in communicating with and assisting commanders and staffs and recovery units during recovery missions.

Additional equipment may be required by units when executing recovery missions in difficult situations such as aircraft or vehicle crashes, collapsed structures, and mountainous or maritime environments. Table D-2 lists examples of equipment that may be required in these situations.

#### **EVASION AIDS**

D-1. Evasion aids are designed to assist IMDC personnel in successfully evading and surviving until they can be recovered. At-risk personnel should carry evasion aids on their person. Not all evasion aids are effective in all areas – the intent is to provide at-risk personnel with different aids to be used as applicable. Evasion aids include blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts (EVCs), and hand-held global positioning system (GPS) devices.

#### **BLOOD CHITS**

D-2. The blood chit (figure D-1) is a small sheet of material imprinted with an American flag, a statement in English, and several languages read by the populace in the operational area. Numbers in the corners identify each individual chit. The statements on the blood chit identify the bearer as an American and promise a reward to anyone providing assistance to the bearer (IMDC personnel) during their attempt to return to friendly control. If a person agrees to render assistance, the bearer removes a corner of the blood chit (with a number) and gives it to the individual rendering assistance. When the blood chit number is presented to American authorities, the American has been returned to friendly control, and the circumstances have been properly validated, the numbered corner of the blood chit represents an obligation of the United States Government to provide compensation to the claimant for assisting an IMDC person. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) maintains the capability to produce blood chits at the request of the combatant commanders as coordinated through JPRA.

D-3. Although blood chits have no inherent or predetermined value, they are subject to accountability. For further guidance on the blood chit program, see JP 3-50, Appendix H, "Blood Chit Program Administration."

#### **POINTEE-TALKEE**

D-4. A pointee-talkee is a small card containing phrases in a three column format; English phrases on the left side of the card, the same phrases in the local language in the middle, and the phonetic pronunciation on the right side of the card. IMDC personnel select the desired English phrase and point to the translation of the phrase beside it or try to phonetically pronounce the desired phrase. The major limitation of the pointee-talkee, as with the blood chit, is using it to communicate with individuals who cannot read. IMDC personnel may have to use other techniques to communicate with local personnel, such as pantomime, phonetics, and sign language. Pointee-talkees should be developed in conjunction with appropriate



language experts, for specific operational areas, and with the assistance of the JPRA as required. New pointee-talkee development should be requested through combatant commands.

Figure D-1. Blood chit

#### **EVASION CHART (EVC)**

D-5. Tailored to cover the individual operational area concerned, an EVC combines standard navigation charts with evasion and survival information printed in the margins. A typical EVC contains information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, and personal protection. They also contain area specific techniques for water and food procurement as well as color pictures of edible and poisonous plants. EVCs are overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding when used as a shelter/cover.

D-6. Navigation and terrain data on an EVC is derived from the most current joint operations graphic (JOG) maps of an area. One EVC includes approximately eight JOG charts, usually four on each side. When JOGs of a particular area are not available other maps are substituted. Depending upon data availability and combatant command requirements, an EVC may vary from 1:24,000 to 1:300,000-scale.

D-7. EVCs are produced on waterproof, tear resistant material and are designed to assist IMDC personnel with navigation, evasion, and survival in hostile territory. The chart is folded to fit in a cargo pocket, showing an American flag on one of the outer panels (figure D-2). The EVC program is managed by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA). EVCs are developed and printed jointly by JPRA and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Procedures for ordering EVCs are found on NGA's compact disk, "Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products". A list of currently available EVCs can also be obtained by contacting JPRA (www.jpra.jfcom.mil).

#### HANDHELD GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

D-8. Small global positioning system (GPS units of several varieties are available from commercial manufacturers. User-programmable capabilities include map datum information, position display format, heading display format, distance measuring format, waypoint storage, and route programming capability. Power is generally provided by AA batteries. A handheld GPS, in conjunction with the SARDOT or another point known only to friendly forces, can be used by IMDC personnel to determine their location in relation to that known point. By transmitting the distance and bearing from their location to that known point, as displayed by the GPS, IMDC personnel can communicate their location over non-secure communications channels without compromising their location.




Figure D-2. Evasion chart

### SIGNALING DEVICES

D-9. Signaling devices are used by IMDC personnel to pinpoint their location to units in their immediate vicinity. When only a general location of the IMDC is known, a signaling device can reduce the amount of time recovery units spend searching for the IMDC's exact location. Examples of signaling devices are infrared beacons ("firefly"), signal strobes, VS-17 panels, flares, smoke grenades, chemlights, and signal mirrors. Figure D-3 shows a signal strobe on the left and an infrared beacon (on a 9-volt battery) on the right.



Figure D-3. Signaling devices

#### SURVIVAL RADIOS

D-10. A variety of survival radios are currently in use throughout DOD. Table D-1 (page D-4) lists survival radios and their capabilities. PR cell personnel may have all of these radios in use within their

respective AOs. Standardized communications, location, and authentication procedures must take into consideration all of the radios deployed throughout the AO.

Radio	Frequency range (MHz)	Preset MHz frequencies	Programmable frequencies	Beacon frequency	PLS	Other capabilities
PRC-90	N/A (fixed frequencies)	243.0 (b) 243.0 (v) 282.8 (v)	No	243.0	No	HI-power beacon mode
PRC-112	121.5 225-299.975	121.5 (b) 121.5 (v) 243.0 (b/v/t) 282.8 (v/t)	Channel A (v/t) Channel B (v/t)	121.5 243.0	Yes	Range and bearing *
PRC-112B (Hook 112)	121.5 225-299.975	121.5 (b) 121.5 (v) 243.0 (b/v/t) 282.8 (v/t)	Channel A (v/t) Channel B (v/t)	121.5 243.0	Yes	Range and bearing * Digital data burst Free-form messages Preset messages
PRC-112B1 (Hook 2)	121.5 225-299.975	121.5 (b) 121.5 (v) 243.0 (b/v/t) 282.8 (v/t)	Channel A (v/t) Channel B (v/t)	121.5 243.0	Yes	Range and bearing * 12-channel GPS Digital data burst Free-form messages Preset messages
PRC-112G	121.5 225-299.975 225-320 340-390	121.5 (b) 121.5 (v) 243.0 (b/v/t) 282.8 (v/t) 406.025 (b)	Channel A (v/t) Channel B (v/t) Additional channels available	121.5 243.0 406.025	Yes	Range and bearing * 12-channel GPS Digital data burst Free-form messages Preset messages 2-way SATCOM (d) Selectable coordinate system Waypoint loading Encryption keys
CSEL	VHF-AM (b) UHF (v) SATCOM(d)		6	243.0 406.025	No	2-way SATCOM (d) Internal GPS Digital data burst Free-form messages Preset messages

Table D-1. Survival radio information

b = beacon mode, v = voice mode, t = transponder mode, d = data only, \* = when interrogated by AN/ARS-6 or Quickdraw radios

### SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

D-11. At-risk personnel may wish to carry additional equipment to assist with survival after an IMDC event. Collapsible water containers, water purification products, camouflage or environmental protection

items, and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife/multi-tool, and lightweight casualty/survival blankets can assist in survival, particularly in situations requiring long-term evasion.

### ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

D-12. In situations requiring the extraction of IMDC personnel from aircraft wreckage, vehicle wreckage, mountainous or high-angle urban environments, and maritime environments, specialized equipment may be required. Table D-2 lists additional equipment for consideration and situations where its use may be required.

Equipment	Purpose
Litters/sleds/rescue baskets/horse collars	Carrying or dragging non-ambulatory personnel to recovery vehicle. Rescue baskets or horse collars are often used when hoisting personnel from water into a helicopter
Hoists/winches	Removing wreckage to access personnel, lowering or raising personnel to a point that is more accessible. Some situations may require a helicopter equipped with a winch
Advanced medical supplies	Medical supplies for treating severe injuries during recovery attempt.
Blankets	Protecting personnel from environmental conditions or from flying debris when using extraction tools on wreckage
Power saws with multiple blades	Cutting wreckage away from personnel
Hacksaws with multiple blades	Cutting wreckage away from personnel
Various lengths of rope or tubular nylon webbing	Fashioning slings, seats, or securing personnel to litters/sleds for hoisting. May also be required for recovery forces to rappel to personnel
Caribiners (snap links)	Securing equipment, attaching personnel to hoists, rappelling, etc.
Multi-tool/crash axe	Cutting through wreckage, doors, wall panels to access personnel
Pry bars	Forcing wreckage, opening jammed vehicle or aircraft doors
Hydraulic tools	Clearing heavy wreckage debris, removing vehicle, aircraft, or building structural members to extract personnel. These tools, such as the Jaws of Life, often require external power pumps and come with interchangeable ends to accommodate different uses. Includes spreaders, cutters, rams, and combination tools.
Safety goggles	Eye protection for units and IMDC personnel when using extraction tools
Kevlar helmet/body armor	IMDC personnel protection during the recovery
High-pressure airbags	Used to lift heavy objects off personnel or to create extraction space. Commercially available in various sizes and in lift capacities from 1 to 70 tons.
Chains, shackles, heavy-duty straps	Clearing heavy wreckage debris, removing vehicle, aircraft, or building structural members to extract personnel. Used in conjunction with power tools or winches/hoists.
Flotation devices	Support personnel (IMDC and recovery force) during maritime/riverine recoveries.

Table D-2. Additional	I PR equipment
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### CONCLUSION

D-13. PR-specific equipment is designed to enable more effective recoveries and to assist at-risk personnel in surviving an IMDC event until they can be recovered. Commanders and staffs (particularly PR cell personnel), recovery units, and at-risk individuals must be familiar with the PR equipment requirements for specific operations and understand the proper employment of this equipment.

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# Appendix E PR in the MDMP Matrix

This matrix was developed to provide the commander and staff a starting point for PR planning. Although it is not all inclusive, it provides a foundation to enable PR planning in both deliberate and time-constrained environments.

#### Table E-1. Receipt of mission

	Receipt of mission				
Responsible	PR activities				
Alert the Staff					
Battle Captain	CCIR update to CDR				
CofS	Directs the staff to conduct parallel/collaborative planning				
	<ul> <li>Direct staff to begin taking notes for the AAR now (all staff sections/units/ and leaders). Schedule a formal AAR/lessons learned session after each phase and mission. Incorporate the AAR/PR LL into the RSOP/TACSOP and disseminate the information to all subordinate forces and follow on echelon forces</li> </ul>				
	(The mission may be tasked by higher, identified through message traffic, or received from an IMDC event or person. Key formats that may be received include: OPLAN, OPORD, Search and Rescue Incident Report (SARIR); SAR Situation Report (SARSIT), a Ground to Air Signal (GTAS); or derived from other staff communications (Spot Report [SPOTREP]), etc.)				
G3 Battle Captain	<ul> <li>Alerts the designated staff reps for PR planning</li> </ul>				
G3	Identifies location/attendees (to include LNOs) for planning				
Staff	Staff begins parallel/ collaborative planning				
PR cell	Alerts units in vicinity of IMDC				
PR cell Staff	<ul> <li>Specific report that identified the IMDC event (Convoy overdue, PERSTAT, SITREP, contact by IMDC)</li> </ul>				
CDR	Emphasizes IMDC's time on the run (isolation/captivity)				
	Gather Tools				
CDR	Orders and communications				
CofS CSM	Higher headquarters order/ plan and graphics				
Staff	Updates the COP with IMDC event information				
G1	Unit database and key personnel shortages list that affect PR operations				
G1	IRR Augmentee plan for PR staff				
G1	Integrate PR into Family Support Plan				
G3	Unit Yellow Ribbon/ Reintegration Plan				
PR cell					
G1 G3	Replacement Plans Attachment to base plan/order				
G1	DOD civilians/contractors status				
L					

	Receipt of mission
Responsible	PR activities
G4	
	Gather Tools
G2	Queries IPB and prepares to facilitate staff IPB
G2	Directs Terrain Detachment and SWO to prepare for MDMP
G2	<ul> <li>Selected Areas for Evasion (SAFE), SAFE Area Intelligence Description (SAID), Evasion Plans of Action (EPA), Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), DD Form 1833</li> </ul>
G2	All-source intelligence plan/products for employment
ACE	Collection Management Dissemination
CMD	ISR status and availability
A2C2	Army Airspace Command and Control     Identify airspace control measures
ACE	Analysis and Control Element
PR cell	Check IMDC via single source RWS-SIGINT
Terrain Det	Review EVC
G3	Current OPORD/Task org
FEC	• Compiles the status of control measures in current operations; status of observers (that can be integrated into ISR); etc.
	Status of Fires/ RFA/ NFA and observers in the vicinity of IMDC; avail for PR support
PR cell	• FMs (PR related), PR SOPs, SPINs, DODDs, DODIs, Theater PR regulation, JPs
G3	Training Status Report (specifically PR training) for staff, units, individuals
G3	Quarterly Training Report for review of PR training (staff, units and individuals) to include CoC and SERE
G3	Compiles the standing RFI list for review
G3	Reviews staff and unit rehearsal schedules that include PR specific training
G3	Review the current ISR plan
	Compiles the ISR available assets
G3	Direct space officer to prepare for MDMP
PR cell	<ul> <li>Assembles the PR code-word list for units not equipped with secure transmission equipment</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Verifies the PR code-word list for IMDC and recovery units</li> </ul>
G3 G4	<ul> <li>Considerations for emergency resupply for IMDC including: weapon, basic load of ammo, food, water, communication equipment (survival radios, beacons, mirror, panel, IR chemlights, smoke/flare device, etc.), navigation supplies (compass, map sheets, GPS), environmental supplies (uniform, cold weather, dry climate, etc.), medical supplies</li> </ul>
G3 PR cell	TACSOP (latest update) PR Section
PR cell	Update COP to/from/vicinity IMDC site)
PR cell	Considerations for "no communications" procedures
G3	Considerations for non-standard navigation procedures
PR cell	<ul> <li>Status of non standard navigation assets (aircraft/artillery illumination; SIGINT)</li> </ul>
PR cell Staff	<ul> <li>Compiles list of all PR capable assets in theater/TPFDD to include USN, USMC, USAF, US Embassy, OGA and their PR POCs</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Status of all PR capable assets in vicinity of IMDC</li> </ul>
G3 Avn PR cell	Identify procedures and equipment required to comply with ATO & SPINs
PR cell	Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product (JPRSP)
	······································

	Receipt of mission
Responsible	PR activities
PR cell	PR Decision support template
	Gather Tools
PR cell	<ul> <li>Websites with PR information (use reach to pull information)</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>AARs/PR Lessons Learned from previous exercises/ operations</li> </ul>
PR cell SOCORD	NAR/UAR plans
PR cell	<ul> <li>Updates the PR POC information for all PR activities at higher HQs (to include HQDA) and subordinate units</li> </ul>
PR cell	Query individual's unit to determine last appropriate last known position and rally point (if identified) in order to develop support plan for unassisted recovery later in MDMP
G4	Current maps and charts
PR cell	Review maps and charts of other components/multinational
Staff	<ul> <li>Standardize maps and charts and datum used</li> </ul>
G3 PR cell	Notify Rear Detachment to prepare for reintegration (message over secure communications)
	Notify reintegration team
G4	<ul> <li>Logistical Attachment to base plan/order to include Traffic Control Point (TCP) procedures</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>MSR and road network: query/notify TCPs near IMDC event to assess possible deviations from routes</li> </ul>
G4	Asses the status of Classes of Supply
G4	<ul> <li>Review DAC and Contractor accountability plans</li> </ul>
	Status of DAC and contractors vicinity IMDC
G5	<ul> <li>Status of diplomatic and NGO agencies</li> </ul>
G5	<ul> <li>Assess key facilities and host nation support in country that can be used in support of PR operations (hospitals, police stations, fire stations, etc.)</li> </ul>
G6	<ul> <li>Determines the current communications architecture for the unit /theater for PR operations</li> </ul>
	Assess PR architecture
PR cell	Compiles the list of Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) network users
G6	Queries the other PR nodes     Compiles the list of feature and PD equipment used excelling the feature DD
G6	Compiles the list of frequencies and PR equipment used specifically for PR
PAO	Review command message
	Update and disseminate command message for PR events     Develop modio policy for PD
	Develop media policy for PR     Other of information means the display OOID and aritical information
G6	Status of information management system to display CCIR and critical information
	<ul> <li>Assess information management tools to prioritize information</li> <li></li></ul>
G6	Assess PR communications plan of other components/ multinational
G7	Assembles the PSYOP/CA/IO plan and include PR
G3	
G7	Assess status of EW assets, computer attack capability, defense IO, OPSEC plans
G2	Assess status of IO in support of PR
Surgeon	Medical support plan, hospital locations, beds available
Surgeon	Alert SERE Psych

	Receipt of mission
Responsible	PR activities
Surgeon	Medical training that impacts PR/IMDC capabilities
SJA	ROE (assists G3)
	Gather Tools
SJA	Status of Forces Agreement
SJA	Legal status of IMDC (including civilians and contractors
SJA	Operational Law concerning PR
SJA	Compiles host/multinational/adjacent/regional nation legal impacts on PR
Chaplain	Assess Religious Support plan to review for PR specific support to IMDC and family
	Update the Estimates
CDR	Emphasizes the time on the run for IMDC
PR cell	Determine PR execution authorities
	Confirm PR execution authorities
CofS	Evaluates status of skill level of the staff in PR planning
Staff	Updates the COP
CDR	Reviews the mission and command relationships
G3	Reviews Commander's PR intent
CSM	<ul> <li>Provides the institutional memory re operations/ situations that are PR related (Family Support Plans, Replacement Operations, 100% accountability requirements; shortfalls in past operations, etc.)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Provides update on past shortfalls and best practices in PR operations</li> </ul>
Staff	Updates the 6 dimensions of the Contemporary Operational Environment and staff IPB
G1	Updates the database
	Compares PERSTAT to the by name rosters
G1	Key PR personnel shortages identified?
G1	Updates status of IRR augmentees to PR staff
G1	Reviews the Replacement system for accountability issues
	Query the accountability "danger areas"
G1	Updates status of DAC and Contractors on the Battlefield
G1	Begins validating the IMDC identity/circumstance
G2	Query JIC, JISE, NIST and national assets
ACE	
G2	Updates the enemy situation; creates initial situation templates; using all-source     intelligence (et/te/fears IMDO site)
ACE	intelligence (at/to/from IMDC site)
Terrain Det	Updates terrain products (at/to/from IMDC site)
SWO	Updates weather/light data
G2	Updates the SAFE, SAID, EVCs, IPG
G2	Updates the ISR plan
CMD	Updates status of ISR assets
PR cell	Retrieve IMDC ISOPREP
G2	
G2	Updates Intel plan with info from components/multinational
G3	Updates operational status of all units
G3	Updates status of PR training of IRR augmentees to staff
CofS	Updates operational time line and status of battle rhythm

	Receipt of mission
Responsible	PR activities
PR cell	<ul> <li>Updates status of no radio communications procedures and non-standard navigational procedures</li> </ul>
	Update the Estimates
PR cell	<ul> <li>Updates status of PR trained staff members/units/individuals</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Updates status of IMDC PR/SERE training</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Updates PR SOP and IMDC event numbering convention</li> </ul>
G3	Updates the rehearsal schedule for staff and units
G3	Updates status of ISR
G3	<ul> <li>Begins consolidation of staff's information requirements</li> </ul>
PR cell	Updates PR POC information
PR cell	Current information on NAR/UAR plans
SOCORD	<ul> <li>Updates status of NAR/UAR plans</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Current PR related documents to include planning and execution checklists/matrixes and AARs/lessons learned</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Retrieves the ISOPREP, EPA and SPINs information for development of contact and authentication plan</li> </ul>
PR cell	• Extracts key information from the ATO and SPINS including: SARNEG, SARDOT, WOD, etc. Disseminate classified and unclassified information.
PR cell	<ul> <li>Determines which airborne platforms are capable of monitoring, assisting, etc with an IMDC event (ex. JSTARS, Rivet Joint, etc)</li> </ul>
A2C2	Update airspace coordination measures for PR
FEC	<ul> <li>Updates information on planned fires and initiate fire support control measures in IMDC area</li> </ul>
Staff	Updates availability of effects to support PR
	<ul> <li>Assess requirements to move communications and ISR assets, units, transportation, and support assets</li> </ul>
G4	Updates PR equipment availability and accountability
G5	Updates civil considerations vicinity IMDC
G5	Updates status of diplomatic agencies and NGO in AO
G5	<ul> <li>Updates status of host nation hospitals/aid facilities; police; fire; ambulance; emergency operations centers</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Updates status of supporting infrastructure</li> </ul>
G6	Updates status of PR communications architecture
G3	Establishes periodic reporting procedures to update lateral and higher HQs
G6	Updates information management tools to prioritize information
	<ul> <li>Ensure display is providing relevant information to commander and staff</li> </ul>
PR cell	Query PR architecture for information
	Update reintegration team

PR cell • G3 AVN •	PR activities         Update the Estimates         • Updates IMDC information:         Leadership         Communications status         Medical status of IMDC         Equipment/environmental protection and sustainment         Operational status         Weapons/Ammunition status         Enemy situation (in contact?)         Time/nature of event         ISOPREP/SERE/EPA         EEFI at risk         Training/expertise         IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures         • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support         • Updates ROE and legal status issues
PR cell • G3 AVN •	<ul> <li>Updates IMDC information: Leadership Communications status Medical status of IMDC Equipment/environmental protection and sustainment Operational status Weapons/Ammunition status Enemy situation (in contact?) Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures</li> <li>Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support</li> <li>Updates ROE and legal status issues</li> </ul>
G3 AVN •	Leadership Communications status Medical status of IMDC Equipment/environmental protection and sustainment Operational status Weapons/Ammunition status Enemy situation (in contact?) Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support Updates ROE and legal status issues
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	Equipment/environmental protection and sustainment Operational status Weapons/Ammunition status Enemy situation (in contact?) Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
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	Weapons/Ammunition status Enemy situation (in contact?) Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	Enemy situation (in contact?) Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	Time/nature of event ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	ISOPREP/SERE/EPA EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	EEFI at risk Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	Training/expertise IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures • Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support • Updates ROE and legal status issues
	IMDC knowledge of contact/authentication procedures         Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support         Updates ROE and legal status issues
	<ul> <li>Updates aircraft status/capabilities/limitations for PR support</li> <li>Updates ROE and legal status issues</li> </ul>
	Updates ROE and legal status issues
S.IA •	
00/1	Undefee impact of DD event
PAO •	<ul> <li>Updates impact of PR event</li> </ul>
Surgeon •	Updates the Medical Support Plan to ensure PR is addressed and up-to-date
•	<ul> <li>Confirms status of closest medical treatment facility</li> </ul>
Surgeon •	<ul> <li>Updates locations of planned (and in-country medical treatment sites to include Level III hospitals) and expertise/beds per site</li> </ul>
•	Confirms status of Level III hospitals
Surgeon •	<ul> <li>Updates status of SERE psychologist availability</li> </ul>
•	Updates SERE psychologist
CSM •	<ul> <li>Updates status of skill level in common Soldier skills that are PR/IMDC related</li> </ul>
•	Provides assessment of IMDC and available units
CofS •	<ul> <li>Updates staff members on organization and capabilities of the other staff sections by directing intra-Staff briefs:</li> </ul>
IO •	Updates OPSEC estimate
Staff •	<ul> <li>Updates route and TCP information</li> </ul>
•	Status of traffic and TCPs
	Perform Initial Assessment
CDR •	Emphasizes time on the run for IMDC
CofS •	Updates the operational time line
Battle • Captain PR cell	<ul> <li>Posts the time line that reflects the time of the IMDC; time on the run; planning time with key tasks; and execution tasks/times (include rehearsal schedule)</li> </ul>
	Consolidates staff's information requirements
	<ul> <li>Determines time required to position critical elements to include ISR, fires, C2 nodes and other PR support assets</li> </ul>

Receipt of mission	
Responsible	PR activities
	Issue the Initial Guidance
CDR	Emphasize the time on the run for IMDC
	Emphasize initial operational time line and steps/tasks in the MDMP to abbreviate
	• Directs the necessary coordination to perform with affected units; PR POCs; and LNOs
	<ul> <li>Authorizes movement of communications and ISR assets, units, transportation, and support assets</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Identifies additional staff tasks (to include PR specific information requirements)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs parallel/collaborative planning times and locations for PR</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Provides CCIR and IR/EEFI as required</li> </ul>
	Issue the Initial WARNO

#### Table E-2. Mission Analysis

Mission Analysis	
Responsible	PR Activity
	Analyze the Higher HQs order
CDR	Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC
CofS	<ul> <li>Directs the staff to identify specified tasks; guides staff to extrapolate the implied and essential tasks</li> </ul>
Staff	Identifies gaps in information that will affect staff planning and PR mission success
Staff	Nominates IR
G3 PR cell	<ul> <li>Missions of adjacent, supporting, supported units and relation to higher HQ plan (to include PR missions)</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Acquires current SPINs and disseminates to staff</li> </ul>
Planning Staff	Parallel/collaborative PR planning sessions
G1	Reviews the Replacement system for accountability issues
G2 ACE CMD	Assess ISR operations for effects on PR
G2	Assess the IHL for effects on PR operations
G2	<ul> <li>Assess the COP and higher HQ products for changes and enemy COA to identify potential changes for effects on PR Planning</li> </ul>
G2	<ul> <li>Assess enemy situation for employment of ISR to/from/vicinity IMDC site</li> </ul>
G3	Assess the P2 controls currently in effect that will prevent additional IMDC events
G3	Assess AO boundaries and control measures for effects on PR planning
	<ul> <li>Assess the time-distance relationship to IMDC from all units</li> </ul>
CofS	Assess the operational time line to determine time constraints
G3	Assess the IO preparation of the battlefield
G7	
G4	Assess the logistical plan for its impact on PR operations
G4	Assess PR equipment availability
G4	<ul> <li>Assess the Movement Management Center (MMC) movement plan to determine its impact on PR</li> </ul>

	Mission Analysis
Responsible	PR Activity
	Analyze the Higher HQs order
G3	<ul> <li>Determines P2 controls along routes and TCPs</li> </ul>
G4	
G5	<ul> <li>Assess the Civil and Diplomatic capabilities to support PR</li> </ul>
G5	<ul> <li>Assess the infrastructure, population, police and paramilitary to support/disrupt PR operations</li> </ul>
G6	Assess the PR communications architecture and determine shortfalls
G2 G7	Assess the electromagnetic spectrum
Surgeon	Assess the medical support plan for PR (SERE Psych and Level III Med Facility)
Surgeon PAO	Assess the medical plan to ensure that media contact is controlled and that medical     personnel are aware of restriction
PAO	Assess public affairs plan for PR
SJA	Assess legal support plan for PR to include ROE
Chaplain	Assess religious support plan for PR
Planning Staff	Assess the higher HQ order to deconflict/update running estimates
otan	Perform Initial IPB
CDR	Emphasizes time on the run for IMDC
Planning Staff	Updates the COP
Staff	<ul> <li>Determines the operational framework consisting of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy situation</li> </ul>
G2	Establish AI (ICW CDR and G3), AOIR, IHL
G3	Collates the staffs IRs and gaps in their knowledge of the battlefield
G3	Defines the AO and AOI (ICW CDR and G2) and their relation to operational boundaries
G2	Describes the battlefield effects on the overall effectiveness on enemy operations
Staff	Describes the battlefield effects on the overall effectiveness on friendly operations
Staff	Updates all available information regarding the threat in proximity to/from/vicinity IMDC
Terrain Det	Evaluate terrain to/from/vicinity IMDC
SWO	Assess the weather and light data
G2	Determines the most likely, most dangerous, and other ECOAs and the impact on PR
Staff	• Determines if there is a threat from non-military forces (police, militia, angry civilians, etc.)
Staff	Determines impacts on the IMDC, recovery and support
G2	Develop situation and event templates to/from/vicinity IMDC
G3	Identify HPT/HVTs to support PR mission
G2	
FSO	
	Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
CDR	Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC
CofS	Guides the Staff in identifying specified, implied and essential PR tasks in the order
PR cell	Researches the higher HQ order, SOPs, policies and directives to identify PR tasks
Staff	Ensure ability to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate IMDC are addressed

Responsible         PR Activity           Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tesks           CofS         Identifies the essential rehearsals           PR cell         Provides key information from the SPINS.           Staff         So you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets listed below.           G3         Art/Cround/Martime Units available for recovery operations           G2         All-source intelligence           HUMINT         SIGINT           SIGINT         SIGINT           OSINT         CI           G2         DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)           G5         NGO assets           Chaplain         Local religious leaders           Surgeon         HAM medical personnel           PAO         Multinational assets           SJA         SJA           G3         Vold constraints that the comstraints           G3         Identifies the comstraints might affect this PR mission           Chermines how constraints might affect this PR mission           Cold coldinies of authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)           Determines fi authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, del		Mission Analysis
CofS       • Identifies the essential rehearsals         PR cell       Provides key information from the SPINS.         Staff       • Do you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets listed below.         G3       • Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G2       • Ail-source intelligence         • HUMINT       • SIGINT         • SIGINT       • MASINT         • TECHINT       • OSINT         • Cl       G2         G2       • DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)         G5       • NGO assets         Chaptain       • Local religious leaders         Surgeon       + HN medical personnel         PAO       • Multinational assets         SJA       • SJA         G1       • Contract company representatives         G4       • DOD civilians         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determines for constraints that the commander has inposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines of Papability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PD cetrmines if authority is de	Responsible	PR Activity
PR cell         Provides key information from the SPINS.           Review Available Assets           Staff         Do you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets           G3         Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations           G2         Air/source intelligence           HUMINT         ININT           SIGINT         MAISNIT           TECHINT         OSINT           CI         CI           G2         DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)           G5         NGO assets           Chaplain         Local religious leaders           Surgeon         HN medical personnel           PAO         Multinational assets           G3         Contract company representatives           G4         DOD civilians           G3         Host naican assets           G3         Multinational partners, adjacent nations            Determines how constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission           Staff         Identifies the constraints might affect this PR mission           Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated           Identifies the commander(s		Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
PR cell       Provides key information from the SPINS.         Review Available Assets         Staff       Do you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets listed below.         G3       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G2       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G2       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G2       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G3       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G2       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G3       Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations         G4       HUMINT         IMINT       SIGINT         Massint       TECHINT         OSINT       CI         G2       DA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)         G5       NGO assets       Colar fact operannel         PAO       Multinational assets       Salation         SJA       SJA       SJA         G1       Contract company representatives       Ga         G4       DOD civilians       Gasarch dogs)       Ga <td></td> <td>Identifies the essential rehearsals</td>		Identifies the essential rehearsals
Review Available Assets           Staff         • Do you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets listed below.           G3         • Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations           G2         • Ali-source intelligence           HUMINT         • IMINT           SIGINT         • MASINT           • TECHINT         • OIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)           G5         • NGO assets           Chaplain         • Local religious leaders           Surgeon         + HN medical personnel           PAO         • Multinational assets           SJA         • SJA           G3         • Contract company representatives           G4         • DOD civilians           G3/PMO         • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)           G5         • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission           PR cell         • Determines fPR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated elentifies the constraints might affect this PR mission           • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR           Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be inititated elentifies the commander(s) with authority	PR cell	
Staff <ul> <li>Do you have the assets you need to accomplish your identified tasks? Consider assets listed below.</li> <li>G3</li> <li>Air/Ground/Maritime Units available for recovery operations</li> <li>G2</li> <li>All-source intelligence</li> <li>HUMINT</li> <li>IMINT</li> <li>SIGINT</li> <li>TECHINT</li> <li>OSINT</li> <li>CI</li> <li>G2</li> <li>DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, other service intelligence, CIA, DOS, DOE, Treasury, FBI, USCG, commercial (SPOT, Teraserver, etc.), international assets (COSPAS SARSAT)</li> <li>G5</li> <li>NGO assets</li> <li>Chaplain</li> <li>Local religious leaders</li> <li>Surgeon</li> <li>HN medical personnel</li> <li>PAO</li> <li>Multinational assets</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>G3</li> <li>Host nation assets</li> <li>Contract company representatives</li> <li>G4</li> <li>ODD civilians</li> <li>G3/PMO</li> <li>Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)</li> <li>G5</li> <li>Host nation assets</li> <li>G3</li> <li>Multinational partners, adjacent nations</li> <li>Determine Constraints</li> <li>Determines for PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Detetrmines the requirement to maintain on call/be</li></ul>	PR cell	Provides key information from the SPINS.
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Chaplain <ul> <li>Local religious leaders</li> <li>Surgeon</li> <li>HN medical personnel</li> <li>PAO</li> <li>Multinational assets</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>SJA</li> <li>Contract company representatives</li> <li>G4</li> <li>DOD civilians</li> <li>G3/PMO</li> <li>Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)</li> <li>G5</li> <li>Host nation assets</li> <li>G3</li> <li>Multinational partners, adjacent nations</li> <li>Determine Constraints</li> <li>Staff</li> <li>Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission</li> <li>Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated</li> <li>Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)</li> <li>Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR</li> <li>Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions</li> <li>CDR</li> <li>Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC</li> <li>Staff</li> <li>Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission</li> <li>PR cell</li> <li>Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status</li> <li>Staff</li> <li>If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template</li> <li>Staff</li> <li>If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template</li> <li>It denot the communication</li></ul>	G2	
Surgeon       • HN medical personnel         PAO       • Multinational assets         SJA       • SJA         G1       • Contract company representatives         G4       • DOD civilians         G3/PMO       • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC<	G5	NGO assets
PAO       • Multinational assets         SJA       • SJA         G1       • Contract company representatives         G4       • DOD civilians         G3/PMO       • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         G4       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Identifies the constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines fow constraints might affect this PR mission       • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission       • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)       • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR         • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status	Chaplain	Local religious leaders
SJA       • SJA         G1       • Contract company representatives         G4       • DOD civilians         G3/PMO       • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	Surgeon	HN medical personnel
G1       Contract company representatives         G4       DOD civilians         G3/PMO       Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       Host nation assets         G3       Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       Identifies the constraints might affect this PR mission         Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission       Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission       Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR       Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	PAO	Multinational assets
G4       • DOD civilians         G3/PMO       • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	SJA	• SJA
G3/PMO       • Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)         G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	G1	Contract company representatives
G5       • Host nation assets         G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission       • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission       • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	G4	DOD civilians
G3       • Multinational partners, adjacent nations         Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions         CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	G3/PMO	Kennel master (cadaver and search dogs)
Determine Constraints         Staff       • Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission         PR cell       • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission         • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated         • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission         • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)         • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR         Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	G5	Host nation assets
Staff PR cell• Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission • Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission • Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported) • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PRCDR• Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDCStaff• Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR missionPR cell• Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	G3	Multinational partners, adjacent nations
PR cell• Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission• Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated • Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission • Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported) • Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PRIdentify Critical Facts and AssumptionsCDR• Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDCStaff• Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR missionPR cell• Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		Determine Constraints
<ul> <li>Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated</li> <li>Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)</li> <li>Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR</li> </ul> <b>Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions</b> CDR         Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC           Staff         Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission           PR cell         Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status           Staff         If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	Staff	<ul> <li>Identifies the constraints that the commander has imposed on this mission</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Identifies the commander(s) with authority to plan, launch, execute, support this PR mission</li> <li>Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)</li> <li>Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR</li> <li>Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions</li> <li>CDR</li> <li>Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC</li> <li>Staff</li> <li>Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission</li> <li>PR cell</li> <li>Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status</li> <li>If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template</li> </ul>	PR cell	<ul> <li>Determines how constraints might affect this PR mission</li> </ul>
mission• Determines if authority is dependent on method of recovery (immediate, deliberate, external supported)• Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PRIdentify Critical Facts and AssumptionsCDR• Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDCStaff• Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR missionPR cellStaff• If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		Determines if PR capability must be in place before offensive operations can be initiated
external supported)• Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PRIdentify Critical Facts and AssumptionsCDR• Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDCStaff• Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR missionPR cell• Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and statusStaff• If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		
Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions           CDR         Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC           Staff         Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission           PR cell         Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status           Staff         If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		
CDR       • Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC         Staff       • Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR mission         PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		Determines the requirement to maintain on call/be prepared unit for PR
Staff• Identifies each piece of information in their staff estimate/ IPB as fact or assumption as it relates to PR missionPR cell• Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template		Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
PR cell       • Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status         Staff       • If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	CDR	Emphasizes time on the run for the IMDC
• If no communications with IMDC, extrapolate potential IMDC location from last known position / direction of travel and event template	Staff	
position / direction of travel and event template	PR cell	Reconfirm IMDC location, identity and status
Can IMDC survive ongoing battlefield activities until recovery via survival and evasion?	Staff	
		Can IMDC survive ongoing battlefield activities until recovery via survival and evasion?

	Mission Analysis
Responsible	PR Activity
	Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
PR cell	UAR/NAR recovery mechanism in area?
SOCORD	
	Perform Risk Assessment
Staff	<ul> <li>Identifies tactical operations hazards that are IMDC producing and hazards for PR operations</li> </ul>
CSM	Identify historical IMDC-producing actions
PR cell	Potential ECOA that produce IMDC
Staff	Convoy operations
	Traffic control point measures
	<ul> <li>Identify enemy counter reconnaissance/counter PR measures and likely COA</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Recovery force experiences IMDC event during mission</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Medical evacuation operations accounting and reporting procedures</li> </ul>
	Determine fratricide potential in recovery operations and develop countermeasures
	<ul> <li>Identify environmental hazards that affect IMDC and PR operations</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Evaluate information management shortfalls</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Mortuary affairs accounting and reporting</li> </ul>
	Inaccurate accounting for personnel
	Ineffective IMDC event validation
	Ineffective battle handover of replacement personnel
	Determine Initial CCIR and EEFI
CDR	Emphasizes time on the run of the IMDC
Staff	<ul> <li>Identifies the gaps in battlefield information that affects this PR mission</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Focuses initial CCIR on decisions the commander must make to focus planning and select the optimum COA</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>After selecting the COA, shifts CCIR to information the commander needs to make decisions during execution</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Reviews the list of RFIs/LTIOV developed during the predeployment phase and updated in theater to reflect current situation</li> </ul>
G2	Identifies the indicators for each IR
G2	Submits RFIs/LTIOV to close gaps in information
	Determine the ISR Plan
G2	<ul> <li>Researches and reviews all assets that can provide support to PR</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Researches and identifies component capabilities to employ in the ISR plan for PR</li> </ul>
G3	
G2	<ul> <li>Reviews the information gaps (RFIs/LTIOV) and determines which ISR assets can best obtain the information</li> </ul>
G3	Develops a plan for employing each asset based on capabilities and limitations
G3	<ul> <li>Gives special consideration for employing unmanned technical capability to locate and observe this IMDC and identify enemy</li> </ul>
G2	<ul> <li>Identifies the enemy counter reconnaissance capabilities against the ISR plan</li> </ul>
G2	Submits RFIs to higher if your assets cannot obtain the information
G3	Develops the ISR plan for this mission; includes effects to mask movement
PR cell	<ul> <li>Identifies units in proximity to IMDC and assess their elevation; angle of view; viewing technology</li> </ul>

	Mission Analysis
Responsible	PR Activity
	Determine the ISR Plan
G2	Coordinates/deconflicts the plan with the assets
	Update the Operational Time Line
PR cell	Updates IMDC event
CofS	Updates overall timeline based on new IMDC information
	Time and location of PR rehearsals
	Write the Restated Mission
G3	Writes the mission statement for this OPORD
PR cell	
	Deliver a Mission Analysis Briefing
CofS	<ul> <li>Rehearses staff for mission analysis briefing to the CDR</li> </ul>
Staff	<ul> <li>Presents mission analysis briefing to commander</li> </ul>
	Approve the Restated Mission
CDR	Approves the restated mission for the OPORD
	Develop the initial CDR's intent
CDR	Issues the CDR's intent
	Issue the Commander's Planning Guidance
CDR	Emphasizes the time on the run for IMDC
	<ul> <li>Describes his/her visualization of the PR battlefield</li> </ul>
CDR	<ul> <li>Directs that PR be incorporated into all phases of force projection</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs the staff to task organize a recovery force for initial deployment</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Consider incorporating no radio communications and non-standard navigation procedures into the planning</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Provides directives to the staff on specific COAs to include or exclude and how to abbreviate the MDMP</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs the CofS to include PR cell in all planning meetings</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs the staff to work with CSM to incorporate IMDC preventative measures into SOPs</li> </ul>
	Directs G3/G4/PR cell to consider the use of emergency resupply to support IMDC
	<ul> <li>Directs G3 to integrate PR into all training</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs G2 to review enemy responses to every previous PR mission.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Directs staff to review the AO to determine out-of-range areas for aircraft; availability of NAR assets</li> </ul>
	Directs include fires for PR missions
	<ul> <li>Directs staff to develop PR recommendations for CCIR.</li> </ul>
	Issue a Warning Order
Staff	Prepare and transmits updated WARNO
	Review Facts and Assumptions
PR cell Staff	Reviews RFIs and facts/assumptions and updates with changes and corrections and determines impact

Deenersitele	Course of Action Development
Responsible	PR Activities
	Analyze relative combat power
G2 G3	<ul> <li>Compute the force ratios (enemy that affect this mission vs. friendly tasked with this PR mission)</li> </ul>
Staff	<ul> <li>Analyzes the tangible aspects of combat power (METT-TC, maneuver, firepower)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Analyze the intangible aspects of combat power (Morale, training levels, protections, leadership, information)</li> </ul>
	Generate Options
Staff	<ul> <li>Develops COAs to execute recovery operation (immediate, deliberate, external supported, unassisted)</li> </ul>
	Array Initial Forces
G3	• Ensure the commander's intent and planning guidance is considered. If COA is not within parameters seek approval or change
Staff	Considers air/ground/maritime avenues of approach
	Identify units and task organization
	<ul> <li>Evaluate forces arrayed using this COA and the forces available that can respond to this mission</li> </ul>
G2	Consider available units against situation and event templates
G3	<ul> <li>Determines a proposed LD; CPs enroute; RP, etc. Determines a proposed forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or line of departure (LD).</li> </ul>
G3	<ul> <li>Identify AOs and control measures for subordinate units</li> </ul>
A2C2 PR cell	<ul> <li>Validate the selection or determine recommended change to geographical control measures</li> </ul>
Terrain Det	
PR cell G7	<ul> <li>Incorporates the mission profile into the established PR deception plan</li> </ul>
	Develop Concept of Operations
Staff	<ul> <li>Integrate all BOS into overall concept of operations supporting PR</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Ensure concept of operations supports all five PR execution tasks</li> </ul>
G3	<ul> <li>Develop PR concept of operations, incorporating decisive, shaping and sustaining operations</li> </ul>
	Assign Headquarters
G3	<ul> <li>Recommends task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of units for PR operations</li> </ul>
	Recommend command relationships for PR
Staff	<ul> <li>Identifies shortages of headquarters to higher for resolution</li> </ul>
PR cell	<ul> <li>Recommend command and control requirements for PR operations</li> </ul>
	Prepare COA Statements and Sketches
Staff	Ensure BOS supports each COA statement and sketch
G3	<ul> <li>Prepares a statement and supporting sketch for each COA (include who [generic task org]; what; when; where; why for each subordinate unit and hazards (where)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>At a minimum the sketch includes array of generic units and control measures for PR operations (Creates a notional sketch with all probable control measures for air/ground/maritime recovery operation)</li> </ul>
	Course of Action Briefing
Staff	Conducts COA briefing
PR cell	Provides IMDC event update

#### Table E-3. Course of Action (COA) Development

Course of Action Development	
Responsible	PR Activities
Course of Action Briefing	
CDR	Provides guidance for this mission
	Accept/eliminate/direct further development of COAs

### Table E-4. COA Analysis (War Game)

COA Analysis	
Responsible	PR Activities
CDR	<ul> <li>Conduct COA analysis of PR operation IAW SOP</li> </ul>
Staff	<ul> <li>Ensure all five PR execution tasks are war gamed</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Consider effect of PR operation on overall/ongoing operations</li> </ul>
	• Wargame primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) PR options
G3	Identifies missions for subordinate units
	Updates the CCIR
Staff	Updates the staff estimate
	<ul> <li>Develop decision support template and synchronization matrix – ensure they include PR considerations</li> </ul>
War game briefing	
Staff	Delivers a briefing to ensure all staff members fully understand the results of the war game
G2	Updates ISR and enemy situation
PR cell	Provides IMDC event update

### Table E-5. COA Comparison

COA comparison	
Responsible	PR Activities
Staff	<ul> <li>Analyzes the PR COA advantages and disadvantages from their perspective</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Compares feasible PR COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous COA</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Modifies decision matrix for this mission as required</li> </ul>
	Creates decision matrix for operations
CofS	<ul> <li>Determines the weight of each criterion based on relative importance and the commander's guidance</li> </ul>
Staff	Scores each PR COA against criteria for the functional area
	<ul> <li>Totals scores of each PR COA in each functional area</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Compares the PR COAs by each functional area</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Decides on a recommended PR COA based on advantage/disadvantage analysis and COA comparison</li> </ul>

#### Table E-6. COA Approval

COA Approval		
Responsible	PR Activities	
Staff	Identifies the preferred COA for this recovery and makes a recommendation	
CofS	<ul> <li>Highlights any changes to each PR COA resulting from the war game</li> </ul>	
CofS	Provides decision briefing to commander	

COA Approval		
Responsible	PR Activities	
Staff		
PR cell	Provides IMDC event update	
G2	Updates enemy situation	
CDR	Selects the PR COA	
	<ul> <li>Issues Final Planning Guidance for this recovery</li> </ul>	
G3	Issues a WARNO	

### **ORDERS PRODUCTION**

E-1. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear concise concept of operations and required supporting information. PR cells assist the staff by including the PR information in the base document, the plan, or order. Additionally, PR cell will assist the staff in preparing Appendix 1 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex C (Operations Overlay) to the base OPLAN/OPORD using the COA statement that was generated, analyzed, and compared in earlier steps.

# Appendix F Reports and Formats

F-1. The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview and the associated format for PR related messages and reports. The USMTF formats in table F-1 are especially applicable to JPRC personnel.

(NOTE: Examples of the following USMTF, PR related message traffic show all sets available for these formats. Actual sets and addressees will vary from situation to situation. Complete administrative instructions for using the USMTFs may be found in the Joint Pub 6-04 Series.)

USMTF PR-related messages				
Report Title	Message Title	What is it/What does it do?	From	То
Evasion Plan of Action	EPA	Individual/Crew/Team Evasion Plan	Individual	PR cell
Isolated Personnel Report	ISOPREP	Individual Authentication Data	Individual	PR cell
Appendix to OPORD	PR Appendix	Appendix to Annex C (Operations Overlay)	Lower	Higher Lateral
Search Plan Execute	1EXECUTE	Execute order for recovery forces	Higher HQ	Recovery Force
Search Plan Execution Pattern	2EXECUTE	Describes the search pattern to be utilized by a recovery asset	Recovery asset HQ	PR cell
Other Search & Rescue Mission Activity	80THSAR	Details other personnel recovery mission activity occurring in a specific AO	PR cell	PR cell
Search & Rescue Mission Data	8SARDATA	Details the results of a recovery attempt	Recovery asset HQ	PR cell
Search and Rescue Mission Info	8SARMSN	Details the status/update of a recovery operation.	Recovery asset HQ	PR cell
Search and Rescue Unit Designation	8SARUNIT	Reports the activity of a recovery force	Recovery asset HQ	PR cell
Available Search and Rescue Assets	AVAILSAR	Lists the available recovery forces for a specific time	PR cell	PR cell
Search and Rescue Assistance Req't	SARAR	Report indicates PR assistance is required	Lower	Higher Lateral
Search and Rescue Beacon	SARBECON	Reports location and frequency of PR related beacons	PR cell	PR cell
Search and Rescue Mission Comms	SARCOMMS	Reports the communications plan for the PR operation	PR cell	PR cell
Search and Rescue Coordination	SARCOORD	Report identifies recovery force C2	PR cell	PR cell
Search and Rescue Information	SARINFO	Reports problems with the recovery force	Recovery asset HQ	PR cell
Search and Rescue Incident Report	SARIR	Reports situations / incident that may generate a recovery operation	Lower	PR cell
Search and Rescue Met Information	SARMET	Reports meteorological conditions that may affect the PR operation.	PR cell	Recovery asset HQ
Search and Rescue Request	SARREQ	Used to request forces to participate in a PR operation.	PR cell	PR cell
Search and Rescue Sit. Summary Report	SARSIT	Use to coordinate, summarize, or terminate PR operations	PR cell	PR cell

### Table F-1. USMTF PR-related messages

F-2. Although not included in this appendix, PR cell personnel should be familiar with the following message/USMTF formats that may indicate an IMDC event has occurred:

- Title: Accident Report / Serious Incident Report [SIR].
- Title: Closure Report [CLOSEREP].
- Title: Patrol Report [PATROLREP].
- Title: Personnel Status Report [PERSTAT].
- Title: Straggler Status Report [STRAGSTATREP].
- Title: Unit, Strength, Status, and Casualty Report [UNTSTRCASRPT].

## **EVASION PLAN OF ACTION (EPA)**

F-3. The EPA is an individual plan developed before executing a combat mission and must be written with the recovery force in mind. The EPA informs the recovery force about the IMDC person's intentions. In the absence of any other specific information or intelligence, PR cells and recovery forces will use this data to help plan a recovery. The more complete, accurate, and up-to-date the information is, the better the chances for successful recovery.

F-4. The format below is the minimum information required to produce an individual EPA. Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement "PER ATO SPINs" as substitute information. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document or an electronic database enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. EPAs must be classified to at least the level of the OPLAN/OPORD for the mission they support. Paragraphs must be individually classified to the appropriate level.

F-5. There are a few key source documents for preparing an EPA: the air tasking order (ATO), the SPINs (special instructions) that complements an ATO, and the PR CONOPS or SOP. The ATO is a source document for such information as mission date, number, and aircraft call signs. Army forces that are generally listed on the ATO include deep attack and long-range surveillance (LRS) insertion missions. When an aircraft is reported lost, the ATO call sign will immediately be verified and passed by a PR cell rep via the ATO database to speed information to recovery forces.

F-6. SPINs are the most significant document with respect to EPA planning. They are usually published in a quarterly format and a weekly format by a joint or multinational air operations center. The quarterly SPINs have standing procedures such as standard survival radio communication procedures, signaling procedures, and recommended immediate and extended evasion intentions that are central to the EPA. Weekly SPINs publish information that changes regularly for security such as the PR authentication information (PR number, letter, word, and duress word of the week); search and rescue dot (SARDOT) location, and the SAR numerical encryption grid (SARNEG).

F-7. Another key source of information is the PR CONOPS or SOP. Although this document is geared primarily toward recovery forces, there is a section that covers authentication and isolated personnel procedures and contact/link-up procedures. It is imperative that personnel read this section thoroughly because it describes the preferred tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that the recovery force will use to signal, authenticate, and pick up the IMDC person. The PR CONOPS/SOP often provides additional information on the use of evasion aids and recommended evasion techniques in that theater.

### **EVASION PLAN OF ACTION FORMAT**

- 1. (X) Identification
  - a. (X) Name and rank (for each crew or team member).
  - b. (X) Mission number, aircraft or team call sign or identifier, crew or team position, type aircraft, call sign suffix, other.
- 2. (X) Planned Route of Flight, Travel, and/or Delta Points or waypoints on File
  - a. (X) If not on file, the route points must be described in the EPA for the ingress, target area, and egress.
  - b. (X) Describe in-flight emergency plans for each leg of the mission.
- 3. (X) Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions for the First 48 Hours, Uninjured
  - a. (X) Hide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation from team (distance and heading).
  - b. (X) Evade alone or link-up with crew or team (rally points).
  - c. (X) Travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and other such details).
  - d. (X) Intended actions and/or length of stay at initial hiding location.
- 4. (X) Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions, If Injured
  - a. (X) Provide hiding intentions if injured.
  - b. (X) Provide evasion intentions if injured.
  - c. (X) Provide travel intentions if injured.
  - d. (X) Provide intended actions at hiding locations if injured.
- 5. (X) Extended Evasion Actions and/or Intentions After 48 Hours
  - a. (X) Destination (recovery area, mountain range, coast, border, FLOT).
  - b. (X) Travel routes, plans, and/or techniques (either written and/or sketched).
  - c. (X) Actions and/or intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.
  - d. (X) Recovery/contact point signals, signs, and/or procedures (written out and/or sketched).
  - e. (X) Back-up plans, if any, for the above.
- 6. (X) Supplementary Information. The following information should be completed with assistance from appropriate PR cell personnel, operations, signal, intelligence, and life support personnel as needed.
  - a. (X) Communications and Authentication
    - (1) (X) Word, number, color, and/or letter of the day, month, or quarter; bona fides; SARDOT; SARNEG; duress code word; other (as applicable).
    - (2) (X) Available communications and signaling devices: type and quantity of radios, programmed frequencies, PLS code, encryption code, quantity of batteries, type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, other.
    - (3) (X) Primary communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies (initial/extended contact procedures).
    - (4) (X) Back-up communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies.
  - b. (X) Other Useful Information
    - (1) (X) SERE training completed.
    - (2) (X) Weapons and ammunition carried.
    - (3) (X) Personal evasion kit items.
    - (4) (X) Listing of issued signaling, survival, and evasion kit items.
    - (5) (X) Mission evasion preparation checklist.
    - (6) (X) Clothing and shoe sizes, Resupply, etc
    - (7) (X) Signature of reviewing official.

# DA FORM 1833, ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT (ISOPREP)

F-8. The ISOPREP is a data card maintained on all "At Risk" personnel at a minimum. It contains personal data known only to the At Risk person and is used by recovery forces to positively authenticate the IMDC person. The ISOPREP is the individual Soldier's most important source of authentication data. Its proper completion, use, and storage are critical to successful Recovery and Reintegration and are a vital part of long term POW/MIA accountability.

F-9. Upon notification that a Soldier is IMDC, the individual's unit will forward the respective ISOPREP data to the appropriate PR cell by the fastest secure means available. Information passed telephonically will be followed up by message. The PR cell or operations center will disseminate data contained on DD Form 1833 to other authorized agencies, including multinational forces if practicable, to assist in the recovery effort. Figures F-1 and F-2 are examples of an ISOPREP.

F-10. General guidelines for handling DA Form 1833 ISOPREP include the following.

- ISOPREPs are classified "CONFIDENTIAL" when filled in and must be stored appropriately.
- Upon notification that recovery operations have been unsuccessful or terminated, appropriate entries will be made on DD Form 1833 and the information filed. Copies of the ISOPREP and other pertinent information will be disseminated to other agencies IAW theater directives. This normally includes the JPRC and JPRA for permanent archiving.
- If death has been verified, do not destroy the ISOPREP. A directed investigation may require ISOPREP data to assist in identifying the remains of the victim. The physical description information contained on the ISOPREP will be declassified and accountability transferred to a senior member of the investigation team or board.
- The sensitive personal information contained within the declarative statements on the ISOPREP is not necessary for physical identification and will remain classified.
- ISOPREP originals should only be forwarded to JPRA for personnel declared to be in the following categories: missing in action (MIA); captured (POW); detained; hostage; killed in action-body not recovered (KIA-BNR); killed in action-body recovered (KIA); and died in captivity. The ISOPREP will become an official document in the missing persons identification file.
- The ISOPREP should be reviewed at least semiannually.

## DD Form 1833 CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

	NTIAL (WHEN FILLED			
ISOLATED PERSONNEL	1. NAME (Last, First, Middle	e Initial)	2. SSN	
REPORT ( <i>ISOPREP</i> ) (see privacy Act Statement	Driver, Tank.		123-45-6789	
on reverse before				
completing this form)				
CLASSIFIED BY: AFR 64-		UCTIONS	3. RANK/GRADE	
З,	Items 1 through 15 and 20 t	hrough 23 are to be completed	<sup>1</sup> 04	
AR 525-90	by Applicant. Items 16 through	ugh 19 and Item 24 are to be	e	
NWP 19-2 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR	completed by RCC Personn	el. All items are to be filled in		
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR	through 24.	IL for items 3, 13, 14, and 20		
4. BRANCH OF SERVICE	5. NATIONALITY	6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. OBVIOUS MARKS (Scar,	
USA	USA	(YYMMDD)	Birthmark, Mole)	
00,1	00,1	19620411	FROG TATTOO ON	
			LEFT CHEST	
8. BLOOD GROUP	9. HEIGHT	10. COLOR OF EYES	11. COLOR OF HAIR	
AB+	68"	Blue	BLACK	
,		Bide		
12. DATE PREPARED	13. DATE REVIEWED	14. AUTHENTICATOR NO.		
(YYMMDD)	(YYMMDD) AND	7492		
990806	CURRENT ASSIGNMENT			
	991004	15. SIGNATURE		
16. DATE MISSING	17. LOSS POSITION	18. PRIORITY (Holds vital	19. SPARE	
(YYMMDD)		information requiring	PLS CODE: 217896	
		priority rescue)		
		□ YES □ NO		
		Fold Here		
	PERSONAL AUTHE	NTICATION STATEMENTS		
20 MY FIRST CAR WA	S A BLUE 1979 FORD		ET IS MY CAT ROCKY	
STEPSIDE PICKUP TF				
		WHO IS A 27-POUND BLACK AND GREY		
CUBIC INCH MOTOR		TABBY WHO IS NEUTERED AND SLEEPS ON		
LEATHER INTERIOR.	LEATHER INTERIOR. MY CHEST.			
22. MY FAVORITE BAF			RIEND WAS NAMED	
		GLORIA, SHE WAS 62", HAD LONG BROWN		
KILLER MICROBREWERY IN THE TOWN OF				
	BOLLING, NEW YORK, 2250 FEET ABOVE HAIR, BLUE EYES AND SHE DROVE A 1965			
SEA LEVEL WITH A P	SEA LEVEL WITH A POPULATION OF 225. FIRE ENGINE RED FORD MUSTANG WITH A			
301 HEMI.				
24. ADDITIONAL DATA:				
Allergies: None Shoe: 10 BDU trouser: 36L BDU jacket: 44M SERE C 1991, Workout 4 times				
a week, PLS code 013456, Blood chit # 163483912, I carry a Phoenix junior, VS-17 panel, extra				
	an Garmin GPS 12-XL			

DD Form 1833 CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

Figure F-1. ISOPREP front example

### DD Form 1833 CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. Sections 133, 3012, 5031 and 8012; ÉO 9397 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): It is essential to the combat search and rescue effort for the protection of search and rescue forces from enemy entrapment. The social security number is used to ensure positive identification. ROUTINE USE(S): It will be completed by each aircrew member who may be subject to action in or over hostile territory. It contains personal information that may be used to ensure positive identification. After the aircrew member has completed the form it will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL." DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: The information is necessary since it affects the entire search and rescue mission and effect on individual of not providing information could be loss of crew status. CODE PRINT CODE CODE **RIGHT HAND** LEFT HAND 10. LITTLE FINGER 1. LITTLE FINGER Arch KΚ **Tented Arch** LL Finger Loop MM Thumb Loop NN 2. RING 9. RING Whorl 00 **Finger Missing** PP Finger Mutilated QQ Question/Uncertain YY -Fold Here-3. MIDDLE 8. MIDDLE PHOTOGRAPH (Front View) 4. INDEX 7. INDEX PHOTOGRAPH (Profile View) 5. THUMB 6. THUMB

DD Form 1833 CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

### Figure F-2. ISOPREP back example

### **ISOPREP** INSTRUCTIONS.

F-11. Many theaters have established instructions for completing this form. The following information is provided as a guide.

### **ISOPREP** Front.

F-12. The ISOPREP is typed or completed in ink; however, a pencil is used to complete items 3, 13, 14, and 20 through 24.

F-13. Items 1 through 13. Self-explanatory.

F-14. Item 14. Enter a four-digit number that can be easily remembered during times of duress. This number should not be in the individual's military records or public information.

F-15. Item 15. Self-explanatory.

F-16. Items 16 through 19. To be completed by PR cell personnel.

F-17. Items 20 through 23. Complete with short declarative statements, not questions and answers. These statements should be personal details that are easily remembered and not subject to change. Avoid references to dates, ages, or other information from the individual's military record or public information. Details of friends, relatives (other than immediate family), pets, vehicles, and vacations would be appropriate. (For example: "My first car was a brown and white, 2-door, 1951 Chevrolet."). Recovery forces will then be able to derive several questions from each statement to authenticate the individual.

F-18. Item 24. Additional Data: Suggestions for additional data. Allergies, Medicine, Shoe Size, Uniform Size, Ethnic Group, Survival Training type/dates, Physical Conditioning, Outdoor experience, survival radio type (or other communications capability), PLS code, Blood Chit #, or anything else that may help recovery forces.

### **ISOPREP Back**

F-19. Blocks 1 through 10. Used to record fingerprints and appropriate codes. Fingerprinting will only be accomplished by qualified personnel from the offices of the Provost Marshall, Security Police, Military Police, Special Investigation, Criminal Investigation Division, or other trained personnel. When SOF assume or are assigned responsibility for the recovery of an individual by unconventional means, SOF code the individual's fingerprints on the ISOPREP. Fingerprints need not be coded before forwarding the ISOPREP to SOF.

F-20. Photographs. Provide current front and profile photographs of the individual in appropriate uniform without headgear and glasses.

# APPENDIX 1 (PERSONNEL RECOVERY) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS OVERLAY) TO OPORD (XXXX)

F-21. This appendix should describe the personnel recovery concept of operations and responsibilities for execution. The appendix can be further subdivided to more effectively illustrate the entire personnel recovery architecture. Tabs that may be included to add clarity include the following:

- Tab A: Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery.
- Tab B: Evasion Guidelines and Status.
- Tab C: SERE Training and Support.
- Tab D: Reintegration.
- Tab E: Accounting for missing personnel.

Note: Although FM 5-0 does not specify additional appendices to Annex C, joint doctrine includes a Personnel Recovery appendix under Annex C (Operations). It is recommended that a Personnel Recovery appendix be included in Annex C (Operations Overlay.

### APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C FORMAT

Classification

(X) APPENDIX 1 (Personnel Recovery) to ANNEX C (Operations Overlay) to OPORD (X)

#### (X) References:

- a. (X) CJTF xx OPLAN 9999, OPERATION Raven
- b. (X) CFLCC OPLAN 9999
- c. (X) CFLCC PR CONOPS
- d. (X) Joint Pub 3-50, Personnel Recovery
- e. (X) FM 3-50.1 Personnel Recovery

f. (X) List any other applicable document that provides users with essential information for planning and executing personnel recovery operations.

g. (X) Maps: Map Series Number/ Sheet Number / Sheet Name / Edition / Scale / DATUM

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: ZULU

### 1. (X) SITUATION.

a. (X) Enemy Forces. See Annex B. Discusses the enemy forces that may influence support and recovery force operations. It should also assess the attitudes of the local populace toward evaders.

b. (X) Friendly. Refer to base order, annex A (Task Organization), and annex C (Operations). Should identify any existing recovery forces other than those tasked in this appendix that could have a recovery capability either as an assigned mission or as an inherent capability. Identify recovery assets available for planning separately.

c. (X) Environment. List all critical terrain, weather, and civil considerations that would impact PR operations. Refer to appropriate annexes as required

d. (X) Definitions. Identify the reference document utilized. Define recovery terms used for procedures, personnel, capabilities, units, and equipment to ensure standardization among individuals, support and recovery forces.

e. (X) Assumptions. Refer to base order/plan. List any assumptions that are crucial to PR operations that are not already listed in the base order/plan.

2. (X) MISSION. Enter the restated mission including on-order missions. State the mission of the functional in support of the base OPORD/OPLAN.

### 3. (X) EXECUTION

a. (X) Concept of PR Operations. Describe the overall concept for integrating the available recovery capabilities to support the commander's intent and the recovery plan. The concept of PR operations expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the PR mission and how it is tied to supporting the overall PR operation. Describe how actions of subordinate units and assets fit together by task and purpose. As a minimum, the concept of PR operations addresses the PR scheme of maneuver and concept of fires, but may include definitive guidance for specialized situations such as PR in the rear area and along convoy routes; PR conducted by the host-nation; PR conducted by specialized recovery assets including Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR) / Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR). Discuss details of the concept of PR operations in subparagraphs as necessary, based on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of the PR operation. Omit unnecessary subparagraphs. The following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the concept of PR operations.

(1) (X) Maneuver. State the scheme of maneuver for PR units. This paragraph must be consistent with the base order (paragraph 3a) and annex C (Operations Overlay). Detail how recovery forces operate in relation to the rest of the force. State the method the PR forces will use to get to the AO (ex. infiltration, penetration of enemy security zone, passage of lines, etc).

(2) (X) Fires. State the concept of fires (including SEAD) in support of PR operations. This subparagraph states which PR elements have priority of fires; the purpose of, priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions for fire support and fire support coordinating measures. Refer to annex D (Fire Support) as required.

- (a) (X) Air Support.
- (b) (X) Field Artillery Support
- (c) (X) Naval Gunfire Support.
- (d) (X) Fire Support Coordinating Measures.

(3) (X) ISR. State how the ISR system supports PR operations throughout each of the five PR tasks (Report, Locate, Support, Recover, Reintegrate). (This paragraph should focus on the employment of ISR assets while paragraph 4 below focuses on intelligence tasks.) Address how the ISR assets are supporting the PR scheme of maneuver. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and annex L (ISR) as required.

(4) (X) Intelligence. Describe the intelligence system concept throughout each of the five PR tasks (Report, Locate, Support, Recover, Reintegrate). State the priority of effort in relation to situation development, targeting, intelligence debriefing, combat assessment, and counterintelligence. Refer to annex B (Intelligence) and annex L (ISR) as required.

(5) (X) Engineer. Clarify the scheme of engineer support for PR operations. Indicate priority of effort. Provide priority of mobility and survivability assets as appropriate. Delegate or withhold authority to emplace obstacles (ex. PR forces use mines to separate the enemy reaction force from the IMDC person or recovery force). Refer to annex F (Engineer) and other annexes as required.

(6) (X) Air and Missile Defense. State the overall concept of air and missile defense in support of PR operations. Establish priority of air defense support and provide air defense weapons status and warning status. Ensure airspace coordination measures are published. Include UAV considerations. Refer to annex G (Air and Missile Defense) as required.

(7) (X) Information Operations. State the overall concept synchronizing PR operations with information operations. Ensure that OPSEC and Electronic Warfare guidance is addressed. Establish priority of support. Refer to annex P (Information Operations) as required.

(8) (X) NBC Operations. State the overall concept synchronizing PR with NBC operations. This paragraph may describe the use of smoke in support of the recovery force or recovery of contaminated IMDC personnel. Assign priorities of effort and support. Refer to annex J NBC Operations) as required.

(9) (X) Others as required.

b. (X) Tasks to subordinate units. List by unit, those PR tasks not contained in the base order. This may include tasks to the rear detachment and its role in the five PR tasks.

c. (X) Tasks to other combat and combat support units. List by unit, those PR tasks not contained in the base order. Clearly state the task and purpose for each CS/CSS unit that supports the PR operation.

d. (X) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (X) Time order or plan becomes effective.

(2) (X) Information Requirements. List information requirements that are unique to PR operations and not addressed in the base order.

(3) (X) Risk reduction control measures. Include measures unique to the PR operation and not included in unit SOPs. Examples include mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), operational exposure guidance (OEG), troop-safety, vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.

(4) (X) Intelligence coordination measures. Include measures unique to the PR operation and not included in unit SOPs. The measures may be described here or included on operational graphics. Include the following: area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR), intelligence handover line/lines (IHL).

(5) (X) Rules of engagement (ROE). Refer to annex E (Rules of Engagement) if required. Include special considerations (ex. Recovery of DOD civilians and/or contractors).

- (6) (X) Environmental considerations.
- (7) (X) Force protection.
- (8) (X) Any additional coordinating instructions.
  - (a) Rehearsal times
  - (b) Linkup times

4. (X) SERVICE AND SUPPORT. State any support requirements (fuel, armament, CASEVAC, conventional maintenance, PR special equipment requirements, emergency re-supply, etc required by forces tasked to conduct the PR operation). Refer to applicable annexes as required.

a. (X) Support concept. State the concept of logistics support to the PR operation. This may include the following.

(1) (X) The support concept organized into a framework to support the five PR tasks.

(2) (X) A brief outline of the support command mission.

(3) (X) Support command headquarters or support area locations, including locations of the next higher logistic bases if not clearly conveyed in the CSS overlay.

(4) (X) The commander's priorities of support.

(5) (X) Role of units in the next higher CSS organization supporting the unit.

(6) (X) The use of Host Nation (HN) support.

(7) (X) Significant or unusual CSS issues that might impact the overall PR operation.

(8) (X) Any significant sustainment risks.

(9) (X) Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the Soldier and his or her systems.

b. (X) Materiel and services.

c. (X) Medical evacuation and hospitalization. This includes a thorough depiction of the Reintegration task and the associated medical requirements and medical care locations.

d. (X) Personnel service support. This includes a thorough depiction of the Reintegration task and the associated personnel requirements including the IMDC person's family.

#### 5. (X) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. (X) Command. State the map coordinates for command post and key PR C2 elements throughout the execution of the five PR tasks. This paragraph must detail the transition of C2 enroute to or from the recovery area; by the appropriate HQs; as the recovery force moves throughout the battlefield.

- (1) (X) Recovery Force Commander: TAC: 10R SW 12345678 Main: 10R SW 23456789
- (2) (X) Recovery Force Air Support: TAC Main
- (3) (X) Recovery Force PR cell. TAC Main
- (4) (X) Next Higher PR cell. TAC Main
- (5) (X) JPRC: TAC Main
- (6) (X) Level III Care Facility: HQ assigned task TAC Main
- (7) (X) Rear detachment. TAC Main

b. (X) Signal. List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs. Identify the specific signal operating instructions (SOI) edition in effect, required reports and formats and times the reports are submitted. (Note: The PR recovery force should operate with an "on-scene channel" to communicate among themselves. All other control elements should operate on a separate frequency to pass reports and receive orders and information. This paragraph may include the following.

(1) (X) On Scene frequencies. State who reports – what information – on what net (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE))

- (2) (X) Control element frequencies.
- (3) (X) Reports and formats, report times.
- (4) (X) Execution checklist

Authenticator's Last Name Authenticator's Rank

Tabs.

Tab A: Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery Tab B: Evasion Guidelines and Status Tab C: SERE Training and Support Tab D: Reintegration Tab E: Accounting for missing personnel

Distribution:

# **USMTF FORMATS**

### TITLE: SEARCH PLAN EXECUTION; (1EXECUTE)

### General Instructions: Execute order for recovery forces.

Format /DE /PARENT /SRUNIT /AREA /IFF /TAC 1 DATA ENTRY / 2 PARENT UNIT DESIGNATOR / 3 SRU IDENTIFIER / 4 SEARCH AREA DESIGNATOR / 5 IFF/SIF / 6 TACAN CHANNEL

### Example

1EXECUTE			
/DE/PARENT	/SRUNIT	/AREA	/IFF /TAC
/01/AIR COMBAT COMMAND	/1 FW	/A-1	/B:30223/103
/02/CAP VA	/UNIT 5	/A-2	
/03/USJFCOM	/CTU35.01.20	/A-2	/B:31001 /102//

### TITLE: SEARCH PLAN EXECUTION PATTERN (2EXECUTE)

### General Instructions: Describes the search pattern to be utilized by a recovery asset.

#### Format

/DE /PATH /CREEP /CSP /OST /ALT /TS /CS 1 DATA ENTRY / 2 SEARCH PATTERN DESIGNATOR / 3 SEARCH AND RESCUE CREEP / 4 COMMENCE SEARCH POINT / 5 ON SCENE DAY-TIME / 6 AIRCRAFT SEARCH ALTITUDE / 7 TRACK SPACING / 8 COVERAGE FACTOR

#### Example

2EXECUTE	
/DE/PATH/CREEP /CSP	/OST /ALT/TS /CS
/01/TSR /090T /3510N07901W	/141325Z/150/ 10NM/ .88
/02/CSC /215T /3530N07950W	/141400Z/050/ 5NM/ .92
/03/CSC /215T /3335N07950W	/141400Z/ -/ 5NM/.94//

### TITLE: OTHER SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION ACTIVITY INFORMATION (80THSAR)

General Instructions: Details other personnel recovery mission activity occurring in a specific AO.

Format						
/REF	/FROM	/TO	/QTY	/SHPTYP	/EQMT	/CMNT

1 REFERENCE NUMBER / 2 FROM DAY-TIME / 3 TO DAY-TIME / 4 COUNT OF EQUIPMENT REPORTED / 5 SHIP TYPE / 6 EQUIPMENT NAME / 7 OTHER SAR MISSION ACTIVITY COMMENTS

Example	
80THRSAR	
/REF /FROM /TO /QTY /SHPTYP/EQMT	/CMNT
/ABC123/141325Z/141800Z/ 1/FFG /SH60	/OS CC//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION DATA (8SARDATA)

### General Instructions: Provides results of the PR operation by the recovery force.

#### Format

/MSNNO /TASKUNIT /TYPAC /DUR /SR /REC /CMNT 1 MISSION NUMBER / 2 TASKED UNIT / 3 AIRCRAFT TYPE / 4 MISSION DURATION TIME IN HOURS AND TENTHS / 5 COUNT OF SORTIES / 6 PERSONNEL RECOVERED / 7 SAR MISSION REPORT COMMENT

#### Example 8SARDATA /MSNNO /TASKUNIT /TYPAC /DUR /SR /REC/CMNT /LL12345 /32 RCS /HTH / 4.5/ 4/ 33//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION INFORMATION (8SARMSN)

General Instructions: Reports the status/update of a recovery operation for a specific recovery force.

#### Format

/MSNNO /SAROBJ /STATUS /SPTNO /TASKUNIT /SER 1 MISSION NUMBER / 2 SAR OBJECTIVE CALL SIGN / 3 MISSION STATUS / 4 SUPPORTING UNIT MISSION NUMBER / 5 TASKED UNIT / 6 REPORT SERIAL NUMBER

### Example

8SARMSN /MSNNO /SAROBJ /STATUS /SPTNO /TASKUNIT /SER /LL12345 /DIABLO /INITIAT/MSS999 /32 RCS /MSS9999 /DIABLO /INITIAT/LL12345 /VMS 99//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE UNIT DESIGNATION (8SARUNIT)

### General Instructions: Reports the activity of a designated recovery force

#### Format

/MSNNO /CALLSIGN /ACTTYP /PRIFRQ /SECFRQ /CMNT 1 MISSION NUMBER / 2 CALL SIGN OF SAR UNIT / 3 TYPE OF ACTIVITY / 4 PRIMARY F REQUENCY / 5 SECONDARY FREQUENCY / 6 OTHER SAR UNIT COMMENTS

### Example

8SARUNIT /MSNNO /CALLSIGN /ACTTYP /PRIFRQ /SECFRQ /CMNT /LL12345 /OTTO 41 /SAR / 349.2/ 297.1 /MSS999 /DARE 11 /CAP / 325.4/ 349.2//

### TITLE: AVAILABLE SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSETS (AVAILSAR)

### General Instructions: Report that lists the available recovery forces for a specific time

Format AVAILSAR/ / / / // 1 COUNT AND TYPE SAR SUPPORT ASSETS / 2 FROM DAY-TIME / 3 TO DAY-TIME / 4 SPECIFIC CALL SIGN

*Example* AVAILSAR/003A10/FROM:141325Z/TO:141700Z/SANDY 10//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENT (SARAR)

### General Instructions: Report indicates that PR assistance is required

*Format* SARAR///// 1 SAR REQUIREMENT INDICATOR

*Example* SARAR/YES//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE BEACON (SARBECON):

### General Instructions: Reports the location and frequency of PR related beacons

Format SARBECON/ / /.....// 1 BEACON LOCATION / 2 FREQUENCY / 3 BEACON IDENTITY

*Example* SARBECON/CAPE HATTERAS/A-BAND/MARITIME//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION COMMUNICATIONS (SARCOMMS)

### General Instructions: Reports the communications plan for the PR operation

Format SARCOMMS/ C / CP / FB / F // 1 SAR COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUIT DESIGNATOR / 2 COMMUNICATION PRIORITY / 3 FREQUENCY BAND / 4 FREQUENCY

*Example* SARCOMMS/ONSCENE/P/A-BAND/243.0MHZ//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE COORDINATION (SARCOORD)

### General Instructions: Report identifies recovery force C2

#### Format

SARCOORD/ / // 1 SAR MISSION COORDINATOR UNIT NAME / 2 ON SCENE COMMANDER UNIT NAME

Example

SARCOORD/SMC:314 FS/OSC:USCG CUTTER//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION (SARINFO)

### General Instructions: Reports problems with the recovery force

Format

SARINFO/ / / // // 1 SAR EMERGENCY PHASE CLASSIFICATION / 2 SAR OBJECT OR TYPE / 3 NATURE OF DIFFICULTY / 4 SAR OBJECT COMMENT

Example

SARINFO/ALERT/OBJ:FSH/AGROUND/TAKING ON WATER//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE INCIDENT REPORT (SARIR)

General Instructions: Used to report any situation / incident that may generate a recovery operation. It is initiated immediately upon determining that an aircraft, has been downed, personnel are missing, or a person, vessel unit, etc requires PR.

#### Format (Abbreviated)

LINE 1 – DATE / TIME Group (DTG) LINE 2 -- UNIT: Unit Making Report LINE 3 -- CALL SIGN: Call Sign of Disabled or lost platform (Aircraft, Ship, Submarine, or Other) LINE 4 – TYPE: Type of Disabled or Lost Aircraft, Ship, Submarine, or Other LINE 5 - COLOR: Color of Disabled or Lost Aircraft, Ship, Submarine, or Other LINE 6 - ID: Aircraft Tail or Side Number, Ship/Submarine Hull Number, or Other Number LINE 7 - LOCATION: Location Disabled or Lost Aircraft, Ship, Submarine, or Other in Latitude/Longitude, UTM or Six-Digit Grid Coordinate With MGRS Grid Zone Designator LINE 8 - OUALIFIER: Location Oualifier: ACTUAL or ESTIMATED Followed by LAND or SEA LINE 9 - TIME OF INCIDENT: DTG of Incident LINE 10 - CAUSE: Cause of Disabled or Lost Aircraft, Ship, Submarine, or Other LINE 11 -- PERSONNEL: Count of Personnel on Board and Qualifier: ACTUAL or ESTIMATED) LINE 12 - STATUS: Enter Count of Personnel and their Statuses LINE 13 - REQUIRE: Enter RCC or COMBINED ASSISTANCE if PR Assistance is required LINE 14 POINT OF CONTACT: Enter the Point of Contact and Telephone Number LINE 15 - NARRATIVE: Free Text for Additional Information Required for Clarification of Report LINE 16 - AUTHENTICATION: Report Authentication

### Example.(AIRCRAFT INCIDENT)

EXER/SOLID SHIELD 93// MSGID/SARIR/602 FS/0130012// ACINCDT/F4E/301230Z/1637N12020E/EE/005/GINGER 32/GREY/CAM:WDL/SE78035 /UNK/POB:2/SQLF:ACT/1/KIA/1/EVAD// SARAR/YES// AMPN/AIRCRAFT LOST AT SEA. REQUEST NAVAL SUPPORT// SARSTAT/ORBITG// GENTEXT/PERSONAL ID/SSN 123-11-1234, LT WHIZ// AKNLDG/YES// RMKS/LOST CONTACT WITH SURVIVOR//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION (SARMET)

### General Instructions: Reports meteorological conditions that may affect the PR operation.

#### Format

SARMET/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / 1 ALTITUDE IN HUNDREDS OF FEET / 2 WIND DIRECTION / 3 SPEED OF WIND / 4 VISIBILITY / 5 MOST SIGNIFICANT WEATHER / 6 AMOUNT OF TURBULENCE / 7 CLOUD COVER IN EIGHTHS / 8 CLOUD TYPE / 9 CLOUD BASE ALTITUDE IN HUNDREDS OF FEET / 10 CLOUD TOP ALTITUDE IN HUNDREDS OF FEET / 11 TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES CELSIUS OR FAHRENHEIT / 12 BAROMETRIC PRESSURE / 13 SEA WAVE HEIGHT / 14 WAVE DIRECTION IN DEGREES / 15 SEA STATE / 16 SEA TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES CELSIUS OR FAHRENHEIT

#### Example

SARMET/150/265T/33KTS/7NM/SKC/LGT/2/AC/BASE:100/TOP:210/-17C/29.34 /3FT/235T/3/-3C//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE REQUEST (SARREQ)

### General Instructions: Used to request forces to participate in a PR operation.

#### Format (Abbreviated)

LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME (DTG) LINE 2 – UNIT: Unit Making Report LINE 3 – REQUEST: Request Number LINE 4 – PRIORITY: Priority of Request: 1, 1A through 1Z; 2, 2A through 2Z; 3, 3A Through 3Z; 4, 4A through 4Z LINE 5 – TYPE: Air Mission Type LINE 6 -- ON TIME: DTG Aircraft Are Requested to be at SAR Location or ASAP LINE 7 -- OFF TIME: DTG Aircraft Are to Depart From SAR Location LINE 8 – NO. TYPE: Number and Type of Assets Requested LINE 9 – LOCATION: SAR Location in UTM or Six-Digit Grid Coordinate With MGRS Grid Zone Designator LINE 10 – NARRATIVE: Free Text for Additional Information Required for Clarification of Report LINE 11 – AUTHENTICATION: Report Authentication

### Example

EXER/DISPLAY DETERMINATION 93/EXIDL:DD89// MSGID/SARREQ/AFSOUTH DO/23002/DEC// REF/A/MSGID:SARIR/CTG23.10/220045ZDEC1992/-/NOTAL// SEAINCDT/STARK/230100Z/4526N12335W/35KM/EE/PRINI 45/GREY/POB:204 /SQLF:ACT// MET/FL190/330T/33KTS/4000M/FG/LGT/2/AS/BASE:180/TOP:230/10C/28.99/2M /335T/2// REQUEST/1ST ROC/2/SHIPTYP:FF/1// TIMESPEC/TFRM:TASK/302200Z/312200Z// FYFCE/TF502/1/SHIP:DDG// FYPOS/SPRUANCE/235T-HESSEN-25NM/230130Z/330T15KTS/US// ISR/5NM/005T/5KTS// EMCON/CHARLIE/230001Z/240001Z//

### TITLE: SEARCH AND RESCUE SITUATION SUMMARY REPORT (SARSIT)

#### General Instructions: Use to coordinate, summarize, or terminate PR operations.

#### Format Abbreviated

LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME (DTG) LINE 2 – UNIT (Unit Making Report) LINE 3 - MISSION NUMBER (Enter the JPRC SAR Mission Number) LINE 4 - STATUS (SAR Status: COMPLETED or TERMINATED if SAR Activity has ceased and will not be resumed at a later time; Suspended, if SAR activity is discontinued and objective is not recovered) LINE 5 - CALL SIGN (Call Sign of disabled or lost aircraft, ship, submarine, or other) LINE 6 – TYPE (Type of disabled or lost aircraft, ship, submarine, or other) LINE 7 - LOCATION (UTM or Six-Digit grid coordinate with MGRS grid zone designator of SAR incident) LINE 8 – PERSONNEL (Number of personnel involved in incident) LINE 9 - PERSONNEL STATUS (Status of personnel involved in incident (Recovered)) LINE 10 – NARRATIVE (Free text for additional information required for clarification of report) LINE 11 – AUTHENTICATION (Report authentication) Example EXER/DEEP FISH 92/EXIDL:DF92// MSGID/SARSIT/JRCC/15002/DEC// REF/A/MSGID:SARIR/COMSUBLANT/132100ZDEC1992// REF/B/MSGID:SARREO/JRCC/132300ZDEC1992// PERIOD/140800Z/141700Z// 8SARMSN /MSNNO /SAROBJ /STATUS /SPTNO /TASKUNIT /SER /LL12345 /DIABLO /INITIAT/MSS999 /32 RCS /MSS9999 /DIABLO /INITIAT/LL12345 /VMS 99// SUBINCDT/SSBN/132255Z/3545N12723W/EE/US/200.5M/359-35/POB:305// **8ENACT** /MSNNO /ACTTYP /ACTLOC /TIME /ENUNIT /LL12345 /ORBITG /3450N12759W /140600Z/DDGC /MSS999 /ORBITG /3452N12757W /140602Z/CGNC// AMPN/EUNITS ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE SUB AND HAVE THREATENED RESCUE// **8WEATHER** /MSNNO /WEATHER/VIS /BASE/WD /WNDSPD /PK-GUST/SS/CMNT /LL12345 /SKC / 7NM/ 200/135T/5KTS /10KTS / 2// 8MSNLOC /MSNNO /LOCTYP/LOCN /LOCID /ALTIT/CMNT /A:LL12345 /PUPNT /3545N12723W /-/ 005/A1// AMPN/CREW ON SURFACE// 8CONTROL /MSNNO /CONT/CALLSIGN /PRIFRQ /SECFRQ /REPIN /LL12345 /CORD/SUNBEAM 40 / 349.2/ 292.4/XRAY /MSS999 /CORD/HIGHSTAR / 322.5/ 322.5/XRAY// **8TIMEAMP** /MSNNO /ACTTYP /TMEDES/TIME /ACTTYP /TMEDES/TIME /CMNT /LL12345 /ORBITG /TOT / 0550/SAR /TOT / 0600// 8SARUNIT /MSNNO /CALLSIGN /ACTTYP /PRIFRO /SECFRO /CMNT /LL12345 /OTTO 41 /SAR / 349.2/ 297.1 /CAP / 325.4/ 349.2// /MSS999 /DARE 11 **8SARDATA** /MSNNO /TASKUNIT /TYPAC /DUR /SR /REC/CMNT /LL12345 /32 RCS /HTH / 4.5/ 4/ 33// RMKS/SAR IS TERMINATED, NO REMAINING SURVIVORS. RED SAG HARASSED SAR FORCE AND CAUSE THE DEATHS OF 20 WHO COULD NOT BE PULLED FROM THE WATER. THE SUB HAS SUNK AND THE RED FORCE IS ATTEMPTING SALVAGE//

	Initial IMDC Information
Person receiving	
Reporting source	
DTG received	
Event time	
Event location	
Event cause	
IMDC location	
Tactical situation and observer location	
IMDC identities	, E
IMDC medical condition	. ? ~
Recovery actions currently underway?	C A M .
	Other IMDC information
Unit	
ISOPREP?	
EPA?	
SERE training	
Equipment	
Communications	
Survival	
Evasion aids	
Clothing/footwear	

## Table F-1. Initial IMDC event information gathering template

# Glossary

# SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-50.1 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (\*). For other terms, refer to the manual listed. JP 1-02 and FM 1-02 are posted in the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on CD-ROM.

- Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html.
- Follow this path to access JP 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CDROM: Main menu>Joint Electronic Library>DOD Dictionary.
- Follow this path to access FM 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CDROM: Main menu>Joint Electronic Library>Service Publications>Multiservice Pubs>FM 101-5-1.

A2C2	Army airspace command and control
AAR	after action review
ACE	analysis and control element
ACO	1. (Civil SAR) Aircraft coordinator (IAMSAR) 2.airspace control order (FM 3-52)
ACP	air control point
ADCON	administrative control
ADF	automatic direction finding
ADOCS	Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
ADVON	advanced party/echelon
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AI	area of interest
AMC	air mission commander
AMPS	automated mission planning system
AO	area of operations
AOIR	area of intelligence responsibility
AOR	area of responsibility
ARSOC	Army special operations component
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ARSOTF	Army special operations task force
ASCC	Army service component command
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
ATO	air tasking order
AUTL	Army Universal Task List
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BOS	battlefield operating system
C2PC	Command and control personal computer

C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
СА	surveillance, and reconnaissance civil affairs
САР	combat air patrol; crisis action planning
CAS	close air support
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements (PIR + FFIR)
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCSM	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
СМОС	civil military operations center
СОА	course of action
COG	centers of gravity
CONUS	continental United States
СОР	common operational picture
СР	checkpoint; command post
CSS	combat service support
DAR	designated area for recovery
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DP	decision point
DSM	decision support matrix
DST	decision support template
DUSTWUN	duty status whereabouts unknown
ECOA	enemy course of action
EDRE	emergency deployment readiness exercise
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EPA	evasion plan of action
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ESR	external supported recovery
EVC	evasion chart
FA	field artillery
FAA	forward assembly area
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCL	final coordination line
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FEC	fires and effects cell
FFIR	friendly forces intelligence requirements
FLOT	forward line of own troops)
FP	force protection
FSCL	(joint) fire support coordination line (JP 1-02)
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GI&S	geospatial information and services
GPS	global positioning system
GTAS	ground to air signal
GTL	gun-target line
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HPT	high-payoff target
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high-value target
I&W	indications and warnings
IADS	Integrated Air Defense System
IAMSAR	International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue manual
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	intelligence handover line
IMDC	isolated, missing, detained, or captured
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INFOSYS	information system
IO	information operations
IP	initial point
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPG	isolated planning guidance
IR	intelligence requirements
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISE	intelligence support element (ISE)
ISOPREP	isolated personnel report, (DD Form 1833)
ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
IWS	integrated work station
IWS	integrated work station
JFAC	joint force air component
JFACC JFC	joint force air component commander
JFC JFLC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component
JFLUU	joint force land component commander

JFMCC	joint force marine component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIC	joint intelligence center
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JMET	joint mission essential task
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JPRA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JPRSP	joint personnel recovery support product
J-SEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
	aircraft
JTF	joint task force
KIA	killed in action
LARS	Light Airborne Recovery System radio
LD	line of departure
LD/LC	line of departure is line of contact
LKP	last known position
LNO	liaison officer
LTIOV	latest time information of value
MACO	marshalling area control officer
MACOM	major command
MAGTF	Marine air ground task force
MANPADS	man-portable air defense system
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MCC	movement control center
MCOO	modified combined obstacle overlay
MDMP	military decision making process
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METL	mission essential task list
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit

MEU (SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MGRS	military grid reference system
MIA	missing in action
mIRC	internet relay chat
ΜΟΟΤΨ	military operations other than war
MRR	minimum risk route
MRX	mission rehearsal exercise
MSC	major subordinate command
MSF	Medicins Sans Frontieres
MTF	medical treatment facility
NAI	named area of interest
NAR	nonconventional assisted recovery
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
NFA	no fire area
NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIST	national intelligence support team
NORDO	no radio
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSW	naval special warfare
OAKOC	observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment
OCONUS	outside of the continental United States
OGA	other government agencies
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPSEC	operation security
P2	positive and procedural control
PA	public affairs
PACE	primary, alternate, contingency, emergency
PD	point of departure
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PLS	Personnel Locating System
PME	peacetime military engagement
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POW	prisoner of war
PR	personnel recovery

PR C2 Cell	personnel recovery command and control cell
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
PRO	personnel recovery officer
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private volunteer organization
PZ	pick up zone
PZCO	pickup zone control officer
RCC	rescue coordination center
RFA	restrictive fire area
RFI	request for information
RFL	restrictive fire line
RI	relevant information
RM	risk management
ROE	rules of engagement
ROI	rules of interaction
ROZ	restricted operations zone
RP	release point; rally point
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, integration
RSOP	readiness standing operating procedure.
RWS	remote working station
SA	staging area
SAAFR	standard Army aviation flight route
SARDOT	search and rescue dot
SARIR	search and rescue incident report
SARNEG	search and rescue numerical encryption grid
SARREQ	search and rescue request
SARSAT	search and rescue satellite-aided tracking
SARSIT	search and rescue situation report
SATCOM	satellite communications
SCIF	sensitive compartmented information facility
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defense
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, escape
SECUNT	special forces
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SITEMP	situation template
SOA	special operations aviation
SOF SOFA	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	signal operating instructions
SUr	standing operating procedures

SP	start point
SPINS	special instructions
SU	situational understanding
SWO	staff weather officer
TAA	tactical assembly area
TACON	tactical control
TACSOP	tactical standing operating procedures
TAI	targeted area of interest
TBMCS	theater battle management core system
TECHINT	technical intelligence
TF	task force
TLP	troop leading procedures
TPFDD	time phased force and deployment data
ТТР	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
UARCC	unconventional assisted recovery coordination center
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List.
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USCG	US Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USMTF	United States message text format
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UTM	universal transverse mercator
UW	unconventional warfare
WARNO	warning order

# SECTION II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

accountability	The requirement for a commander to answer to superiors for mission accomplishment, for the lives and care of the soldiers under his command, and for the effective and efficient use of Army resources. (FM 1-02)
administrative control	(joint) Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also known as ADCON. (JP 1-02)
after action review	A method of providing feedback to units by involving participants in the diagnostic process in order to increase and reinforce learning. The AAR leader guides participants in identifying deficiencies and seeking solutions. Also known as AAR. (FM 7-0)
air control point	An easily identifiable point on the terrain or an electronic navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air movement. Air control points are generally designated at each point where the flight route or air corridor makes a definite change in any direction and at any other point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation. Also known as ACP. (FM 3-52)
air defense battlefield operating system	Protects the force from missile attack, air attack, and aerial surveillance by any of the following: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, conventional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. It prevents enemies from interdicting friendly forces, while freeing commanders to synchronize movement and firepower. (FM 7-15)
Air Force Special Operations Component	(joint) The Air Force component of a joint force special operations component. Also known as AFSOC. (JP 1-02)
air mission commander	Commander of the largest aviation unit supporting the air assault operation. He is responsible for all embarked soldiers and for coordinating all support from liftoff to touchdown. (FM 3-04.111)
airspace control order	(joint) An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. Also known as ACO. (JP 1-02)
air tasking order	(joint) A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also known as ATO. (JP 1-02)
all-source intelligence	The intelligence products, organizations, and activities that incorporate all sources of information and intelligence, including open-source information, in the production of intelligence. (FM 2-0)

analysis and control element	A military intelligence organization under operational control to the G2. The analysis and control element (ACE) is the primary military intelligence organization that assists the G2 in synchronizing all reconnaissance and surveillance activities, and supporting the G3 in integrating reconnaissance and surveillance tasks into the operation. The ACE also provides technical guidance, produces all-source intelligence, and disseminates targeting and intelligence data, as well as providing the threat and environmental portion of the common operational picture. Also known as ACE. (FM 2-0)
analysis (intelligence)	The process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to produce intelligence that describes the current and predicts the future impact of the threat and/or environment on operations. (FM 34-3)
area of intelligence responsibility	(joint) An area allocated to a commander in which the commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at the commander's disposal. See also area of interest; area of responsibility. Also known as AOIR. (JP 1-02)
area of interest	(joint) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also known as AOI. (JP 1-02)
area of operations	(joint) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. See also area of responsibility; joint operations area; joint special operations area.
	Also known as AO. (JP 1-02)
area of responsibility	(joint) The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also known as AOR. (JP 1-02)
Army airspace command and control	The Army's application of airspace control to coordinate airspace users for concurrent employment in the accomplishment of assigned missions. Also known as A2C2. (FM 3-52)
Army special operations component	(joint) The Army component of a joint force special operations component. Also known as ARSOC. (JP 1-02)
Army special operations forces	(joint) Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also known as ARSOF. (JP 1-02)
Army special operations task force	A temporary or semi-permanent grouping of Army special operations forces units under one commander formed to carry out specific operations or a continuing mission. Also known as ARSOTF. (FM 100-25)
ASCOPE	A memory aid for the characteristics considered under civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities organizations, people, events. (FM 6-0)
assembly area	The area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation. Also known as AA. (FM 3-90)

assessment	The continuous monitoring throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. (FM 3-0)
asymmetry	Dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm. (FM 3-0)
authentication	<ul> <li>(joint) 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator.</li> <li>2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information.</li> <li>3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official.</li> <li>4. In evasion and recovery operations, the process whereby the identity of an evader is confirmed. See also evader; evasion; recovery operations. (JP 1-02)</li> </ul>
automatic resupply	(joint) A resupply mission fully planned before insertion of a special operations team into the operations area that occurs at a prearranged time and location, unless changed by the operating team after insertion. See also emergency resupply. (JP 1-02)
battle captain	The shift officer in charge within a command post associated by position and not rank. The battle captain is located in the operations section of a command post and oversees the conduct of command post operations during his shift. The battle captain ensures that relevant information is given to decision makers and works closely with all members of the command group and staff. (FM 6-0.6)
battlefield operating systems	The physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders. Commanders use BOS to direct operations. Specifically commanders arrange BOS through synchronization to mass effects of combat power at the chosen place of time to overwhelm an enemy or dominate a situation. The seven BOS are: a. intelligence system -the activity to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the environmental features required by a command planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations; b. maneuver system – the movement of forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the employment of forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force protection; c. fire support system – the collective and coordinated use of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, offensive information operations, and other lethal and non-lethal means against targets located throughout an area of operations; d. air defense system – protects the force from missile attack, air attack, and aerial surveillance by any of the following: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, conventional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. It prevents enemies from interdicting friendly forces, while freeing commanders to synchronize movement and firepower; e. mobility/countermobility/survivability system – mobility operations

	preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces; countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces; survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems; f. combat service support system – the support and services to sustain forces during full spectrum operations; g. command and control system – collective tasks associated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also known as BOS. (FM 7-15)
blood chit	(joint) A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. See also evasion aid. (JP 1-02)
branch	A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions. (FM 3-0)
brevity code	(joint) A code which provides no security but which has as its sole purpose the shortening of messages rather than the concealment of their content. (JP 1-02)
broadcast dissemination	The simultaneous dissemination of combat information, intelligence, targeting information, etc. to multiple terminals at multiple echelons in order to provide immediate combat information and intelligence. (FM 2-0)
calculated risk	An exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can
	visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)
captured	visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage
captured call for fire	visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)
•	<ul><li>visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)</li><li>See missing.</li><li>(joint) A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the</li></ul>
call for fire	<ul> <li>visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)</li> <li>See missing.</li> <li>(joint) A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>A term used by non-medical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard non-medical vehicles or aircraft. Also known as</li> </ul>
call for fire casualty evacuation	<ul> <li>visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)</li> <li>See missing.</li> <li>(joint) A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>A term used by non-medical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard non-medical vehicles or aircraft. Also known as CASEVAC. (FM 8-10-6)</li> <li>(joint) Those characteristics capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical</li> </ul>
call for fire casualty evacuation centers of gravity	<ul> <li>visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)</li> <li>See missing.</li> <li>(joint) A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>A term used by non-medical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard non-medical vehicles or aircraft. Also known as CASEVAC. (FM 8-10-6)</li> <li>(joint) Those characteristics capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also known as COG. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>Any process carried out by one unit or person with the object of ascertaining the friendly or hostile character or identity of another.</li> </ul>
call for fire casualty evacuation centers of gravity challenge	<ul> <li>visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0) See missing.</li> <li>(joint) A request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>A term used by non-medical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard non-medical vehicles or aircraft. Also known as CASEVAC. (FM 8-10-6)</li> <li>(joint) Those characteristics capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also known as COG. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>Any process carried out by one unit or person with the object of ascertaining the friendly or hostile character or identity of another. (FM 11-43)</li> <li>(Army) Predetermined point on the ground used to control movement, tactical maneuver, and orientation. Also called CP. (FM</li> </ul>

	operations. See ASCOPE. (FM 6-0)
civil-military operations	(joint) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. See also civil affairs. (JP 1-02)
civil-military operations center	(joint) An ad hoc organization [Note: the Army definition uses "coordination center"], normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also known as CMOC. See also civil affairs; civil- military operations. (JP 1-02)
clandestine operation	(joint) An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. See also covert operation; overt operation. (JP 1-02)
collaborative planning	The real-time interaction among commanders and staffs at two or more echelons developing plans for a single operation. (FM 5-0)
collection plan	(joint) A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. See also information. (JP 1-02)
combat air patrol	(joint) An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target. Also known as CAP. (JP 1-02)
combatant command	(joint) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. See also specified command; unified command. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority) combat service support	<ul> <li>(joint) Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10</li> <li>("Armed Forces"), United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.</li> <li>Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also known as COCOM. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)</li> <li>(joint) The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces</li> </ul>
	in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. See also combat support. (JP 1-02)
combat service support battlefield operating system	The support and service to sustain forces during full spectrum operations. (FM 7-15)
combat support	Critical combat functions provided by units and soldiers in conjunction with combat arms units and soldiers to secure victory (FM 3-90)
command and control battlefield operating system	All collective tasks associated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (FM 7-15)
command and control system	The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)
command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems	(joint) Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. (JP 1-02)

command post exercise	(joint) An exercise in which the forces are simulated, involving the commander, the staff, and communications within and between headquarters. Also known as CPX. See also exercise; maneuver. (JP 1-02)
command relationships	(joint) The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. See also combatant command (command authority); operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)
commander's critical information requirements	(joint) Commander's critical information requirements comprise information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02) (Army) Elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations. Also known as CCIRs. See also information; information requirements; intelligence; priority intelligence requirements. (FM 3-0)
commander's intent	(joint) A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state that serves as the initial impetus for the planning process. It may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 1-02) (Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain and the desired end state. (FM 3-0)
commander's visualization	The mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force's current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commander's intent). (FM 6-0)
common operational picture	An operational picture tailored to the user's requirements, based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Also known as COP. (FM 3-0)
communications checkpoint	An air control point that requires serial leaders to report either to the aviation mission commander or the terminal control facility. Also known as CCP. (FM 3-52)
compartmentation	1. In unconventional warfare, the division of an organization or activity into functional segments or cells to restrict communication between them and prevent knowledge of the identity or activities of other segments except on a need-to-know basis. 2. Restricting the use of crypto variables to specific users for the purpose of limiting access to the information protected by these crypto variables and limiting the adverse impact of a compromise of these variables. (FM 31-20-5)

concept of operations	Describes how commanders see the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. As a minimum, the description includes the scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. The concept of operations expands the commander's selected course of action and expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-0)
concept plan	An operation plan in concept format. Also known as CONPLAN. (FM 5-0)
conduct	To perform the activities of the operations process: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing. (FM 6-0)
constraint	A restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action a subordinate commander has for planning. (FM 5-0)
contact point	(joint) 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more ground units are required to make physical contact. 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. 3. In evasion and recovery operations, a location where an evader can establish contact with friendly forces. Also known as CP. (JP 1-02)
contact procedure	(joint) Those predesignated actions taken by evaders and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of evaders to friendly control. (JP 1-02)
contiguous area of operations	When all of a commander's subordinate forces' areas of operation share one or more common boundaries. (FM 3-90)
contingency	(joint) An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02)
contingency plan	(joint) A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (JP 1-02)
contractor	Person or business that provides products or services for monetary compensation. A contractor furnishes supplies, services, or performs work at a certain price or rate based on the terms of a contract. (FM 3-100.21)
control measures	Directives given graphically or orally by a commander to subordinate commands to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control combat operations. Each control measure can be portrayed graphically. In general, all control measures should be easily identifiable on the ground. (FM 5-0)
controls	(joint) 1. A position along a route of march at which men are stationed to give information and instructions for the regulation of supply or traffic. 2. A position marked by a buoy, boat, aircraft, electronic device, conspicuous terrain feature, or other identifiable object which is given a name or number and used as an aid to navigation or control of ships, boats, or aircraft. 3. In making mosaics, a point located by ground survey with which a corresponding point on a photograph is matched as a check. (JP 1-02) Actions to eliminate threats or reduce their risk. (FM 100-14)
controls	Actions to eminiate uncats of reduce them fisk. (FWI 100-14)

coordinated fire line	(joint) The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyond which conventional, indirect, surface fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located. Also known as CFL. (JP 1-02)
coordinating altitude	(joint) A procedural airspace control method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed- wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan and may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. (JP 1-02)
counterinsurgency	(joint) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also known as COIN. (JP 1-02)
counterintelligence	(joint) Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also known as CI. (JP 1-02)
country team	(joint) The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)
course of action	<ul> <li>(joint) 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or a unit may follow.</li> <li>2. A possible plan open to an individual or a commander that would accomplish or is related to accomplishment of the mission.</li> <li>3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission.</li> <li>4. A line of conduct in an engagement.</li> <li>5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also known as COA. (JP 1-02)</li> </ul>
covert operation	(joint) An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. See also clandestine operation; overt operation. (JP 1-02)
crisis action planning	(joint) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also known as CAP. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

criteria of success	Information requirements developed during the operations process that measure the degree of success in accomplishing the unit's mission. They are normally expressed as either an explicit evaluation of the present situation or forecast of the degree of mission accomplishment. (FM 6-0)
datum (geodetic)	(joint) 1. A reference surface consisting of five quantities: the latitude and longitude of an initial point, the azimuth of a line from that point, and the parameters of the reference ellipsoid. 2. The mathematical model of the earth used to calculate the coordinates on any map. Different nations use different datum for printing coordinates on their maps. The datum is usually referenced in the marginal information of each map. (JP 1-02)
debriefing	The systematic questioning of individuals not in the custody of friendly forces to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques. (FM 34- 52)
deception event	(joint) A deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation. (JP 1-02)
deception means	(joint) Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means: a. physical means – Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples include military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics; bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities); b. technical means – Military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles; c. administrative means – Resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (JP 1-02)
decision point	(joint) The point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific target area of interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead time to engage the adversary in the target area of interest. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations. See also course of action; decision support template; target area of interest. (JP 1-02)
decision support template	(joint) A graphic record of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 1-02) (Army) A staff product initially used in the war gaming process, which graphically represents the decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what conditions a decision is most likely to be required to initiate a specific activity (such as a branch or sequel) or event (such as lifting or shifting of fires). Also known as DST. (FM 5-0)
decisive operation	The operation that directly accomplishes the task assigned by the

	higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements. (FM 3-0)
decisive point	A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (FM 3-0)
deconflict	To reconcile or resolve a conflict in responsibility, area of operations, airspace, or interests in order to accomplish smooth operations without undesired redundancy or threat of fratricide. (FM 5-0)
deliberate planning	(joint) 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)
*deliberate recovery	The sum of actions conducted by Army forces when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible or was not successful.
departure point	That point, assembly area, airfield, or other location from which an aircraft begins an aeronautical mission. (FM 3-04.111)
disrupt	1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in piecemeal fashion. (FM 3-90) 2. An engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and cause the enemy to attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 90-7) 3. In information operations, breaking and interrupting the flow of information between selected command and control nodes. (FM 3-13)
diversion	(joint) 1. The act of drawing the attention of forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons. A diversion order will not constitute a change of destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area. A diversion may connect one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the other side of the danger. (JP 1-02)
downed aircrew pickup point	A point where aviators will attempt to evade and escape to be recovered by friendly forces. (FM 3-04.111)
emergency resupply	(joint) A resupply mission that occurs based on a predetermined set of circumstances and time interval should radio contact not be established or, once established, is lost between a special operations tactical element and its base. (JP 1-02)
end state	At the operational and tactical levels, the conditions that, when

	achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation. (FM 3-0)
enemy prisoner of war	An individual or group of individuals detained by friendly forces in any operational environment who meet the criteria as listed in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Handling of Prisoners of War. Also known as EPW. (FM 34-52)
essential elements of friendly information	Critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. Also known as EEFI. (FM 3-13)
evacuation	A combat service support function that involves the movement of recovered material, personnel, casualties, bodies, prisoners of war, and so forth from a forward collection point along a main supply route to a rearward, usually higher unit, exchange point, or facility. (FM 4-0)
evacuation force	Element of joint task force that conducts in-country evacuation operations, including advance party, evacuation control center, marshalling, and force protection operations. (FM 3-07)
evader	(joint) Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (JP 1-02)
evasion	(joint) The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (JP 1-02)
evasion aid	(joint) In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to blood chits, pointee talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issue survival equipment. See also blood chit; evasion; evasion chart; pointee-talkee; recovery. (JP 1-02)
evasion and escape	(joint) The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. Also known as E&E. (JP 1-02)
evasion chart	(joint) Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. Also known as EVC. See also evasion; evasion aid. (JP 1-02)
evasion plan of action	(joint) A course of action, developed prior to executing a mission, which is intended to improve a potential evader's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's actions and movement. Also known as EPA. See also course of action; evader; evasion; recovery force. (JP 1-02)
event template	A model against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy's ability to adopt a particular course of action. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning. (FM 2-0)
execution decisions	The selection, during preparation and execution, of a course of action anticipated by the order. (FM $6-0$ )
execution information	Information that communicates a decision and directs, initiates, or

	governs action, conduct, or procedure. (FM 6-0)
execution matrix	A visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by phase for a tactical operation. (FM 5-0)
exfiltration	(joint) The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. See also special operations; unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)
exploit	In information operations, to gain access to adversary command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information. (FM 3-13)
*external supported recovery	The sum of actions conducted when immediate or deliberate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. ESR is either the support provided by the Army to other Joint Task Force (JTF) components, interagency organizations, or multinational forces or the support provided by these entities to the Army. Also known as ESR.
extraction zone	(joint) A specified drop zone used for the delivery of supplies and/or equipment by means of an extraction technique from an aircraft flying very close to the ground. (JP 1-02)
final coordination line	A phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements. Also known as FCL. (FM 3-90)
fire support battlefield operating system	The collective and coordinated use of target-acquisition data, indirect- fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, offensive information operations, and other lethal and non-lethal means against targets located throughout an area of operations. (FM 7-15)
footprint	(joint) 1. The area on the surface of the earth within a satellite's transmitter or sensor field of view. 2. The amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities present and occupying space at a deployed location. (JP 1-02)
foreign instrumentation signals intelligence	(joint) Technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-US aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence is a subcategory of signals intelligence. Foreign instrumentation signals include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links. Also known as FISINT. See also signals intelligence. (JP 1-02)
forward arming and refueling point	(joint) A temporary facility – organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area closer to the area where operations are being conducted than the aviation unit's combat service support area – to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. Also known as FARP. (JP 1-02)

forward assembly area	A temporary area where aviation units gather to prepare for a mission that is forward of the aviation brigade's assembly area and airfield, but not as far forward as the attack position. Aircraft may be in the forward assembly area for short or long duration based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Also known as FAA. (FM 3-04.111)
forward edge of the battle area	(joint) The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. Also known as FEBA. (JP 1-02)
forward line of own troops	(joint) A line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The forward line own troops may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy forward line of own troops indicates the forward- most position of hostile forces. Also known as FLOT. (JP 1-02)
friendly forces information requirements	Information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation. (Marine Corps) Information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force information requirement. Also known as FFIR. See also commander's critical information requirements. (FM 1-02)
functional component command	(joint) A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)
geospatial information and services	(joint) The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations, including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. Also known as GI&S. (JP 1-02))
global positioning system	(joint) A satellite constellation that provides highly accurate position, velocity, and time navigation information to users. Also known as GPS. (JP 1-02)
handover line	(joint) A control feature, preferably following easily defined terrain

	features, at which responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from one force to another. (JP 1-02)
high-payoff target	(joint) A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. Also known as HPT. See also high-value target. (JP 1-02)
high-value target	(joint) A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. Also known as HVT. See also high-payoff target. (JP 1-02)
hostile environment	See operational environment.
host nation	(joint) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also known as HN. (JP 1-02)
host-nation support	(joint) Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. See also host nation. (JP 1-02)
human intelligence	The intelligence derived from the analysis of information obtained from a human intelligence source by a trained human intelligence collector or other persons tasked with obtaining information through a questioning methodology.
	Also known as HUMINT. (FM 2-0)
imagery intelligence	(joint) Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also known as IMINT. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)
*immediate recovery	The sum of actions conducted to locate and recover IMDC personnel by forces directly observing the isolating event or, through the reporting process, determining that IMDC personnel are close enough for them to conduct a rapid recovery.
indications and warning	(joint) Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time- sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities, terrorist attacks; and other similar events. Also known as I&W. See also information; intelligence. (JP 1-02)
indicator	(joint) In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02)

information	1. In the general sense, the meaning humans assign to data. 2. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, data that have been processed to provide further meaning. See also information operations; information requirements. (FM 6-0)
information operations	The employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making. Also known as IO. See also information; information requirements. (FM 3- 13)
information requirements	All of the information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations; that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). See also information; information operations. (FM 6-0)
information system	(joint) The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.(JP 1-02) (Army) The equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers – hardware and software – and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. Also known as INFOSYS. (FM 3-0)
initial point	(joint) 1. The first point at which a moving target is located on a plotting board. 2. A well-defined point, easily distinguishable visually and/or electronically, used as a starting point for the bomb run to the target. 3. airborne – A point close to the landing area where serials (troop carrier air formations) make final alterations in course to pass over individual drop or landing zones. 4. helicopter – An air control point in the vicinity of the landing zone from which individual flights of helicopters are directed to their prescribed landing sites. 5. Any designated place at which a column or element thereof is formed by the successive arrival of its various subdivisions, and comes under the control of the commander ordering the move. Also known as IP. (JP 1-02)
intelligence	(joint) 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)
intelligence battlefield operating system	The activity to generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the environmental features required by a command planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. (FM 7-15)

55	(joint) A well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing,
	exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are seven major disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence. [Note: the Army definition replaces "open source intelligence" with "all-source intelligence."] See also counterintelligence; human intelligence; imagery intelligence; intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; open-source intelligence; signals intelligence; technical intelligence. (JP 1-02) (FM 2-0)
intelligence handover line	The boundary between areas of intelligence responsibility. The IHL may be defined either dynamically (for example, the division IHL will be 3 km in front of its committed brigade's forward line of own troops) or conceptually (for example, to coincide with a phase line). Also known as IHL. (FM 34-130)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield	The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is designed to support the staff estimate and military decision making process. Most intelligence requirements are generated as a result of the IPB process and its interrelation with the decision making process. Also known as IPB. (FM 34-130)
intelligence reach	A process by which deployed military forces rapidly access information, receive support, and conduct collaboration and information sharing with other units (deployed in theater and from outside the theater) unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command. (FM 2-0)
intelligence requirement	(joint) 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat forces. Also known as IR. See also intelligence; priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02)
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance	An enabling operation that integrates and synchronizes all battlefield operating systems to collect and produce relevant information to facilitate the commander's decision making. Also known as ISR. (FM 3-55)
intelligence synchronization matrix	A graphic representation that ties the collection plan to an operation and the commander's intelligence needs. (FM 5-0)
intermediate staging base	(joint) A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation. (JP 1-02) (Army) A secure staging base established near to, but not in, the area of operations. Also known as ISB. (FM 3-0)
interoperability	<ul> <li>(joint) 1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.</li> <li>2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)</li> </ul>

isolated personnel report	(joint) A Department of Defense Form (DD 1833) containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also known as ISOPREP. See authenticate; evader. (JP 1-02)
joint force	(joint) A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)
joint force air component commander	(joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also known as JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)
joint force commander	(joint) A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also known as JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)
joint force land component commander	(joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces, planning and coordinating land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also known as JFLCC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)
joint force maritime component commander	(joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also known as JFMCC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)
joint force special operations component commander	(joint) The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also known as JFSOCC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint operations	(joint) A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)
joint operations area	(joint) An area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also known as JOA. See also area of responsibility; joint special operations area. (JP 1-02)
joint special operations air component commander	(joint) The commander within a joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities. Also known as JSOACC. (JP 1-02)
joint special operations area	(joint) A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also known as JSOA. (JP 1-02)
joint special operations task force	(joint) A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also known as JSOTF. (JP 1-02)
joint task force	(joint) A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also known as JTF. (JP 1-02)
latest time information is of value	The time by which an intelligence organization or staff must deliver information to the requester in order to provide decision makers with timely intelligence. This must include the time anticipated for processing and disseminating that information, as well as for making the decision. Also known as LTIOV. (FM 2-0)
law of armed conflict	See law of war.
law of war	(joint) That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also known as the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)
level of care	Describes the five levels of treatment within the military health care system. Each level has the same capabilities as the level before it, but adds a new treatment capability that distinguishes it from the previous level. Level I: The first medical care a soldier receives is provided at this level. This care includes immediate lifesaving measures,

emergency medical treatment, advanced trauma management (ATM), disease prevention, stress prevention, casualty collection, and evacuation from supported unit to supporting medical treatment facility (MTF). Level I elements are found in divisions, corps, and in echelons above corps (EAC) units. These elements include the trauma specialist assisted by first aid (self-aid/buddy aid) and enhanced first aid (combat lifesaver) and the Level I MTF (battalion aid station). Some or all of these elements are found in maneuver, combat support, and combat service support units. When a Level I medical capability is not present in a unit, this support is provided, on an area support basis, to that unit by the supporting Level II medical unit. Level II: Capabilities duplicate Level I and expand available services by adding operational dental care, laboratory, x-ray, and patient holding capabilities. Some Level II facilities also have mental health and preventive medicine capabilities. Emergency medical treatment and ATM is continued. If necessary, additional emergency measures are instituted; however these measures do not exceed those dictated by the immediate needs. Level II units are located in the combat zone (brigade, division, corps support areas) and at EAC. Forward support, brigade support, main support, division support, area support medical companies, and medical troops provide Level II medical care. The forward surgical team (FST) from the corps collocates with a medical company/troop and provides emergency resuscitative surgical capability. The combined medical company and FST are generally considered to be Level II+. This capability is organic to the medical company/troop, main support battalion, division support command, airborne and air assault divisions, and the support squadron, armor cavalry regiment (light). Level III: This level of support expands the support provided at Level II. Level III characterizes the care that is provided by the combat support hospital (CSH) in the corps. Minimum operational functions required for a Level III hospital include: command, control, and communications; patient administration; nutritional care; supply and services; triage; emergency medical treatment; pre-operative care; orthopedics; general surgery; operating rooms and central materiel and supply services; anesthesia, nursing services (to include intensive and intermediate care wards); pharmacy; clinical laboratory and blood banking; radiology services; and hospital ministry team services. Operational conditions may require Level III units to locate in offshore support facilities, third country support bases, or in other locations. Level III hospitalization provides hospital care to all classes of patients and with medical resupply can indefinitely sustain care. The Level III hospital in some environments may be augmented with specialty teams, such as head and neck or renal hemodialysis team. Level IV: This level of care is provided at an EAC CSH that is normally augmented with additional and specialized medical and surgical capabilities and with additional patient holding capabilities. The EAC CSH is staffed and equipped for general and specialized medical and surgical treatment. This level of care provides further treatment to stabilize those patients requiring evacuation to continental United States (CONUS). Level V (CONUS Support Base): This definitive level of care is provided in the CONUS support base. The patient is treated in hospitals staffed and equipped to provide the most definitive care available. Hospitals used to provide this care are not limited to US Army hospitals. Hospitals from the

	other Military Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the civilian health care systems may also be included. Civilian hospitals include those hospitals that are members of the National Disaster Medical Systems. (FM 4-02)
linkup	A meeting of friendly ground forces which occurs in a variety of circumstances. (FM 3-90)
linkup point	A point where two infiltrating elements in the same or different infiltration lanes are scheduled to meet to consolidate before proceeding with their missions. (FM 3-90)
lodgment	(joint) A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (JP 1-02)
maneuver	<ul> <li>(joint) 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war.</li> <li>3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)</li> </ul>
maneuver battlefield operating system	The movement of forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the employment of forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force protection. (FM 7-15)
marshalling	(joint) 1. The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points, complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. 2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and/or equipment especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement. (JP 1-02)
marshalling area	(joint) A location in the vicinity of a reception terminal or pre- positioned equipmen storage site where arriving unit personnel, equipment, materiel, and accompanying supplies are reassembled, returned to the control of the unit commander, and prepared for onward movement. The joint complex commander designating the location will coordinate the use of the facilities with other allied commands and the host nation, and will provide life support to the units while in the marshalling area. See also marshalling. (JP 1-02)
measurement and signature intelligence	Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target, source, emitter, or sender measurement of the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also known as MASINT. (FM 2-0)
medical evacuation	The timely and efficient movement of the wounded, injured, or ill while providing en route medical care to and between medical treatment facilities. Also known as MEDEVAC. (FM 4-02.7)

medical treatment facility	(joint) A facility established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or dental care to eligible individuals. Also known as MTF. (JP 1-02)
METT-TC	A memory aid used in two contexts: (1) in the context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (2) in the context of tactics, the major factors considered during mission analysis. (FM 6-0)
military grid reference system	(joint) A system which uses a standard-scaled grid square, based on a point of origin on a map projection of the surface of the Earth in an accurate and consistent manner to permit either position referencing or the computation of direction and distance between grid positions. Also known as MGRS. (JP 1-02)
mission essential task	A collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission(s). (FM 7-0)
mission essential task list	A compilation of collective mission essential tasks an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its wartime mission(s). Also known as METL. (FM 7-0)
mission statement	A short paragraph or sentence describing the unit's essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It usually contains the elements of who, what, when, and where, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how. (FM 5-0)
mobility/counter-mobility/ survivability battlefield operating system	Mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces; countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces; survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon systems. (FM 7-15)
mortuary affairs	Covers the search for, recovery, identification, preparation, and disposition of remains or persons for whom the Services are responsible by status and Executive Order. (FM 10-64)
movement control	(joint) 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. [Note: the Army definition adds "Organizations responsible for these functions are movement control teams, movement control centers, and movement control activities."] Also called movement control center or MCC. (JP 1-02)
multinational operations	(joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)
named area of interest	(joint) The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Named areas of interest are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions of the battlespace. Also known as NAI. See also area of interest. (JP 1-02)
national intelligence support team	(joint) A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also known as NIST. See also

	intelligence. (JP 1-02)
naval special warfare	(joint) A designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent application of force. Also known as NSW. (JP 1-02)
no-fire area	(joint) A land area, designated by the appropriate commander, into which fires or their effects are prohibited. Also known as NFA. (JP 1-02)
noncontiguous area of operations	When one or more of the commander's subordinate forces do not share a common boundary. (FM 3-90)
nonconventional assisted recovery	Evader recovery conducted by special operations forces unconventional warfare ground and maritime forces and other government agencies who are specially trained to develop nonconventional assisted recovery infrastructure, and interface with or employ indigenous or surrogate personnel. These forces operated in uncertain or hostile areas where combat search and rescue capability is either infeasible, inaccessible, or does not exist to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate isolated personnel back to friendly control. Nonconventional assisted recovery forces generally deploy into their assigned areas before strike operations and provide the joint force commander with a coordinated personnel recovery capability for as long as the force remains viable. Also known as NAR. (FM 3-05.231)
nongovernmental organizations	(joint) Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also known as NGOs. (JP 1-02)
operation order	(joint) A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation Note: Army adds it contains as a minimum a description of the task organization, situation, mission, execution, administrative and logistics support, and command and signal for the specified operation. Also known as OPORD. (JP 1-02)
operation plan	<ul> <li>(joint) Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, for the conduct</li> <li>of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a timephased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN – An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant commander's strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs</li> </ul>

	will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN – An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant commander's strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD – A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation order; time- phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)
operational environment	A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows. a. permissive environment – Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment – Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. c. hostile environment – perational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)
operations process	The activities performed during operations: plan, prepare, and execute with continuous assessment. (FM 6-0)
operations security peacetime military engagement	(joint) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02) All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding
permissive environment	with other countries, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander's objectives as articulated in the theater engagement plan. Also known as PME. (FM 3-0) See operational environment.

personnel recovery	(joint) The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other US Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these (JP 1-02) (Army) The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of US military, DOD civilians, and DOD contractor personnel who are isolated in an operational environment, or as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Also known as PR. (FM 3-50.1)
pinpoint	(joint) 1. A precisely identified point, especially on the ground, that locates a very small target, a reference point for rendezvous or for other purposes; the coordinates that define this point. 2. The ground position of aircraft determined by direct observation of the ground. (JP 1-02)
planned targets	(joint) Targets that are known to exist in an operational area, and against which effects are scheduled in advance or are on-call. Examples range from targets on joint target lists in the applicable campaign plans, to targets detected in sufficient time to list in the air tasking order, mission-type orders, or fire support plan. Planned targets have two subcategories: scheduled or on-call. (JP 1-02)
pointee-talkee	(joint) A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. See also evasion aid. (JP 1-02)
port of debarkation	(joint) The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. Also known as POD. See also port of embarkation. (JP 1-02)
port of embarkation	(joint) The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo and personnel depart. This may be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to a port of debarkation; for unit and non-unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. Also known as POE. See also port of debarkation. (JP 1-02)
positive control	(joint) A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (JP 1-02) (Army) A technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. (FM 6-0)
preparation	Activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation, including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspection, and movement. (FM 3-0)

primary, alternate, contingency, emergency	A planning acronym used in all aspects of mission planning and operations to ensure mission success by designating at least four plans or methods of achieving the desired end state. Also known as PACE. (FM 3-05.231)
priority intelligence requirements	(joint) Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making. Also known as PIRs. See also information requirements; intelligence; intelligence requirement. (JP 1-02)
priority target	A target on which the delivery of fires takes precedence over all the fires for the designated firing unit or element. The firing unit or element will prepare, to the extent possible, for the engagement of such targets. A firing unit or element may be assigned only one priority target. The designation may be based on either time or importance. (FM 6-20-40)
prisoner of war	(joint) A detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces. Also known as POW or PW. (JP 1-02)
procedural control	A technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. (FM 6-0)
procedures	Standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task. (FM 3-90)
psychological operations	(joint) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also known as PSYOP. (JP 1-02)
public affairs	(joint) Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also known as PA. (JP 1-02)
rally point	1. An easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed. 2. An easily identifiable point on the ground at which aircrews and passengers can assemble and reorganize following an incident requiring a forced landing. Also known as RP. (FM 3-90)

reachback	(joint) The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02)
real time	(joint) Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed only by the time required for electronic communication. This implies that there are no noticeable delays. (JP 1-02)
relevant information	All information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control. Also known as RI. (FM 3-0)
restrictive fire area	(joint) An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. Also known as RFA. See also fires. (JP 1-02)
restrictive fire line	A line established between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects across that line. Also known as RFL. See also fires. (JP 1-02)
resupply	The act of replenishing stocks in order to maintain required levels of supply. (FM 4-0)
risk	(joint) 1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. See degree of risk. See also risk management. (JP 1-02)
risk assessment	(joint) The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). (JP 1-02)
risk management	(joint) The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors, and making informed decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. "The five steps of risk management are identify the hazards, assess the hazards, develop controls and make risk decision, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate." Also known as RM. See also risk. (JP 1-02)
rules of engagement	(joint) Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also known as ROE. See also law of war. (JP 1-02)
running estimate	A state estimate, continuously updated based on new information as the operation proceeds. (FM 6-0)
*search and rescue dot	A geographic location known only to friendly forces, which allows an IMDC to pass his or her location over an unsecured radio net without compromising their location. Also known as SARDOT
*search and rescue numerical encryption grid	A 10-letter code word, with no repeating letters, that corresponds to the numbers 0 through 9, which allows an individual to pass his or her encrypted location over an unsecured radio net without compromising their position. Also known as SARNEG.
Service component command	(joint) A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. See also functional component command. (JP 1-02)
shaping operations	Operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. (FM 3-0)

signal operation instructions	(joint) A series of orders issued for technical control and coordination of the signal communication activities of a command. In Marine Corps usage, these instructions are designated communication operation instructions. [Note: the Army term is "signal operating instructions."] Also known as SOI. (JP 1-02)
signals intelligence	(joint) 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreigninstrumentation signals intelligence however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also known as SIGINT. See also foreign instrumentation signals intelligence; intelligence. (JP 1-02)
situation template	(joint) A depiction of assumed adversary dispositions, based on adversary doctrine and the effects of the battlespace if the adversary should adopt a particular course of action. In effect, the situation templates are the doctrinal templates depicting a particular operation modified to account for the effects of the battlespace environment and the adversary's current situation (training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, dispositions). Normally, the situation template depicts adversary units two levels of command below the friendly force, as well as the expected locations of high-value targets. Situation templates use time-phase lines to indicate movement of forces and the expected flow of the operation. Usually, the situation template depicts a critical point in the course of action. Situation templates are one part of an adversary course of action model. Models may contain more than one situation template. Also known as SITEMP. See also course of action. (JP 1-02)
situational understanding	The product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationship among the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Also known as SU. (FM 3-0)
special operations	(joint) Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)
special operations forces	(joint) Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also known as SOF. (JP 1-02)

special staff	(joint) All staff officers having duties at headquarters and not
	included in the general (coordinating) staff group or in the personal staff group. The special staff includes certain technical specialists and heads of services, e.g., quartermaster officer, antiaircraft officer, transportation officer, etc. (JP 1-02)
stability operations	Operations that promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. (FM 3-0)
staff estimate	An assessment of the situation and an analysis of those courses of action a commander is considering during planning and execution. It includes an evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area influence each course of action and includes conclusions and a recommended course of action to the commander. (FM 5-0)
standing operating procedures	(joint) A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also known as SOP. (JP 1-02)
status-of-forces agreement	(joint) An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force or its members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also known as SOFA. (JP 1-02)
supporting forces	(joint) Forces stationed in or to be deployed to an operational area to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (JP 1-02)
suppression of enemy air defenses	(joint) That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also known as SEAD. (JP 1-02)
surveillance	(joint) The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape	Training and actions taken by military members to assist them in surviving in hostile environments, resisting enemy activities, escaping enemy forces, and evading enemy forces until the individual or unit can be reunited with friendly forces. Also known as SERE. (FM 3- 04.111)
sustaining operations	Operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. (FM 3-0)

synchronization matrix	A format for the staff to record the results of wargaming and synchronize the course of action across time, space, and purpose in relation to an enemy course of action. (FM 5-0)
tactical control	(joint) Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1-02)
target(ed) area of interest	The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction causes the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. [Note the Army term is "targeted area of interest." Also known as TAI. (FM 3-90)
target reference point	An easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man- made) used to initiate, distribute, and control fires. Target reference points (TRPs) can also designate the center of an area where the commander plans to distribute or converge the fires of all his weapons rapidly. They are used by task force and below, and can further delineate sectors of fire within an engagement area. TRPs are designated using the standard target symbol and numbers issued by the fire support officer. Once designated, TRPs also constitute indirect fire targets. Also known as TRP. (FM 3-90)
task organization	A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (FM 3-0)
task-organizing	(joint) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. (JP 1-02) (Army) The process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. (FM 3-0)
technical intelligence	(joint) Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technological advantage. Also known as TECHINT. See also intelligence. (JP 1-02)

theater	(joint) The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)
time-phased force and deployment data	(joint) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non- unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also known as TPFDD. See also time- phased force and deployment list. (JP 1-02)
time-phased force and deployment list	(joint) Appendix 1 to Annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. Also known as TPFDL. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02)
trigger	1. Event or time-oriented criteria used to initiate planned actions directed toward achieving surprise and inflicting maximum destruction on the enemy. 2. A designated point or points (selected along identifiable terrain) in an engagement area used to mass fires at a predetermined range. (FM 6-30)
troop leading procedures	A sequence of activities used by small unit leaders to plan and prepare for operations. Also known as TLP. (FM 5-0)
*unassisted recovery	Actions taken by IMDC personnel to achieve their own recovery without outside assistance.
uncertain environment	See operational environment.
unconventional assisted recovery	(joint) Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. Also known as UAR. See also authenticate; evader; recovery; uncoventional assisted recovery coordination center. (JP 1-02)
unconventional assisted recovery coordination center	(joint) A compartmented special operations forces (SOF) facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and tactical planners to coordinate, synchronize and de-conflict non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR) operations on a 24-hour basis within the geographical area assigned to the joint force commander. The unconventional assisted recovery coordination center (UARCC) is an integral part of the joint force commander's (JFC's) comprehensive personnel recovery architecture and the functional equivalent of a component rescue coordination center. When directed by the JFC, through the joint force special operations component commander, the

	special operations command Operations Directorate establishes the UARCC (normally within the Joint Operations Center (JOC)) to serve as the focal point for all NAR operations. The UARCC interfaces and coordinates with the JOC, joint search and rescue center, component rescue coordination centers (RCCs) (including the SOF RCC) and the special activities cell. Also known as UARCC. See also uncoventional assisted recovery coordination center. (JP 1-02)
unit	(joint) 1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment; specifically, part of an organization. 2. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. 3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. In this meaning, also called unit of issue. 4. With regard to Reserve Components of the Armed Forces, denotes a Selected Reserve unit organized, equipped, and trained for mobilization to serve on active duty as a unit or to augment or be augmented by another unit. Headquarters and support functions without wartime missions are not considered units. (JP 1-02)
universal transverse mercator grid	(joint) A grid coordinate system based on the transverse mercator projection, applied to maps of the Earth's surface extending to 84 degrees N and 80 degrees S latitudes. Also known as UTM. (JP 1-02)

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