



Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED)

Review of Results-Based Budgeting in United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

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**Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services in the
Review of Results-Based Budgeting in United Nations Mission in Liberia**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Results-based budgeting (RBB) was first introduced in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 2002-2003 with an underlying intention to establish a versatile planning and management tool that would directly link resource allocation to achievement of results. This report is second in a series of Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reports in response to a request by the Controller for review of the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of RBB in peacekeeping operations and specifically examines the (RBB) process as applied at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

UNMIL operations are currently in consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal (CDW) phases, in which the mission's emphasis is shifting from peacekeeping to peace building, involving capacity development for the Government of Liberia and support to civil society structures to enhance long-term peace. The UNMIL strategy for this process is embodied in the Integrated Mission Priorities and Implementation Plan (IMPIP), which incorporates the long term objectives for all stakeholders including the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the Government of Liberia. UNMIL's RBB framework reflects the mission's annual priorities in the context of the broader IMPIP.

The Controller's Budget Instructions, which are common to all missions, set the policies, procedures and methodology for RBB in UNMIL, while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Strategic Guidance addresses the planning parameters for each specific mission in accordance with its mandate. OIOS sees merit in combining the two documents into a single DPKO guidance on the basis of which the mission should then issue detailed mission budget instructions (MBI) that articulate the priorities and operational direction envisaged for each component.

OIOS notes that the coordination between Support and Substantive components of the mission is weak. Since mission performance is ultimately reported on the basis of the RBB framework, OIOS sees a need to enhance formal coordination between them in the development of the draft RBB framework. Similarly, individual sections in the Substantive component should formally coordinate to identify areas of overlap in their outputs and to determine how these may impact their indicators. OIOS also concludes that there was a need to streamline the RBB review process when the mission finalizes and submits the draft to headquarters, noting that the mission answers separately to the Financial Management Support Service in the Department of Field Support (DFS), Office of Operations in DPKO as well as Peacekeeping Finance Division in the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA) through disparate channels of communications.

OIOS notes that some indicators of achievement in UNMIL's RBB framework did not have specific baselines and targets and some of the activities of the mission could not be linked to the RBB framework because of the inconsistency in some indicators. OIOS findings also hinted at difficulty in including some aspects of the work programme that was qualitative in

nature and that could not easily be expressed in quantitative terms in the framework. OIOS notes however that the RBB framework is integrated into the strategic planning process and that mission's senior leadership was actively involved and supportive of RBB.

OIOS found UNMIL to be in compliance with the Controller's Budget Instructions on the portfolio of evidence but noted that collection and monitoring of performance data was done in an ad hoc manner and needed to be streamlined. OIOS also notes that there were no standard operating procedures (SOP) for RBB focal points and that most had not received formal training in RBB.

Overall, OIOS found UNMIL to be on the right path in its implementation of the principles of RBB and has established a solid foundation for its eventual transition to a full-fledged results-based approach for effective management and decision-making in peacekeeping. The report contains eight recommendations, to help the mission improve its RBB planning process, formulation and reporting of the framework as well as training and capacity development. OIOS further notes that relevant recommendations for specific attention of OPPBA and/or DPKO and DFS are only referred to but not explicitly made in this report as they were already made in the OIOS report on the review of RBB in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). This final report takes into consideration and reflects adjustments undertaken in response to comments received from OPPBA, DPKO, DFS, and UNMIL in response to a draft report submitted for their respective review on 17 September 2007.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
CDW	Consolidation, Drawdown and Withdrawal
CST	County Support Team
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EBA	Enterprise Budgeting Application
FMSS	Financial Management Support Service
IMIP	Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan
IMPIP	Integrated Mission Priorities and Implementation Plan
IMTC	Integrated Mission Training Center
LJSSD	Legal and Judicial System Support Division
MBI	Mission Budget Instructions

OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Service
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
OO	Office of Operations
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning, Budgets and Accounts
PFD	Peacekeeping Finance Division
RBB	Results-based Budgeting
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNPOL	United Nations Police

I. Introduction

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), at the request of the Controller¹, is undertaking a review of the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the results-based budgeting (RBB) in peacekeeping operations. The review covers all phases of the RBB process as applied in peacekeeping operations, and encompasses RBB at the mission level as well as support and guidance provided by headquarters to the missions throughout the RBB process.

2. This report is second in a series of OIOS reports on RBB and specifically examines the RBB process as applied to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The review focuses on the congruence and alignment of the RBB operational framework in regard to the mission's mandate, its relevant processes, policy guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for peacekeeping operations. Particular emphasis is on the practical application of the RBB framework to UNMIL's operations, including the presence of time-bound performance indicator baselines and targets, documentation of performance indicator methodologies at mission level, observed change in indicators of achievement, and whether the elements of the framework provide an adequate measurement of results achieved. The review further addresses integration of the RBB framework into the mission's planning process, self-monitoring and any adjustments to the framework, capacity development, training, and the use of best practices.

¹ Controller's memorandum to OIOS of 28 November 2005.

II. Methodology

3. In conducting this review, OIOS utilized a variety of qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods, basing its findings on the following six data sources: (1) interviews with personnel from the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA) at headquarters; (2) individual and focus group interviews with mission staff during field visit to UNMIL;² (3) surveys of senior management in all 18 peacekeeping missions to assess their understanding, nature and extent of involvement in RBB systems application; (4) similar surveys of staff at the operational level in all 18 peacekeeping missions;³ (5) programme data analyses; and (6) literature review. OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation and assistance extended to it by DPKO, DFS, OPPBA and senior leadership and staff in UNMIL during the course of the review. This final report takes into consideration and reflects adjustments undertaken in response to comments received from OPPBA, DPKO, DFS, and UNMIL in response to a draft report submitted for their respective review on 17 September 2007.

4. There were a few limitations in conducting the survey of mission staff. Due to high vacancy rates, staff absences on leave and staff turnover, it was difficult to define a fixed universe of staff from which to survey, and OIOS was also unable to apply consistent sampling criteria in the selection of the survey population by the missions. As a result, OIOS is not able to determine a precise survey response rate. In order to address these limitations, all findings were based on evidence derived from multiple sources of data, including survey data.

III. RBB in United Nations Peacekeeping – Overview and Context

5. The United Nations undertakes complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations throughout the world and works with diverse partners, each focusing on specific aspects of the integrated peacekeeping effort, such as humanitarian relief, elections monitoring and supervision, economic reconstruction and institution building. Over the past seven years, the aggregate peacekeeping budget has increased more than fourfold, from US\$1 billion in 1999 to over US\$5 billion in 2006. It is against this backdrop that former Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed organization-wide reforms, including a shift away from input-based budgeting to RBB, with the intention of establishing a versatile planning and management tool that would link resource allocation to results.⁴

6. There are certain considerations unique to peacekeeping that influence the ultimate effectiveness of RBB as a planning and management tool. Peacekeeping budgets are by their very nature multidimensional and integrated, and need to be viewed from different perspectives. For example, some missions operate within very broad mandates as interim administrations

² OIOS held meetings/interviews with 105 UNMIL staff in the form of one-on-one interviews and focus groups at UNMIL headquarters and 2 field sectors.

³ The two separate RBB surveys for senior management and staff at the operational level were administered during February-April 2007 period, yielding 51 and 110 responses respectively.

⁴ United Nations interim report on results-based budgeting for the biennium 2002-2003; A/57/478 of 15 October 2002.

while others have more narrow objectives associated with humanitarian assistance, restoring rule of law, or supervising elections. This diversity across missions extends to the budgeting process as well, implying different stages in the mission life cycle, differences in structure, as well as, differences in the scope and focus of respective budgets. In addition, the peacekeeping missions frequently operate in an especially fluid and uncertain context of political and security change. This high degree of uncertainty therefore undermines the ideal RBB scenario in which each mission could establish a logical framework with clear objectives linked to a set of stable and predictable outputs and performance indicators against which mission performance would be assessed. A third consideration is that results in peacekeeping missions tend to be a collective responsibility of various contributors and partners where each contributor tends to seek to establish a plausible claim of contributing to the envisaged results. In these multidimensional scenarios it is difficult to parse out the specific proportion of an outcome attributable to each individual partner.

IV. Application of RBB in UNMIL

7. Established by Security Council Resolution 1509 of 2003, UNMIL is currently in a process of consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal (CDW)⁵ that entails a shift in emphasis from peacekeeping to peace building, as well as support to structures and capacities that enhance longer-term peace. This process also requires proper cooperation and coordination between UNMIL and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) for Liberia in the context of ‘One UN’⁶, and between the UNCT (including UNMIL) and civil society with emphasis on capacity building for the Government of Liberia in military (building a national army) and civilian facets, including strengthening the rule of law through legislative reform, training the police force, advancing human rights protection and promoting economic development.

8. The UNMIL’s strategy for CDW is complementary to the mission’s Integrated Mission Priorities and Implementation Plan (IMPIP) and provides an integrated assessment of progress based on the Government’s Four Pillar Framework, namely, security, economic revitalization, governance and rule of law, and basic services and infrastructure. The IMPIP serves as (1) a shared strategic planning tool in monitoring the progressive transfer of responsibility to the Government; (2) aligns annual objectives in the logical framework and budget with mission strategic planning process; and (3) coordinates activities of the UNCT around integrated mission implementation plan. It is designed to ensure the smooth and orderly handover of security responsibilities and the cessation of capacity building tasks to allow for the eventual withdrawal of the mission. Further, the CDW is based on a series of benchmarks which reflect the transition of the mission from peacekeeping to peace-building in the post-election period and also takes into account the capacity of government institutions. The benchmarks are considered in the development of a carefully calibrated UNMIL drawdown strategy that takes into consideration security sector reform and institutional capacity building issues. UNMIL also convenes and

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 12 September 2006 (S/2006/743).

⁶ In Liberia, the UN is made up of two key components. One is the UNCT, a collection of 16 specialized agencies, funds, programmes and the World Bank. These, along with the International Monetary Fund, are present on a long-term basis to support humanitarian and development efforts in the country. The other is the UNMIL, mandated by the Security Council to secure the peace until the Liberian state can take over that responsibility. The concept of ‘One UN’ here refers to “teaming up so that the UN delivers as one”.

chairs the Strategic Planning Group of the UNCT, further enabling tracking of mission progress and operational decision-making with reference to the RBB framework within the overall context of IMPIP. The Strategic Planning Group serves as a forum for the mission, operating within the framework of an integrated mission to involve the UNCT in discussing longer-term peace building issues. It is also an opportunity for the UNCT to discuss the transitional issues which are in many ways linked to the CDW. Its core mandate is to develop and periodically review strategies on particular subjects/areas of UNMIL focus; review and recommend follow-up action on the quarterly report on the CDW Plan Monitoring Group and associated reports including the IMPIP; review and recommend action on the mission's threat assessment as well as review timeliness and feasibility of the transfer of security responsibilities on a county by county basis to the Government of Liberia as indicated by the CDW plan.

9. The UNMIL RBB cycle is initiated by the issuance of two sets of guidance; (i) the Controller's Budget Instructions from the OPPBA that address the budgetary content of RBB frameworks, methodology issues and timelines, as well as generic budget-related policy objectives, and (ii) the Strategic Guidance from DPKO's Office of Operations (OO) that broadly outline key political and operational assumptions underlying these priorities. Additionally, the Strategic Guidance also outlines procedural expectations and any changes to prior procedural expectations.

10. Staff members at UNMIL noted that the Controller's Budget Instructions achieve DPKO-wide standardization at the expense of mission-specific relevance.⁷ Likewise, staff members perceived the DPKO Strategic Guidance as generic and inadequate in guiding them to develop relevant mission-specific plans. They noted that this lack of adequate guidance has a cascading effect through the entire mission in regard to its RBB framework development, making it difficult to not only devise a well-tailored results framework in the Substantive components, but also making it difficult to align the Support component behind the Substantive components' plans and effectively allocate resources for both components. OIOS also received feedback from senior and mid-level management staff in UNMIL that the Strategic Guidance either failed to adequately account for changes in UNMIL's operating environment or that it contained substantive inaccuracies about the situation on the ground. In order to ensure the accuracy of substantive information, some focal points in the mission suggested that the political narrative in the guidance should originate from the mission and not from headquarters.

11. *On OIOS' observation in Paragraph 10 above that "Staff members at UNMIL noted that the Controller's Budget Instructions achieve DPKO-wide standardization at the expense of mission-specific relevance", the OPPBA commented that while there may be a perception of standardization in regards to the approach to be followed by all peacekeeping missions, opportunity is given to missions to articulate their specific situations and consideration is given to these during budget formulation.*

12. OIOS found that the Strategic Guidance transmitted to UNMIL in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, did in fact enumerate strategic goals and operating assumptions specific to conditions in Liberia. However, UNMIL's Strategic Guidance for 2007-2008 appears to be at variance with the mission's emphasis on shifting from peacekeeping to peace building by proposing a scaling

⁷ This finding is common across all missions surveyed.

down of activities within the strategic objective for Humanitarian and Reconstruction issues.⁸ This contradicts the role that the mission envisioned when formalizing the inter-agency Strategic Planning Group and the explicit mention of the need for greater, rather than less, integration of peace building efforts across the UNCT.⁹ OIOS notes however, that DPKO does include provisos for the mission to revert with comments and recommendations,¹⁰ including a qualifier that the strategic objectives are subject to change, pending any revisions to the mandate in the Security Council.¹¹

13. *On OIOS' observation in Paragraph 12 above, UNMIL has noted that with the shift towards peace-building the support provided by the mission for humanitarian activities is being gradually handed over to the Government or, as needed, to other UN agencies. In addition, the mission noted that the scaling down of humanitarian activities does not contradict "the role that the mission envisioned when formalizing the Inter-Agency Strategic Planning Group and the explicit mention of the need for greater rather than less integration of peace-building efforts across the UNCT." This is so because the mission will continue to coordinate and collaborate with UN agencies in the delivery of humanitarian assistance although at a scaled down level.*

14. In OIOS opinion, combining the two sets of instructions into a single consolidated RBB guidance would enhance the relevance and utility of the guidance while also clarifying the context in which the guidance is being set. A recommendation to that effect was made to OPPBA and DPKO based on a similar finding in the OIOS review of RBB in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

15. *On OIOS' recommendation in Paragraph 14 above, the OPPBA noted in their response to the OIOS review of UNMIK that this recommendation is problematic due to the distinct roles of OPPBA/PFD and DPKO in the peacekeeping budgeting process. OIOS appreciates the concerns of OPPBA and reiterates that the recommendation is an opportunity for the parties to consider the issues and ascertain whether a change would be appropriate that would be beneficial to the RBB process in peacekeeping.*

V. Preparation of the RBB Framework at UNMIL

16. OIOS found that UNMIL faced a number of challenges in preparing the RBB framework. Staff involved in the preparation of UNMIL's RBB framework noted that their ability to produce a comprehensive, accurate and representative draft was drastically hampered by the short time provided to prepare the framework. For example, for the 2007-2008 budget cycle, the mission received the Strategic Guidance on June 29 and was given until July 14 - a total of 14 days to

⁸ For example, within the strategic objective of "Humanitarian and Reconstruction Issues," the 2007-2008 Strategic Guidance does underscore the need for UNMIL to "continue ... to coordinate and collaborate with UN agencies in the delivery of humanitarian assistance ... and to support the Government's reconstruction and national recovery efforts." Importantly, however, it states that these efforts should continue, "albeit at a scaled-down level."

⁹ See "Strengthening Peace building Efforts in Liberia: A Discussion Document for UNMIL and the UNCT." Revised Draft dated 15 April 2007. Office of the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General (O/DSRSG) for Recovery and Governance; United Nations Mission in Liberia.

¹⁰ See CNL-352 [2006-2007] paragraph 15 and CNL-428 [2007-2008] paragraph 13, respectively.

¹¹ See CNL-428 [2007-2008] paragraph 13.

submit the draft RBB framework. RBB focal points said the time was insufficient to prepare a comprehensive, accurate and truly representative draft for the mission.¹² In addition, it was pointed out that headquarters was not always considerate of the mission's particular circumstances – for instance, requiring the mission to produce its RBB framework during a scheduled visit of the Secretary-General to UNMIL.¹³

17. OIOS also notes that upon receipt of the Strategic Guidance, the mission announced the event through a broadcast email instructing section-level RBB focal points to submit their inputs. In OIOS opinion, given the short timeframes from HQ, a more proactive and participatory approach in the planning process could yield more useful and effective outcomes. The internal planning process in the mission should start with enough anticipation as to be able to respond to the exigencies and requirements of HQ instructions. HQ offices in turn should at least establish referential timeframes for any given year so that missions would be better prepared to respond to stringent deadlines. In that line, UNMIL should issue detailed Mission Budget Instructions (MBI) to all components, precisely articulating the methodology and process for the formulation of the RBB framework, including vision and priorities of senior leadership. This should be followed-up by a series of formal mission-wide RBB meetings where senior leadership may field questions and comments from their Chiefs of sections and RBB focal points on the MBI.

18. OIOS notes that coordination between the Mission's Substantive and Support components on RBB is weak. OIOS found that there is a lack of consultation and communication between the Substantive and Support components for more precise tailoring of resource requests, both human and financial, in line with mission's operational needs. Some sections where their resource only comprised staffing posts observed that their posts remained unchanged even though their outputs and indicators had changed; leading to a perception that there was no direct link between their outputs and resource allocations. OIOS notes that some Sections from the Substantive component claimed to have never been consulted when resource planning for the mission was being finalized. OIOS learned that to some extent, the Support component relies on standardized ratios for predicting resource needs for the mission (i.e. units of support input needed per unit of output).¹⁴ However, conditions on the ground, particularly in remote areas of the country, often lead to premature obsolescence of physical equipment and delays in logistical assistance. In these situations, standardized ratios can not be failsafe in predicting resource needs with accuracy. *However, the mission noted that standard ratios are used as guidelines and are adjusted to meet specific needs, such as the need for additional vehicles above the ratios in remote locations.* Greater communication and coordination at the outset of the RBB process would help the mission craft more accurate resource projections in the Support component. OIOS also learned that some sections in the Support component were already monitoring client satisfaction, which suggests that the data collection infrastructure needed to undertake effective assessment of client needs may already be in place. UNMIL should therefore improve

¹² Refer to UNMIL's Strategic Guidance for time period provided for planning RBB log frames; CNL428 of issue date 24 May 2005 allowing 28 days for submission of 06/07 log frames; See CNL352 of issue date 28 June 2006, allowing 22 days for submission of 07/08 log frames.

¹³ OIOS acknowledges that this submission deadline was in part driven by the impending budget workshop consultations, for which Headquarters needed ample time to review the mission's RBB frameworks in order to provide meaningful feedback at the workshop.

¹⁴ For example, the number of vehicles would be determined solely on the basis of number of personnel, without regard to the specific tasks and the location of the unit.

coordination between the Support and Substantive components in the mission to enable a better appreciation of resource requirements and also promote transparency of the RBB process.

19. OIOS also notes similar need for coordination between different sections of the Substantive components during preparation of the draft framework. Overlap in activities often occurs between sections at the mission, for example between the Civil Affairs and Human Rights and Gender Affairs Sections on areas where both are working with the Government on the work of their respective section – human rights and gender affairs. For example, for Expected Accomplishments 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 there are outputs regarding interaction with the Government on Human Rights and Civil Affairs matters that require input of both the Human Rights and Civil Affairs Sections.¹⁵ Additionally, Expected Accomplishment 3.1.4 and related outputs on gender affairs issues requires input by both the Civil Affairs and Gender Affairs Sections.¹⁶ This was also confirmed by interviews with staff members who noted there is often overlap of their work and a need to work to coordinate work and hence coordination between different sections during the preparation of the framework would be useful. Overall, there is a need for formal coordination between them in formulating their respective inputs to the framework in order to avoid duplication and to ensure that appropriate attribution for the activity. This point was further expressed by survey respondents with 50 percent of them noting the need for more conduciveness and collaboration on planning, implementation and reporting.

20. OIOS notes that there is a protracted submission and plan review process. On finalization of the RBB framework draft, it is submitted to headquarters for review and presentation to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) for endorsement and eventual approval. OIOS notes that the draft RBB framework from the mission is first reviewed within DPKO and DFS by OO, FMSS, and then submitted to OPPBA/PFD for their review. This review process involves extensive communications between DPKO and OPPBA/PFD through multiple means.¹⁷ OIOS concluded from the data collected from the RBB focal points that the review process at headquarters was not coordinated and often required the mission to provide the same information to different individuals seeking similar clarifications. OIOS notes disparate, duplicative and uncoordinated request for queries on the draft budget proposal coming at different times and from different entities. OIOS also notes that the queries were often similar in nature and could be more efficiently and easily addressed at one time, during the review period. After review in DPKO, the draft is then submitted to PFD for their review and in the process, more queries are requested from the mission. OIOS concluded that the entire review process could be better coordinated between Headquarters (FMSS, OO and PFD) and the Mission if the review process was streamlined and formalized resulting in improved efficiency and effectiveness of the process.

21. OIOS notes that the review process, from start to final review, can last up to three months, which was frustrating to UNMIL staff as it deprived them of a sense of progress. In OIOS opinion, it would be more productive to circulate the draft to all relevant offices in DPKO, after which a joint video conference can then be held between DPKO and the Mission to discuss the draft and make necessary amendments before forwarding the final draft to PFD. Once DPKO has

¹⁵ Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period 1 July, 2007 to 30 June, 2008, A/61/783, pp. 21-22.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Communication with the Mission is done using telephone calls, email and video conferencing.

completed review of the draft and submitted it to OPPBA/PFD, any queries or outstanding clarifications should be made to DPKO.¹⁸ Proper feedback and details on the changes that were made to the proposed plans should be properly exchanged and shared between OPPBA/PFD, DPKO OOs and the mission.

VI. Analysis of the UNMIL 2007-2008 RBB Framework

22. OIOS notes that UNMIL's 2007-2008 RBB framework consists of three Substantive components - Security Sector, Peace Consolidation and Rule of Law, and a Support component, whereas in the 2006-2007 framework the mission had five components, namely, Ceasefire, Humanitarian and Human Rights, Security Reform, Peace Process and Support.¹⁹ OIOS learned that the framework components were changed from the 2006-2007 RBB framework to reflect progress in the implementation of the mandate, under which several key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003 either had been completed, or were on their way to completion. Additionally, the new components reflect the work of the current consolidation phase of the mission and the benchmarks covering this phase.²⁰ OIOS notes some reticence and lack of flexibility on the part of DPKO to make necessary changes to the Mission's components to reflect the progress made in achieving part of its mandate as well as to reflect the consolidation phase it had now entered into.

23. OIOS observed that despite DPKO's reservations to make the changes, it was appropriate for UNMIL to make the relevant changes to the components. As these were in line with the RBB guidelines for peacekeeping operations issued by OPPBA, which outline that the RBB logical frameworks should be aligned with the structure of the Mission reflected in either the Security Council Resolution or the Secretary-General's report.²¹ In OIOS opinion, changes that reflect more accurately the situation and needs on the ground and that reflect the progress made in achieving the mandate should not only be allowed but should be made mandatory in every peacekeeping operation. In the case of UNMIL, it would then be appropriate for the components to be changed again, in coming years, to further reflect the progress of the Mission in achieving its mandate.

24. In the 2007-2008 framework, UNMIL has a total of 9 expected accomplishments, 25 indicators of achievement and 107 outputs. OIOS found the framework to be comprehensive and its elements to be specific, attainable, realistic and time-bound. However, OIOS found that only 14 of the 25 (56 percent) indicators of achievement had performance measures i.e. baselines and targets against which performance could be tracked.²² OIOS believes that this hampers the

¹⁸ At this point FMSS and the mission have developed a common position on the draft, but in the event of other substantive issues being raised by PFD, FMSS can communicate via telephone or email with the mission.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁰ Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period 1 July, 2007 to 30 June, 2008, A/61/783, p. 4.

²¹ RBB Guidelines, 2005-2006 Performance Reports and 2007-2008 budget proposals, Peacekeeping Finance Division, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, Department of Management.

²² OIOS analysis in this regard is based on baselines and targets that were measurable and indicated the progress of the work of the mission from year to year, such as various numbers or percentages that are used to measure progress, for example, indicator 2.1.1, "Increase in the total number of civil servants returned to their duty stations in the counties (2005-2006:

Mission's ability to properly monitor the performance of results. Most of the RBB focal points surveyed also confirmed that it was difficult to demonstrate results achieved at the end of the cycle either because the Mission had implemented a programme responding to real time events during the cycle, that did not completely conform with its approved framework, or because the indicators of achievement established in the framework were not adequately measuring the results achieved. Only 9 percent of respondents were confident that the indicators of achievement in the framework could accurately measure results.

25. OIOS notes from data collected that the 2007-2008 RBB framework does not fully reflect the total programme of work of some sections. Instead, the sections have their detailed work plans that guide their work programme while the RBB framework details only those aspects of the work programme that are considered to be measurable. OIOS notes that the measurability required of RBB frameworks meant that work of a qualitative nature was not included in the framework.²³ For example, the results of the frequent interaction by the Office of Gender Affairs with Government of Liberia in the area of technical assistance is very difficult to measure; and when quantified in terms of number of meetings, the qualitative nature of assistance provided cannot be appropriately reflected in the framework. Survey respondents suggested that the RBB framework would better reflect the work of their respective sections if the components included a short narrative paragraph outlining the section's work plans and overall purpose.

26. OIOS learned that the RBB framework only reflected work that could be predicted in advance because it was prepared 9 to 12 months ahead of its implementation. Sixty-two percent of respondents in senior mission leadership said that their flexibility would be unduly restricted if they focused only on the outputs and indicators stipulated in the framework. They said that the framework did not capture all the activities performed by the mission in its response to changing situations, noting that several activities become necessary after approval of the framework or because of the need for collaboration with stakeholders whose activities are not necessarily reflected in the framework. OIOS concluded that UNMIL could be performing some tasks that may not be reflected in the RBB framework either because the RBB framework is not being adjusted to reflect current outputs and indicators or because the work cannot be measured using the indicators of achievement established in the approved framework. A recommendation was made to OPPBA and DPKO to review the framework methodology for reflecting both qualitative and quantifiable indicators based on similar findings in the review of RBB in UNMIK.²⁴

27. OIOS notes that UNMIL has a Gender Affairs Office in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)²⁵ on women, peace and security. The office is located in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and gender is treated as a cross-cutting issue across the mission programme of work. UNMIL recently moved the Gender

1,200; 2006-2007: 1,400; 2007-2008: 2,400". Indicators of achievement of the Yes/No type are only considered appropriate if the indicator of achievement pertains to a critical issue and it can be objectively verified.

²³ For example, both civil and gender affairs frequently interact with the Government of Liberia and its varying needs and demands with technical assistance. This assistance and interaction is difficult to quantify, and if quantified the qualitative nature of the work is hard to reflect in the framework.

²⁴ OIOS report on the Review of Results-based Budgeting in United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 6 August 2007; recommendation SP-07-001-004, paragraph 46.

²⁵ S/RES/1325(2000), 31 October 2000.

Office from the Support to the Substantive component. OIOS found that gender mainstreaming is represented throughout the substantive components of the RBB framework; with nine gender initiatives appearing in the 2007-2008 RBB framework.²⁶ OIOS further notes that in developing the draft RBB framework, UNMIL's RBB focal point has successfully integrated gender mainstreaming principles into the Substantive component instead of under the Support component as was previously done. OIOS commends UNMIL for taking the initiative to incorporate gender issues where appropriate, such as promoting a gender balance in the Police force²⁷ and the Reintegration of War Affected Populations in Host Communities.²⁸ These examples represent a good practice of monitoring the gender aspects of the work of the mission, and to have specific and measurable targets that are relevant and achievable.

VII. Linkages of RBB to Strategic Planning and Management

28. IMPIP incorporates the various mission objectives and plans; including the Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP) and the RBB framework. IMPIP constitutes the benchmarking and development plan for UNMIL and is also closely aligned to the four pillar framework of the Government of Liberia.²⁹ OIOS found it to be a comprehensive planning framework that provides strategic direction and options for decision-making in line with the United Nations priorities. IMPIP also provides a mechanism for UNMIL to link its work to that of other United Nations agencies working in Liberia.³⁰

29. OIOS notes that IMPIP has evolved as UNMIL's strategic planning framework representing the Mission's operational and management plan for implementing and supporting strategic goals and objectives; integrating the work of the components as well as harmonizing the work of external partners and stakeholders engaged in development work in Liberia, such as other UN agencies, funds and programmes. However, being a long-term macro-planning framework (sometimes spanning three or more years), IMPIP does not represent a concise linkage between strategic planning and resource allocation. For this, the RBB framework can serve as the driver for planning and estimating resources oriented towards achieving intended results and on providing important feed-back for day to day management in the Mission. In that regard, OIOS notes positively UNMIL senior leadership's efforts in linking mission's RBB framework to IMPIP and in applying RBB as a tool for planning and operational decision-making. Although RBB is clearly not regarded as the strategic planning tool for the mission, respondents were able to clearly demonstrate how it links to the mission strategic planning process through IMPIP.³¹

²⁶ See nine gender items from 07/08 log frame: (IoA 1.3.2 , plus one output, IoA 2.1.5 and two outputs, IoA 3.1.4 and 3 outputs .

²⁷ A/61/873, Expected accomplishment 1.3, Indicator of achievement 1.3.2.

²⁸ A/61/873, Expected accomplishment 2.3, Indicator of achievement 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.

²⁹ In early 2007, the Government of Liberia unveiled its interim Poverty Reduction Strategy based on pressing need to combat problems of inequality and poverty, based around four pillars, namely, Enhancing National Security, Economic Revitalization, Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law, and Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Basic Social Services.

³⁰ For example, UNMIL and the United Nations County Support Teams (CST) jointly produce the County Assessment and Action Report, which outlines cross-cutting issues in the key areas of the four pillars; and the United Nations Development assistance Framework (UNDAF) which is the overall framework under which programmes are developed for UN support to national priorities and joint programmes are encouraged when and where feasible.

³¹ OIOS survey results on the review of RBB in PKOs administered to all missions including UNMIL.

30. In a results-based approach, it is useful that expected results are transposed into unit/section work plans in order to obtain a clear picture of whether the expected results have been achieved and to help clarify the attribution or contribution to achieving such results. A large number of UNMIL respondents mentioned using IMPIP as a work planning tool in their day to day operations. For example, the Legal and Judicial System Support Division (LJSSD) and its subunits' work plans for the current year are in line and integrated with the priorities and projects included in the strategy agreed by Rule of Law Task Force as reflected in IMPIP. OIOS commends UNMIL for its robust programme planning in which unit work plans serve to inform individual work plans for mission staff including senior managers.

31. OIOS also established that through their involvement in IMPIP senior management are fully engaged and supportive of the work of RBB focal points with regard to the framework and budget. Being an integral component of the IMPIP process, there is full ownership and accountability for the RBB framework on the part of senior leadership in the mission. In that context, OIOS notes with satisfaction that UNMIL is progressing in the right direction in its gradual implementation of the principles of RBB in its strategic planning process and establishing a more comprehensive results-based management approach. For example OIOS found that it was appropriate for UNMIL to continuously review its progress according to the IMPIP and adjust its log frame components to reflect the achievement of the mission's mandate and the consolidation phase it is in now. Such changes are in line with OPPBA guidelines requiring alignment with mission structure, Security Council resolutions and the Secretary-General's reports. DPKO might benefit from a review of the lessons emerging from UNMIL's experiences with RBB, particularly with regard to the integration of RBB into strategic planning and with other results-based approaches in peacekeeping to improve management and decision-making.

VIII. Performance Measurement, Monitoring and Reporting

32. Performance measurement at the mission level is two fold: tracking progress on efficiency i.e. whether inputs and activities were converted into the planned outputs according to plans and schedules, and monitoring effectiveness by way of determining the extent to which results were achieved as planned. Although the focus of performance measurement under RBB is on results and its various dimensions, there should be equal emphasis on the efficient use of resources and alignment of work processes. While the improved integration and cohesion of RBB with IMPIP in UNMIL should lead to greater efficiency in the delivery of services and achievement of results, OIOS notes that the staff performance appraisal cycle (e-Pas) beginning in April each year is not consistent with the mission's RBB cycle which starts in July. The resultant inconsistency in staff performance and mission performance cycles lead to potential inefficiencies in work planning and performance assessments.³²

33. OIOS found UNMIL to be in compliance with the requirement for submitting the portfolio of evidence, which is part of the Controller's Instructions for RBB frameworks. The portfolio of evidence should provide data on mission performance and ultimately establish an audit trail for verification by management. OIOS notes that an audit conducted in 2006 found

³² Interviews with Chiefs of Sections.

discrepancies between the outputs reported in the portfolio of evidence and the actual numbers reported in supporting documentation provided by the mission.³³ In response to this observation, the mission developed and introduced a system and guidelines for preparation of the portfolio of evidence every six months; and a data collection record template that Chiefs of sections maintain for their respective indicators.³⁴ OIOS commends UNMIL for responding to the audit recommendations and developing a robust system for collecting data for the portfolio of evidence.

34. In addition, OIOS also found that RBB focal points were monitoring and reporting performance data for their respective sections on a regular basis throughout the year. However, OIOS notes that it was being done in an ad hoc manner and they were not making use of the data collection record template developed in the mission.³⁵ The focal points used different methods and techniques for collecting and reporting performance data, ranging from use of spreadsheets, internal correspondence by email, and other manual notations. OIOS notes that there was no systematic process to collect and aggregate data received from the different RBB focal points. OIOS is aware that this might be addressed through the Enterprise Budgeting Application (EBA) project to modernize budgeting and performance reporting for peacekeeping missions that OPPBA is working on. However, in the interim, UNMIL could improve its monitoring and reporting of performance data by making use of the data collection record template already developed in the mission and exploring the potential for automating some of these processes, if anything, on a temporary basis and through the most efficient and economical means, perhaps by using systems that already are in place elsewhere.

IX. Capacity Development

35. OIOS learned that the Support component RBB focal points and Chiefs of sections, who are all directly involved with RBB at the mission, had not received training on RBB. This was further corroborated through the survey respondents from UNMIL.³⁶ OIOS further learned that the mission had requested a training team from FMSS to visit the mission and conduct training but due to budget constraints this was not approved.³⁷ OIOS found however, that a training session for the Substantive component focal points had just been conducted by the Mission's Integrated Mission Training Center (IMTC) in May 2007. Although the RBB focal points from the Support component did not take part in the training, they did however review the training material developed by IMTC and provided feedback on it. OIOS commends this effort but encourages DPKO to develop, maintain and disseminate to missions standardized training materials on RBB in order to ensure that there is a common understanding of procedures, terms and methodology used in RBB. DPKO should further ensure that such materials for RBB is regularly updated and is readily available to all missions.

36. OIOS also notes that UNMIL does not have standard operating procedures (SOPs) for RBB. To underscore the importance of SOPs, OIOS asked RBB focal points what they understood as their role in the Mission in regard to RBB and notes the variances in their

³³ OIOS Audit report A.P.2006/626/03: UNMIL Results-based Budgeting Portfolio of Evidence; 5 February 2007.

³⁴ UNMIL Memorandum: Results-based budgeting Portfolio of Evidence and Performance Reports; 19 January 2007.

³⁵ Focus group interviews with RBB focal points.

³⁶ None of the respondents said they had received any formal RBB training or preparation on RBB.

³⁷ Interview with senior management and RBB focal points in UNMIL.

responses ranging from (a) drafting the framework – 31 percent; (b) coordinating and follow up – 31 percent; (c) reporting – 15 percent; and (d) 23 percent could not specify their role. OIOS notes that none of the respondents indicated monitoring of the RBB framework to be their role. OIOS also notes that for RBB to be fully institutionalized in the mission, staff should have RBB information available to understand the processes and mechanism used to determine the mission’s plans and gauge its success. As noted in a related OIOS report on UNMIK, there are several documents and materials with relevant information in DPKO that can be used for drafting detailed SOPs and OIOS urges UNMIL to use these to develop mission SOPs for RBB focal points.³⁸

X. Best Practices

37. OIOS observed that every section in UNMIL has two RBB focal points; including an ‘Alternate Focal Point’ that participates in all RBB activities throughout the year and is kept informed on all relevant matters concerning the section in the RBB framework. This enables sections to have continual presence of a focal point on RBB despite high staff turnover and other absence such as vacation and sick leave. In OIOS opinion, this is a good practice that could be replicated in other missions.

38. OIOS was also informed that many staff members would find it useful to have a list of “best practice” terms for the RBB framework, particularly on indicators of achievement and outputs, which should be compiled and disseminated mission-wide. They suggested that a separate list containing terminology that was approved in previous RBB frameworks could be compiled for every component.³⁹ The list of terms would serve as a useful guide in developing indicators of achievement and outputs for the sections while also enabling staff members to appreciate the terminology used in the other sections in formulation of RBB terminology. In addition, as was also notes in the report on UNMIK, OIOS learned that there is little formal sharing of best practices related to RBB, except for the informal exchanges that take place at DPKO’s annual workshops and some reference on the OPPBA RBB website. Even then, only a few respondents in UNMIL claimed to be aware of this website, and none had any memory of visiting the web site recently. Based on similar findings in the review of RBB in UNMIK, a recommendation was made to DPKO to develop tools such as peacekeeping RBB website and compendium of RBB best practices.⁴⁰

XI. Conclusion

39. An integrated approach to budget and planning in peacekeeping operations is necessary for achieving an appropriate allocation of resources and for managing these resources efficiently. OIOS concluded that UNMIL is on the right path in its implementation of the principles of RBB

³⁸ DPKO document titled ‘RBB Process and People Table’; and Peacekeepers’ Pocket Guide on RBB Terminology.

³⁹ Focus group interviews with RBB focal points.

⁴⁰ OIOS report on the Review of Results-based Budgeting in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), dated 6 August 2007; Recommendation SP-07-001-010, paragraph 52.

and has established a solid foundation for its eventual transition to a full fledged results-based approach that can support management decision making. UNMIL's senior leadership is fully supportive of RBB and there appears to be a general acceptance and buy-in for RBB at the different levels of the mission. OIOS also found the practice in UNMIL of appointing alternative RBB focal points for each section to be a good practice that can be replicated in other missions.

40. OIOS found however that the mission RBB process could be strengthened by increasing intra-mission coordination between the Support and Substantive components and by more careful formulation of indicators that have specific baselines and targets. OIOS also notes the absence of a formal mechanism for the issuance of Mission Budget Instructions and formal meeting for intra-mission dialogue between senior leadership, Chiefs of sections and RBB focal points. OIOS is of a view that such a forum would present staff with opportunity to better understand the vision and priorities of senior leadership, and thereby reflect these aspects adequately in the RBB framework.

XII. Recommendations

41. OIOS has made eight recommendations in this report. In addition, OIOS found that some of the RBB issues in UNMIL are common to other missions and may have been observed in the report on UNMIK. Some recommendations arising from such findings were already made in the OIOS report on the review of RBB in UNMIK dated 6 August 2007, and have therefore not been repeated in this report, except for those recommendations specifically directed to the Mission.

42. **Recommendation 1: UNMIL should formalize procedures for issuance of a comprehensive set of Mission Budget Instructions based on the DPKO Guidance to anticipate, articulate and coordinate processing of the RBB framework. (para. 17) (SP-07-003-001).***

43. *In regard to recommendation 1, UNMIL noted that budget instructions are being issued each year and it is committed to continue this practice and hence suggested closure of the recommendation. However, OIOS reiterates the recommendation after review of the Mission Budget Instructions which are not sufficiently comprehensive as they deal mostly with the Support Component and not all of the Components at the mission. OIOS will further review the implementation of this recommendation and its closure once it is verified that more specific budget instructions are issued.*

44. **Recommendation 2: UNMIL should establish formal mechanisms to enhance coordination between Substantive and Support components and among its sections in the preparation and planning phase of the RBB framework. (paras. 18-19) (SP-07-003-002).**

45. *Concerning recommendation 2, UNMIL confirmed that the substantive sections lead the RBB process by formulating their sections' plans first, which is then utilized by the support component sections to prepare their RBB and cost estimates in support of the substantive elements. Draft substantive RBB plans are circulated by the Chief Budget Officer to all support*

* Internal code used by the Office of Internal Oversight Services for recording recommendations.

component sections for review and adjustment of their plans, before costing are done to ensure that the outputs are in line with one another (Substantive and Support). Additionally, mission planning guidelines such as the Force Overwatch Concept of Operation and the UNPOL deployment plan are developed in cooperation with the Joint Logistics Operation Centre and discussed at length in Support Section Chief's meetings. UNMIL noted that these procedures are working well and are assisting the Mission to facilitate coordination among the parties in formulating the RBB frameworks and hence suggested that this recommendation be closed. However, OIOS reiterates this recommendation and emphasizes the need to establish a formal coordination mechanism between the mission's components and among its sections in the preparation and planning phase of the RBB framework. OIOS acknowledges that sufficient coordination is occurring within the sections/components through different mechanisms such as the Force Overwatch Concept, UNPOL Deployment Plan but did not find sufficient coordination between the mission's components nor was there any established formal mechanism to ensure such coordination takes place.

46. Recommendation 3: UNMIL in conjunction with DPKO Headquarters should develop a streamlined process for review and feedback of the draft RBB framework between Headquarters and the Mission ensuring that all entities involved are kept fully aware of the progress and changes made to the missions' plan. (paras. 20-21) (SP-07-003-003).

47. Recommendation 4: UNMIL should ensure that indicators of achievement in the RBB framework clearly establish performance measures, so that actual progress can be based on specific baselines and targets. (para. 24) (SP-07-003-004).

48. Recommendation 5: DPKO should document best practices regarding the integration of the different levels of work planning in UNMIL, as well as the use of lessons learned in adjusting subsequent work plans and include them in the RBB planning guidelines. Additionally, a compendium of good practices and lessons learned on the implementation of RBB should be developed and be made available to all missions. (paras. 28-31) (SP-07-003-005).

49. From comments concerning recommendation 5, OIOS is pleased to note various developments that are taking place in DPKO/DFS including a review of the needs and opportunities for a survey of best practices on RBB, including those developed by UNMIL, once the lead team and structures are in place. OIOS awaits further progress in this area.

50. Recommendation 6: UNMIL should streamline the monitoring and reporting of performance data by RBB focal points through the use of the data collection record template. Automation of the monitoring and reporting essentials should be explored and if successful applied to all peacekeeping missions until the EBA becomes operational (para. 34) (SP-07-003-006).

51. In regard to recommendation 6, UNMIL noted that it will re-issue the SRSG Instruction of 19 January 2007 which sets out responsibilities and timelines in the collection of data and reporting thereof. OIOS awaits further progress in this area.

52. *OPPBA noted that they had previously commented in their response to the OIOS report on RBB at UNMIK that the project for development and implementation of EBA is in place as planned and approved by legislative bodies. The EBA project is driven based on a detailed project timeline, including all aspects of training for its introduction in peacekeeping. OIOS notes these comments and reiterates that until EBA is fully operational automation of the monitoring and reporting essentials should be explored to ensure that the monitoring and reporting of performance data is done.*

53. Recommendation 7: DPKO should develop standardized training materials on RBB for use by the Integrated Mission Training Centers in missions on an ongoing basis. (para. 35) (SP-07-003-007).

54. *DFS commented that training materials on RBB is being used by missions as the basis for training to officers and focal points at the field missions and these training materials have been used at a number of RBB workshops conducted between 2002-2005. They further mentioned that DPKO in partnership with PFD and Department of Management has developed training materials for budget workshops, which included training on RBB for mission personnel in UNMIL (2003), UNOCI (2004), UNMIS (2005), UNMIK (2005) and ONUB (2005). They also noted that the Controller's Budget Instructions have guidance on best practices to facilitate the formulation of RBB frameworks. Also, DPKO has published on its peacekeeping intranet a reference document containing all budget and performance reports on RBB frameworks to provide missions with examples of how other missions formulate RBB elements. Based on this information they suggested that this recommendation be deleted. OIOS acknowledges the training materials on RBB that have been used at RBB workshops conducted between 2002-05, however, the material is available in the form of customized presentations for each workshop and do not provide a template of RBB training materials specific to missions. Additionally, these training materials were most recently used in 2005 and may require updating with relevant examples from missions. Furthermore, as noted in the report (paragraph 35) none of the RBB focal points and chiefs of sections reported having received any training on RBB. The mission requested for standardized training material to be provided to the IMTC to be utilized for training at the mission. OIOS reiterates the recommendation and encourages DPKO/DFS to develop standardized training materials on RBB, based on available materials, for the use of IMTCs in missions on an ongoing basis.*

55. Recommendation 8: UNMIL should develop clear SOPs using existing material and documentation on RBB and effectively disseminate them including through the mission intranet website. This could also be included in the briefing package provided to new staff members that join the Mission. (para. 36) (SP-07-003-008).

56. *DFS commented in regard to recommendation 8 that the recommendation has been implemented as UNMIL has prepared comprehensive RBB process and theory training presentations, which were approved in June 2007. UNMIL noted that they have been reflected on the Best Practices website and were also circulated to the Substantive Section Chiefs and RBB Focal Points. UNMIL also noted that the SRSG's Instruction of 19 January 2007 clearly sets out roles and responsibilities and are available to the new staff members who join the mission. As noted in paragraph 36, OIOS acknowledges the presence of several documents and material with*

relevant information on RBB in DPKO/DFS but reiterates the need to use these materials to develop clear SOPs and disseminate them to RBB focal points in the mission to ensure that focal points have guidance on their role and responsibilities with the RBB process.
