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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Taye-Brook Zerihoun
A: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Mission in the Sudan

DATE: 18 January 2007

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:26 (07-⁰⁷⁻⁰⁰⁰²⁰)

FROM: Dagfinn Knutsen, Acting Director
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS 

SUBJECT: **OIOS Audit No. AP2006/632/01: Deployment of UN Police and
OBJET: Military Observers in UNMIS**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted during February to July 2006.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that UNMIS has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on your response, I am pleased to inform you that we have closed recommendations 3, 5, 7 and 8 in the OIOS recommendations database. In order for us to close out the remaining recommendations (i.e., 1, 2, 4, 6, 9 and 10), we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical (i.e., recommendations 1-6, and 9) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.
3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.
4. I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff of UNMIS for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
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Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division



Deployment of UN Police and Military Observers in UNMIS

Audit no: AP2006/632/01
Report date: 18 January 2007
Audit team: Elias Kedir, Auditor-In-Charge
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Deployment of Civilian Police and Military Observers in UNMIS

OIOS conducted an audit of the deployment of UN Police and UN Military Observers (UNMOs) in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) from February to July 2006. The objectives of the audit were to assess whether: (i) the number of UN Police and UNMOs deployed was consistent with the Mission's requirements; (ii) UN Police and UNMOs were deployed in a timely manner; (iii) the number and locations of team sites were consistent with the Mission's requirement, and the team sites were constructed in a timely manner; (iv) logistics support provided to the UN Police and UNMOs was adequate; and (v) UN Police officers and UNMOs had the required language and driving skills.

OIOS experienced major difficulties in obtaining prompt access to records and in interviewing responsible UNMIS personnel in connection with this audit. This was due to the restrictions placed by the UNMIS Management on staff interaction with OIOS auditors. These restrictions were in clear violation of General Assembly resolution 48/218B and were only removed after the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services notified the Secretary-General in May 2006 of her decision to withdraw the auditors unless the UNMIS Management completely and unconditionally removed the restrictions. This was done by UNMIS on 21 May 2006 and the audit was concluded in July 2006.

The audit found that the number of UN police officers and UNMOs authorized was in excess of the Mission's requirement. UNMIS had not yet determined the optimum number of team sites and their locations. Some team sites were not suitable for the conduct of operations, and no team sites were established in some political and militarily sensitive areas. The UNMIS management needs to periodically review the political and military situation on the ground and adjust the number of UN police officers and UNMOs deployed, and team site locations within the Mission area.

There were delays in deploying police officers and UNMOs to team sites after their arrival at the Mission's Headquarters. Full deployment of police officers and UNMOs had not been achieved as of the time of the audit. The UNMIS management needs to take remedial measures to address the factors that impeded the timely deployment of the police and UNMOs. Such measures include: (a) prioritizing team sites for construction; (b) improving the coordination between UNMIS and DPKO in timing the arrival of police officers and UNMOs in the Mission area; and (c) pursuing with the host government the problems faced in obtaining land for establishing team sites and in the customs clearance of equipment.

Logistics support for UN police and UNMOs was inadequate. The Mission did not adequately provide the essential patrol equipment and other facilities at team sites to ensure that they were fully operational in accordance with established norms. UNMIS was not in compliance with its own guidelines regarding the allocation of vehicles to police and UNMOs. The Mission needs to address these shortcomings to increase the operational effectiveness of UN police officers and UNMOs deployed in UNMIS.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. OIOS conducted an audit of the deployment of Civilian Police and United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) from February to July 2006. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. On 24 March 2005, by resolution 1590, the Security Council established UNMIS. The Mission's mandate is to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the main rebel group in the South, i.e., the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) who were in armed conflict with each other during the last two decades. Specifically, UNMIS is expected to: (a) facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; (b) assist the parties in the mine action sector; and (c) contribute toward international efforts to protect and promote human rights in the Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts toward the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups.
3. UNMIS' work plan encompasses four main components; (1) good offices and political support for the peace process; (2) security; (3) governance; and (4) humanitarian and development assistance. The security component is addressed by the military and the governance component, in part, by the UN Police.
4. The Security Council has authorized the deployment of 715 police officers and 750 UNMOs for UNMIS. The mandate of the UN Police is to assist the Government with the development of a transparent police service. The objective is to create a modern, effective, and efficient police force that operates in a fair and impartial manner in observing the rule of law. The mandate of UNMOs includes monitoring and verifying compliance with ceasefire agreements.
5. The comments made by the management of UNMIS on the draft report have been included in the report as appropriate and are shown in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

6. The major objectives of the audit were to ascertain whether:
 - (i) The number of UN Police and UNMOs deployed was consistent with the Mission's requirements;
 - (ii) UN Police and UNMOs were deployed in a timely and effective manner;
 - (iii) The number and locations of team sites were consistent with the Mission's requirement, and the team sites were constructed in a timely manner;
 - (iv) Logistics support provided to the UN Police and UNMOs was adequate; and
 - (v) UN Police officers and UNMOs had the required language and driving skills.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7. The audit covered the period from May 2005 to February 2006. The audit approach involved: (a) a review of relevant documentation including policies and guidelines on UN Police and UNMOs; (b) a review of the activities of the Mission Support Division (MSD) in providing logistics support to the UN Police and UNMOs; (c) visits to a number of team sites; and (d) interviews with responsible UNMIS personnel.

8. From the commencement of this audit in February 2006, OIOS experienced major difficulties in obtaining prompt access to records and in interviewing responsible UNMIS personnel. This was due to the memoranda issued to staff by the UNMIS Management describing various “options” that Mission staff could use while interacting with OIOS auditors. These “options”, which were restrictive and in clear violation of General Assembly resolution 48/218B, severely delayed the conduct of this audit. The audit could only be concluded after the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services notified the Secretary-General in May 2006 of her decision to withdraw the auditors from UNMIS unless the instructions issued to staff by the UNMIS Management were reversed completely and unconditionally. The instructions in question were withdrawn on 21 May 2006 and the audit was concluded in July 2006.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Strength of the UN Police and UNMOs

9. By Resolution 1590(2005), the Security Council authorized 715 UN police officers and up to 750 UNMOs for UNMIS for 2005-06. The same numbers of police officers and UNMOs have been authorized in the Mission’s budget for 2006-07. OIOS was informed that these numbers were determined based on a needs assessment conducted by a team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Headquarters, New York prior to the Mission’s establishment. However, the Mission could not explain the factors that were taken into account in determining the authorized strength, and no reports by the assessment team were made available to OIOS for review.

10. The audit found the authorized number of UN police officers and UNMOs to be in excess of UNMIS’ operational needs, based on the following:

- Whereas 680 of the authorized 750 UNMOs were on board, the Mission had assigned 40 UNMOs to other UNMIS units for performing tasks other than monitoring and verification. The Mission confirmed that the 640 UNMOs could implement the Mission’s mandate. Similarly, the Police component was conducting a review of its operations at team sites to determine the optimum number of the police officers required.
- The initial deployment plan indicated that the 715 UN police officers and 750 UNMOs would be deployed in 18 team sites. Subsequently, the number of team sites was increased to 26. However, no additional police officers or UNMOs were needed to be deployed to the additional team sites, since the authorized number of UNMOs and Police officer could cover all of them;
- Nine police officers stationed at El Damazin are to be redeployed to other sectors.

11. An excess number of UNMOs and police officers has financial and operational implications. Excessive personnel mean more cost in mission subsistence allowance (MSA) and other support services. For illustrative purposes, a 15 per cent reduction in the number of UN Police and UNMOs would result in a saving of about \$10 million per annum on MSA alone. In addition, idle capacity can adversely impact the morale of the police officers and UNMOs, and their perception of the United Nations as an efficiently managed Organization.

Number of team sites

12. The number of team sites was not consistent with UNMIS' requirements. One year after the Mission's establishment, UNMIS has not determined the optimum number of team sites. The number has been fluctuating from the initial 35 to 18 and currently to 26. There is no assurance that the latest number is optimal. The Mission indicated that it may change further, based on the political and military situation on the ground.

13. Furthermore, the locations of some of the team sites were not consistent with the Mission's requirements. Some were established at operationally unsuitable locations. For instance, team sites were established at Kumruk and Dindiru where there is no water and no road access respectively. Water was transported to Kumruk by trucks, and police officers and UNMOs were transported to duty from the Sector Headquarters to Dindiru by helicopter daily. Transporting personnel and water to the team sites on a regular basis is costly, and the lack of access to Dindiru could hamper operations. The Mission recently decided to close the team site at Dindiru and identify an alternative site.

13. No team sites had been established in some sensitive areas, such as Yei, for example. The town is located near the Uganda and Sudan border with heavy concentration of armed forces, SPLA and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). A team site was established in the area only in October 2005 after the LRA attacked the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), killing one of its personnel. In addition to endangering peacekeepers and other UN personnel, absence of team sites in such sensitive areas could lead to preventable violence and adversely affect the peace effort.

14. Inadequacy of the pre-mission needs assessment contributed to inconsistencies in determining the number of UN Police and UNMOs required for UNMIS, as well as the number and locations of team sites. Sudan is a very large country, of which the most part is inaccessible by road or air. The assessment team which had come from Headquarters, New York spent only three weeks in the Mission area, which was too short to make a comprehensive assessment. The Mission needs to re-assess its needs and accordingly adjust its deployment of UN Police and UNMOs at team sites based on relevant criteria.

Recommendations 1 to 3

The UNMIS Management should:

- (i) Periodically review the situation on the ground and accordingly adjust the number of UN Police and UNMOs deployed, as well as the number and locations of team sites within the Mission area (AP2006/632/01/01);

(ii) Request DPKO to reduce the authorized number of 750 UNMOs for the budget year 2006-07 to 640 in 2007-08 representing the number of UNMOs UNMIS Management deemed adequate to fulfill the Mission's mandate (AP2006/632/01/02); and

(iii) Develop criteria for establishing team sites to ensure that they are located in the right places (AP2006/632/01/03).

15. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the review of the operational needs is an ongoing exercise with a view to ascertaining the requirements of team sites and the number of UNMOs for deployment. Accordingly, it has asked DPKO to reduce the number of UNMOs in the mission area from 750 to 625. Also, on 19 November 2006, the UN Police, through a policy directive issued by the Police Commissioner, commenced a strength and logistics assessment, with emphasis was on deploying more personnel for field rather than staff duties. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been implemented.*

16. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation and stated that it had asked DPKO to reduce the authorized number of 750 UNMOs to 625 as reflected in the proposed 2007/2008 budget. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been implemented.*

17. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the Police Commissioner, in a briefing note dated 27 November 2006, set out the criteria for police deployment. Based on the Mission's response, recommendation 3 has been closed.*

B. Delay in the deployment of UN Police and UNMOs

18. The deployment of both UN Police and UNMOs was behind schedule. Delays were observed at two stages, i.e.: (a) delay in the arrival of incoming Police and UNMOs at UNMIS Headquarters; and (b) delay in deployment from UNMIS Headquarters to the team sites.

Delays in arrival at the Mission Headquarters

19. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM was signed on 9 January 2005. According to the initial plan, the UN Police and UNMOs were to be fully deployed by 15 October 2005 and 1 January 2006 respectively. However, these milestones were not achieved. By these deadlines, only 16 per cent of the Police and 60 per cent of UNMOs were on board. The Mission has subsequently changed the target dates for full deployment of the personnel several times, but none were successfully met. As of the end of May 2006, 91 per cent of the projected number of UN Police and 73 per cent of UNMOs were deployed, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Projected and actual deployment of Police Officers and UNMOs

Sector/Section	UN Police	UNMOs
Authorized strength	715	750
Projected date for full deployment	15 October 2005	1 January 2006

Actual deployment	115	452
Percentage deployed	16 %	60 %
Deployment as at 31 May 2006	652	547
Percentage deployed	91 %	73 %

20. The main cause for the delay in the arrival of police officers and UNMOs at the Mission was that team sites and accommodation facilities were not ready as planned. The MSD, which is responsible for providing the team sites, identified the following reasons for the delay in the completion of team sites:

- (a) The rainy season from April to September;
- (b) Difficulty in securing land from the Government of Sudan for establishing the team sites;
- (c) Shortage of construction materials, such as gravel; and
- (d) Poor means of transport.

21. As the delay in constructing the facilities continued, some UN Police were deployed to team site locations and were required to operate from their own private accommodations. Kumruk was one such location, and at the time of the audit, 24 officers assigned to the team sites were operating from Ed-Damazin over the last several months.

Delays in deployment from UNMIS Headquarters

22. The deployment of the police officers and UNMOs from UNMIS Headquarters to team sites also had considerable delays. Police officers and UNMOs arriving in the Mission undergo various pre-deployment procedures including checking in, attending the integrated induction course and specialized Police/UNMOs training, and driving and language tests.

23. OIOS, in consultation with the relevant UNMIS Unit, determined that as a benchmark, the number of days required for pre-deployment procedures was 11 days for police officers 13 days for UNMOs, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: Time required for pre-deployment procedures

Procedure	No. of Days	
	UN Police	UNMOs
Check In	1	1
Integrated Induction Training	4	4
Language test	1	1
Specialized police training	3	5
Other (Driving Test, etc.)	2	2
TOTAL	11	13

24. Compared to these benchmarks, the actual number of days (based on a sample of 50 police officers and 50 UNMOs) for pre-deployment procedures were 20 days for UN Police and 17 days

for UNMOs. Thus, on average, UN police officers and UNMOs overstayed at UNMIS Headquarters by 9 days and 4 days respectively.

Major cause of delays at UNMIS Headquarters

25. Skills tests are the major contributing factor to the delay in the deployment of police officers and UNMOs from UNMIS Headquarters to team sites (or repatriation, in case of repeated failure to pass the tests). Standard operating procedures require that all UN Police and UNMOs should pass the language and driving tests based on the Skills Assessment Tests (SAT) guidelines, before they are deployed to team sites. Police officers and UNMOs are allowed three attempts at the language and driving tests, over a one-month period. Failure to pass these tests results in their repatriation. As of April 2006, 9 police officers and 21 UNMOs were repatriated due to their failure to pass the skills tests. The repatriation process took up to 71 days for police officers and up to 150 days for UNMOs, as shown in by Tables 3 and 4. DPKO authorization is required for such repatriations, but no information was available on the time taken by DPKO for issuing such authorization.

Table 3: UN police officers repatriated for failing Skills Tests

Index	First Name	Last Name	Country	Test(s) failed	Date of arrival	Date of departure	Duration (days)
333767	Walter	Britos Costa	Uruguay	English	22/2/2006	23/2/2006	29
333753	Yony	Borges	Uruguay	English	22/2/2006	23/3/2006	29
333776	Adolpho	Hernandez	Uruguay	English	22/2/2006	23/3/2006	29
333924	Juan	Fredes Taramasco	Uruguay	English	22/2/2006	23/3/2006	29
398561	Juan Carlos	Rodriguez	Uruguay	English	22/2/2006	23/3/2006	29
490020	Md Reazuddin	Shaikh	Bangladesh	English	26/2/2006	24/3/2006	26
192691	Joseph	Kato	Uganda	Driving	18/10/2005	28/12/2005	71
363424	Samson	Akinwonmi	Nigeria	Driving	25/1/2006	5/4/2006	70
179640	Md Abdur	Razzak	Bangladesh	Medical records not traced	23/12/2005	27/1/2006	35

26. The intention behind the practice of allowing police officers and UNMOs three attempts is to provide them ample opportunity to pass the tests. However, failing the tests at the first attempt implies a lack of skills, which suggests that the officers may not be able to communicate in the working language or drive in difficult road conditions as required. Therefore, their deployment poses operational as well as safety risks.

27. The Mission’s training capacity was insufficient to absorb the incoming number of police officers and UNMOs. Whereas the Mission allocated 25 slots each for UN Police and UNMOs for the weekly integrated induction training courses, up to 68 of them arrived weekly. This meant that some officers had to wait for the induction training the following week. Checking-in routines also precede the training courses. As the training programme runs from Monday to Thursday (which is the end of the work week in Sudan), the officers who arrived late in the week with insufficient time for checking-in, or those who arrived early in the week, had to wait until the following Monday to enroll in the programme. Lack of proper coordination between DPKO, the contributing countries and UNMIS caused such unscheduled arrivals.

Table 4: UNMOs repatriated for failing Skills Tests

Index	First Name	Last Name	Country	Test(s) failed	Date of arrival	Date of departure	Duration (days)
351829	Moussodji	Jean Baptiste	Gabon	English	8/12/2005	25/1/2006	48
356831	Noumouke	Traore	Guinea	English	9/12/2005	27/1/2006	49
356819	Thiany	Conte	Guinea	English	12/11/2005	1/27/2006	47
357125	Boubacar	Bah	Guinea	English	12/9/2005	1/27/2006	49
356792	Mamadou	Sadia L	Guinea	English	12/9/2005	1/27/2006	49
357106	Camara	Seny	Guinea	English	11/12/2005	27/1/2006	47
832484	Makasa	Kel Vin	Zambia	Driving	29/5/2005	4/9/2005	98
836181	Samdara	Vithea	Cambodia	Driving	4/6/2005	1/9/2005	89
836130	Min	Sovann	Cambodia	Driving	4/6/2005	1/10/2005	119
792012	Bokoshev	Bolotbek	Kyrgystan	Driving	7/5/2005	4/10/2005	150
791817	Banda	Elton	Malawi	Driving	8/5/2005	10/2/2005	147
791755	Ndyanabo	Alex	Uganda	Driving	10/5/2005	30/9/2005	143
351859	Lamboumba	Mamadou	Gabon	English	6/1/2006	31/3/2006	84
397309	Faganda	Camara	Mali	English	11/1/2006	31/3/2006	79
397010	Banaougou	Sinayoko	Mali	English	11/1/2006	31/3/2006	79
442917	Robles	Victor	Peru	English	20/1/2006	30/3/2006	69
428194	Rioja	Alberto	Bolivian	English	20/1/2006	30/3/2006	69
435258	Intalla	A G Assaid	Mali	English	23/1/2006	31/3/2006	67
435299	Akorom	Dollo	Mali	English	23/1/2006	31/3/2006	67
435273	Mohamed	Coulibaly	Mali	English	23/1/2006	31/3/2006	67
426952	Vieng	Chamnan	Cambodia	English	19/1/2006	28/3/2006	68

28. Shortage of communication equipment was another factor that caused delays in the deployment of UN Police and UNMOs to team sites. Police officers and UNMOs must be equipped with communication and other patrol devices for safety as well as operational reasons before being sent to team sites. However, the Mission could not supply them with the equipment because supplies were held up at the port for customs clearance. Fifty-seven police officers who arrived between 1 and 13 March 2006 could not be deployed until early April 2006 due to non-availability of radio equipment. The Mission explained that customs clearance had been a major problem across the board due to the Government's non-cooperation.

29. Non-availability of flights also delayed the deployment of police officers and UNMOs to team sites. The transportation of officers and their baggage to team sites depended on flight capacity. Flights were often cancelled or rescheduled with short or no notice. In addition, incoming officers have a baggage allowance of 100 kilograms inclusive of protective gear, which the officers preferred to travel with, as against the Movement Control (MOVCON) Section's allowance of only 25 kilograms.

30. MOVCON explained that limitations of aircraft (particularly large aircraft) due to limited airfield capacity in most sectors resulted in restrictions on the amount of accompanied luggage that police officers and UNMOs can travel with. Small aircraft (such as L410s and beech-craft) with carrying capacities of 14 and 8 passengers respectively were used in most sectors, including Abyei, Kadugli, Wau, Malakal, and Ed Damazin. The amount of baggage has to be kept at a minimum to allow the full capacity utilization for passengers. The problem can be resolved only with improved

airfield capacity but in the meantime, it can be somewhat mitigated by scheduling special flights for Police and UNMOs' deployment.

31. Delays in the deployment of police and UNMOs have a direct impact on the Mission's ability to meet its objectives. The Police and UNMOs were to be fully deployed by 15 October 2005 and 1 January 2006 respectively. By 15 June 2006, some Police and UNMOs were yet to be deployed, which means that their respective mandate delivery at full capacity was also delayed. This could, in turn, affect the Mission's operational effectiveness and credibility. It could also affect the image of the United Nations.

32. Delays in the deployment of police officers and UNMOs to team sites have financial implications for the Organization. With reference to the sample (50 UN police officers and 50 UNMOs) tested, the Organization paid MSA in the amount of \$87,352 to police officers and UNMOs during the period of the delayed pre-deployment procedures. When extrapolated over the entire population of police officers and UNMOs, the MSA paid when these officers were not productively deployed amounts to over \$1 million as at the time of the audit. The total cost incurred in relation to officers who were repatriated for failing the skills tests amounted to \$298,333, of which MSA accounted for \$222,320. Repatriation costs alone amounted to \$72,885. OIOS was unable to confirm whether the cost of repatriation travel had been recovered from the respective contributing countries.

Recommendations 4 to 8

The UNMIS Management should:

- (i) Ensure that team sites are operationally ready with at least the basic facilities before police officers and UNMOs arrive at the Mission (AP2006/632/01/04);
- (ii) Address the delays in obtaining land for establishing team sites and in the customs clearance of communication equipment by pursuing the matter at the appropriate level with the host government (AP2006/632/01/05);
- (iii) Strengthen coordination with DPKO in order to ensure that the arrival of police officers and UNMOs in the Mission area is synchronized with the schedule for pre-deployment procedures at the Mission Headquarters, so that the idle time spent by police officers and UNMOs at the Mission Headquarters is minimized (AP2006/632/01/06);
- (iv) Increase the Mission's training capacity by filling the vacancies in the Training Unit (AP2006/632/01/07); and
- (v) Schedule special flights as appropriate for the timely deployment of police and UNMOs from the Mission Headquarters to team sites (AP2006/632/01/08).

33. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 4 and explained that the Mission had faced major challenges in the building of team sites, such as, limited contingent engineering company plant resources, limited availability of prepared and confirmed sites, delays in the supply of construction materials and delays due to the rainy season. A strategy for Mission Priority Projects was agreed in August 2006 and is being implemented. Great strides have been made in recent months in the development of team sites. Land for team sites has been obtained through dealings with the authorities; although in some cases land received had not been optimal in terms of its suitability. Facilities are, for the most part, completed in all the designated team sites. Remaining works are likely to be completed by the end of April 2007, subject to availability of materials. Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been implemented.*

34. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the Mission had pursued the issue of customs clearance for communication equipment at the highest level and, in a letter dated 12 April 2005, requested the Government of Sudan to grant customs clearance to facilitate the importation of goods, which was finally denied in writing, in a Note Verbale dated 30 August 2006. Based on the Mission's response, recommendation 5 has been closed.*

35. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 6 and stated that it has now started daily contact between the CMPO and DPKO/FGS in New York regarding deployment of UNMOs. UNMOs do not spend more than the specified time laid out for the integrated induction training except when they fail English and driving tests. Their deployment order is prepared during the training and they are deployed to the field on the first available flight to their respective sectors. Idle time spent by UN Police Officers has been substantially reduced. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been implemented.*

36. *The UNMIS Management did not accept recommendation 7 and explained that the Mission's inability to accommodate incoming UN Police Officers and UNMOs in the training programme as they arrive is not due to the insufficient capacity in the Training Section, rather it is because their arrival does not coincide with the start of the weekly induction training programme. The Mission, however, added that all vacancies in the Integrated Mission Training Centre have been filled. Based on the Mission's response, recommendation 7 has been closed.*

37. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 8 and stated that special flights are scheduled where regular flights are inadequate to deploy Police and UNMOs on a timely basis. Based on the Mission's response, recommendation 8 has been closed.*

C. Inadequate logistics support for UN Police and UNMOs

38. Activities of UNMOs and UN Police form the core of the Mission's peacekeeping mandate. UNMOs' mandate is to monitor and verify implementation of the peace accord between the warring parties, whereas the Police component is to assist the parties by building capacity for a fully democratic police force. Specifically, the UN Police assist the signatories to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with reforming and restructuring the police service, developing police training, monitoring police operations in the field, among other tasks. The tasks of both Police and UNMOs require extensive travel by road within their respective areas of responsibility. Therefore, the importance of adequate allocation of vehicles to them cannot be overemphasized. Their tasks also require patrol equipment such as the global positioning system (GPS), satellite telephones, and hand-held and vehicle communications radios for operational and security reasons. Office space,

office furniture, computers (desktops and laptops) fax and photocopy machines are also essential for their work.

39. The Mission has guidelines on the allocation of equipment to UNMOs, which are also applicable to the Police. OIOS examined the adequacy of the guidelines and the actual distribution of vehicles and equipment to the Police and UNMOs. It was found that:

- The guidelines did not provide for the adequate supply of essential equipment. For instance, it allows per team site one GPS, VHF radio, HF radio and digital camera each. These are not adequate for UNMOs or police requirements. Since each team-site undertakes up to four patrols per day, each patrol team should take these pieces of equipment with it for operational as well as safety reasons.
- The Mission is not in compliance with its own guidelines on the allocation of vehicles and other equipment. Whereas, according to the guidelines, one vehicle is to be allocated to 2.5 persons, this provision is not met in regard to Police and UNMOs, as shown in Table 5.
- Vehicles were equipped with inappropriate types of tyres, which were unsuitable for the kind of terrain and road conditions in the Mission area. Their supply was also inadequate (only one per vehicle), whereas two tyres per vehicle is recommended in view of the poor road conditions and unavailability of repair facilities in many parts of the Mission area. Inferior batteries were provided for electronic devices such as GPS.
- Most team sites had less than the minimum office facilities such as office space, furniture, computers and photocopy machines, and access to the Internet.

Table 5: Vehicles allocated to police officers and UNMOs by sector

Sectors	Police	UNMOs
	One vehicle for (persons)	One vehicle for (persons)
1	4.8	3.5
2	3.5	3
3	2	3
4	5.7	3
5	9	2.5
6	7.7	1.5

The Mission's established vehicle to personnel ratio = 1:2.5

40. Inadequacy of vehicles resulted in the underutilization of police officers and UNMOs. The number of patrols and trips they made per day was reduced, as they were obliged to work in shifts due to the shortage of vehicles. The use of inappropriate tyres as well as the shortage of tyres could increase vehicle downtime and result in underutilization of the limited vehicles at their disposal. Patrolling without communication equipment could hamper operations and increase security risks. Furthermore, insufficient office facilities could affect the quality and timeliness of the daily situation reports that the Police and UNMOs are required to produce.

41. The MSD explained that vehicles have been distributed to sectors in accordance with the Vehicle Establishment Committee's ratio of 1 vehicle for 2.5 personnel. Regional Administrative Officers are responsible for allocating vehicles to different units based on their requirements. The Supply Section indicated that the non-availability of adequate stocks of supplies such as batteries contributed to their inability to issue these items to team sites.

Recommendations 9 and 10

The UNMIS Management should:

- (i) Ensure that Police and UNMO team sites are provided with appropriate office facilities and other equipment to enable them to perform their functions effectively (AP2006/632/01/09); and
- (ii) Establish supply warehouses at the sectors with sufficient supplies and personnel to ensure that team sites are adequately supported (AP2006/632/01/10).

42. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendation 9 and stated that the issue on office facilities and equipment is part of the Mission's Priority Projects and is being addressed accordingly. The Mission has now issued rechargeable batteries and chargers to overcome some of these problems. Other stocks of basic expendable supplies have been issued as required from Sectors. Items are assigned to the Sector offices, which are responsible for the allocation to the Military Observers and UN Police. Recommendation 9 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been fully implemented.*

43. *The UNMIS Management accepted recommendatoin 10 and stated that the establishment of warehouses is being addressed as one of the Mission's Priority Projects. Engineering warehouses and support facilities are available either in the form of rubhalls or sea containers in all of the sectors. Recommendation 10 remains open pending receipt of documentation from UNMIS showing that it has been fully implemented.*

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

44. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNMIS for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.



Dagfinn Knutsen, Acting Director
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UNITED NATIONS



OIOS Client Satisfaction Survey

Audit of: Deployment of UN Police and Military Observers in UNMIS (AP2006/632/01)

	1	2	3	4	5
By checking the appropriate box, please rate:	Very Poor	Poor	Satisfactory	Good	Excellent
1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a manager.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Professionalism of the audit staff (demeanour, communication and responsiveness).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. The quality of the Audit Report in terms of:					
• Accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Clarity and conciseness;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Balance and objectivity;	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Timeliness.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. The extent to which the auditors considered your comments.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please add any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

Name: _____ Title: _____ Date: _____

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey as soon as possible to:
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