

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I  
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Juan Gabriel Valdes,  
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
MINUSTAH

DATE:

*10 May 2005*  
20 April 2005

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:10

*(0294/05)*

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOI

*P. Azarias*

SUBJECT:

OBJECT: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/683/01: Security arrangements in MINUSTAH**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the above-mentioned audit, which was conducted during September and October 2004.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that MINUSTAH has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on the response, we are pleased to inform you that we have closed recommendations 7 and 9 in the OIOS recommendation database. In order for us to close out the remaining recommendations (recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8), we request that you provide us with additional information as indicated in the text of the report and a time schedule for implementing each of the recommendations. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status.
3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

4. OIOS conducted an audit of MINUSTAH security arrangements in September 2004. The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations.
5. The ultimate responsible officer for security in MINUSTAH is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who is also appointed as the Designated Official by the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). The Security Management Team (SMT) is responsible for assisting the SRSG in promulgating all security related policies and guidelines.
6. The Chief Security Officer (CSO) heading the Security Section is in charge of security operations in coordination with other UN agencies present in Haiti and UNSECOORD. The

Security Section of MINUSTAH has 62 approved international posts (10 Professional and 52 Field Service level) and 138 local staff. In addition, two security companies are contracted to provide security for the Mission perimeters. The Security Section uses the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Security Management Standing Operating Procedures (DPKO security SOP) as a guideline in performing its duties. The Security Section consists of the following units:

- Close Protection Units for the SRSG and VIP
- Office of Security Information and Coordination Unit
- Special Investigation Unit
- Security Operation Unit
- Logistics, Training and Development Unit
- ID and Pass Unit
- Administrative Unit.
- 10 Area Security Units outside Port Au Prince

## **II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES**

7. The objectives of this audit were to assess whether:
- (a) Planning for security and emergency situation is adequate;
  - (b) Responsibilities for security and emergency management are clear, and efficiently and effectively carried out; and
  - (c) Security staffing and other resources are adequate.

## **III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

8. The audit reviewed the existing security arrangements and procedures of the Mission's offices and also assessed the coordination aspects with the UN agencies present in Haiti. OIOS reviewed pertinent files, analyzed available data and carried out structured interviews with key security personnel of MINUSTAH and other entities involved in MINUSTAH security. A questionnaire was used to assess whether the personnel was aware of existing security measures.

## **IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

9. Overall, the security conditions at MINUSTAH were not satisfactory. The structure and procedures of security arrangements at MINUSTAH need to be strengthened. The role and functioning of the SMT needs to be focused more on security issues, including overseeing the preparation of the Mission security plan. Important elements of the plan, such as the evacuation procedure and warden system, were still in the process of being completed. Security risks were also increased with the personnel and assets being scattered at eight different locations in the capital city of Port au Prince.

## V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Governance issues in security management

#### Security Management Team

10. The SMT is composed of the Mission's senior managers and the heads of UN agencies. According to the Guidelines for Designated Officials, the SMT is responsible for assisting the SRSG, Designated Official for security in Haiti, in security related policy and decision making. The key responsibility of the SMT is to review and approve the Mission security plan, which is the primary management tool for security preparedness. The plan details responsibilities and actions to be taken in response to emergency situations. The SMT held regular meetings, four in the five months since the start of the Mission. However, when participating in an observer capacity at three SMT meetings, OIOS noticed that these meetings were not focused on monitoring the preparation of the security plan, as further discussed in Section B below. On 30 September 2004, DPKO and UNSECOORD joined efforts and sent a team to provide training in security to MINUSTAH, which proved helpful in understanding the requirements of the mission security management system.

#### Declaring security phase

11. When the SMT reviewed the security phase, discussions revolved around matters not directly related to security – such as effects of the phase on hazard payment and presence in Haiti of family dependants. On these issues, there was marked disagreement between the Mission and the agencies. When MINUSTAH was established on 1 June 2004, the security phase for Haiti was determined at level three, reflecting serious security problems and the possibility that staff may be relocated. On 29 June 2004, the SMT recommended to change the security phase from level three to level two (restricted movement) for the areas of Port au Prince and the Southern parts of the country.

12. Most of the UN agencies felt that the security situation had improved enough to allow the return to Haiti of staff members' dependants, who had been evacuated under the security phase level three. A Mission representative expressed concern that declaring the security phase at level two would result in the cessation of hazard pay, with negative consequences on an already problematic staffing situation (vacancy rate at MINUSTAH is more than 50 percent). On 19 October 2004, the SMT declared the security phase back to level three based on the deteriorated security situation in Haiti.

13. OIOS found the UNSECOORD guidelines on declaring the level of security phases between two and three to be quite general, leaving room for judgmental rather than objective decisions based on relevant criteria to assess security conditions. Furthermore, the pre-requisite conditions for a security phase are the same for peacekeeping missions as for UN agencies, although their mandates and the nature of their intervention in the country are different. Finally, the arrangements related to staff member dependants are inconsistent between the peacekeeping mission and agencies. Haiti is a non-family duty station for MINUSTAH regardless of the security phase, but is a family duty station for UN agencies for security phase level two or lower. OIOS noted these issues in its recent audit of global field security management and made recommendations for UNSECOORD and DPKO to review the mechanism for declaring security phases.

### Crisis Management Working Group

14. During September 2004, thousands of lives were lost in Gonaives due to severe flood. MINUSTAH provided security and humanitarian assistance in response to the crisis, but its efforts were sometimes insufficiently coordinated. For example, there was some confusion in the use of MINUSTAH helicopters, which was the only available mode of transportation to Gonaives on the first day of the flood. The Joint Operation Center organized an advance team including military, CivPol and security. However, the Administration had its own advance team and took the first helicopter to Gonaives. Only after a few days, the DSRSRG formed a joint group consisting of all partners including the inter-agencies to decide whose flight requests would be granted on a priority basis.

15. OIOS is of opinion that the response of the Mission would have been improved in terms of promptness and effectiveness if a crisis management group was established to coordinate the various inputs for security and humanitarian assistance. Such a group should be established under the SMT to deal with crisis situations such as civil unrest, demonstrations, extortion, hijacking, kidnapping, evacuations and natural and environmental disasters, and enacted at the discretion of the Designated Official. The security manuals of DPKO and UNSECOORD provide guidelines for the Group's composition and responsibility in planning and execution of crisis management.

#### **Recommendations 1 and 2**

OIOS recommends that the Designated Official:

- (i) Task the Security Management Team to fulfill its primary duty of reviewing and approving the Mission security plan (AP2004/683/01/001); and
- (ii) Consider the establishment of a Crisis Management Working Group under the Security Management Team (AP2004/683/01/002).

16. *MINUSTAH responded that it was obvious during the SMT meeting of 24 March 2004 that the security plan is far from being developed in an integrated manner and assured that it will spare no effort in order to move forward on the issue in the days ahead. OIOS will keep recommendation 1 open in its database. MINUSTAH agreed to recommendation 2, however, expressed some doubts related to the inclusion of natural disasters within the scope of the group. OIOS noted that the UNSECOORD Crisis Management Planning Guidelines apply equally well to situations such as civil unrest, demonstrations, extortion, hijacking, kidnapping, evacuations and natural and environmental disasters. According to these guidelines, crisis management planning should be considered as an integral part of security planning. Recommendation 2 remains open in the OIOS database.*

#### **B. Security Plan**

17. According to the UNSECOORD and DPKO security operations procedures, the security plan should formulate detailed responsibilities and actions to be taken in response to emergency situations and should include, among other things, the evacuation plan, warden system, risk analysis

and communication strategy. In addition, the security plan should encompass all area security plans covering different regions within the Mission area.

18. The Security Section completed a comprehensive risk analysis. The security radio communication center was also fully operational on a 24/7 basis. With the deterioration of the security situation, radios were issued to all staff members. However, there were still a number of activities to be completed, including primarily the formulation of the overall Mission security plan and area security plans, and the recruitment of area security officers. Also, while the Standard Operating Procedures for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) were finalized during September 2004, no drill in connection with the security plan had been conducted since. There is no procedure in the event of fire. OIOS is of the view that the completion of these tasks should be given priority. The issue was discussed with the CSO who agreed and stated that the plan will be finalized by the end of November 2004. In an e-mail communication dated 8 November 2004, the CSO indicated that the CASEVAC/MEDEVAC plan, Mission Fire Orders and Mission Risk Analysis had been completed.

#### Evacuation plan and warden system

19. The evacuation plan needed to be completed. Some progress was made to identify assembly points, concentration points and safe haven for Port au Prince in the case of evacuation, but no drill had been conducted to assess how well the evacuation plan would be executed. Furthermore, no official arrangements were made for areas other than Port au Prince.

20. Wardens are key figures in the effective functioning of the security plan as they are responsible for ensuring the proper implementation of the security plan in their predetermined zones. During September 2004, the Security Section completed the personnel list of all international staff, selected some 18 wardens and launched a few training sessions for wardens. However, 30 percent of the wardens did not participate in the training sessions. Furthermore, 60 percent of the wardens failed to submit their respective staff list although the submission of these lists had been repeatedly requested by the Security Section. OIOS found that wardens have not been formally appointed by the Designated Official in consultation with the Security Management Team. Formal appointment of wardens is required according to the Field Security Handbook. In addition, the warden system for the national staff has not yet been established.

#### Staff awareness

21. In order to assess staff awareness on security measures, OIOS circulated a questionnaire to the Mission civilian staff, to which 101 of some 230 MINUSTAH civilian staff responded. With the exception of two staff members, all indicated that they had communication tools such as cellular phone or radio to contact the security operation center. A large majority (93 per cent) had also received security briefing on their arrival at MINUSTAH. However, 26 per cent of staff did not know who their respective wardens were and 19 per cent did not know where their assembly points were. This indicated that participation of wardens needed to be improved. More than 20 per cent of the staff had not completed the mandatory Basic Security in the Field Course, which is a requirement for staff deployed in field missions.

### **Recommendations 3 to 5**

OIOS recommends that the Designated Official ensure that:

- (i) The MINUSTAH security plan is finalized (AP2004/683/01/003);
- (ii) A warden system for national staff is established (AP2004/683/01/004);  
and
- (iii) All staff members have completed the mandatory Basic Security in the Field course (AP2004/683/01/005).

#### **Recommendation 6**

OIOS recommends that the Designated Official formally appoint wardens with a reminder of their responsibility in staff security (AP2004/683/01/006).

22. *MINUSTAH's Security Section responded that it commenced unifying its security plan with the UNSECOORD-Haiti-Office. One achievement in this regard was completion of the unified warden database. With regard to Recommendation 5, the Basic Security in the field course has been offered to all mission personnel. Recommendations 3 - 6 remain open in the OIOS database for reasons mentioned in paragraph 16 above and the fact that the number of mission personnel that have completed the Basic Security course remained unchanged.*

#### **C. Results-based budgeting and Staffing**

23. Results-based budgeting requires that there should be a set of performance indicators to measure performance and achievements of the Security Section. Some of the Units of the Security Section submitted weekly progress reports, but there was a need to systematize the preparation of these reports and to establish performance indicators against which progress and final results would be measured.

24. Six of the ten professional posts in the Security Section were vacant. All vacancies were for area security officers, which contributed to weaknesses in the area security plan discussed above. OIOS also reviewed security training arrangements and found that the Security Section organized an array of useful training courses.

#### **Recommendations 7**

OIOS recommends that the MINUSTAH Chief Security Officer systematizes the submission of weekly progress reports by the sub-units and establish performance indicators against which the achievements of the Security Section will be measured (AP2004/683/01/007).

#### **Recommendation 8**

OIOS recommends that the Designated Official ensures that the posts of area security officers are filled without further delay (AP2004/683/01/008).

25. MINUSTAH indicated in its response that weekly reports are being prepared and performance indicators are developed. OIOS will close recommendations 7 in its database. OIOS has been informed by the CSO that nine posts are still vacant. Recommendation 8 will remain open in the OIOS database.

#### **D. Other Security Issues**

##### Perimeter security

26. MINUSTAH had not found a location in Port au Prince to serve as Mission headquarters. Personnel and assets were scattered at eight different locations: there were four office locations, two warehouses, one medical facility location and one helipad location. This presented increased risks in providing suitable security in all eight locations as resources had to be thinly spread among them. The Security Section contracted two security companies and tasked most of its 138 local staff, with the help of military contingents, to provide security at these locations. This helped to mitigate the risks caused by the scattering of locations, but a single headquarters is urgently needed for a more secure work environment.

##### Weapons and security equipments

27. OIOS found that the procurement of weapons requested by MINUSTAH Security Section was not completed five months after its initiation. Weapons are critical for the Close Protection Unit, which is responsible for protecting the SRSG and VIPs. There was some delay in obtaining clearances from DPKO. The lack of information about the local weapons market, such as vendors approved by the host government and weapons' prices and availability, also delayed the procurement action. The Security Section informed OIOS that the Mission received DPKO's clearance and the weapons will be available by the end of November 2004. OIOS noted that the weapons became available in March 2005.

##### Coordination issue

28. The Security Section, in coordination with military and Civilian Police component of MINUSTAH, was in the process of creating a Joint Analysis Center (JAC) to enhance the capability of MINUSTAH in collecting and analyzing security information without duplication. OIOS is of opinion that this is a positive initiative and will follow up on the implementation of the JAC in due course.

#### **Recommendation 9**

OIOS recommends that the Designated Official give highest priority to finding a single location headquarters where personnel and assets will be regrouped as much as possible to maximize security resources (AP2004/683/01/009).

29. MINUSTAH responded that the recommendation has been implemented. MINUSTAH's Headquarters will be established in the Christopher Hotel facilities, the Security Section has made a security survey and issued recommendations and MINUSTAH Engineers are working to implement these recommendations. OIOS will close recommendation 9 in its database.

## **VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

30. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of MINUSTAH for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

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