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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

Internal Audit Division I
Office of Internal Oversight Services

TO: Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz, Chief of Mission
A: UNFICYP

DATE: 14 October 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:2 (0838/04)

THROUGH:

S/C DE:

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division-1
Office of Internal Oversight Services



SUBJECT:

OBJET: **OIOS Audit No. AP2004/654/01: Audit of UNFICYP Security Procedures**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the subject audit, which was conducted in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in June 2004.
2. Based on comments received on a draft of this report, we have closed recommendation 5. All of the other recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendations database pending further actions specified in the last sentence of the paragraph following a recommendation. Please note that OIOS considers recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 as being of critical importance and requests that particular attention be paid to these recommendations.
3. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

I. INTRODUCTION

4. In view of the changing security environment and threats worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) identified the audit of global field security procedures as a matter of priority.
5. The Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General have issued several policy documents recognizing the paramount importance of security and safety of UN personnel in the field. In one of these documents [A/57/365 of 28 August 2002], the Secretary-General set out an inter-organizational security framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. The document states unambiguously the responsibilities of every entity,

individual and group of individuals within the United Nations system of organizations involved in the management of security. DPKO has initiated reforms to its security operations in peacekeeping missions with the issuance of the new DPKO Policy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for a trial period of one year effective October 2003.

6. This report assesses the capability and readiness of UNFICYP in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. The report discusses policy and procedural issues associated with the security of UN personnel and provides practical recommendations for improving security management. The report incorporates UNFICYP's comments, which are shown in italics.

II. BACKGROUND

7. The Designated Official (DO) for security in Cyprus, which is under no security phase, is the Chief of Mission, UNFICYP. All the heads of UN agencies operating in the country are members of the Security Management Team. The FC is the Deputy Designated Official.

8. UNFICYP operates in a buffer zone established along the two ceasefire lines between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces, drawn on 16 August 1974. The buffer zone is 180 kilometers long and covers three percent of the island's surface area. It varies in width from less than 4 meters in Nicosia to some seven kilometers near Athienou. There are five inhabited villages and around 8,000 people who live and work in the buffer zone.

9. In the buffer zone is a tract of land measuring nine square kilometers called the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA), where the Mission houses its headquarters and offices of administrative and select military components. Within the UNPA are community areas such as golf course, swimming pool, dog shelter, church, hive that are used not only by UN staff but also of members of the wider diplomatic and local communities. Also, a chicken farm tended by a number of migrant workers is located within the compound. The Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) has primary responsibility for the security of the UNPA.

III. AUDIT OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

10. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the capability and readiness of UNFICYP in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. The audit included interviews with concerned personnel and tests, which the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

11. Based on the audit work performed, the planning, coordination and control of Security function in the Mission needs improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the Mission's security components in performing its mandate. The following major issues were noted during the review:

- To ensure the continued coordinated execution of the Mission security programme, there must be a thorough review of the roles and responsibilities to be assigned to

the new FSO and his place in the overall security structure in relation to the CM, the CAO and the military.

- Perimeter security in and physical access control to the UNPA need to be improved. Resources, personnel and equipment, need to be re-focused on the more critical offices and facilities within the compound where most headquarters civilian and military personnel operations are concentrated.
- The Mission Security Plan has not been updated since May 2003 and has never been rehearsed.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Organization

Define the Roles and Responsibilities of the Field Security Officer

12. UNFICYP security operations are embedded within multiple functions of the Mission's military structure. The Force Military Police Unit, MFR all have specific roles with respect to security activities. The Chief of Staff is responsible for overall security coordination and is, *de facto*, the Mission Chief Security Officer.

13. The mission does not have a designated civilian security officer but security issues predominantly administrative in nature have been subsumed into the responsibilities of the Senior Administrative Officer (SAO) who reports to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The SAO carries out what could be referred to as "liaison and nominal oversight" functions of Mission security activities. Concurrently, on the military side, the SO2 Operations/Information Officer performs the duties of the Field Security Officer (FSO). OIOS learned that a full-time civilian FSO will assume the post and take over the responsibilities on 1 August 2004.

14. While it is the opinion of the Chief of Mission that the current setup works satisfactorily, and while the composition of the military units dedicated to security planning, facilities security and investigations parallel those set out in the DPKO generic structure for a small mission, there is a need to plan how the setup is going to operate when the civilian FSO assumes his post on 1 August 2004. Specifically, military and civilian coordination, reporting lines, and accountability for each security component need to be defined.

Recommendation 1

The Chief of Mission should ensure that the new Field Security Officer reports to the Head of Mission and that the reporting lines and coordination of activities to other security components are clearly defined particularly between the military and civilian security components. These should be reflected in a formal Job Description for the Field Security Officer, against which the Field Security Officer's performance can be measured. (AP2004/654/01/01)

15. UNFICYP accepted the recommendation and stated, *"The position of Field Security Officer has been filled as of 1 September 2004. The Terms of Reference for the post, with particular emphasis on the position's reporting lines and relationship with the Mission's military component, is being drafted. Expected completion date is 22 October 2004."* OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented. OIOS requests that a copy of the Terms of Reference, when finalized, be made available to OIOS auditors for review.

B. Physical Security

Background

16. The UNFICYP base of operations in the UNPA houses facilities for civilian administration functions and some military operations. The base is home to 42 international staff, 107 national staff and 286 military personnel, military police and civilian police.

17. The UNFICYP HQ offices are located in a smaller section of the UNPA called the Blue Beret Camp (BBC). To provide more stringent security to this area, UNFICYP placed double concertina wire around and inner cordon chicanes at all entry points into the camp.

18. The UNPA perimeter spans 14.8 kilometers and only some of this is installed with 6' fence, which can easily be negotiated on foot. Entry at the gates is controlled by an access control (pass) system but with only concertina wires surrounding some areas of the compound, unauthorized entry outside the two main gates is not prevented.

19. The Mission is in the process of reinforcing perimeter security not just of the UNPA but of the three sector installations as well. Their request for US\$2.1M to acquire equipment for such reinforcement has just been approved by UNHQ in NY.

Strengthen Perimeter Security and Physical Access Control to UN Premises

20. The size and setup of the UNPA is such that it is difficult to secure the perimeter. This, coupled with the permissive access to the compound heightens the security vulnerability of the UN premises.

21. UN vehicles and commercial and private vehicles have access to the premises with little more than a visual examination of vehicle contents. UNFICYP does not have the required equipment, e.g., scanners, x-ray machines, to detect the importation of bomb or other explosive devices, either by vehicles and/or persons entering the base. After clearing the main gates, all the facilities and offices in the compound are easily accessible. No further and stricter security checks for both the vehicle and persons inside the vehicle are performed to enter the BBC.

22. Although the SOPs provide for detailed security procedures for taxis and delivery vehicles entering the compound, these are not strictly implemented. For example, our examination of a sample of the Foxtrot Gate Control Sheet indicated that a separate logbook for taxis and delivery vehicles is not maintained. All types of private/commercial vehicles entering UNPA are logged in only one log sheet, the Foxtrot Gate Control Sheet, contrary to what the SOP dictates. Also, we

noted one delivery vehicle which entered the compound at 22h58 on 23 June 2004 and stayed until 02h30 the following day. This is beyond the 15-minute limit mandated by the SOP. The SOP's intent to control the vehicles is clear but the procedures to achieve the objective are inadequate.

23. The Chief of Mission's residence is on the edge of the UNPA, which is not robustly secured. Moreover, the residence is not afforded any security guard; the CM is likewise not provided with a close protection detail.

24. The Mission SOPs appropriately noted that its UN Flight hangar, where a fleet of two helicopters is based, is also on the edge of the UNPA and is not easily securable.

25. For UN vehicles entering the compound, only the ID card of the driver is checked.

26. Blank ID cards are left under the control of a local staff member without accounting of issued, destroyed and unused cards and oversight by the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer.

27. Of the 1399 valid ID cards and passes as of 23 June 2004, only 688 or 49% belong to international and local UNFICYP and UN agency civilian staff, military, military police and civilian police working within the UNPA and dependents. The rest is issued as community, workers, guest, and diplomatic passes to access the recreational and community facilities within the compound. OIOS finds this setup problematic as regards (1) authority to issue UN ID cards/passes to non-UN staff members and dependents; (2) UN accountability implications; and (3) unnecessary burden to Personnel Section to process and control the additional ID cards/passes.

28. Personnel Section is in charge of the check out only of UNFICYP civilian personnel. As such, they control only the return of 155 ID cards belonging to the civilians and the associated ID cards issued to their dependents.

29. ID cards, still valid until 31 July 2004, of 14 staff members of the Good Offices, which left Cyprus in May 2004, were not returned. Personnel Section efforts to ask for the return of the ID cards have not been successful.

30. The diplomatic pass issued to diplomatic missions and the guest pass issued to visitors to the Force and to private visitors of military, police and civilian members of the Force do not carry the photograph of the bearer.

31. The number of civilian and military personnel based in UNPA does not warrant the need to maintain offices/operations in the whole tract of land the Mission is currently occupying. There is a need to revisit the planned security reinforcement for UNPA. A decision has to be made on whether to secure the whole compound or focus on the areas most in use -- the area where most of the headquarters operations are currently concentrated, the Blue Beret Camp, and critical facilities such as the UN Flight hangar.

32. Installation of blast-resistant window films is underway. With the way the offices are built and the setup of the compound, OIOS believes that it would be prudent to review the need to proceed with the project. The funds earmarked for this may be better used to fortify some weaker areas in UNPA security.

Recommendations 2 - 5

The Chief of Mission should strengthen the perimeter security of and access control to UNFICYP premises and rectify the following deficiencies.

(i) Reconsider the strategic requirement to secure the current UNPA, which currently has non-United Nations commercial and recreational activities operating within the UNPA, reducing the security perimeter to a pragmatic area which encompasses the mission "core" operational areas/facilities (AP2004/654/01/02);

(ii) Review the necessity for the Chief of Mission to reside within UNPA, and the current security problems associated with its current location with the objective to finding accommodation with appropriate security arrangements. This should be considered in association with the fact the Chief of Mission does not have any formal personal security through a Close Protection Detail (AP2004/654/01/03);

(iii) In association with recommendation (i) above, there is a requirement to strengthen the issuance of and control over ID cards, both to UN personnel and visitor. The numbers of ID cards can be reduced significantly, if the recommendation on redefining the mission security perimeter is adopted (AP2004/654/01/04); and

(iv) Expenditures to secure and install blast resistant film on Mission office facilities should be considered as part of a wider assessment of risk mitigation initiatives. There needs to be a 'holistic' independent review of the mission's current physical security detection and prevention arrangements which could be provided by an UNSECOORD threat assessment Team (AP2004/654/01/05).

33. UNFICYP accepted recommendation 2 and stated, "*As part of the ongoing security enhancement review of the Mission, the requirement to secure the entire UNPA is being reconsidered. Several options have been developed, all of which involve the securing of 'core' operational areas/facilities (and not commercial and recreational locations). Completion of the security enhancement review is expected by end-October 2004, with completion of the physical security enhancements by July 2005.*" OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

34. On recommendation 3, "*because of political sensitivities...*" the Mission offered alternative solution to address OIOS' findings on the lack of security of the Chief of Mission's residence located within UNPA. The Mission further stated that it "*has reviewed the security arrangements for the residence and as a result, enhancements to the residence's perimeter fencing will be undertaken, as well as improved lighting and electronic devices installed. Additionally, the assignment of a 24/7 security presence is being considered under the security enhancement review.*"

OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that the alternative solutions proposed by the Mission have been implemented.

35. UNFICYP accepted recommendation 4 and stated, *"In the context of the Mission's security enhancement review, the security of 'core' locations in the UNPA is under consideration. The 'core' locations will not include commercial or recreational facilities in the UNPA and as a consequence, the number of passes issued to 'non-UN personnel' will be greatly reduced. Furthermore, stronger internal controls of blank ID cards will be implemented immediately."* OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

36. UNFICYP accepted and implemented recommendation 5. On 23 August 2004, the Regional Field Security Officer (RFSCO) of Cyprus *"was requested to validate the requirements and prioritize security enhancements to achieve a standard of security commensurate with the level of risk. Under the 'Minimum Cyprus Physical Security Standards' part of the report, Shatter Resistant Film (SRF) was deemed to be an essential mitigating security and safety factor and to this end, the report also provided specifics on minimum SRF standards to be used. The Mission intends to proceed in accordance with the RFSCO's recommendations."* OIOS acknowledges Management's efforts and hereby closes recommendation 5.

C. Security Plan

Update and Rehearse the Security Plan

37. The Mission has a comprehensive Security Plan detailing all the essential elements that should be contained in such a plan. However, we noted the following deficiencies that will hinder the plan's effectiveness in responding to a contingency, if not rectified immediately.

38. The plan has not been tested, which would either identify weaknesses in the plan or confirm the capacity and readiness of medical services to respond to contingencies. The SOP dictates, "It is essential that the Security Plan be subjected to rigorous rehearsal, evaluation and appropriate modifications, in consultation with the United Nations Security Coordinator." In Baghdad, contingency planning and drills in relation to evacuation were not practiced, and this lack of planning manifested itself in the rescue mission. "There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties..." [20 October 2003 Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN personnel in Iraq].

39. The plan has not been updated since May 2003. Also, the Mission SOPs provide for the updating of staff lists only every six months. This should be done on a real time basis as and when a staff member and/or dependent move in and out of the mission, permanently or temporarily.

40. More than 50% of international staff members randomly surveyed do not know the concentration point for evacuation.

Recommendation 6

The Field Security Officer should update and rehearse the Mission Security Plan (AP2004/654/01/06).

41. UNFICYP accepted the recommendation and stated, "*The MSP is being reviewed to encompass the new reduced UNPA perimeter, and the revision of contingency plans and patrol routes. Rehearsal will follow within 30 days of completion of the security enhancement plan. Estimated date of completion: end-November 2004.*" OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database pending its implementation. OIOS requests that a copy of the revised MSP and evidence of rehearsals, e.g., debriefing or lessons learned documents, when completed, be made available to OIOS auditors for review.

D. Other Issues

Provide Security Training to the DO and Members of the SMT

42. The DO and the members of the SMT have not been provided training to effectively carry out their responsibilities for the security and safety of UN personnel. This is an UNSECOORD mandated responsibility [A/57/365 – The Security Accountability Framework, paragraph 29]: "Security management training is mandatory for all designated officials and members of the security management team. Individuals who are selected to serve as designated officials or as members of the security management team must receive security management training at the first available opportunity. While each agency is responsible for providing appropriate security training to its senior managers, UNSECOORD will continue to provide this specific training to designated officials and security management teams at field locations."

Recommendation 7

The Chief of Mission should request UNSECOORD to provide the mandatory security management training for the Designated Official and Security Management Team (AP2004/654/01/07).

43. UNFICYP accepted the recommendation and stated, "*The UNSECOORD Regional Field Security Officer was contacted 21 September 2004 to commence staff planning to arrange security management training for the Designated Official and members of the Security Management Team.*" OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Appoint a Medical Officer to the SMT

44. The Mission SMT does not have a medical officer as a member [United Nations Field Security Handbook, Paragraph 24].

Recommendation 8

The Chief of Mission should appoint a medical officer to form part of the Security Management Team (AP2004/654/01/08).

44. UNFICYP accepted the recommendation and stated that *"The Force Medical Officer will be included in the SMT."* OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Follow up Completion of the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare Course

45. The CAO, in April 2004, issued an Administrative Circular requiring all UNFICYP staff to complete by 15 May 2004 the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare course, which is mandatory for all UN staff in peacekeeping missions, and submit to Personnel Section the certificate of completion. To date, however, four international and two national staff have not submitted their certificate.

Recommendation 9

The Chief Civilian Personnel Officer should continue to follow up on the submission of the certificate of completion of the training.
(AP2004/654/01/09)

46. UNFICYP accepted the recommendation and stated, *"The UNFICYP FSO, in consultation with the CCPO, will follow up with staff members who have not yet submitted the completion certificate. Follow-up to commence end-September 2004."* OIOS will leave the recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

47. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO
Mr. Francis J. Clancy, UNFICYP
UN Board of Auditors
Programme Officer, OIOS
Mr. Terrance Norris, Chief Resident Auditor, UNOCI
Mr. Arnold Valdez, Auditor, IAD I

ACRONYMS

BBC	Blue Beret Camp
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CM	Chief of Mission
CMT	Crisis Management Team
DO	Designated Official
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FC	Force Commander
FMPU	Force Military Police Unit
FSO	Field Security Officer
MFR	Mobile Force Reserve
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
SG	UN Secretary-General
SMT	Security Management Team
SOP	Standard (or Standing) Operating Procedures
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
USG	Under-Secretary-General



OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

Audit Title & Assignment No.: OIOS Audit No. AP2004/654/01: Field Security Procedures in UNFICYP

By checking the appropriate circle please rate:

1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:
 - accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions
 - clarity and conciseness
 - balance and objectivity
 - timeliness
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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