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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

Confidential

TO: Mr. Soren Jessen-Petersen, Special Representative DATE: 11 October 2004
A: of the Secretary-General
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK)

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:50 (0830 /04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

P. Azarias

SUBJECT:
OBJET: **OIOS Audit No AP2004/650/04: Field Security Procedures in the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)**

1. I am pleased to present herewith the final report on the above-mentioned audit, which was conducted during the period June - July 2004.
2. We note from the response to the draft report that UNMIK has accepted some of the recommendations and initiated their implementation. Based on the comments, the recommendations remain open in OIOS' recommendation database pending remedial actions completed. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status. Also please note that OIOS consider recommendations 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20 to 24 as being of critical importance, and requests that you focus your attention on them.
3. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.
4. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
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Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division I



Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNMIK

Audit No: AP2004/650/04
Report Date: 11 October 2004
Audit Team: Nikolai Grigoriev, Chief Resident Auditor
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Field Security Procedures in the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

In view of the changing security environment and threats worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), in close coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) identified the audit of global field security procedures as a matter of priority.

This report assesses the capability and readiness of UNMIK Security System in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. It also assesses the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and SOPs.

Based on the audit results, improvement in planning, coordination, and control of the security function in the Mission are needed to ensure the capability and readiness of the security in performing its mandate and the operational application of the accountability framework. An action plan should be developed by UNMIK management to address observations and recommendations from the audit, which also takes into account the results of the two previous studies undertaken by UNMIK internally and by DPKO.

The following major issues were noted during the review:

- UNMIK, in coordination with DPKO and UNSECOORD, should clarify the designation of the security phase for Kosovo.
- UNMIK should prepare a comprehensive accountability framework that will include all key players, groups and committees and not only the Security Section. A strong level and reporting relationship should be established between the Chief Security Officer, the PDSRSG and the key committees. To reflect the importance of the security issues, the PDSRSG should evaluate the performance of the Chief Security Officer (CSO).
- A more comprehensive security plan should be developed by UNMIK, including crisis management plans, taking into consideration the previous lessons learned. A comprehensive evacuation plan should be drawn, including MEDEVAC.
- The Security Section staffing level and skills set need significant improvement, including the training of the security staff members. All vacancy issues posing an ongoing security risk should be mutually resolved by DPKO and UNMIK. Reference checks on the candidates recruited for the Security Section should be made prior to posting.
- The Designated Official (DO) and the Security Management Team (SMT) should come up with a country-specific Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) document reflecting the situation of Kosovo as a whole, as well as its specific regions. Timelines and performance indicators to implement MOSS should also be established.

- A formalized security education programme in the Mission for the security personnel and the staff members should be established that will include crisis management, warden system, and proper use of security and communication equipment. Mandatory attendance and completion of training and briefings on security should be enforced.
- A system that will automatically update the list of UN personnel should be created in the Security Section. The action undertaken by the Pristina Regional Security Office in updating personnel listing and warden system should be adopted mission-wide by UNMIK.
- UNMIK should strengthen coordination with all key players involved in the field security procedures in Kosovo. The complimentary role that might be played by local authorities should be assessed and reinforced further through a positive outreach programme. The Crisis Action Team or the Crisis Management Working Group should be activated promptly.
- UNMIK in cooperation with OPPBA should take steps to ensure that the security budget of the mission is used as a real planning and reporting tool and performance indicators should reflect the global issues of strategy and coordination, including the establishment and testing of operational plans/scenarios.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. OIOS conducted an audit of field security procedures in UNMIK during June and July 2004. In UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has been appointed as the Designated Official (DO) for security. The DO is accountable to the UN Secretary-General, through the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), for the security and safety of all UN personnel and property in the Mission area. The DO is assisted in this task by the members of the Security Management Team (SMT) and by the Crisis Management Group (CMG).
2. The composition of the United Nations within the Mission area for the purposes of security responsibilities is as follows:

UNMIK Components

Office of the SRSG	Police and Justice – Pillar I
Division of Administration	Civil Administration – Pillar II
UNMIK Police	Institution Building (OSCE) – Pillar III
Reconstruction (European Union)	Pillar IV

UN Specialized Agencies/Partners

UNHCR	UNOHCHR	WHO
UNOCHA	UNCHS (Habitat)	FAO
UNDP	IMF	UNICEF
ILO	World Bank	UNOPS
UNIFEM	EBRD	IOM
UNFPA	ICTY	

3. The approved budget of UNMIK for the twelve-month period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2004 amounts to \$272,210,800. The total strength of UNMIK is 8,056 posts. The Security Section has an authorized strength of 63 international and 228 local staff members.
4. UNMIK comments have been incorporated in this report as indicated in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the capability and readiness of UNMIK Security Section to carry out effectively its staff safety and security mandate in the Mission area. It also was to review the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and SOPs. Specific objectives are to review and assess whether:
 - (i) The mission has an adequate security policy and guidance;
 - (ii) An adequate security plan and procedures that address evacuation, medevac and major emergencies has been implemented;

- (iii) In country and in mission coordination is timely and effective;
- (iv) Staff are sufficiently informed on security matters;
- (v) The level of security education and training is adequate; and
- (vi) The present level of staffing and available equipment meets minimum security needs of the Mission.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The audit was conducted in accordance with the general and specific standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations and included such tests as the auditors considered necessary. The audit covered the security operations of UNMIK and the interface with the pillars and Kosovo Force (KFOR). It included interviews with concerned personnel and review of documents, which the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

7. The field security procedures of UNMIK should be strengthened and need thorough evaluation and review, including the reporting relationships, coordination with the other key players of security, the staffing and manning of the security unit and the education and training of the security personnel and staff members. Comprehensive security plans should be prepared, taking into consideration the real security assessment for Kosovo and outlining all the possible crisis or contingencies for which alternative courses of actions should be drawn up.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Key performance indicators and baseline data

Budget and performance indicators

8. The Budget and Cost Control Unit of UNMIK integrates the over-all logistics requirements of the Security, Engineering and Supply Sections for the yearly budget, based on the requests of the sections. However, the breakdown of such budget estimate does not specifically identify expenditures related to security at the Mission level. We have been informed that the CSO has not, to date, been actively involved in the preparation of the security budget at the Mission level. Therefore, there is no acquisition plan for the Mission. Under the present system, no cost center exists for security. The Mission expressed the need to have a better-established link between the presentation and budget figures coming from UN Headquarters.

9. For the 2004-2005 RBB framework, indicators of achievement in the area of security are not available. There is only one output indicated in the RBB Framework, which is "20 personnel trained

in the areas related to security". For a Mission, as complicated as UNMIK, more global and better-conceived indicators should be used.

Recommendations 1 - 2

UNMIK, in coordination with OPPBA, should:

- (i) Take steps to ensure that the security budget of the mission is used as a real planning and reporting tool. Performance indicators should reflect the global issues of strategy and coordination, including the establishment and testing of operational plans/scenarios (AP2004/650/04/01); and
- (ii) Establish a separate cost center for security and the Chief Security Officer should be involved in the preparation of the budget (AP2004/650/04/02).

10. *UNMIK stated in its response of 20 August 2004 that they will further review the recommendation.*

11. *Concerning recommendation 2, UNMIK informed OIOS that it does not consider necessary to establish a separate cost center for security because security functions are supported by a number of different cost centers including procurement, personnel, engineering and supply. Thus, the establishment of a separate cost center would not seem to be the most effective and efficient approach. Furthermore, there have been no problems with the system currently in place. OIOS will keep recommendations 1 and 2 open in its database pending their implementation.*

Reporting lines and performance evaluation

12. The CSO does not report to the Head of Mission or PDSRSG, as the designated official on security matters. The Head of Mission or the PRSRSG does not evaluate the performance of the CSO, which is not in conformity with the DPKO Field Security Policy. The CSO is also not a member of the Executive Committee of the Mission, which deprived him of important security information. The responsible officials of the Mission explained that, traditionally, the CSO has been working under the supervision of the DOA. If needed, however, the CSO can have direct access to the Head of the Mission.

Recommendations 3 - 5

In order to stress the importance of security, the Designated UNMIK Official should:

- (i) Ensure that the Head of Mission or the PDSRSG in charge of security matters, evaluate the performance of the Chief Security Officer using the E-PAS system (AP2004/650/04/03);

(ii) Include the Chief Security Officer as a member of the Executive Committee (AP2004/650/04/04); and

(iii) Simplify the reporting lines of the Chief Security Officer in conformity with the DPKO Field Security Policy (AP2004/650/04/05).

13. *UNMIK accepted recommendations 3 and 4 and noted in its response that with the new PAS system, the PDSRSG who is the second supervisor of the CSO will have an opportunity to review his performance. The CSO will become a member of the Executive committee on 23 August 2004.*

14. *UNMIK noted recommendation 5 and informed OIOS that the CSO reports directly to the DOA, since most of the day-to-day functions of the CSO are administrative in nature. He however has a direct access to the PDSRSG if and when necessary. UNMIK considers the current reporting system to be efficient and effective. OIOS will keep recommendations 3, 4 and 5 open in its database pending their implementation.*

Implementation of the MOSS

15. The Mission did not have timelines and objectives to implement MOSS. The audit could not obtain a country-specific MOSS, which is a requirement of the UNSECOORD Instructions for MOSS Implementation dated 1 March 2004. For example, although the proposal to establish the 50 meters stand-off zone between the outer wall and the building was made more than a year ago, the mission is still in the process of implementing this requirement.

Recommendation 6

The UNMIK Designated Official and the Security Management Team should prepare a country-specific Minimum Operating Security Standards document reflecting the situation of Kosovo as a whole, as well as its specific regions. Timelines and objectives to implement Minimum Operating Security Standards should also be established (AP2004/650/04/06).

16. *UNMIK noted recommendation 6 and informed OIOS that it has developed a comprehensive country-specific MOSS document, which was submitted to UN Headquarters on 1 October 2003. Implementation plans were also developed and continue to be gradually executed. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

B. Policy, direction and guidance

17. UNMIK receives broad policy directions and guidance from DPKO and advice from UNSECOORD. There was no specific guidance received from DPKO in terms of operational plans of UNMIK.

18. UNMIK did not issue a specific security policy document, except for the MWSP and the UNMIK Standard Operating Procedures, which contain elements of a security policy. It is uncertain whether these policies are known, understood and communicated to all staff concerned.

19. Furthermore, there does not exist a centralized database of lessons learned and best practices, for UNMIK and other related peacekeeping missions. Hence, valuable lessons learned may be lost or not readily available for planning and implementation of good field management practices or field security policies and staff training procedures.

Recommendation 7

The UNMIK Designated Official should prepare a security policy and the Mission should make an effort to maintain a compendium of “security” lessons learned (AP2004/650/04/07).

20. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 7.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

Security responsibilities and accountability framework

21. Security responsibilities are listed and described in the UNMIK Security-wide plan. The accountability framework is also documented in the form of a chart for the UNMIK Security Section dated 25 May 2004. The chart outlines key sections and number of staff for each section reporting to the CSO but is considered incomplete because it does not depict the whole UNMIK Security System. The Mission modified the DPKO Security Management SOPs and is regularly updating this document. The functions and the organizational structure of the Security Section are consistent with DPKO SOPs.

22. Based on interviews with the Designated Official (PDSRSG), Director of Administration, Chief Security Officer and Deputy Security Officer the SMT members generally understand their respective security responsibilities and accountabilities. However, the level and reporting relationship of the CSO vis-a-vis the PDSRSG and the key committees such as the Executive Committee and the Crisis Management Group is weak.

Recommendation 8

A comprehensive accountability framework should be prepared by the Designated UNMIK Official, that will include all key players, groups and committees and not only for the Security Section. UNMIK should approach UNHQ to assess the level of the post of Chief Security Officer, taking into account the importance of the task of the Chief Security Officer (AP2004/650/04/08).

23. *UNMIK partially accepted recommendation 8 and informed OIOS that it has already addressed the issue of the accountability and responsibility of different key players.* UNMIK will further review the level of the CSO post. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

C. Security Plan

Comprehensive crisis management and security plans for all the regions

24. UNMIK prepared a Mission Wide Security Plan (MWSP) for Kosovo that was duly approved by the SRSG, with minor changes done every six months. However, except for Mitrovica Region, there were no individual Regional Security Plans (RSPs). For example, no plan was prepared for Pristina region.

25. Moreover, no crisis management plan was prepared by UNMIK that analyses significant contingencies or crisis and lays down the appropriate strategies and courses of action or options to undertake that will mitigate the risks for each contingency. The Mission did not establish local standard operating procedures for various emergency scenarios. However, a new security plan was being prepared that would include more operational details and logistic support from KFOR and CIVPOL.

Recommendations 9 - 10

The UNMIK Designated Official should:

- (i) Prepare individual security plans for all the regions (AP2004/650/04/09); and
- (ii) Implement a more comprehensive security plan that includes crisis management (or contingency) plans, taking into consideration previous lessons learned. The plan should also include alternative courses of actions or options that will establish the local standard operating procedures for various emergency scenarios (AP2004/650/04/10).

26. *UNMIK noted recommendation 9 and informed OIOS that individual plans for regions already exist and are regularly updated.*

27. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 10 and informed OIOS that UNMIK is in the process of further improving its crisis management plan, specially taking into account lessons learnt from the March violence. OIOS will keep recommendations 9 and 10 open in its database pending their implementation.*


Clarification of the designated security phase

28. A review of the MWSPs dated 01 March 2004 and 31 January 2003 showed that the security level of Kosovo was Phase 4. On 11 March 2004, the security level for UNMIK was downgraded to Phase 3. We also noted in the plans that UNMIK established five Alert Stages in addition to the five UN Security Phases stated in the FSH, which brings confusion. In the MWSP dated 01 March 2004, UNMIK is under Phase 4 and Alert Stage Black for Northern Mitrovica and Stage Grey (Precautionary) for the remainder of the province, as follows:

UN SECURITY PHASES

- 1 – PRECAUTIONARY
- 2 – RESTRICTED MOVEMENT
- 3 – RELOCATION
- 4 – PROGRAM SUSPENSION

STAGE GREY (PRECAUTIONARY)



- 5 – EVACUATION

29. The FSH, Phase 3 relocation, enables the DO to recommend to the Secretary-General, through the UNSECOORD, the implementation of any or all of the following mandatory actions:

- temporary concentration of all internationally-recruited staff members and/or their eligible family members in one or more sites within a particular area;
- relocation of all internationally-recruited staff members and/or their eligible family members to alternative locations within the country; and/or
- relocation outside the country of all eligible family members of internationally-recruited staff members and/or non-essential internationally-recruited staff members.

30. On the other hand, Phase 4 – Programme Suspension, enables the DO to recommend to the Secretary-General, through UNSECOORD, the relocation outside the country of all remaining internationally-recruited staff members except those directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian relief operations or security matters. All other internationally-recruited staff members who heretofore were considered essential to maintain programme activities will be evacuated at this time.

31. We were informed that the FSH is only applicable to the agencies and not to the missions because the DPKO is the office-in-charge of the missions and UNSECOORD can only advise the missions. Thus, the policies and directives implemented by the mission are those coming from DPKO and not from the UNSECOORD.

Recommendation 11

The UNMIK Designated Official, in consultation with UNSECOORD, should clarify the designation of the security phase for Kosovo and each of the regions (AP2004/650/04/11).

32. UNMIK noted recommendation 11 and informed OIOS that the current security phase for UNMIK is 3. OIOS will keep recommendation 11 in its database pending implementation.

Threat assessment analysis

33. UNMIK does not prepare an extensive threat assessment analysis report, except for the Physical Assessment Report that was conducted and prepared after the Baghdad incident. There are regular weekly assessment meetings being undertaken by the Threat Assessment Committee, which should be chaired by a high-ranking official, in lieu of the SICC representative.

Recommendation 12

The UNMIK Designated Official should ensure that the Threat Assessment Committee meets on a regular basis and prepare a risk analysis of security intelligence, document decisions taken and in the case of emergency, advise the Crisis Action Team accordingly. Furthermore, the Chairperson of this Committee should be at level appropriate to decision making (AP2004/650/04/12).

34. UNMIK noted recommendation 12 and informed OIOS that the Threat Assessment Committee meets on a weekly basis and is comprised of all key players including UN Security, CIVPOL and KFOR. OIOS will keep recommendation 12 in its database pending implementation.

Efficiency and effectiveness of the warden system

35. The warden system failed during the March 2004 incidents due to operational set up, communication system and lack of training for wardens and staff members. There was no training conducted on the warden system prior to June 2004 that would ensure wardens, alternate wardens and staff members are well trained to face any emergency situation. On the other hand, staff members who have undergone security briefings, including personnel induction were not sufficiently trained on the importance of the warden system, in order to prepare them for emergency situation.

36. Also, there were no full-scale regular drills/exercises for emergencies arising from hostilities and other situations, other than fire, to ensure that the warden system can be effectively carried out in time of any crisis and emergencies. No evacuation exercise was carried out for staff members.

37. The responsible officials however assured OIOS that the warden system would be set up and tested in the near future. Letters of reprimand will be put on files for those not attending the briefings. In the Warden Recall Exercises conducted in May 2002 and April 2003, we noted in the reports that some Wardens were either on leave or on business in Pristina, showing that there were no alternates who took over the duties and responsibilities of the absent Wardens.

Recommendation 13

The UNMIK Designated Official should establish mandatory training on the functioning of the warden system, and conduct drills and exercises to complement the training (AP2004/650/04/13).

38. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 13 and informed OIOS that the mandatory training has already been established and drills are conducted routinely.* OIOS will keep recommendation 13 in its database pending implementation.

Evacuation plans and Medevac

39. Although there are evacuation procedures stated in the MWSP and RSP for Mitrovica, they are basic and not detailed enough to include alternative courses of action. The plans are fragmented and the execution of evacuation is not clear. Also, there are no provisions for MEDEVAC under the topic "Execution/Implementation" of the security plans. There are only standing protocols with KFOR for local emergencies, but not for mission wide evacuation in times of crisis.

Recommendation 14

The UNMIK Designated Official should prepare a more comprehensive evacuation plan that includes MEDEVAC and the necessary protocols and procedures for the use of communications and air assets in the event of emergencies, including alternative courses of action (AP2004/650/04/14).

40. *UNMIK informed OIOS that they will further review recommendation 14.* OIOS will keep recommendation 14 in its database pending implementation.

List of UN personnel

41. Updating the list of UN personnel in the Security Section is not performed on a timely basis. The lists of new personnel and those who checked out are prepared and forwarded to the Security Section monthly. Thus, if an emergency should happen within the month, the new staff members in the Mission are not included in UN personnel list in the Security Section.

42. It should be noted that the Pristina Regional Security Office, in updating the warden system, also made a commendable effort to update their records of UN personnel in their area of jurisdiction, including the physical location of the residence of the staff members. They are making actual visits to the residence of the staff members to check the security of the residence and the actual location. Digital images of staff members and their residence were included in the individual file records of each staff members.

Recommendation 15

The UNMIK Designated Official should establish a system that will link the check in and out functions of the Personnel Section with the Security Section and will automatically update the list of UN personnel in the Security Section. The system used by Pristina Regional Security Office should be uniformly used by UNMIK and other regions of UNMIK in order to facilitate evacuation of staff members from their residence in case of emergency (AP2004/650/04/15).

43. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 15. UNMIK has already linked check-in/check-out data with the Security Section. This provides not only an overview of the personnel in Kosovo, but also for a timely update of the warden system. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

D. Coordination between offices and other bodies

44. Interviews conducted by OIOS reveal a mix of opinion on the quality of field security management. The reporting relationship of the CSO with the PDSRSG and with the Executive Committee of the Mission deprived him of important security information and decisions, resulting to untimely information sharing and possible negative impact on the security operations in case of a crisis similar to the events of March 2004.

45. In the past, coordination with KFOR, OSCE and EU was inadequate, resulting in confusion. The CSO however, commends the UNMIK Police for the good cooperation demonstrated to date with the Security Unit. We also noted that the Host Government does not have an official role in the security of the Mission, supported by a signed MOU or similar protocol.

46. During the March 2004 events, the Crisis Action Team (CAT), which is the equivalent of the Crisis Management Working Group referred to the Security Operations Manual, was activated only after 24 hours. It should have been activated within an hour.

Recommendations 16 - 17

The UNMIK Designated Official should:

(i) Strengthen coordination with all key players involved in the field security procedures in UNMIK including assessing the complimentary role that might be played by local authorities which should be reinforced further through a positive outreach programme (AP2004/650/04/16); and

(ii) Develop procedures so that the Crisis Action Team or the Crisis Management Working Group can be activated within an hour (AP2004/650/04/17).

47. *UNMIK partially accepted recommendation 16 and informed OIOS that it is in the process of strengthening the coordination with all key players including CIVPOL and KFOR. The local authorities do not have responsibilities in the reserved area of security and the rule of law in general.*

48. *Concerning recommendation 17, UNMIK accepted recommendation 17 and informed OIOS that procedures have been developed, including an establishment of a Crisis Management Center with the necessary logistical and technological support. OIOS will keep recommendations 16 and 17 open in its database pending implementation.*

E. Communications with staff members

49. The security radio room/communications is continuously operational. The procedure for dissemination of security related information is made thru the warden system, lotus notes, phones and radios. Although the policy is to distribute radios to all staff members as the most reliable means of communications in times of crisis, however, not all staff have proper radios. In addition, due to the high cost of radio equipment, which, the staff members will be responsible for if lost makes them reluctant to request one.

Recommendation 18

The UNMIK Designated Official should ensure that radios are distributed to all UNMIK staff members to ensure that full dissemination of all instructions even in cases of failure of the cell phone system is possible (AP2004/650/04/18).

50. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 18 and informed OIOS that it is in the process of distributing radios to all international staff and to local staff at the approved rate of 1:3. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

F. Security education, training and activities

Training of security personnel

51. There is no formalized security education programme in the mission. Except for training on the use of firearms, security personnel have not undergone other training such as terrorist attacks and bomb threats that will enhance their capability to provide security for the personnel and assets of the Mission. Furthermore, even the training on firearms might no longer be available because the firearms instructor is being transferred to the United Nations Headquarters and there is no decision on his replacement. At present, two internationally recruited security officers are not qualified to handle their weapons, which increase the risk in an emergency situation.

Training of staff members

52. The staff members were only briefed on their personal/residential security in the Security Briefing and in the Personnel Induction Seminar/Training. In the Induction Handbook distributed to staff members, it was only noted that for warden system, the staff members will have to refer to the

security homepage. Also, deadlines were not set for the completion of the Basic Field Security Training. Hence, in view of the lack of attention from management, staff members are not recognizing the importance of the warden system. Likewise, staff members did not receive training on the actual use of the radio equipment. They were only given instructions upon receipt of the radios requested. Hence, it is not sure whether the staff members can efficiently and effectively use the radios in case of emergency.

Crisis management training

53. Crisis management training was performed on a limited scale. A follow up review of the exercise was not performed. A bigger exercise was planned for the last quarter of 2003, but was not conducted.

Recommendation 19

The UNMIK Designated Official should in consultation with the Chief Security Officer and Security Management Team, establish a formal security education programme in the Mission for security personnel and staff members. This should include crisis management training, activation of the warden system, use of security equipment for the security personnel, use of communications equipment and use of radio or other communications equipment applicable for the staff members (AP2004/650/04/19).

54. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 19 and informed OIOS that training for wardens is already taking place, and the use of radios training for all staff will begin shortly.* OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.

G. Staffing, competencies and planning of the security office

Mission standard operating procedure for crisis management and work plans

55. Procedures relevant for crisis management exist in the UNMIK Standard Operating Procedures dated 5 May 2004. Work plans are not prepared for all sectors/sections having a high security risk. The existing work plans that were prepared by the Security Section are considered to be too generic and incomplete.

Recommendation 20

The UNMIK Designated Office should ensure that the Security Management Team and the Crisis Management Group, with the input of the Chief Security Officer, develop a formal crisis management plan taking into account the security plan and the Standard Operating Procedures. The Security Section should prepare work plans for key risk security areas, based on a systematic threat assessment and should specifically indicate risks and initiatives

together with the necessary resources to implement them, including the realistic milestones (AP2004/650/04/20).

56. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 20 and informed OIOS that subsequent to the March crisis, UNMIK enhanced its crisis management plan. OIOS will keep this recommendation open in its database pending implementation.*

Staffing of Security Section

57. UNMIK has outstanding personnel issues related to recruitment, resources and staff levels in particular. The Personnel Section is obtaining an approved Staffing Table for the Security Section. According to the CSO, the Security Section is dangerously close to being ineffective due to shortage of staff members and inappropriate security skills and experience of the staff members being recruited for the Mission. This issue has been raised by the PDSRSG in a communication to the USG-DPKO. Likewise, no criteria or a plan of operations for the posting and manning of staff members for the Security Section is available. However, the Close Protection Unit and the chain of command structure are considered adequate by the CSO.

58. A sample of personnel files for security officers revealed that none of the files contained evidence that reference checks had been carried out to ensure their qualifications for the position. Furthermore, some files did not contain P11 or curriculum vitae of the individuals recruited.

Recommendations 21 - 24

The UNMIK Designated Official should ensure that:

- (i) The UNMIK Security Section is adequately staffed by following up with DPKO on previous communication sent by UNMIK to DPKO and requesting immediate action to fill vacant posts with qualified and trained personnel (AP2004/650/04/21);
- (ii) Reference checks on candidates for posting to the Security Section, prior to hiring is conducted (AP2004/650/04/22);
- (iii) Criteria are defined and applied in the development of a plan of operations and an independent comprehensive review should be conducted to reconcile actual Security Section needs with the actual staff strength (AP2004/650/04/23); and
- (iv) An evaluation of the staffing levels, expertise, and the current policy on rotation should be done by UNMIK with the help of DPKO (AP2004/650/04/24).


59. *UNMIK accepted recommendation 21 and informed OIOS that the Designated Official is actively involved in ensuring that the recruitment of security officers is given a priority in DPKO.*

60. UNMIK noted recommendations 22 and 23 and informed OIOS that all candidates for security posts are pre-cleared by UNSECOORD and it is assumed that the reference checks are done by UNSECOORD. UNMIK also informed OIOS that the current staffing provision for the Security Section is appropriate, however, a high vacancy rate and turnover of personnel pose operational difficulties.

61. UNMIK partially accepted recommendation 24 and informed OIOS that the current staffing provisions and expertise requirements are considered appropriate. However, a more coordinated rotation and succession plan is currently being developed in coordination with PMSS/DPKO. OIOS will keep recommendations 21, 22, 23 and 24 open in its database pending their implementation.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

62. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors by the UNMIK management and staff.



Patricia Azarias, Director
Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

ACRONYMS

CAT	Crisis Action Team
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CMG	Crisis Management Group
CSO	Chief Security Officer
DO	Designated Official
DOA	Director of Administration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FSH	Field Security Handbook
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MORSS	Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards
MWSP	Mission Wide Security Plan
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDSRSG	Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
RSP	Regional Security Plan
SG	UN Secretary-General
SMT	Security Management Team
SOP	Standing (or Standard) Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TAC	Threat Assessment Committee
UNHQ NY	United Nations Headquarters, New York
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
USG	Under-Secretary-General



OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

Audit Title & Assignment No.: OIOS Audit No. AP2004/650/04: Field Security Procedures in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

By checking the appropriate circle please rate:

1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:
 - accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions
 - clarity and conciseness
 - balance and objectivity
 - timeliness
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4.				
-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- clarity and conciseness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- balance and objectivity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please comment on any areas in which you have rated the audit team's performance as below your expectations. Also, please feel free to provide any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

Name: _____ Date: _____

Title: _____

Organization: _____

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey form as soon as possible in the enclosed envelope addressed to: Ms. Patricia Azarias, Director, Internal Audit Division - I, OIOS, Room DC2-518 United Nations Headquarters New York, NY 10017 U.S.A. or by fax to: 212-963-8100.