

United Nations  Nations Unies  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I  
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. Jean Arnault  
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
UNAMA

DATE: 5 October 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:9 (0806/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

*P. Azarias*

SUBJECT:

OBJET: **OIOS audit No. AP2004/630/01: Audit of UNAMA Field Security Procedures**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted during June-July 2004.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that UNAMA has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on the response, we are pleased to inform you that we have closed recommendations 5, 7, 8 and 16 in the OIOS recommendation database. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations Nos. 1 to 4, 6, 9 to 15 and 17, we request that you provide us with additional information as indicated in the text of the report and a time schedule for implementing each of the recommendations. Please refer to the recommendation number concerned to facilitate monitoring of their implementation status.
3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.
4. I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff of UNAMA for the assistance and cooperation provided to the auditors in connection with this assignment.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations  
Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO  
Mr. Kiplin Perkins, Chief Administrative Officer, UNAMA  
UN Board of Auditors  
Programme Officer, OIOS  
Mr. R. Manohar, Chief Resident Auditor, UNAMA

# Office of Internal Oversight Services

## Internal Audit Division I



### Audit of UNAMA Field Security Procedures

---

**Audit no:** AP2004/630/01

**Report date:** 5 October 2004

**Audit team:** Mr. R. Manohar, Chief Resident Auditor UNAMA

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**Audit of UNAMA Field Security Procedures**

In view of the changing security environment and threats worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) identified the audit of global field security procedures as a matter of priority.

This report assesses (i) the adequacy of security measures and capability of UNAMA Security section in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area and (ii) the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and SOPs. The report discusses policy and procedural issues associated with the security of UN personnel and facilities and provides practical recommendations for improving security management.

Based on the audit results, the organization, and coordination of the security function in the Mission needs significant improvement. The following major issues were noted during the review:

- UN staff in Afghanistan is vulnerable to attacks as security coverage provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is limited to Kabul and its environs. There was no evidence that any protocols / memorandum of understanding regarding safety and security of UN staff and UN compounds has been entered into between ISAF and UNAMA.
- The CSO is not aware of the security procedures of the Close Protection Unit (CPU), manned by the French army, of the SRSG and if the CPU procedures are compatible with the security procedures of UNAMA/ UNSECOORD. The differing procedures could compromise the personal security of the SRSG.
- The absence of a qualified and competent security analyst has handicapped the threat perception ability of the security team in the county. Consequently the reaction of the security team is physical and reactionary instead of being pro-active.
- There is a need to establish better co-ordination among UN agencies by combined road missions to ensure focused security coverage.
- UNSECOORD and DPKO should clarify the role and responsibilities of UNSECOORD Afghanistan and UNAMA security staff to avoid duplication of efforts in the region.
- The evacuation plan has not been rehearsed at all since the inception of the mission in March 2002.
- The Warden System is to be revived for the international staff and coverage extended to national staff.

- Radio check delinquency in Kabul ranges from 27% - 44% with the result that the whereabouts of more than 60 UNAMA staff members in Kabul is not accounted for on any given day.
- Only four houses out of the 60 houses that accommodate UNAMA staff in Kabul have been certified as MORSS compliant.
- Physical security and access control of UNOCA complex needs to be augmented. Some work is being done to bolster the perimeter security.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION	1-4
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES	5
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	6-7
IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT	8
V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
A. Security Organization and Management	9-15
B. Coordination	16-22
C. Capability	23-26
D. Specific Security systems/controls	27-38
E. Physical Security	39-44
F. Other Issues	45-48
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	49
Annex 1	

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In March 2004, the UNAMA CAO requested the Chief Resident Auditor, UNAMA to review the safety and security of UNAMA personnel. The results of this review forms part of the “global audit of field security procedures” coordinated by the Internal Audit Division I of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in the United Nations organizations. The report incorporates UNAMA’s comments, which are shown in italics.

2. Security remains a significant problem in Afghanistan. Civilians continue to be killed in inter-factional fighting. Attacks by extremist elements on aid agencies, both national and international, and on government officials continue to occur predominantly in the southern provinces. In recent weeks a number of serious attacks have taken place outside the traditional high – risk areas adding an element of uncertainty to the security situation in the country.

3. Security risks remain for three reasons. First, pockets of resistance of Al Qaeda and Taliban remain. Second, factional clashes are taking place. Third, banditry continues in the absence of proper security and a system of enforceable law. Keeping in view the security risks, UNSECOORD has assessed the security situation in Afghanistan as phase III with the south, south – east, and eastern parts of Afghanistan considered high – risk areas.

4. Despite the deteriorating security situation and the constraints faced in the field, it is indeed creditable that the UN country team, UNSECOORD, UNAMA staff and UNAMA security staff are managing to perform their assigned roles.

## **II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES**

5. The objectives of the audit were to: (i) assess the adequacy of security measures and the capability of UNAMA security section in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the mission area; and (ii) the mission’s performance against the established accountability framework and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

## **III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

6. The audit covered the security procedures and reviewed the level of security organization and management, coordination of security at various levels, and physical security of UN personnel and premises.

7. The audit methodologies included interviews, data gathering, information and report analyses, the study of files and the observation of practices.

## **IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

8. Despite the rapid strides made by UNAMA to enhance the security measures and its capability to protect its staff and assets, the UN staff working in Afghanistan are operating in an insecure environment. The onus of providing security coverage lies with the ISAF, an external

actor mandated by the UN. At present ISAF's security coverage is limited to Kabul and Kunduz and UN staff working in other areas of Afghanistan remain vulnerable to attacks. It is imperative that a protocol / memorandum of understanding is established by UNAMA with ISAF as to the extent of security coverage and assistance that can be provided by ISAF so that UN personnel can operate in a secure and safe environment.

## V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Security Organization and Management

9. UNAMA is the leading UN agency in Afghanistan. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to UNAMA is the designated official (DO) on security matters for all the UN agencies in the country and UNAMA. The FSCO, UNSECOORD advises the DO on all security matters. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) acts as the Deputy DO. The DO or his alternate chairs the meeting of the Security Management Team (SMT) (consisting mainly of all heads of UN agencies in Afghanistan) every Sunday morning. A working group of the SMT meets every Thursday to address issues of policy. The SMT working group in effect is also the Crisis Management group.

10. There is a need to appoint a dedicated DO to deal exclusively with security matters due to the dynamic and volatile security situation in the country. Security issues take precedence and dominate the substantive roles assigned to the SRSG or his Deputy. According to the FSCO, the previous SRSG chaired the SMT meetings very rarely (about 2%), and the present SRSG (appointed in February 2004) has managed to chair 20% of the SMT meetings held so far. The FSCO, however, informed OIOS that the previous SRSG as well as the current SRSG were briefed on security and were well aware of the developing security scenarios. The former DO alternate and the DSRSG (Political Affairs), who is also the designate Alternate DO, voiced the need for a dedicated DO.

#### **Recommendation 1**

In order to cope with the complexity of the security environment in Afghanistan, the Designated Official should consider requesting UNSECOORD to appoint another official as the Designated Official for Afghanistan, who is able to devote his full attention on security matters (AP2004/630/1/01).

11. *According to UNAMA management the security management structure of UNSECOORD and UNAMA is being integrated and the post of a full time Assistant DO is being established. The recommendation remains open in OIOS' database pending appointment of the Assistant DO.*

12. The Mission Security Management SOP, issued by DPKO on 26 September 2003, states that the CSO is responsible to provide close protection security to the SRSG. The CSO has no interaction with the Close Protection Unit (CPU) and the SRSG as per the UNAMA chain of command structure. The French Army, on a gratis basis, mans the CPU and provides the close protection security to the SRSG. According to the CSO, the decision to provide close protection security to the SRSG was taken by DPKO and no directive was issued to him about the revised

arrangement. The CSO also claims that he is not aware of the procedures of the CPU and the compatibility of the CPU procedures with the security procedures of UNAMA. In the event of an emergency the differing procedures followed could compromise the personal security of the SRSB.

### **Recommendation 2**

The Designated Official should seek clarification from DPKO on the role of the CPU vis-à-vis the CSO of UNAMA to remove any ambiguities in the procedures to be followed in the personal protection of the SRSB (AP2004/630/1/02).

13. *UNAMA management accepted the recommendation and stated that the CSO will discuss security matters with the CPU, and UNSECOORD will be asked to help clarify this relationship and agree on the procedures to be followed.* The recommendation remains open in OIOS' database pending issuance of procedures to be followed by the CSO and the CPU.

14. The proposed security structure by UNSECOORD provides for co-location of UNSECOORD security officers with the UNAMA security officers in all the 8 regions in Afghanistan (See Annex). The SRSB, the CAO and CSO hold the view that there is duplication of efforts between UNSECOORD and UNAMA. Upon inquiring, the FSCO, UNSECOORD mentioned there was no duplication of effort in the region. According to the FSCO, the structure provides for complementarity between UNSECOORD and DPKO security staff in the regions and has proved to be useful. Considering the role of UNSECOORD is to provide security advice and analysis to the SRSB, the SMT and the UN country team, and DPKO security staff handles the implementation of security programmes for the mission, there is a need to bring about clarity to avoid any duplication of efforts between the two agencies.

### **Recommendation 3**

The Designated Official should obtain clarification from UNSECOORD and DPKO concerning the roles and responsibilities of UNSECOORD, Afghanistan and DPKO security staff in Afghanistan (AP2004/630/03).

15. *According to UNAMA management the integration of the security management structure of UNAMA and UNSECOORD addresses the interrelationships of various security functions, and detailed implementation plans are being developed.* The recommendation remains open in OIOS' database pending issuance of detailed implementation plans.

## **B. Coordination**

16. Security Council resolution 1386 (2001) authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (led by NATO) to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas so that the UN personnel can operate in a secure environment. In October 2003 the mandate of ISAF was expanded to provide security outside of Kabul and its environs (Security Council resolution 1510).



17. ISAF have secured Kabul and its immediate environs and mitigated the security risk. Except for expansion into Kunduz, ISAF is yet to provide security coverage in other areas of Afghanistan. In the regions, the Coalition Forces (combat arm of NATO) have come to the assistance of UN, whenever requested by the UN. However, the Coalition Forces are not obligated to provide any assistance to the UN. Their operational requirements take precedence over the UN's request for seeking security coverage for its staff. Of concern is the lack of capability on the part of the host government to provide the acceptable security measures to protect the UN staff and assets. The reasons were the lack of trained manpower, limited mobility, and inadequate and unreliable equipment. In effect, the UN staff working in other areas of Afghanistan remains vulnerable to attacks, as security coverage provided by ISAF is limited to Kabul and Kunduz only. This has been amply borne out by the attacks to the UNAMA road convoy near Gardez and the killing of 2 national staff in Jalalabad recently.

#### **Recommendation 4**

The Designated Official should instruct the UN country team to establish protocols with ISAF as to the extent of security coverage and assistance to be provided to the UN staff. The residual risks to the UN need to be assessed and may have to be mitigated by withdrawing the UN staff from the insecure regions (AP2004/ 630/1/04).

18. *According to UNAMA management, close relationships exist with ISAF and Coalition forces with regard to security and safety of UN staff and UN compounds. Further, UNSECOORD and the SMT regularly monitor conditions in the country, and administrative relocations have already taken place.* The reply given by UNAMA management, however, does not specifically state whether any protocols /memorandum of understanding regarding safety and security of UN staff and UN compounds has been entered into between ISAF and UNAMA. Therefore, the recommendation remains open in OIOS' database.

19. There are about 21 UN agencies operating in Afghanistan, each with their own mandate. UNAMA's mandate is political and the mandates of the other UN agencies are aid/development oriented. According to the former DO alternate, it was premature for agencies such as UNESCO and ILO, with their development mandates, to be operating in Afghanistan at this juncture. At best, these agencies could come under the umbrella of UNAMA with a reduced establishment, thereby, lessening the burden on an already overstretched infrastructure. For instance, field visits by the personnel of various agencies could be combined and one road mission undertaken as against the present practice of several road missions being undertaken independent of each other. The implications for security would be better manageability of its resources and providing focused coverage.

## **Recommendation 5**

The Designated Official should consult the other UN agencies operating in Afghanistan to establish better coordination of field visits, for example by combining road missions instead of each agency undertaking them separately (AP2004/630/1/05).

20. *According to UNAMA management the Enhanced Minimum Operational Security Standards that have been recently developed by the SMT for medium and high-risk areas have specifically mandated the coordination of road missions.* Based on UNAMA's response, OIOS has closed this recommendation.

21. There is excellent co-operation between the various UN agencies in the sharing of intelligence and threat assessment. An issue of concern, however, was the quality of threat assessment due to the absence of a competent security analyst in the UN team in Afghanistan. The management review conducted in March 2004 identified this weakness in the security management in the country. Efforts made to recruit a security analyst by UNAMA/UNSECOORD were not available on record.

## **Recommendation 6**

The Designated Official should take measures to recruit a security analyst on priority to help in the meaningful analyses of threats/incidents occurring in the mission area and to enable security to take a pro-active role to mitigate risks (AP2004/630/1/06).

22. *According to UNAMA management, a security information analyst has been recruited by UNOPS and assigned to the UNAMA Civil/Military Unit for the purpose of assisting in the security information analysis in cooperation with the UNSECOORD, FSCO and the SMT.* Upon inquiring, the CSO informed that UNOPS will not be recruiting the security information analyst and there is likely to be a delay in the recruitment. Therefore, the recommendation remains open in OIOS' database pending recruitment of the security analyst.

## **C. Capability**

23. The CSO heads the UNAMA security Section. Twelve international staff and 97 national staff assist him. The important post of Deputy CSO has remained vacant since December 2003.

24. The CSO was the only international staff member posted to the mission in April 2002. The second international staff member arrived into the mission area in August 2002. During this period whenever the CSO went out of the mission area on leave, his responsibilities were handed over to the Operations Officer to oversee security operations. The posting of an unqualified and inexperienced staff member to discharge the duties of the CSO represented a serious risk and left the mission staff vulnerable during times of crisis.

25. The present CSO is at the P-3 level. Keeping in view the gravity of the security situation in Afghanistan, there is a need to post an experienced CSO at the P-4 level. This has been provided for in the staffing table.

#### **Recommendation 7**

The Designated Official should take steps to recruit a Chief Security Officer at a more senior level (P5, P4) to contend with the dynamic security situation in the country. Similarly, the vacancy of Deputy Chief Security Officer should also be filled as soon as possible (AP2004/630/1/07).

26. *The UNAMA Personnel Section has requested PMSS/ASD/OMS/DPKO to advertise the post of Chief Security Officer, Deputy Chief Security Officer, Chief Investigations Unit, Chief Regional Security, and 6 additional Field Security Officers.* Based on UNAMA's response, OIOS has closed this recommendation.

#### **D. Specific Security Systems/Controls**

27. UNAMA has in place a procedure for the rapid dissemination of security related information. However, the security advisories issued are all in English and there is a need to simultaneously translate the security advisories into Dari and Pashtu, the local languages in Afghanistan. The translations are essential, as many of the UNAMA drivers do not have a good grasp of English language. (The international staff members, due to security reasons, are not allowed to drive and are transported in UN vehicles driven by locally recruited drivers). The delay in translating the security advisories could compromise the intended precautions to be taken.

#### Warden System and Security Plan

28. Paragraph 28 of the DPKO field security policy provides for the appointment of wardens and deputy wardens by the DO to ensure implementation of the security plan in a predetermined zone. According to the CSO, UNAMA has a warden system in place for the international staff. However, he stated that the warden system needs to be revived and coverage extended to the national staff. Six staff members out of the 13 who responded to the questionnaire sent by audit said that they are not aware of their wardens. Nine staff members responded that the warden system was not effective.

29. A National Security Plan has been prepared by UNSECOORD. Inputs to the National Security Plan are provided by all UN agencies. A review of the inputs provided by UNAMA revealed the following deficiencies:

- Regional Security Plans have been prepared for 3 out of 8 regions in Afghanistan.
- The staff lists are not updated and reliable. For instance a staff member deployed in Kabul was shown as working in a region.
- List of essential and non-essential staff needs to be updated.

- Some staff members, by virtue of their nationality, would encounter difficulties in entering the nearest neighboring country in the event evacuation by road takes place. There is a need to reassign such staff members to other regions.
- Evacuation exercise has not been conducted by UNAMA since inception of the mission in March 2002.

### **Recommendations 8 – 10**

The Designated Official should ensure that:

- (i) The warden system is revived extending coverage to national staff (AP2004/630/1/08);
- (ii) Evacuation exercises are conducted at regular intervals and under various scenarios (AP2004/630/1/09); and
- (iii) Security information advisories are simultaneously translated and disseminated in the local languages (AP2004/630/1/10).

30. *UNAMA management stated that the CSO has been tasked to review the warden system and activate a revised program including extending coverage to national staff members. This will be undertaken in the month of September.* Based on UNAMA's response, OIOS has closed recommendation 8.

31. *According to UNAMA management, the DO and SMT with the guidance of the UNSECOORD FSCO is planning to conduct a joint evacuation exercise for all UN agencies and UNAMA later this year.* Recommendation 9 remains open in OIOS' database till such time the evacuation exercise is conducted.

32. *UNAMA management stated that security information advisories are translated and disseminated in the local languages, most such advisory deal with traffic congestion or closed roads and are already issued verbally to drivers in their local language.* Upon inquiring, the Chief Transport Officer, UNAMA (CTO) stressed that his drivers are handicapped as advisories relating to matters other than traffic movements are not translated in time leaving little / no time for his drivers to react to situations. OIOS agrees with the views of the CTO and reiterates the need for simultaneous translation and dissemination of security advisories in the local languages. Therefore, recommendation 10 remains open in OIOS' database.

### Security training

33. A review of the 37 personnel files revealed that only 3 staff members had completed the mandatory training on "Basic Security in the Field". In addition, 100% of the staff members who responded to the questionnaire indicated that they were not aware of the "DPKO specific security arrangements".

## **Recommendation 11**

The Chief Civilian Personnel Officer (CCPO) should coordinate with the CSO and Chief of Communications and Information Technology Section to compile a list of personnel who have completed the security training courses. For those staff members who have not completed the course, the CAO should set a deadline to complete the mandated programme “Basic Security in the Field”. Further, the CSO should obtain and distribute copies of the “DPKO Specific Security arrangements” to all the staff members of UNAMA. (AP2004/630/1/11)

34. *UNAMA management accepted this recommendation. They have set a deadline to complete the exercise.* Currently this exercise is ongoing. However, management’s reply is silent on the issue of creating awareness among the staff members by distributing copies of the “DPKO Specific Security arrangements”. The recommendation remains open in OIOS’ database pending distribution of copies of the “DPKO Specific Security arrangements” to the staff members.

### ID Control System

35. A UNOCA (United Nations Operation Center in Afghanistan) SOP exists for issue of ID Cards. However, the SOP does not provide for adequate controls over the receipt, stock and issue of ID cards. The Communications and Information Technology Section of UNAMA issues blank ID cards to the ID and Pass Unit. There is no stock control over the blank ID cards in the ID and Pass unit. The risk of issuing ID cards to unauthorized personnel exists.

36. UNAMA ID unit issues ID cards for other agencies such as UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services), Electoral unit, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) etc. Personnel of the other UN agencies, on their official stationery, make requests for issue of ID cards. In many cases, requests are signed on behalf of particular officers. The request is checked by the CSO, UNAMA and forwarded to the ID unit for issue of ID cards. When enquired, the CSO informed that UNAMA does not maintain the database of specimen signatures of authorized signatories. This could compromise the access control as any staff member can get hold of official stationery of the UN agencies and forward a request for issue of ID.

37. Duplicate ID cards are issued in lieu of lost ID cards. In some cases it is noticed that the ID Pass Assistant issues the duplicate ID cards on his own on the basis of the incident report. This represents a conflict of interest.

## **Recommendations 12 and 13**

The Designated Official should:

- (i) Institute new procedures for stock control of ID cards. The blank ID cards should be pre-numbered serially and a stock

register should be maintained indicating the total number of blank ID cards received, ID cards issued, invalid ID cards printed, and the balance on hand. An international security staff should destroy the invalid ID cards after accountings for all the ID cards (AP2004/630/1/12); and

(ii) Obtain a list of personnel authorized by the heads of various UN agencies along with their specimen signatures, to verify requests for issue of ID for their staff members. ID cards should be issued only based on the authorization of the CSO or his alternate (AP2004/630/1/13).

38. *UNAMA management accepted these recommendations. The CSO has been instructed to institute a system of stock control of ID cards, and verify requests for ID cards. The recommendations remain open in OIOS' database pending systems being instituted for stock control of ID cards and verifying requests for issuance of ID cards.*

#### **E. Physical Security**

39. The substantive component of UNAMA is located at compound (B) in the heart of Kabul city, and the administrative component is located on the outskirts of Kabul city called the UNOCA (UN Operation Center in Afghanistan) Complex. UNICEF, UNOPS and ANBP (Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme) share the complex with UNAMA. A notable feature of the UNOCA complex is the cost of the common administrative services (CAS), which is shared amongst the agencies; Security, janitorial services, communications, etc are part of the CAS agreement. This arrangement is cost-effective and should be replicated in other missions too.

40. UNICEF, the lead agency in UNOCA complex, has contracted out the security services to a private company in Afghanistan called the Boost Blossom Group (BBG). BBG provides security at the main gate, the eastern gate, and mans the watchtowers. BBG recruits its guards from among the able bodied Afghans. Total no of guards hired is 77. The guards conduct ID checks, and control visitors' access. Though the manager of the BBG claims that they conducted background checks of their potential recruits, the veracity of the checks is doubtful. Crippled by 23 years of war there are no reliable institutions in Afghanistan, either in the private or government sector that can verify the antecedents of the recruit. Infiltration of saboteurs in the guise of guards is a possibility and would compromise the security of the UNOCA complex.

#### **Recommendation 14**

The Designated Official should advise UNICEF to reconsider outsourcing of security guards to a local company (AP2004/ 630/1/14).

41. *UNAMA management will raise the reconsideration of this issue with the UNOCA Management Group (UMG), which is composed of representatives of the UN agencies occupying*


*the UNOCA Compound.* UNAMA management is yet to raise the matter with UMG. Therefore, the recommendation remains open in OIOS' database.

42. A walk through of UNOCA complex, measuring 178,798 square meters, revealed the following deficiencies:

- a) A partially covered drainage pipe near the second boom gate opens into the adjacent farm;
- b) The wall near the main gate is easy to scale as the wall provides toe holds and is not smooth;
- c) ID cards are not prominently displayed by staff members as well as by casual laborers. It should be made mandatory for all staff members and casual laborers to display their ID cards prominently to facilitate easy identification of any unauthorized personnel loitering in the complex;
- d) Overhang of trees (See picture 1 below), abandoned guard towers (See picture 2 below), a lean-to shack, all on the western perimeter of the wall provides easy access into the complex;
- e) Light fixtures need to be provided at regular intervals on the northern and eastern perimeter of the wall;
- f) There is a need to implement new security measures to counter the threat of letter bombs that has surfaced up in the mission area. All mail received in the UNOCA complex should be scanned in the x-ray machine; and
- g) UNAMA administration building has two entrances. Only a receptionist mans the front entrance. The rear entrance is left open and there is a possibility that visitors to UNOPS could also gain access to the UNAMA administration building. The rear door could be closed making provision for emergency opening only.



Picture 1: Overhang of trees



Picture 2: Abandoned guard tower

43. When enquired, the Security officer, UNAMA stated that the UNOCA Management Group (UMG) has a plan to address the shortcomings. However, no time frame and cost estimates of plan of action could be produced to audit.

#### **Recommendation 15**

The Designated Official, in consultation with UMG, should augment physical security measures on priority basis to prevent unauthorized access into the UNOCA complex (AP2004/630/1/15).

44. *According to UNAMA management, the UNOCA Management Group budget has been adopted for the repair and upgrading of security features during 2004. The major work of constructing guard towers, reinforced entrance gates, security wall lighting for the guard towers, and guard control areas has been completed. A remote TV camera surveillance system is planned. UNAMA's budget for 2005 includes a provision for additional x-ray machines. OIOS would like to reiterate that the shortcomings noted in paragraph 42 a) to d) has not been redressed. Therefore, the recommendation remains open in OIOS' database.*

#### **F. Other Issues**

45. International Staff members of UNAMA are required to perform radio check daily. A Security Focal Point, (SFP) is appointed for each house and it is the duty of the SFP or the Deputy SFP to report on behalf of other staff members (minimum 3 staff members share an accommodation) between 19:30-21:30 hours. In the event the SFP/Deputy SFP does not report, it is the duty of the radio operator in the security operations center to follow up and account for staff members. According to the radio operator it is difficult to follow up as invariably the radio of the SFP or the Deputy SFP is switched off. A radio check delinquency report is prepared and incorporated in the daily situation report of the Security Section. For the month of June 2004, the delinquency rate ranges from 17 to 40 SFPs who did not conduct radio checks. This figure translates to 74 to 95 staff members who were not accounted for during the period. Evidence of disciplining the delinquents by the CAO is not available on record.



### **Recommendation 16**

The Designated Official should take disciplinary action on staff members who fail to respond to radio checks (AP2004/630/1/16).

46. *UNAMA management accepted this recommendation and implemented revised radio call-in procedures to check radio delinquency.* Based on UNAMA's response, OIOS has closed this recommendation.

47. It is the responsibility of international staff members of UNAMA to ensure that their residence meets the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS). A review of the compliance report indicates that only 4 houses out of the 60 houses in Kabul occupied by UNAMA staff were certified to be MORSS compliant as of 01 July 2004.


### **Recommendation 17**

The Designated Official should fix a deadline for ensuring compliance to the MORSS (AP2004/630/1/17).

48. *UNAMA management accepted this recommendation and a deadline of 30 September was fixed to ensure MORSS compliance.* The number of houses certified as MORSS compliant remains to be 4 as of 28 September, and achieving the target by 30 September appears to be remote. Therefore, the recommendation remains open in OIOS' database.

## **VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

49. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNAMA for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.



Patricia Azarias, Director  
Internal Audit Division I, OIOS

AFGHANISTAN INTEGRATED SECURITY STRUCTURE (I)

Annex 1

