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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the
competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After
investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs concluded that the agency's leader had "lacked the leadership skills
that were needed for his critical position." In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394) stipulated that the FEMA Administrator,
among other top agency leaders, must meet certain qualifications. President George W. Bush's
signing statement for this act seemingly challenged the constitutionality of these requirements,
and it stated that the "executive branch shall construe [the applicable provision] in a manner
consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." Three Members of Congress then
urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards
and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue
between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out
nation's safety and security."
These events reflect broader interbranch differences over congressional authority to establish
statutory qualifications. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that
Congress generally has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications. The boundaries of
this authority have not been conclusively drawn, however, and the executive branch, in recent
years, has asserted that congressional authority in this area is more limited than congressional
practice would suggest. Statutory qualification requirements might continue to be an area of
conflict between Congress and the President. Inasmuch as these provisions are not self-enforcing,
their success as a means of assuring competent leadership of the federal government will depend
upon the two branches' adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes.
In practice, it has not been unusual for Congress to mandate that appointees to certain positions
meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA
Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds
that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of
characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political
balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has used such statutory
provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have them. This report provides
background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional
authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and provides related
analysis and options. The report includes two tables with examples of existing positions with
qualification requirements.
This report will be updated in response to policy developments related to statutory qualifications.
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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Constitutional Appointments Framework ................................................................................ 2
Congressional Authority to Establish Qualifications for Leadership Positions............................... 3
Executive Branch Views ........................................................................................................... 4
Signing Statements.............................................................................................................. 4
Department of Justice Opinions.......................................................................................... 5
Statutory Qualifications in Practice................................................................................................. 7
Qualification Modifications ...................................................................................................... 9
Qualification Waivers.............................................................................................................. 10
Qualifications for Members of Collegial Bodies .....................................................................11
Statutory Qualifications: Analysis and Options............................................................................. 12
Advantages and Disadvantages of Statutory Qualifications ................................................... 13
Options for Congressional Consideration ............................................................................... 15
Incremental Establishment of Qualifications.................................................................... 15
Agency-wide Qualifications ............................................................................................. 16
Government-wide Standards............................................................................................. 16
Senate Standards ............................................................................................................... 17
Concluding Observations .............................................................................................................. 18
Table A-1. Examples of Department and Agency Leadership Positions with Statutory
Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................ 20
Table A-2. Examples of Positions on Independent Collegial Bodies with Statutory
Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................ 24
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Appendix. Examples of Statutory Qualification Requirements .................................................... 20
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 29
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the
competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After
investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs concluded, among other findings, that the agency's leader had "lacked
the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position."1 The committee went on to
recommend that future leaders of national emergency management efforts "have significant
experience in crisis management, in addition to substantial management and leadership
experience, whether in the public, private or nonprofit sector."2
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, appointees to the top FEMA leadership position were not
required, in statute, to meet any qualifications.3 This was changed by the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006,4 under which the FEMA Administrator, among other top
agency leaders, is required to meet certain qualifications. The act provides the following:
The Administrator shall be appointed from among individuals who have--(A) a
demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security;
and (B) not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the
public or private sector.5
The Bush Administration seemingly challenged the legitimacy of this provision in the President's
signing statement for the act. It reads, in part, as follows:
Section 503(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by section 611 of the Act,
provides for the appointment and certain duties of the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Section 503(c)(2) vests in the President authority to
appoint the Administrator, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but purports to
limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may select the
appointee in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by
experience and knowledge to fill the office. The executive branch shall construe section
503(c)(2) in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.6
The President appears to take issue with the extent to which the qualifications might limit the
pool of potential nominees to the position. The statement does not make clear whether the
Administration sees Section 503(c)(2) as being in conflict with the Appointments Clause and, if
so, in what way. The final sentence in the excerpt suggests that, to the degree that Section
503(c)(2) is seen to be in conflict with the Administration's reading of the Appointments Clause,
the President might elect not to abide by the provision. In response to the signing statement, three
1
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation
Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2006), unpaginated chapter, "Conclusions and Findings."
2
Ibid., p. Recommendations - 4.
3
The head of FEMA at that time was the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Appointments to
this position were to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (P.L. 107-296, �
103(a)).
4
P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394.
5
Ibid., � 611(10), as it amends � 503(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002; 120 Stat. 1397.
6
U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 42, October 4, 2006, pp. 1742-1743.
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Members of Congress urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling
for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and
for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant
importance to out nation's safety and security."7
Both Congress and the President have an interest in assuring that the federal government is led by
appointees who have the necessary qualifications to successfully and faithfully implement the
law. As discussed later in this report, the preponderance of evidence and historical practices
suggest that Congress has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications--as long as those
qualifications do not amount to a de facto legislative designation. In many instances, Congress
has mandated that appointees to leadership positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory
qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have
certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other
qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency,
or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party
affiliation. Congress has, however, used qualification provisions selectively; most executive
branch positions do not have statutory qualifications. This report provides background on the
constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional authority to set
qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and discusses related options for
congressional consideration. Examples of positions with statutory requirements or restrictions are
provided in two tables in the Appendix.
The Constitution charges Congress with the responsibility of determining how most leaders of the
federal government will be appointed. The framework for this process is based in Article II:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.8
This clause sets presidential appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
(hereafter referred to as PAS positions) as the default process for filling such positions.9 But only
certain officers of the United States must be appointed by that method. At the discretion of
Congress, "inferior" officers may be appointed either under the default process or by the
President alone, the courts, or agency heads. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
"Officers of the United States" to mean "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States."10 The Supreme Court has provided guidance that could assist
7
U.S. Congress, letter from Senators Mary L. Landrieu, Susan M. Collins, and Joseph I. Lieberman to President
George W. Bush, October 12, 2006. (Letter obtained from CQ Top Docs at CQ.com.)
8
Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2.
9
In a 1976 opinion, the Comptroller General reasoned that this provision indicates that all officers of the United States
are to be PAS positions unless Congress affirmatively delegates that authority (Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-183012, 56
Comp. Gen. 137).
10
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
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Congress in identifying which officers may be appointed through one of the non-PAS processes.
In Edmond v. United States,11 the court reasoned that
[g]enerally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some higher
ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an "inferior officer" depends
on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who
formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that
were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in
the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important
Government assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers whose work
is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.12
This suggests that, aside from officers in positions that the Constitution specifically identifies,
such as ambassadors and "Judges of the supreme Court," the Constitution requires only one layer
of advice and consent positions in the hierarchy of each agency. It indicates that appointees with
PAS-appointed supervisors are inferior officers, and that Congress may, therefore, provide for
appointment by one of the other specified authorities.13
In the case of executive branch departments and agencies outside the White House, Congress
usually elects either to use the PAS process or to delegate authority to the agency head. This
enables the Senate to play a role in appointments to the leadership positions where it is most
interested in maintaining influence over programs and policies. In some cases, Senators may
influence nominee selection. They also may obtain commitments to carry out implementation of
laws in certain ways during confirmation hearings, and they are likely to exact promises to testify
before committees for oversight purposes.
�
The power of Congress to specify qualifications for a particular office is generally understood to
be incident to its constitutional authority to establish the office. Historically, it has established
qualifications many times; Justice Louis Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in Myers v. United
States, documented the longstanding nature of this practice. He observed that "a multitude of laws
have been enacted which limit the President's power to make nominations," and added that
"[s]uch restriction upon the power to nominate has been exercised by Congress continuously
since the foundation of the Government."14 Justice Brandeis noted that
Congress has, from time to time, restricted the President's selection by the requirement of
citizenship. It has limited the power of nomination by providing that the office may be held
only by a resident of the United States; of a State; of a particular State; of a particular
district; of a particular territory; of the District of Columbia; of a particular foreign country.
11
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
12
Ibid., pp. 662-663.
13
Although the Senate plays an important advice and consent role for many presidential appointments, it is noteworthy
that officers of the United States may not be appointed by Members of Congress.
14
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
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It has limited the power of nomination further by prescribing specific professional
attainments, of occupational experience. It has, in other cases, prescribed the test of
examinations. It has imposed the requirement of age; of sex; of race; of property; and of
habitual temperance in the use of intoxicating liquors. Congress has imposed like restrictions
on the power of nomination by requiring political representation; or that the selection be
made on a nonpartisan basis. It has required in some cases, that the representation be
industrial; in others, that it be geographic. It has at times required that the President's
nominees be taken from, or include representatives from, particular branches or departments
of the Government. By still other statutes, Congress has confined the President's selection to
a small number of persons to be named by others.15
When specifying qualifications, Congress has, at times, come close to specifying the individual
who must be appointed. In 1916, for example, Congress enacted a law providing that
of the vacancies created in the Judge Advocate's Department by this act, one such vacancy,
not below the rank of Major, shall be filled by the appointment of a person from civil life,
not less than forty-five nor more than fifty years of age, who shall have been for ten years a
Judge of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, shall have served for two years as a
Captain in the regular or volunteer army, and shall be proficient in the Spanish language and
laws.16
These requirements would likely have limited the President's potential choices to one or two
people, a limitation on the President's appointment power that might not withstand judicial
scrutiny. Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in establishing qualifications, its
constitutional power is probably not without limits. In its majority opinion in Myers, the Court
noted that "the legislative power" comprehends the authority "to prescribe qualifications for
office, or reasonable classification for promotion, ... provided of course that these qualifications
do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative
designation."17
�
Although the preponderance of evidence and historical practice supports the understanding that
Congress has broad authority in this area, this view is not universally held. Executive branch
views, as articulated through presidential signing statements and opinions of the Department of
Justice, have ranged from the assertion that Congress has no such authority to an
acknowledgment of some such authority that lacks clear boundaries.
The view that Congress may have authority to establish only limited qualifications was evident in
President George W. Bush's signing statement for the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, discussed in the introduction to this report, as well as other presidential
signing statements. President Bush's 2006 signing statement for the Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act, for example, raised similar issues.
15
Myers v. United States, 265-274. Footnotes omitted.
16
39 Stat. 169.
17
Myers v. United States, 128 (Opinion of the Court).
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The executive branch shall construe subsections 202(a) and 502(a) of title 39, as enacted by
subsections 501(a) and 601(a) of the Act, which purport to limit the qualifications of the pool
of persons from whom the President may select appointees in a manner that rules out a large
portion of those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill the positions, in a
manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.18
Previous Presidents, in other signing statements, also raised constitutional objections to
qualification provisions. In a 1992 signing statement for legislation establishing the Morris K.
Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy Foundation, for example,
President George H.W. Bush stated that the bill he was signing into law "purport[ed] to set
qualifications, including requirements as to political party affiliation, for the trustees who will
administer the foundation created by the bill." In his estimation, under the appointments clause of
the Constitution, "congressional participation in such appointments may be exercised only
through the Senate's advice and consent with respect to Presidential nominees." He stated that he
would, therefore, "treat these provisions as precatory."19
A signing statement by President William J. Clinton raised specific, rather than blanket,
objections to a qualifications provision, while agreeing to abide by its requirements:
[S]ection 21(b) of the Act would forbid the appointment as United States Trade
Representative or Deputy United States Trade Representative, of anyone who had ever
``directly represented, aided, or advised a foreign [government or political party] ... in any
trade negotiation, or trade dispute with the United States.'' The Congress may not, of course,
impose broad restrictions on the President's constitutional prerogative to nominate persons
of his choosing to the highest executive branch positions, and this is especially so in the area
of foreign relations. However, because as a policy matter I agree with the goal of ensuring
the undivided loyalty of our representatives in trade negotiations, I intend, as a matter of
practice, to act in accordance with this provision.20
Historically, opinions of Attorneys General recognized a constitutional authority for Congress to
set qualifications. In 1871, for example, Attorney General Amos T. Akerman offered the
following opinion:
The argument has been made that the unquestioned right of Congress to create offices
implies a right to prescribe qualifications for them. This is admitted. But this right to
prescribe qualifications is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will
of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment. The parts of
the Constitution which confer this power are as valid as those parts from which Congress
derives the power to create offices, and one part should not be sacrificed to the other. An
18
U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 42, December 20, 2006, p. 2196.
19
U.S. President (G.H.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National
Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 28,
March 19, 1992, p. 507. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell later rebutted, on the Senate floor, the signing
statement's reasoning (Sen. George J. Mitchell, "The Udall Foundation Act," remarks in the Senate, Congressional
Record, vol. 138, April 9, 1992, pp. 8689-8691).
20
U.S. President (Clinton), "Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995," Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, vol. 31, December 19, 1995, pp. 2205-2206. As noted later in this report, Congress waived the
requirement in question for Clinton's appointment of Charlene Barshevsky to the position.
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office cannot be created except under the condition that it shall be filled according to the
constitutional rule.... Though the appointing power alone can designate an individual for an
office, either Congress, by direct legislation, or the President, by authority derived from
Congress, can prescribe qualifications, and require that the designation shall be made out of a
class of persons ascertained by proper tests to have those qualifications; ... It has been argued
that a right in Congress to limit in the least the field of selection, implies a right to carry on
the contracting process to the designation of a particular individual. But I do not think this a
fair conclusion. Congress could require that officers shall be of American citizenship or of a
certain age, that judges should be of the legal profession and of a certain standing in the
profession, and still leave room to the appointing power for the exercise of its own judgment
and will; and I am not prepared to affirm that to go further, and require that the selection
shall be made from persons found by an examining board to be qualified in such particulars
as diligence, scholarship, integrity, good manners, and attachment to the Government, would
impose an unconstitutional limitation on the appointing power. It would still have a
reasonable scope for its own judgment and will. But it may be asked, at what point must the
contracting process stop? I confess my inability to answer. But the difficulty of drawing a
line between such limitations as are, and such as are not, allowed by the Constitution, is no
proof that both classes do not exist.21
A 1979 opinion of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was seemingly
consistent with the earlier view, stating that
Congress has power to prescribe qualifications for office; but the power of appointment
belongs to the President, and it cannot be usurped or abridged by Congress.... There is no
settled constitutional rule that determines how these two powers--the power of Congress to
prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to appoint--are to be reconciled, but
it seems clear that there must be some constitutionally prescribed balance. The balance may
shift depending on the nature of the office in question. For example, Congress has required
that the President appoint members of both parties to certain kinds of boards and
commissions; there is serious question whether Congress could constitutionally require the
President to follow the same practice with respect to his Cabinet.22
In 1989, however, the Department of Justice articulated a different point of view. The Office of
Legal Counsel issued a memorandum entitled "Common Legislative Encroachments on
Executive Branch Constitutional Authority," which stated, in part, the following:
Congress ... imposes impermissible qualifications requirements on principal officers. For
instance, Congress will require that a fixed number of members of certain commissions be
from a particular political party. These requirements ... violate the Appointments Clause. The
only congressional check that the Constitution places on the President's power to appoint
"principal officers" is the advice and consent of the Senate.23
In 1996, the Department of Justice, citing Myers v. United States, the 1871 opinion of the
Attorney General, and the 1979 OLC opinion, acknowledged that Congress has the constitutional
authority to set certain qualifications. Nonetheless, it asserted that the requirements for the U.S.
Trade Representative overstepped this authority because of the foreign policy responsibilities of
the position and the position's close proximity to the President:
21
13 Op. A.G. 516, 520-521, 524-525 (1871).
22
3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 389 (1979).
23
13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 250 (1989). (This memorandum was superceded by a 1996 OLC memorandum, which did not
address the issue of qualifications (20 Op. O.L.C. 120).)
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Whatever the possible role of Congress in setting reasonable qualifications for office, ... a
restriction ruling out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and
knowledge to fill a particular office invades the constitutional power of the President and
Senate to install the principal officers of the United States. Any power in the Congress to set
qualifications "is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the
person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment." [Akerman]
Congress may not dictate qualifications "unattainable by a sufficient number to afford ample
room for choice." [Akerman] Even if "there is no settled constitutional rule that determines
how ... the power of the Congress to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President
to appoint ... are to be reconciled," we have opined that "there must be some constitutionally
prescribed balance" and that this "balance may shift depending on the nature of the office in
question." [1979 OLC opinion] Here, the restriction is particularly egregious because the
office in question involves representation of the United States to foreign governments--an
area constitutionally committed to the President.... Furthermore, the position in question is
especially close to the President. The Office of United States Trade Representative is
"established within the Executive Office of the President." ... Congress has also expressed
[in statute] its sense that the United States Trade Representative "be the senior representative
on any body that the President may establish for the purpose of providing to the President
advice on overall economic policies in which international trade matters predominate." ...
We believe that, where an office thus entails broad responsibility for advising the President
and for making policy, the President must have expansive authority to choose his aides.24
Although executive branch views, as expressed in these signing statements and opinions from the
Department of Justice, are seemingly inconclusive about the precise range of Congress's
constitutional authority in this area, they clearly do not endorse the view that this authority is
broad.
�
Congress has established hundreds of executive branch positions in statute, but only a relatively
small portion of the provisions creating these positions specify minimum qualifications that must
be met by appointees. Table A-1, in the Appendix to this report, provides examples of
department and agency leadership positions with statutory qualification requirements. For each
example, the table identifies the position, its compensation level, the text of the qualification
provision, the location of the provision in the U.S. Code, and the type of provision. Table A-2,
also located in the Appendix, provides similar examples for independent collegial bodies, such as
regulatory boards and commissions.
As suggested by Justice Brandeis's previously mentioned dissenting opinion in the Myers case,
Congress has developed a number of different kinds of qualifications for executive branch
leadership positions. These include the following:
� requirements of political party balance on collegial bodies;
� restrictions on the basis of active duty or retired military status;
� restrictions on the basis of concurrent federal government employment;
� restrictions on the basis of criminal record;
24
20 Op. O.L.C. 279, 280-281 (1996).
� �
� restrictions on the basis of prior employment;
� requirements of specified expertise, knowledge, or education;
� requirements that the individual be an authority in a specified field related to the
position;
� requirements of demonstrated ability, or experience related to the position;
� requirements of fitness between the individual and the office;
� requirements of specified character trait (e.g., integrity);
� requirements of U.S. citizenship;
� requirements that the individual be selected without regard to political affiliation;
and
� requirement of specified affiliations (e.g., membership in the Public Health
Service for the Surgeon General).
For some positions, the qualifications are specific. The director of the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, for example, is to be appointed "from among individuals who are citizens
of the United States, have a demonstrated understanding of financial management or oversight,
and have a demonstrated understanding of mortgage security markets and housing finance." The
law further provides a very specific disqualifying provision: "An individual may not be appointed
as Director if the individual has served as an executive officer or director of an enterprise at any
time during the 3-year period ending upon the nomination of such individual for appointment as
Director."25 Similarly, the position of controller at the Office of Federal Financial Management in
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must be filled "from among individuals who
possess--(1) demonstrated ability and practical experience in accounting, financial management,
and financial systems; and (2) extensive practical experience in financial management in large
governmental or business entities."26 These provisions seemingly provide objective criteria, such
as demonstrated understanding of specific topics and ability and experience in certain fields, that
must be used in the selection, by the President, and consideration, by the Senate, of nominees to
these two positions.
For other positions, qualification requirements are more general. The position of director of
operational test and evaluation at the Department of Defense, for example, is to be filled "without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office
of Director."27 Similarly, appointments to the position of archivist of the United States are to be
made "without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of the professional
qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the office of Archivist."28
These provisions supply guidance to the President, in his selection, and to the Senate, in its
consideration of a nominee. Compared with the language of more specific requirements, the
phrases used in these provisions--regard for political affiliation, fitness to perform the duties, and
professional qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities--would arguably be
subject to a greater variety of subjective interpretations.
25
12 U.S.C. � 4512(a).
26
31 U.S.C. � 504(b).
27
10 U.S.C. � 139(a)(1).
28
44 U.S.C. � 2103(a).
� �
In some cases, Congress has established requirements that appointees be drawn from particular
parts of the population. For example, at least seven of the 25 members of the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board must be individuals with disabilities.29 In other cases,
Congress has specified that special experience or sensitivity to a population is required. In
selecting appointees for the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely
Disabled, the President is to select several non-governmental appointees, one of whom is
"conversant with the problems incident to the employment of the blind," another of whom is
"conversant with the problems incident to the employment of other severely handicapped
individuals," a third of whom "represent[s] blind individuals employed in qualified nonprofit
agencies for the blind," and a fourth of whom "represent[s] severely handicapped individuals
(other than blind individuals) employed in qualified nonprofit agencies for other severely
handicapped individuals."30 Although many individuals would meet these qualifications, the
requirements significantly reduce the size of the pool of individuals from which the President can
select.
In some cases, Congress has applied a qualification to a broad category of positions for specific
policy reasons. For example, many defense-related leadership positions are required to be filled
by civilians, which reinforces the tradition of civilian supremacy in the United States
government.31 Only a civilian may be appointed as Secretary of Defense. In addition, an
individual "may not be appointed [to the position] within 10 years after relief from active duty as
a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force."32 Military service restrictions
of one kind or another apply to many other leaders of the Department of Defense, as well,
including the Deputy Secretary,33 Under Secretaries,34 and Assistant Secretaries.35 Other executive
branch leadership positions with military service restrictions include the Director and Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence,36 the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),37 and the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).38
Congress has sometimes modified qualifications it had established earlier. For example, an
appointee to the position of Under Secretary for Health at the Department of Veterans Affairs was
formerly required to be
a doctor of medicine ... appointed without regard to political affiliation or activity and
solely--(A) on the basis of demonstrated ability in the medical profession, in health-care
29
29 U.S.C. � 792(a)(1)(A).
30
41 U.S.C. � 46(a)(2).
31
For more on the history of this development, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and
Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1957).
32
10 U.S.C. � 113(a).
33
10 U.S.C. � 132(a).
34
10 U.S.C. �� 133, 134, 135, 136, and 137.
35
10 U.S.C. � 138.
36
50 U.S.C. � 403-3a.
37
49 U.S.C. � 106.
38
42 U.S.C. � 2472.
� �
administration and policy formulation, and in health-care fiscal management; and (B) on the
basis of substantial experience in connection with the programs of the Veterans Health
Administration or programs of similar content and scope.
This provision was amended by the Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 2004.39 Under
the qualifications specified in the revised section, the appointee is no longer required to be a
doctor of medicine, and must have "demonstrated ability in the medical profession, in health-care
administration and policy formulation, or in health-care fiscal management," rather than all three
areas.40 This amendment emerged from the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs with the
following explanation:
Current law requires the Under Secretary for Health to be a "doctor of medicine," restricting
the pool of candidates that may be considered by the President for nomination to the
position. Senior executives in the health care industry who may have exceptional credentials
and experience, but who are not doctors of medicine, are excluded from consideration.
The Committee bill would repeal the requirement for VA's Under Secretary for Health to be
a medical doctor and allow the Secretary flexibility to nominate candidates with
demonstrated abilities to fill this key position from the widest spectrum of talents.41
Qualification provisions are created by law; they may also be waived by law, and Congress has
occasionally done so on a case-by-case basis. Congress passed legislation waiving civilian status
requirements for the appointments of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense
(1950),42 retired Admiral James B. Busey and retired General Thomas C. Richards to FAA
Administrator (1989 and 1992),43 and Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly as NASA Administrator
(1989).44 In 2002, the civilian status limitation on the NASA Deputy Administrator was waived
for the candidate of the President's choosing for the duration of that fiscal year, rather than for a
particular individual.45 The President nominated an active duty Marine Corps officer to the
position, then withdrew the nomination in the face of opposition, among key Senators, to setting
such a precedent.46 He subsequently nominated a civilian, who was confirmed.
In addition to these cases involving military officers, Congress has waived qualifications in other
instances. In 1997, for example, Congress waived a conflict of interest restriction for the U.S.
trade representative. The section provides that
39
P.L. 108-422; 118 Stat. 2379.
40
38 U.S.C. � 305(a). Emphasis added.
41
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Nurse Recruitment and
Retention Act of 2004, report to accompany H.R. 4231, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 108-538 (Washington: GPO,
2004), p. 10.
42
P.L. 81-788, 64 Stat. 853.
43
P.L. 101-47, 103 Stat. 134; and P.L. 102-308, 106 Stat. 273.
44
P.L. 101-48, 103 Stat. 136.
45
P.L. 107-117, � 307, 115 Stat. 2301.
46
Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, March 22, 2002, p. 9.
� �
[a] person who has directly represented, aided, or advised a foreign entity ... in any trade
negotiation, or trade dispute, with the United States may not be appointed as United States
Trade Representative or as a Deputy United States Trade Representative.47
This provision was waived to allow Charlene Barshefsky to be appointed as U.S. Trade
Representative. As an attorney for a Washington law firm, she had "advised the Canadian
government on trade matters and also represented the government of Quebec in a case involving
lumber imports."48 Among the arguments presented in favor of the waiver was the fact that
Barshefsky was already serving as deputy U.S. trade representative in 1995 when the restriction
was enacted.49
Statutory qualification requirements are more common for members of collegial boards and
commissions than they are for other executive branch leadership positions. (For examples of
requirements for collegial bodies, see Table A-2 in the Appendix of this report.) Arguably, such
provisions serve to enhance both the independence and neutral competence of these entities.
Collegial boards and commissions are generally structured so that they have more independence
from the President than do other executive branch agencies. As one congressional study stated
with regard to regulatory bodies,
[h]istorically, Congressional interest in the regulatory agencies is rooted in the notion that
these commissions were created by Congress, vested with Congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce and, therefore, had a special relationship to the legislative
branch. The commission form, as it has been created and developed by Congress over the
past ninety years, is a determined attempt to isolate the agencies both from precipitous
change and from control by the Executive Branch. It was for those reasons that Congress
established bipartisan commissions composed of multi-members, serving set terms expiring
at staggered intervals, who could be removed by the President only upon a showing of
sufficient cause.50
Qualification requirements for members of a collegial body can also serve to enhance the
agency's independence by emphasizing the importance of neutral competence, relative to political
considerations, during the selection and confirmation processes.
In the post-World War II era, the quality of the membership and functioning of regulatory bodies
was a matter of concern for government scholars and observers. In 1949, the first Hoover
Commission observed that "[a]ppointments to membership on [independent regulatory]
commissions are sometimes below desirable standards because of the inadequate salaries offered,
or the failure of the Executive to appreciate the importance of the positions."51 A 1960 report to
President-elect John F. Kennedy was also critical of the quality of regulatory agency leaders:
47
19 U.S.C. � 2171(b)(3).
48
Paul Blustein, "Clinton Seeks Waiver for Barshefsky," Washington Post, January 9, 1997, p. E3.
49
Rep. Billy Tauzin, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.143, March 11, 1997, p. H822.
50
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Study on Federal Regulations: Vol. 1, The Regulatory
Appointments Process, S. Doc. 95-25, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 16.
51
U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The Independent Regulatory
(continued...)
� �
It is generally admitted by most observers that since World War II a deterioration in the
quality of our administrative personnel has taken place, both at the top level and throughout
the staff.... Careful scrutiny of agency members from the standpoint of their qualifications as
well as their prejudices in behalf of administering the legislative goals to which they were to
be committed, was during these years too often replaced by a consideration of what political
obligations could be repaid through appointments.... These attitudes have had a serious
impact upon the regulatory agencies. At the top level initial expertise would be lacking and
the want of devotion to the public service militated against its acquisition through continuing
tenure. Top administrative positions appear to have been sought frequently as stepping
stones to further political preference or to positions of importance within the industries
subject to regulation. A too common complaint at the bar is that the staffs have captured the
commissions and that independent and bold thinking on the part of the members of these
agencies is absent.52
In the late 1970s, a Senate committee investigation found that the "pre-eminent problem with the
regulatory appointments process, as it has operated in the past, is that it has not consistently
resulted in the selection of people best equipped to handle regulatory responsibilities."53 The
committee recommended that the organic acts for each collegial regulatory board and commission
include the following language:
The President shall nominate persons for the Commission/Board to insure commission
membership shall be balanced, with broad representation of various talents, backgrounds,
occupations, and experience appropriate to the functions and responsibilities of the
Commission/Board. . . . The Commission/Board shall be composed of members who by
reason of training, education or experience are qualified to carry out the functions of the
Commission/Board under this chapter.54
Although this specific language has not been included in the organic acts of all boards and
commissions, many collegial bodies now have statutory provisions imposing similar
requirements. (See Table A-2.)
� �
Should issues concerning the competence of executive branch officials become a high priority for
Congress, it might consider adding qualification requirements to existing or new statutory
executive branch positions. The use of statutory qualifications entails certain potential benefits
and costs for Congress, the President, and the federal bureaucracy. These advantages and
disadvantages are discussed in the next section. This section is followed by a discussion of
several options.
(...continued)
Commissions: A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Washington: GPO, 1949), p. 3.
52
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report
on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect, committee print prepared by James M. Landis, 86th Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 11-12.
53
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Principal Recommendations and Findings of the Study
on Federal Regulation, Volumes I-VI, committee print, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979), p. 13.
54
Ibid., p. 4.
� �
�
Although some statutory qualification requirements address characteristics that are not explicitly
related to competence (notably those setting civilian and citizenship status requirements), most
appear intended to ensure that competent and qualified individuals are appointed to leadership
positions. One student of the administrative process observed, "[t]he prime key to the
improvement of the administrative process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good men can
make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good laws."55 Both Congress and the
President have an interest in ensuring that the federal government is led by competent leaders
who have the ability to implement the law successfully and faithfully. At the same time, inasmuch
as the President is seen to be responsible for coordinating the management of the executive
branch, it could be argued that he must be given the freedom to appoint leaders who will be
accountable and, to some degree, politically loyal to him. These interests--competence,
accountability, and loyalty--are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, they can be in tension. For
example, recent research suggests that executive branch programs headed by mid-level managers,
who are appointed at the agency level, may be better managed than those run by top executive
branch leaders in presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions.56
It could be argued that establishing minimum qualifications for a program's or agency's
leadership position is likely to lead to improved performance by that program or agency. This
argument assumes that the President would select, and the Senate would consider, a nominee on
the basis of these qualifications. It also assumes that the Senate would more easily reject, on this
basis, poorly suited candidates. Finally, it assumes that an appointee with these qualifications
would do a better job of leading the program or agency than would an appointee without these
qualifications. Although these assumptions might hold true in many cases where qualifications
are stipulated, they are not guaranteed to hold in all situations.
The difficulties that may arise during the implementation of qualification provisions are
illustrated by the nomination and appointment of Julie Myers to be Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This position, originally
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
Border Security, is to be filled by an individual who has "a minimum of 5 years professional
experience in law enforcement, and a minimum of 5 years of management experience."57 The
President nominated Myers to the position on June 29, 2005. Questions about whether or not
Myers met the specified qualifications were raised and addressed during her confirmation hearing
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.58 In the months
55
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report
on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect, p. 66.
56
John B. Gilmour and David E. Lewis, "Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management,"
American Politics Research, vol. 34, January 2006, p. 22. The researchers conclude that they "have shown that
programs administered by political appointees get systematically lower management grades than programs
administered by senior executives" (p. 42). Their sample of senior executives includes both career employees and
political appointees, however.
57
6 U.S.C. � 252(a)(2)(B). This position has a unique statutory context. Originally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
established the position of Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Border Security without specifying the means of
appointment (P.L. 107-296 � 442(a)(2)). As part of a modification of a presidential reorganization plan that rearranged
border security functions, the position was renamed the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and identified as a presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed position. (See "Border Reorganization Fact
Sheet," at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0073.shtm, visited January 15, 2008.)
58
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Nominations of Stewart A.
(continued...)
� �
after the hearing, some Senators were satisfied that Myers was qualified for the position, while
others stated that her experience was insufficient and opposed the nomination on that basis.59 The
nomination was reported out of the committee and placed on the Senate Executive Calendar, but
it was not considered by the full Senate during the 109th Congress.60 Although reservations about
Myers's qualifications may have prevented the nomination from coming to the floor at that time,
the nomination may also have been held up because of other concerns.61 On January 4, 2006, the
President gave Myers a recess appointment to the position.62 He again nominated her to the
position on January 9, 2007, at the beginning of the 110th Congress. On December 19, 2007, after
Myers had served in the position for nearly two years, and less than a month before her recess
appointment would have expired, the Senate confirmed her nomination.
Although many qualified individuals are nominated to, and confirmed for, positions with
statutory qualifications, appointments to such positions can sometimes lead to a tug of war
between the President and Congress. In such a case, (1) Congress establishes minimum
experience requirements; (2) the President nominates the individual of his choice, who some
argue has insufficient experience to meet these requirements; (3) the Senate does not confirm the
nomination after some Senators oppose it because of this perceived shortcoming; (4) the
President gives the nominee a recess appointment that lasts up to two years; and (5) the Senate
confirms the individual, despite concerns about his or her qualifications, or, if the appointee is not
confirmed, he or she must leave office when the recess appointment expires.
It could be argued that this interbranch conflict is a healthy exercise of constitutional checks and
balances. But this dynamic seemingly imposes a potentially heavy cost on the federal
bureaucracy. An individual whose leadership and management qualifications are publicly cast
into doubt in the Senate can still serve in a major federal government leadership position if the
President elects to circumvent the confirmation process through a recess appointment. Although
the President can install his chosen nominee in this way, the process might diminish the
appointee's stature and, potentially, his or her effectiveness.
The prospect of an interbranch tug of war over qualifications might raise concerns, from an
institutional perspective and on a practical level, about the worth of establishing such
qualifications in the first place. Institutionally, this tug of war might sometimes damage Congress,
particularly the Senate. To the extent that the President circumvents the Senate when a nominee's
qualifications are in question, congressional prerogatives--the authority of Congress to specify
the characteristics of an office and the role of the Senate in the appointment process--are
undercut and, seemingly, these institutions are injured. As a practical matter, it could be argued
that a qualification requirement is of little use if it is not sufficient to prevent an individual whose
satisfaction of that requirement is in doubt in the Senate from holding the office.
(...continued)
Baker and Julie L. Myers, hearing, 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 15, 2005, pp. 16-21.
59
Chris Strohm, "New Immigration Enforcement Chief Gets Mixed Reception," GovExec.com Daily Briefing, January
5, 2006, at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0106/010506c1.htm, visited January 15, 2008.
60
Information obtained from the nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS), available to
Congress at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, visited January 15, 2008.
61
Eileen Sullivan, "Recess DHS Appointments May Backfire, Expert Says," CQ Homeland Security, January 6, 2006,
at http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/109/hsnews109-
000002026893.html@allnews&metapub=HSNEWS&seqNum=8&searchIndex=0, visited January 15, 2008.
62
U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Personnel Announcement," January 4, 2006, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/01/20060104-3.html, visited January 15, 2008.
� �
It is worth noting, however, that statutory qualifications do not typically lead to such open
conflicts between Congress and the President. Because these conflicts can impose political and
institutional costs on the President as well, he has an incentive, in general, to abide by the
requirements established by Congress. When Congress contemplates establishing qualifications,
the possibility of such a conflict--a disadvantage--might be weighed against the potential
benefits of the proposed requirements.
Conflicts concerning statutory qualifications have typically been resolved through the political
process. Whether statutory qualifications legally bind the appointment process actions of the
President or the Senate remains an open question. It is not clear what, if any, legal consequences
might follow if either actor were to ignore such provisions.
Establishing specific qualifications for an advice and consent position entails other potential
disadvantages. First, it narrows the field of individuals from whom the President may select, and
otherwise worthy candidates might be eliminated prematurely from consideration. Second, the
inclusion of certain qualifications in law could lead the President and the Senate to overlook or
undervalue other potentially important qualities when evaluating candidates. Third, the
qualifications that are necessary, or most important, for carrying out the responsibilities of a
position might change over time. Finally, should the President and the Senate determine that it
would be preferable, in a given situation, to appoint, to a given position, an individual who does
not technically meet its qualifications, legislation might be necessary to waive the statutory
requirements.
With regard to statutory qualifications, several approaches are available to Congress. Most
existing statutory qualifications will remain in force absent congressional action. Congress could
reduce the number of positions with these kinds of requirements, either through a comprehensive
review of such provisions or through incremental legislative changes, during a reauthorization
process, for example. Congress could increase the use of statutory qualifications. Options include
the continued incremental adoption of qualification provisions, the development of agency-wide
minimum qualification thresholds, and the enactment of a government-wide standard for all
government leadership positions. The Senate could also elect to establish threshold standards for
confirmation of all or some presidential nominees.
Congress could continue recent legislative practices and establish statutory qualifications on a
case-by-case basis. Under this option, the number of positions with these requirements would
slowly increase. These provisions could be added where neutral competence is perceived to be of
particular importance, or where other attributes, such as U.S. citizenship or civilian status, are
deemed necessary. This approach would be consistent with the view that the need for program or
agency leaders with particular characteristics should be weighed, on a case-by-case basis, against
the President's need for flexibility in selecting his preferred leadership team. It assumes that the
balance between these two interests will vary according to the responsibilities of the position and
its proximity to the President. Whereas Congress might require members of an independent
regulatory entity that deals with complex technical questions to have a certain educational
background, for example, it might not stipulate any requirements for an assistant secretary whose
responsibilities are assigned by the secretary.
� �
�
Congress could establish, for one or more agencies, organization-wide threshold requirements. In
effect, Congress has instituted such a threshold requirement--civilian status--for most top
leadership positions at the Department of Defense. Such thresholds have also been established for
the membership of many collegial bodies, especially regulatory boards and commissions, as
discussed above. These entities differ from departments and other executive branch entities,
however, because they each have only a few uniform leadership positions.
In a variation of this approach, Congress could establish agency-wide requirements that vary
according to each leadership position's level in an agency's hierarchy. During the 109th Congress,
Senator Daniel K. Akaka introduced legislation that used this model. The bill would have
established minimum leadership, management, and subject matter experience requirements for
most top leaders at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It would also have required that
appointees to top leadership positions in the department possess "a demonstrated ability to
manage a substantial staff and budget."63 Appointees to positions compensated at Levels II and III
of the Executive Schedule, such as the Administrator of FEMA and DHS Under Secretaries,
would have been required to meet the most rigorous standards proposed by the bill. Appointees to
Level IV positions, such as most Assistant Secretaries, would have been subject to similar, but
slightly less stringent, standards. The bill would have excepted the DHS Secretary and Deputy
Secretary, as well as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, from these requirements.
The agency-wide qualifications approach might be particularly useful to Congress where broad
agreement exists, particularly on the congressional committees of jurisdiction, regarding
threshold standards for a particular agency. Agency-wide qualifications might be more difficult to
establish where broad agreement on minimum standards does not exist or where the leadership
positions for a given agency require a broad range of talents or experience.
Another approach that Congress could consider would be to establish government-wide
requirements that would be applied to all or most top leadership positions. Congress has
established government-wide requirements regarding citizenship through a recurring provision of
the funding bill for the Department of the Treasury and other agencies. The provision's
requirements are quite specific:
Unless otherwise specified during the current fiscal year, no part of any appropriation
contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or
employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the
stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in
the continental United States unless such person: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is a
person in the service of the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act who, being
eligible for citizenship, has filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United
States prior to such date and is actually residing in the United States; (3) is a person who
owes allegiance to the United States; (4) is an alien from Cuba, Poland, South Vietnam, the
countries of the former Soviet Union, or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence; (5) is a South Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian refugee
paroled in the United States after January 1, 1975; or (6) is a national of the People's
63
109th Cong., S. 2040, � 3.
� �
Republic of China who qualifies for adjustment of status pursuant to the Chinese Student
Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-404): Provided, That for the purpose of this section, an
affidavit signed by any such person shall be considered prima facie evidence that the
requirements of this section with respect to his or her status have been complied with:
Provided further, That any person making a false affidavit shall be guilty of a felony, and,
upon conviction, shall be fined no more than $4,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year,
or both: Provided further, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in
substitution for, any other provisions of existing law: Provided further, That any payment
made to any officer or employee contrary to the provisions of this section shall be
recoverable in action by the Federal Government. This section shall not apply to citizens of
Ireland, Israel, or the Republic of the Philippines, or to nationals of those countries allied
with the United States in a current defense effort, or to international broadcasters employed
by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or to temporary employment of translators, or to
temporary employment in the field service (not to exceed 60 days) as a result of
emergencies.64
Most full-time leaders are paid from appropriated funds. In effect, therefore, the provision
restricts appointments, government-wide, to many top leadership positions.
If Congress found it necessary, such an approach could be used to put in place qualifications such
as minimum experience or demonstrated ability. Qualifications that set discrete, objective
standards might be more easily enforced than those that set more subjective requirements.
Arguably, it is easier to measure whether or not a nominee has specific educational credentials
than whether he or she meets the threshold of "related educational background."
Notably, the appropriations provision above includes a number of exceptions. If Congress were to
determine that no non-U.S. citizen should be appointed to a particular position, it would need to
enact a separate, more restrictive, provision for that post. This example demonstrates the
difficulty of establishing a government-wide standard that could cover all situations.
Consequently, if Congress were to establish government-wide minimum standards, it might be
necessary to create individual exceptions for certain positions.
Several of the options discussed above would set qualifications in statute. The Senate, of course,
could establish confirmation standards that would, in effect, set qualifications for some or all
nominations. This approach was recommended, for regulatory agency appointees, by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs as a result of its previously discussed late-1970s study. The
committee recommended that
[t]he Senate should establish the following general standards to be applied in confirmation of
regulatory agency appointees: (a) That by reason of background, training or experience, the
nominee is affirmatively qualified for the office to which he or she is nominated. (b) That, in
considering a regulatory appointment, the Senate shall consider the character and nature of
the office, and the needs of the agency to which the nominee has been named. (c) That, in
considering a regulatory appointment to a collegial body, the Senate shall consider the
existing composition of that body and whether or not members of a single sector or group in
society are too heavily represented. (d) That the nominee is committed to enforcement of the
64
P.L. 110-161, Division D, � 705.
� �
regulatory framework as established by Congress in the statutes. (e) That the nominee meet
the statutory qualifications to hold the office to which he or she was nominated.65
Such confirmation standards might be established in the Standing Rules of the Senate, or by
standing order, either of which would be accomplished by Senate resolution. Alternatively, such
standards could be adopted by individual committees for nominations within their jurisdictions.
These rules, at either the committee or full Senate level, could establish either mandatory or
optional consideration of standards during the confirmation process, and they could require either
that the standards be considered or that they be followed, and/or include waiver and enforcement
provisions.
A constitutional objection might be raised with regard to the establishment of Senate confirmation
standards. Unlike statutory qualifications, which, as discussed above, can be seen to be an
exercise of Congress's constitutional authority to create offices, Senate confirmation standards
would be established by the Senate alone, rather than the full Congress. On the other hand, it
could be argued that such standards would be a legitimate exercise of the Senate's constitutional
authority to set its own rules. The rules would not directly limit the President's authority to select
a nominee, they would merely guide the Senate's advice and consent process.
The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the
constitutional authority to establish statutory qualifications for federal government positions.
Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in this area, there appears to be consensus that it may
not set qualifications that limit the President's selection to the extent that the appointment is a de
facto legislative designation. Neither case law nor statute has established a bright line that clearly
defines the boundaries of this authority. Within this somewhat ambiguous environment, Congress,
at times, has enacted standards that limit the President's selection pool to a greater extent than the
executive branch sees as legitimate. In response, the President has issued signing statements, and
the Justice Department has issued opinions, that challenge the constitutionality of such
provisions. In practice, this difference of opinion has occasionally led to conflict between the two
branches in the appointment process arena. Whereas Senators may sometimes block confirmation
of a nominee who is perceived to lack sufficient qualifications, the President may use his recess
appointment power to sidestep the Senate and install his preferred nominee. Although this
dynamic might be suboptimal for the smooth functioning of the federal bureaucracy, for
Congress, and for the President, it is part of a larger pattern of give and take between the
President and Congress in areas of shared constitutional power. For the moment, interbranch
conflicts concerning statutory qualifications are likely to be resolved in the political realm.
If establishing such standards became a legislative priority, Congress would have a number of
options for asserting its prerogatives in this area. These options include a continuation of present
ad hoc practices, establishment of agency-wide or government-wide standards, and the
establishment, in the Senate, of confirmation standards. The success of statutory qualifications
and confirmation standards as a means of ensuring competent leadership of the federal
65
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Principal Recommendations and Findings of the Study
on Federal Regulation, Volumes I-VI, p. 10.
� �
bureaucracy would depend on adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes,
and successful political resolution of interbranch conflicts as they arise.
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ecneirepxe detaleR �
noitcirtser yratiliM � ])c( dna )b(601 � .C.S.U 94[ .noitaiva ot detaler yltcerid dleif a ni ecneirepxe evah )II( noitatropsnarT
pihsnezitic .S.U � )3( dna ;nailivic a eb )2( ;setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb )1(--tsum rotartsinimda ehT ....eciffo eht fo fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA
ssentiF � srewop dna seitud eht yltneiciffe tuo yrrac ot laudividni eht fo ssentif eht redisnoc llahs tnediserP eht ... noitaivA laredeF ,rotartsinimdA
)II( esnefeD fo tnemtrapeD
dnuorgkcab ])a(331 � .C.S.U 01[ .rotces scitsigoL dna ,ygolonhceT
detaleR � etavirp eht ni dnuorgkcab tnemeganam evisnetxe na evah ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... ,noitisiuqcA rof yraterceS rednU
]a3-304 � .C.S.U 05[ .stnemeriuqer dna seitivitca ecnegilletni yratilim fo noitaicerppa
na ,ecneirepxe ro gniniart yb ,evah ... ro ;sutats evitca ni ,secroF demrA eht fo reciffo denoissimmoc a
eb ... ]ecnegilletnI lanoitaN fo rotceriD ytupeD lapicnirP eht dna ecnegilletnI lanoitaN fo rotceriD eht sa[
gnivres slaudividni eht fo eno taht elbarised si ti ,secnatsmucric yranidro rednu ,taht ssergnoC fo esnes
eht si tI ... .sutats evitca ni secroF demrA eht fo reciffo denoissimmoc a eb yam ]ecnegilletnI lanoitaN
noitcirtser yratiliM � fo rotceriD ytupeD lapicnirP eht dna ecnegilletnI lanoitaN fo rotceriD eht[ fo eno naht erom toN
)I( ecnegilletnI lanoitaN fo rotceriD eht
esitrepxE � ]304 � .C.S.U 05[ .esitrepxe ytiruces lanoitan evisnetxe evah llahs ... fo eciffO ,ecnegilletnI lanoitaN fo rotceriD
])a(311 � .C.S.U
01[ .ecrof demra na fo tnenopmoc raluger a fo reciffo denoissimmoc a sa ytud evitca morf feiler retfa )I( esnefeD
noitcirtser yratiliM � sraey 01 nihtiw esnefeD fo yraterceS sa detnioppa eb ton yam nosrep A ....efil nailivic morf detnioppa ... fo tnemtrapeD ,esnefeD fo yraterceS
noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE(
ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP
a
lareneG noitisoP
stnemeriuqeR noitacifilauQ yrotutatS htiw snoitisoP pihsredaeL ycnegA dna tnemtrapeD fo selpmaxE .1-A elbaT
� � �
snoitacifilauq
detaleR � ])3()b(2317 � .C.S.U 24[ .tnemtrapeD eht fo
dnuorgkcab smargorp tnempoleved dna hcraeser nailivic eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era )B( dna ;sdleif gnireenigne )III( ygrenE
detaleR � ro cifitneics ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah )A(--ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,ecneicS rof yraterceS rednU
ytiliba detartsnomed
detaleR � ])a(603 � .C.S.U 83[ .epocs dna tnetnoc ralimis fo smargorp ro noitartsinimdA stifeneB snareteV
tnemtnioppa eht nihtiw smargorp fo noitartsinimda eht )2( dna ;tnemeganam lacsif )1(--ni ytiliba detartsnomed )III( sriaffA snareteV
lacitilopA � fo sisab eht no ylelos dna ytivitca ro noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,stifeneB rof yraterceS rednU
ecneirepxe detaleR � ])2()a(503
ytiliba detartsnomed � .C.S.U 83[ .epocs dna tnetnoc ralimis fo smargorp ro noitartsinimdA htlaeH snareteV eht fo smargorp
detaleR � eht htiw noitcennoc ni ecneirepxe laitnatsbus fo sisab eht no )B( dna ;tnemeganam lacsif erac-htlaeh
tnemtnioppa ni ro ,noitalumrof ycilop dna noitartsinimda erac-htlaeh ni ,noisseforp lacidem eht ni ytiliba detartsnomed )III( sriaffA snareteV
lacitilopA � fo sisab eht no )A(--ylelos dna ytivitca ro noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,htlaeH rof yraterceS rednU
ecneirepxe detaleR � ])1()a(3071 � .C.S.U 12[ .tnemtaert ro ,noitacude )III( tnediserP eht fo eciffO evitucexE
dnuorgkcab ,noitneverp esuba ecnatsbus fo sdleif eht ni ecneirepxe sah laudividni eht rehtehw dna ,laudividni ,yciloP lortnoC gurD lanoitaN fo eciffO
detaleR � eht fo dnuorgkcab lanoisseforp ro lanoitacude ,cifitneics eht noitaredisnoc otni ekat llahs tnediserP eht ... ,noitcudeR dnameD rof rotceriD ytupeD
snoitacifilauq
detaleR � ])a(3012
tnemtnioppa � .C.S.U 44[ .tsivihcrA fo eciffo eht fo seitilibisnopser dna seitud eht mrofrep ot deriuqer snoitacifilauq )III( noitartsinimdA sdroceR dna sevihcrA
lacitilopA � lanoisseforp eht fo sisab eht no ylelos dna snoitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... lanoitaN ,setatS detinU eht fo tsivihcrA
)III(
ecneirepxe detaleR � ])b(405 � .C.S.U 13[ .seititne ssenisub ro latnemnrevog egral ni tnemeganam laicnanif ni ecneirepxe tnediserP eht fo eciffO evitucexE ,tegduB
ytiliba detartsnomed lacitcarp evisnetxe )2( dna ;smetsys laicnanif dna ,tnemeganam laicnanif ,gnitnuocca ni ecneirepxe dna tnemeganaM fo eciffO ,tnemeganaM
detaleR � lacitcarp dna ytiliba detartsnomed )1(--ssessop ohw slaudividni gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... laicnaniF laredeF fo eciffO ,rellortnoC
ecneirepxe detaleR �
egdelwonk detaleR � ])2()c(313 � .C.S.U 6[ .rotces etavirp ro cilbup eht ni ecneirepxe tnemeganam )II( ytiruceS dnalemoH
ytiliba detartsnomed dna pihsredael evitucexe fo sraey 5 naht ssel ton ... dna ;ytiruces dnalemoh dna tnemeganam ycnegreme fo tnemtrapeD ,ycnegA tnemeganaM
detaleR � fo egdelwonk dna ni ytiliba detartsnomed a ... evah ohw slaudividni gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... ycnegremE laredeF ,rotartsinimdA
ytiliba detartsnomed
detaleR � ])d(4159 � .C.S.U 02[ .saera eseht ni pihsredael dna ytivitcudorp deniatsus rof yticapac detartsnomed
sdleif deificeps a evah dna ,saera hcus nihtiw tnemeganam sa llew sa ,noitacude ni noitaulave ro ,scitsitats ,hcraeser )II( noitacudE fo tnemtrapeD
ni ytirohtuA � dilav yllacifitneics fo sdleif eht ni seitirohtua deifilauq ylhgih era ohw slaudividni morf detceles eb llahs ... ,secneicS noitacudE fo etutitsnI ,rotceriD
noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE(
ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP
a
lareneG noitisoP
egdelwonk detaleR �
ytiliba detartsnomed )b(e123 )VI( ytiruceS dnalemoH
detaleR � � .C.S.U 6[ .htlaeh cilbup dna enicidem fo egdelwonk dna ni ytiliba detartsnomed a ssessop llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,reciffO lacideM feihC
snoitacifilauq ])2()a(3042 � .C.S.U 05[ .setatS detinU
detaleR � eht fo ytiruces lanoitan eht stcetorp dna secnavda taht rennam a ni noitartsinimdA eht fo smargorp )VI( ygrenE fo tnemtrapeD
dnuorgkcab noitisopsid slairetam dna ,noitarefilorpnon ,snopaew raelcun eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era dna ,noitartsinimdA ytiruceS raelcuN
detaleR � tnemeganam lanoitazinagro ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... lanoitaN ,rotartsinimdA ytupeD lapicnirP
dnuorgkcab
detaleR � ])a(6317 � .C.S.U
ytiliba detartsnomed 24[ .ycilop ygrene laredeF yb detceffa stseretni lla fo snrecnoc dna sdeen eht ylriaf ssessa ot deifilauq )VI( ygrenE fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA
detaleR � yllaiceps si ohw laudividni na ,ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomed yb ,eb llahs ... yrotalugeR cimonocE ,rotartsinimdA
ssentiF �
tnemtnioppa ])1()a(931 � .C.S.U 01[ .rotceriD fo eciffo eht fo seitud eht mrofrep ot ssentif )VI( esnefeD fo tnemtrapeD
lacitilopA � fo sisab eht no ylelos dna noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw ... ],[efil nailivic morf detnioppa ]eb llahs[ ... ,noitaulavE dna tseT lanoitarepO fo rotceriD
)VI( ytiruceS dnalemoH
])B()2()a(252 � .C.S.U 6[ .ecneirepxe tnemeganam fo fo tnemtrapeD tnemecrofnE smotsuC
ecneirepxe detaleR � sraey 5 fo muminim a dna ,tnemecrofne wal ni ecneirepxe lanoisseforp sraey 5 fo muminim a evah llahs ... dna noitargimmI rof yraterceS tnatsissA
)VI( noitacudE fo tnemtrapeD
])b(7159 � .C.S.U 02[ .scitsitatS ,scitsitatS noitacudE rof retneC lanoitaN
egdelwonk detaleR � noitacudE rof retneC lanoitaN eht yb detsissa smargorp fo egdelwonk laitnatsbus evah ... llahs ... ,scitsitatS noitacudE rof renoissimmoC
])1()d(601 � .C.S.U 94[ .ecrof demra na fo reciffo
raluger remrof a ro ,ecrof demra na fo reciffo raluger deriter a ,ecrof demra na ni ytud evitca no reciffo
noitcirtser yratiliM � na eb ton yam rotartsinimdA ytupeD eht ,ecrof demra na fo reciffo raluger remrof a si rotartsinimdA )VI( noitatropsnarT
ecneirepxe detaleR � eht fi ,revewoH .rotartsinimdA ytupeD sa detnioppa eb yam ecrof demra na ni ytud evitca no reciffo fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA
pihsnezitic .S.U � nA .noitaiva ot detaler yltcerid dleif a ni ecneirepxe evah dna setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb tsum ... noitaivA laredeF ,rotartsinimdA ytupeD
ytiliba detartsnomed ])A()1()a(3087 � .C.S.U 62[ .tnemeganam ni ytiliba )III( yrusaerT eht fo tnemtrapeD
detaleR � detartsnomed a evah ,snoitacifilauq rehto gnoma ,ohw slaudividni morf edam eb llahs tnemtnioppa ... ,euneveR lanretnI fo renoissimmoC
])1()c(a2641 )III( yrusaerT eht fo tnemtrapeD
pihsnezitic .S.U � .C.S.U 21[ .setatS detinU eht fo snezitic era ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs ... ,noisivrepuS tfirhT fo eciffO ,rotceriD
])2()c(2317 � .C.S.U
snoitacifilauq 24[ .setatS detinU eht fo ytiruces lanoitan eht stcetorp dna secnavda taht rennam a ni noitartsinimdA )III( ygrenE
detaleR � ytiruceS raelcuN lanoitaN eht fo smargorp noitisopsid slairetam dna ,noitarefilorpnon ,snopaew raelcun fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA ytiruceS
dnuorgkcab eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era )B( dna ;sdleif lacinhcet etairporppa dna ,tnemeganam lanoitazinagro raelcuN lanoitaN ,rotartsinimdA/ytiruceS
detaleR � ,ytiruces lanoitan ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah )A(--ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... raelcuN rof yraterceS rednU
noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE(
ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP
a
lareneG noitisoP
])i(165 � .C.S.U 82[ .sessentiw dna ,sroruj ,lennosrep
truoc fo noitcetorp htiw ecneirepxe ro smetsys truoc laredeF dna ,etatS ,ytnuoc htiw ro ni ecneirepxe
)4( dna ;ecneirepxe cimedaca level-egelloc )3( ;level lacol dna etatS eht ta ylralucitrap ,seicnega
tnemecrofne wal rehto htiw gnitanidrooc ni ecneirepxe )2( ;ycnega tnemecrofne wal laredeF ro eciffo
s'ffirehs ,tnemtraped ecilop a ni ,seussi ytreporp elbatnuocca dna ,tegdub ,lennosrep gnidulcni ,seitud
tnemeganam tnemecrofne wal level-dnammoc fo sraey 4 fo muminim a )1(--evah dluohs ... lahsram hcaE
])e(165 � .C.S.U 82[ .tcirtsid rehto hcus ni ediser yam tcirtsid rehtona ni lahsram sa gnivres
noitacude detaleR � si emit emas eht ta ohw sdnalsI anairaM nrehtroN eht rof detnioppa lahsram yna )2( dna ;detnioppa
ecneirepxe detaleR � si lahsram eht hcihw rof tcirtsid eht fo selim 02 nihtiw ediser yam kroY weN fo tcirtsiD nrehtuoS
tnemeriuqer eht rof dna ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht fo truoC roirepuS eht rof ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht rof lahsram
ycnediseR � eht )1(--taht tpecxe ,detnioppa si lahsram hcus hcihw rof tcirtsid eht nihtiw ediser llahs lahsram hcaE c slahsraM setatS detinU
ecneirepxe detaleR �
gniniart detaleR � ]502 � .C.S.U 24[ .smargorp htlaeh cilbup ni ecneirepxe tnacifingis ro gniniart dezilaiceps bsecivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD
pihsrebmem sproC � evah )2( dna ,sproC ralugeR eht fo srebmem era )1( ohw slaudividni morf detnioppa eb llahs ... ,ecivreS htlaeH cilbuP ,lareneG noegruS
egdelwonk detaleR � ]eton 1151 � .C.S.U 51 ;)d(2 � ,0791 fo 4 .oN nalP noitazinagroeR[ .noitartsinimdA )V( ecremmoC
ecneirepxe detaleR � eht fo krow eht ot tnatropmi senilpicsid cifitneics rehto ro ,cirehpsomta ,cinaeco fo selpicnirp fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA cirehpsomtA
noitacude detaleR � eht ni elbaegdelwonk ,ecneirepxe dna noitacude cifitneics fo nosaer yb ,si ohw laudividni na eb llahs ... dna cinaecO lanoitaN ,tsitneicS feihC
egdelwonk detaleR �
ecneirepxe detaleR � ])b(b247 � .C.S.U 61[ .tnemeganam efildliw dna seirehsif fo selpicnirp eht ni elbaegdelwonk ,ecneirepxe )V( roiretnI eht fo tnemtrapeD ,ecivreS
noitacude detaleR � dna noitacude cifitneics fo nosaer yb ,si eh sselnu rotceriD eht sa detnioppa eb yam laudividni oN efildliW dna hsiF setatS detinU ,rotceriD
)VI ot lauqe etar si riahC - V ot lauqe etaR(
noitcirtser ])5()b(4072� .C.S.U 52[ ....esneffo gnimag ro ynolef a fo detcivnoc neeb sah roiretnI eht fo tnemtrapeD ,noissimmoC
noitcivnoc ynoleF � ... ohw ,noissimmoC eht ,no ecivres eunitnoc ot ro ,ot tnemtnioppa yna rof elbigile eb llahs laudividni oN gnimaG naidnI lanoitaN ,srebmeM
ytiliba detartsnomed
detaleR �
tiart
retcarahc deificepS � ])a(3 � .ppA .C.S.U 5[ .snoitagitsevni ro ,noitartsinimda
tnemtnioppa cilbup ,sisylana tnemeganam ,wal ,sisylana laicnanif ,gnitidua ,gnitnuocca ni ytiliba detartsnomed
lacitilopA � dna ytirgetni fo sisab eht no ylelos dna noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw ... detnioppa eb llahs ... )VI( lareneG srotcepsnI
ecneirepxe detaleR �
egdelwonk detaleR � ])3()a(109 � .C.S.U 13[ .seititne ssenisub ro latnemnrevog egral ni secitcarp tnemeganam
ytiliba detartsnomed laicnanif ni ecneirepxe lacitcarp evisnetxe dna fo egdelwonk dna ,fo tnemeganam lareneg ni ytiliba
detaleR � detartsnomed ssessop ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ,elbacilppa sa ,detangised ro detnioppa eb ... llahs ... )VI( sreciffO laicnaniF feihC
noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE(
ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP
a
lareneG noitisoP
])A()2()a(2 � .C.S.U 7[ .ytrap lacitilop
emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem eht fo eerht naht erom toN .saera hcus
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � ot tcepser htiw decnalab si srenoissimmoC eht fo egdelwonk detartsnomed eht taht erusne ot kees
srebmem )ii( dna ;tcA siht yb derevoc stseretni dna ,sthgir ,secivres ,selcitra dna sdoog rehto ro seitidommoc eht
gnoma decnalab ,saera detaler fo erom ro eno fo noitubirtsid ro gnissecorp ,gnisidnahcrem ,noitcudorp eht ro ,noitaluger sti ro gnidart )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
ni egdelwonk detartsnomeD � serutuf ni egdelwonk detartsnomed evah hcae llahs ohw snosrep tceles )i( llahs tnediserP eh]T[ ... gnidarT serutuF ytidommoC
noitcirtseR )srebmeM
ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS
evitucexE( aycnegA
stnemeriuqeR noitacifilauQ yrotutatS htiw seidoB laigelloC tnednepednI no snoitisoP fo selpmaxE .2-A elbaT
.)845 � .C.S.U 82( "edoC setatS detinU ,5 eltit fo 5135 noitces ni htrof tes eludehcS evitucexE
eht fo VI leveL evitucexE rof dedivorp noitasnepmoc cisab fo etar eht fo ssecxe ni ton noitasnepmoc fo setar ta eltit siht fo 345 noitces rednu detnioppa syenrotta
dna ,syenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa ,syenrotta setatS detinU fo seiralas launna eht xif llahs lareneG yenrottA eht ,5 eltit fo 7135 hguorht 5135 snoitces ot tcejbuS" .d
).6002 ,82 rebmeceD deniatbo ,noitamrofni noitpircsed boj dna ,noitacifilauq ,ssecorp noitanimon
gnidivorp tnemucod ,sriaffA lanoissergnoC fo eciffO ,ecivreS slahsraM .S.U( ".esaercni yap siht evorppa ot dezirohtua si lareneG yenrottA ytupeD ehT .raey eno rof
MSU sa ecnamrofrep lufsseccus no desab si ,yap ytilacol gnidulcni ,000,341$ mumixam a ot egnar yap leveL roineS eht hguorht tnemecnavdA .yap ytilacol rieht dedda
si hcihw ot ,)6002 ni( 808,901$ ta snigeb sMSU 72 eseht fo yralas ehT .noitan eht dnuora seciffO tcirtsiD SMSU xelpmoc erom ,regral eht fo emos ta snoitisop lahsraM
leveL roineS 72 yltnerruc era erehT .%86.82 ot %25.21 morf seiralas tsujda taht ediwnoitan saera yap ytilacol 23 era erehT .yap ytilacol dedda osla si hcihw ot ,)6002
ni( 759,811$ si etar 01 petS 51-SG ehT .noitisop eht ni shtnom xis retfa 01 petS eht ot og yam sMSU .yap ytilacol fo tnuoma etairporppa eht dedda yllacitamotua
si hcihw ot ,705,19$ fo )6002 ni( etar esab a htiw trats )51 edarG( eludehcS lareneG eht ni sMSU .level 51-SG eht ta retne ]slahsraM .S.U[ sMSU fo ytirojam ehT" .c
).102 .C.S.U 73 eeS( .9-O leveL ta reciffo denoissimmoc a sa detasnepmoc si lareneG noegruS ehT .b
.leveL eludehcS evitucexE yb degnarra era snoitisoP .a
.edoC setatS detinU eht morf deniatbo noitamrofni morf ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC yb depoleveD :ecruoS
])a(545 .C.S.U 82[
.lawener ot tcejbus dna redro eht yb dehsilbatse sa doirep cificeps a rof noitcesbus siht ni tnemeriuqer
ycnediser eht morf reciffo hcus tpmexe taht seitilibisnopser lanoitidda ro laud dengissa eb yam yenrotta
setatS detinU tnatsissa na ro yenrotta setatS detinU a ,eengised sih ro lareneG yenrottA eht morf redro
na ot tnausruP .tcirtsid rehtona ni yticapac emas eht ni gnivres si emit emas eht ta ohw sdnalsI anairaM
nrehtroN eht rof detnioppa yenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa ro yenrotta setatS detinU yna ot ylppa
ton llahs noitcesbus siht fo snoisivorp ehT .foereht selim 52 nihtiw ro detnioppa si ehs ro eh hcihw rof
tcirtsid eht ni ediser llahs yenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa hcaE .foereht selim 02 nihtiw ediser yam kroY
tnemeriuqer weN fo tcirtsiD nretsaE eht dna ,kroY weN fo tcirtsiD nrehtuoS eht ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht fo sreciffo dsyenrottA
ycnediseR � eseht taht tpecxe ,detnioppa si eh hcihw rof tcirtsid eht ni ediser llahs yenrotta setatS detinU hcaE tnatsissA dna syenrottA setatS detinU
noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE(
ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP
a
lareneG noitisoP
])b(451 � .C.S.U
74[ .noissimmoC eht fo pihsrebmem lluf eht fo ytirojam a etutitsnoc hcihw srenoissimmoc fo rebmun
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � tsael eht ot lauqe rebmun a eb llahs ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb yam ohw srenoissimmoc )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
pihsnezitic .S.U � fo rebmun mumixam ehT ....setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo rebmem hcaE snoitacinummoC laredeF
])e(2422 � .C.S.U
21[ .dnuorgkcab yrotaluger ro ,lagel ,laicnanif gnorts a evah )3( ro ;seititne laicnanif fo noitaluger eht
dnuorgkcab ni elbaegdelwonk ro decneirepxe era )2( ;erusolcsid dna gnitroper laicnanif dna scimonoce larutlucirga
ro ,ecneirepxe ,egdelwonk detaleR � ni elbaegdelwonk ro decneirepxe era )1(--ohw draoB eht fo srebmem tnioppa llahs tnediserP ehT
])a(2422 � .C.S.U 21[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � fo srebmem eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem owt naht erom toN ....tseretni cilbup eht fo evitatneserper )III si riahC -VI(
pihsnezitic .S.U � yldaorb dna setatS detinU eht fo snezitic eb llahs ohw ,srebmem eerht fo tsisnoc llahs draoB ehT noitartsinimdA tiderC mraF
])2()c(a536 � .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI( srotceriD fo
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � 21[ .ytrap lacitilop eno yna fo srebmem eb llahs eerht naht erom ton ,draoB eht fo srebmem evif eht fO draoB knaB tropmI-tropxE
)III si riahC -
])a(4-e0002 � .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs mohw fo eerht naht VI( noissimmoC ytinutroppO
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � erom ton ,srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs ... noissimmoC ytinutroppO tnemyolpmE lauqE eh]T[ ... tnemyolpmE lauqE
])b(32351 � .C.S.U 24[ .tnemtnioppa lanigiro eht ot tcepser htiw deilppa hcihw snoitidnoc yna ot tcejbus
eb llahs dna edam saw tnemtnioppa lanigiro eht hcihw ni rennam eht ni dellif eb llahs noissimmoC
eht no ycnacav A ....sraey 4 fo mret a rof detnioppa eb llahs )ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa
eb yam mohw fo eno naht erom ton( srebmem eht fo owt )B( dna ;sraey 2 fo mret a rof detnioppa
eb llahs )ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa eb yam mohw fo eno naht erom ton( srebmem eht
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � fo owt )A(--detnioppa tsrif srebmem eht fo ,noitanimon fo emit eht ta tnediserP eht yb detangised sA
])3()a(32351 � .C.S.U 24[ .snoitcele fo yduts eht )VI( noissimmoC
esitrepxe ro ecneirepxe detaleR � ro noitartsinimda noitcele ni esitrepxe ro htiw ecneirepxe evah llahs noissimmoC eht fo rebmem hcaE ecnatsissA noitcelE
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP �
egdelwonk dna ])1()b(6822 � .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem eerht naht
ecnetepmoc detartsnomed detaleR � erom toN .draoB eht fo snoitcnuf thgisrevo dna evitagitsevni tnednepedni eht ot tnaveler egdelwonk
pihsnezitic .S.U � dna ecnetepmoc detartsnomed a htiw ytefas raelcun fo dleif eht ni strepxe detcepser era ohw snezitic )III( draoB ytefaS
noitcirtser yratiliM � setatS detinU gnoma morf ... efil nailivic morf detnioppa srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs draoB ehT seitilicaF raelcuN esnefeD
])c(3502
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � � .C.S.U 51[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa eb llahs srenoissimmoC eht fo eerht naht erom toN
])a(3502 � .C.S.U 51[ .noissimmoC eht fo srebmem sa evres ot deifilauq era ,ytefas ot
sksir morf cilbup eht fo noitcetorp dna stcudorp remusnoc ot detaler saera ni esitrepxe dna dnuorgkcab )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
esitrepxe dna dnuorgkcab detaleR � rieht fo nosaer yb ,ohw slaudividni redisnoc llahs tnediserP eht ,stnemtnioppa hcus gnikam nI ytefaS tcudorP remusnoC
noitcirtseR )srebmeM
ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS
evitucexE( aycnegA
]142
stseretni � .C.S.U 21[ .yrtnuoc eht fo snoisivid lacihpargoeg dna ,stseretni laicremmoc dna ,lairtsudni ,larutlucirga )II si riahC
deificeps fo noitatneserpeR � ,laicnanif eht fo noitatneserper riaf a ot drager eud evah llahs tnediserP eht ,tcirtsid evreseR laredeF - III( sronrevoG fo draoB
noitcirtser cihpargoeG � eno yna morf detceles eb llahs mohw fo eno naht erom ton ,draoB eht fo srebmem eht gnitceles nI metsyS evreseR laredeF
])a(328 � .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI(
ecneirepxe 03[ ....noissimmoC eht fo snoitcnuf eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq era ecneirepxe ro ,noitacude ,gniniart noissimmoC weiveR htlaeH
ro ,noitacude ,gniniart detaleR � fo nosaer yb ohw snosrep gnoma morf ... detnioppa ,srebmem evif fo tsisnoc llahs noissimmoC ehT dna ytefaS eniM laredeF
)III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � ])b(103 � .C.S.U 64[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srenoissimmoC 3 naht erom toN emitiraM laredeF
])a(4017 � .C.S.U 5[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda eb )VI si riahC - V( ytirohtuA
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � yam mohw fo 2 naht erom ton ,srebmem eerht fo desopmoc si ytirohtuA snoitaleR robaL laredeF ehT snoitaleR robaL laredeF
rotcerid ])b(a2241 � .C.S.U 21[ .snoitcetorp remusnoc laicnanif ro ,gnisuoh ,sdeen tiderc ,secivres gniknab no
1 tsael ta rof noitailiffa deificepS � stseretni ytinummoc ro remusnoc gnitneserper fo yrotsih raey-2 a naht erom htiw noitazinagro na morf
noitcirtser cihpargoeG � nesohc eb llahs rotcerid 1 tsael tA ....metsyS knaB naoL emoH laredeF eht fo tcirtsid elgnis yna morf
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � eb llahs rotcerid detnioppa 1 naht erom toN .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srotcerid
tnemtimmoc ro ,gniniart 3 naht erom toN ....tiderc gnisuoh dezilaiceps gnidivorp ot tnemtimmoc a htiw ro ecnanif gnisuoh )III si riahC - VI( draoB
,ecneirepxe evisnetxe detaleR � ni gniniart ro ecneirepxe evisnetxe htiw snosrep gnoma morf eb llahs ... detnioppa srotcerid ehT ecnaniF gnisuoH laredeF
]4317 � .C.S.U 24[ .ycilop ygrene laredeF yb detceffa stseretni
lla fo snrecnoc dna sdeen eht ylriaf ssessa ot deifilauq yllaiceps era ,ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab
,ytiliba detartsnomed yb ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem dna namriahC ehT
ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart
,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomeD � ])1()b(1717 � .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem eerht naht erom toN yrotalugeR ygrenE laredeF
tnemnrevog ])3()a(c734 � .C.S.U
laredef eht fo trap toN � 2[ .tnemnrevoG laredeF eht fo hcnarb laiciduj ro ,evitalsigel ,evitucexe eht ni seeyolpme ro sreciffo
stiart retcarahc deificepS � detnioppa ro detcele ton era ,noissimmoC eht ot detnioppa emit eht ta ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs ...
ecneirepxE � dna tnemgduj doog dna ,ytilaitrapmi ,ytirgetni ,ecneirepxe rieht fo sisab eht no nesohc eb llahs srebmeM
])1()a(c734 � .C.S.U 2[ .ytrap lacitilop emas )VI(
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � eht htiw detailiffa eb yam hpargarap siht rednu detnioppa noissimmoC eht fo srebmem 3 naht erom oN noissimmoC noitcelE laredeF
])a(2181 � .C.S.U
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � 21[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb yam srotceriD fo draoB eht fo srebmem eht fo 3 naht
erom to]N[ ....ecneirepxe yrosivrepus knab etatS evah llahs mohw fo 1 ,setatS detinU eht fo snezitic
rotcerid era ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs mohw fo 3 )C( dna ;noisivrepuS tfirhT fo eciffO )III si riahC - VI( srotceriD
eno tsael ta rof ecneirepxe detaleR � eht fo rotceriD eht eb llahs mohw fo 1 )B( ;ycnerruC eht fo rellortpmoC eht eb llahs mohw fo 1 )A( fo draoB noitaroproC
pihsnezitic .S.U � --srebmem 5 fo gnitsisnoc srotceriD fo draoB a ni detsev eb llahs noitaroproC eht fo tnemeganam ehT ecnarusnI tisopeD laredeF
noitcirtseR )srebmeM
ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS
evitucexE( aycnegA
])a(166 � .C.S.U 92[ .tcA siht rednu noissimmoC )III si riahC - VI(
ecneirepxe eht fo snoitcnuf eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq era ecneirepxe ro ,noitacude ,gniniart fo nosaer yb ohw noissimmoC weiveR htlaeH
ro ,noitacude ,gniniart detaleR � snosrep gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs ohw srebmem eerht fo desopmoc eb llahs noissimmoC ehT dna ytefaS lanoitapuccO
])2()b(1485 � .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � eht fo srebmem eerht naht erom ton taht rennam a hcus ni edam eb llahs ... srebmem fo stnemtnioppA
])1()a(1485 � .C.S.U 24[ .setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb llahs mohw fo hcae )II si riahC - III( noissimmoC
pihsnezitic .S.U � ,srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs hcihw noissimmoC yrotalugeR raelcuN eht ... dehsilbatse si erehT yrotalugeR raelcuN
srebmem 3 ])b(1111 � .C.S.U 94[
tsael ta rof egdelwonk detartsnomed .noitaluger
dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp noitatropsnart ro ,ytefas noitatropsnart ,srotcaf namuh ,gnireenigne ytefas ,noitcurtsnocer tnedicca
,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet detaleR � ni egdelwonk detartsnomed dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ,noitacifilauq lacinhcet fo sisab eht no detnioppa )III si riahC - VI( draoB ytefaS
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � eb llahs srebmem 3 tsael tA .ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srebmem 3 naht erom toN noitatropsnarT lanoitaN
]451 � .C.S.U 54[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo eb llahs mohw fo owt naht erom ton )III si riahC -
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � ... srebmem eerht fo desopmoc eb ot ,"draoB noitaideM lanoitaN" eht ... dehsilbatse ybereh si erehT VI( draoB noitaideM lanoitaN
])b(a2571 � .C.S.U 21[ .ytrap detailiffa
-noitutitsni rehto ro ,eeyolpme ,reciffo ,rotcerid ,rebmem eettimmoc a sa noinu tiderc derusni yna htiw
rebmem 1 tub devlovni ,neeb yltnecer evah ro ,era ,tnemtnioppa eht fo emit eht ta ,ohw slaudividni gnoma morf draoB
lla rof noitcirtser noitailiffa roirP � eht ot detnioppa eb yam draoB eht fo rebmem eno naht erom toN ....draoB eht no evres ot deifilauq
ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,noitacude yllaicepse era ,ycilop laicnanif ro ,noitaluger secivres laicnanif ,secivres laicnanif fo egnar daorb a ot
detaler fo noitaredisnoC � gnitaler ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,noitacude rieht fo eutriv yb ,ohw slaudividni ot noitaredisnoc evig llahs )III
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � tnediserP eh]T[ ....ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem owt naht erom si riahC - VI( noitartsinimdA
tseretni cilbup fo evitatneserpeR � toN ....tseretni cilbup eht fo evitatneserper yldaorb era ohw ,srebmem eerht fo tsisnoc llahs draoB ehT noinU tiderC lanoitaN
]1021 � .C.S.U 5[ .tnediserP
tnemnrevog eht fo noitcerid eht ta ro wal yb dedivorp esiwrehto sa tpecxe ,setatS detinU eht fo tnemnrevoG
laredef eht fo trap toN � eht ni noitisop ro eciffo rehtona dloh yam draoB eht fo rebmem oN .draoB eht fo snoitcnuf
ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq yllaicepse era ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomed
,ytiliba detartsnomed detaleR � yb ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem ehT .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda )III si riahC - VI( draoB
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � eb yam mohw fo 2 naht erom ton ,... srebmem 3 fo desopmoc si draoB noitcetorP smetsyS tireM ehT noitcetorP metsyS tireM
]14 )III si riahC - VI(
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � � .C.S.U 51[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srenoissimmoc eht fo eerht naht erom toN noissimmoC edarT laredeF
noitcirtseR )srebmeM
ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS
evitucexE( aycnegA
.yllacitebahpla degnarra era seicnegA .a
.edoC setatS detinU eht morf deniatbo noitamrofni morf ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC yb depoleveD :ecruoS
rebmem eno tsael
ta rof ecneirepxe rotces etavirP � ])b(107
srebmem draob owt � .C.S.U 94[ .rotces etavirp eht ni )erutlucirga gnidulcni( ecneirepxe ssenisub ro lanoisseforp htiw
tsael ta rof egdelwonk detartsnomed laudividni na eb llahs rebmem eno tsael ta dna ,noitaluger noitatropsnart ro noitatropsnart fo sdleif eht
dna gnidnats lanoisseforp detaleR � ni egdelwonk detartsnomed dna gnidnats lanoisseforp htiw slaudividni eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem 2 )III si riahC - VI( draoB
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � tsael ta ,emit nevig yna tA ....ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srebmem 2 naht erom toN noitatropsnarT ecafruS
])a(d87 � .C.S.U 51[ .elbacitcarp
stnemtnioppa gnitanretla eb yam sa ylraen sa yletanretla detnioppa eb llahs seitrap lacitilop tnereffid fo srebmem stnemtnioppa )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
hguorht lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � gnikam ni dna ,ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srenoissimmoc ... eerht naht erom toN egnahcxE dna seitiruceS
])a(f132 � .C.S.U 54[ .seeyolpme fo noitazinagro
ro reyolpme yna ni detseretni esiwrehto ro ylirainucep eb ro fo tnemyolpme eht ni eb ton llahs dna
spuorg tneutitsnoc deificeps seeyolpme ro sreyolpme rehtie yb noitadnemmocer tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ,draoB eht fo namriahc
morf eb tonnac rebmem drihT � eb llahs ohw ,rebmem enO .denrecnoc sreyolpme dna seeyolpme fo ,ylevitcepser ,rebmun tsegral
spuorg tneutitsnoc eht ot yrotcafsitas draoB eht no noitatneserper edivorp ot sa os ,tcerid llahs tnediserP eht sa sesac htob
deificeps fo snoitadnemmocer ni ,... sreyolpme fo sevitatneserper yb edam snoitadnemmocer morf detnioppa eb llahs rebmem eno )III si riahC - VI(
morf srebmem owT � dna seeyolpme eht fo sevitatneserper yb edam snoitadnemmocer morf detnioppa eb llahs rebmem enO draoB tnemeriteR daorliaR
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP �
tnemtnioppa lacitilopA �
egdelwonk detaleR � ]553 .tatS 121 ;)a(108 � ,35-011
tnemeveihca .L.P[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb draoB eht fo srebmem 3 naht erom llahs tneve on ni tub )III si riahC - tnelaviuqe
dna ecneirepxe detaleR � ,noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw dna ,ecneirepxe tnaveler dna ,ycavirp dna seitrebil livic ni esitrepxe yliad :VI( draoB thgisrevO
snoitacifilauq detaleR � ,erutats cilbup ,stnemeveihca ,snoitacifilauq lanoisseforp rieht fo sisab eht no ylelos detceles eb llahs ... seitrebiL liviC dna ycavirP
])a(205 .C.S.U 93[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda eb yam srenoissimmoC
eht fo 3 naht erom toN .tcA tnemecnahnE dna ytilibatnuoccA latsoP eht rednu srenoissimmoC
lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP � dedrocca seitilibisnopser decnahne eht tuo yrrac ot yrassecen esitrepxe dna snoitacifilauq eht evah llahs
esitrepxe detartsnomed noissimmoC eht ot detnioppa laudividni hcaE ....noitartsinimda cilbup ro ,wal ,gnitnuocca ,scimonoce
dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ni esitrepxe detartsnomed dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet rieht fo sisab eht )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC
,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet detaleR � no ylelos nesohc eb llahs ]yehT[ ....srenoissimmoC 5 fo desopmoc si noissimmoC yrotalugeR latsoP ehT yrotalugeR latsoP
noitcirtseR )srebmeM
ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS
evitucexE( aycnegA
� �
Henry B. Hogue
Analyst in American National Government
hhogue@crs.loc.gov, 7-0642
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